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In past years, I have sometimes thought what a thing it would 
be, could the Queen 'in Council' (in Parliament or wherever it were) 
piek out some gallant-minded, stout, well-gifted Cadet, - younger son 
of a Duke, of an Earl, or a Queen herself; younger son doomed now 
to go mainly to the Devil, for absolute want of a eareer; - and say 
to him, "Young fellow, if there do lie in you potentialities of gover-
ning, of gradually guiding, leading and coercing to a noble goal, how 
sad is it they should be all lost! They are the grandest gifts amortal 
can have; and they are, of all, the most neeessary to ot her mortals in 
this world_ See, I have scores on scores of 'Colonies', all ungoverned, 
and nine-tenths of them full of jungles, boa-constrictors, rattlesnakes, 
and Parliamentary Eloquences_ ... one of these rou shall have, you 
as Vice-King; on rational considerations, and ad vitam aut culpam 
it shall be yours (and perhaps your posterity's if worthy): go you and 
buckle with it, in the name of Heaven; and let us see what you will 
build it to!" 
THOMAS CARLYLE 
Landgenooten! volgen wij het voorbeeld van Engeland! Het eigen-
belang roept ons naar Borneo. maar brengen wij den Borneoten de 
weldaden, die het christendom ons schenkt, en die met het goud van 
hunnen grond niet te betalen zijn.... Wij zijn geroepen, om die 
ongelukkigen uit hunne stoffelijke en zedelijke ellende op te heffen, 
en daardoor onze eigen nationale grootheid en rijkdom te vermeerderen. 
Thans is het nog tijd om aan die roeping te voldoen; maar verwaar-
loozen wij onzen pligt, dan houdt Engeland het dreigend zwaard van 
Damocles boven onze hoofden, dan 'wordt de scepter van ons genomen 
en aan een ander gegeven'. 
Dr W. R. BARON VAN HOEVELL 
PREFACE 
This study deals with the years 1809 to 1888, during which the fate 
of modern Borneo was being decided. In 1809, under the stress of the 
Napoleonic Wars, and af ter more than two centuries of intermittent 
occupation, the Dutch were forced to withdraw from the island entirely. 
They returned in 1817, but largely neglected their newly-restored pos-
sessions until the arrival on the north-west coast in 1839 of James 
Brooke, the future 'White Raja' of Sarawak. This event - the most 
important single occurrence in the history of nineteenth-century Borneo 
- not only stimulated British interest in the north-western corner of 
the island, and led directly to the founding of Labuan in 1846, but also 
obliged the Dutch to look more carefully to the security of their pos-
sessions in the south. The succeeding forty years sawa steady increase 
in the influence and dominion of both powers, until by 1888 the is land 
had been partitioned between the two. 
Most writers on nineteenth-century Borneo so far have concentrated 
on its internal history. Veth, Kielstra, van der Kemp, van Rees. Baring-
Gould and Bampfylde, Keppel, St. John, Rutter, and others have des-
cri bed in great detail and with substantial accuracy the various wars 
and expeditions, political developments and administrative changes in 
the areas and during the periods with which they were respectively 
concerned. I have not attempted to recapitulate their narratives. My 
purpose has rather been to interpret existing knowledge in the light 
of my own researches into the policies and ambitions of the British and 
Dutch Governments, to view the history of the island not from Bandjer-
masin or Kuching, but from Batavia, London and The Hague. 
The chief sources which I have used are the manuscript records 
relating to Borneo of the English East India Company, 1812-24 
(preserved at the India Office Library, London), of the British Foreign 
and Colonial Offices, 1842-92 (at the Public Record Office), and of 
the Netherlands Ministries of the Colonies, 1813-75, and of Foreign 
Affairs, 1838-70 (at the Rijksarchief in The Hague). Some volumes 
in these series have been consulted by other writers for particular 
purposes but, so far as I am aware, no systematic use of them has 
previously been made. Because no 'student's guide' to the Dutch colonial 
VI 
archives has yet been produced, I have given in Appendix 'A' a brief 
description of the records of the N etherlands Ministry of the Colonies 
which refer to the nineteenth century and which are to be found in 
the Rijksarchief. This, I hope, may be of value to students working in 
the same field. 
The present work is based on a dissertation entitled 'British and 
Dutch Policy in Borneo, 1809-1888', which was approved for the 
degree of Ph. D. at the University of Cambridge in October 1953. 
I have since re-written same sections and modified others, using in-
formation contained in books and articles which have appeared during 
the past twelve months. 
I am glad to have the opportunity of thanking Prof. D. G. E. Hall 
and Mr. C. D. Cowan of the School of Oriental and AfrÎcan Studies, 
London, bath of whom read portions of my original manuscript in draft 
and provided me with many valuable comments and suggestions. During 
my vi sits to Holland I was privileged to meet and received generous 
assistance from a number of Dutch scholars, inc1uding Prof. mr. F. M. 
baron van Asbeck, Prof. dr. J. H. Boeke, Prof. dr. W. Ph. Coolhaas, 
Prof. dr. J. J. L. Duyvendak, Prof. mr. J. H. A. Logemann, and Prof. 
dr. T. H. Milo. I am also indebted to the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, 
Land- en Volkenkunde for generous financial support; to Mr. J. F. 
Trotter for producing an excellent set of maps from the sketches with 
which I supplied him; to Mrs. Emily Hahn Boxer for drawing my 
attention to a collection of Dutch manuscripts which I had missed; to 
the Secretary of the Borneo Company, Limited, for allowing me to 
see the early minute books of that organization; and to the staffs of 
the Public Record Office, the British Museum, and the Rijksarchief, 
and of the Libraries of the Colonial Office, the Royal Empire Society, 
the Universities of Cambridge, London, and Leiden, and the Ministerie 
voor Uniezaken en Overzeese Rijksdelen for numerous acts of kindness 
and attention. 
Finally, I wish to express my great sen se of gratitude to Dr. Victor 
Purcell of the University of Cambridge and Prof. dr. G. Gonggrijp of 
the Nederlandsche Economische Hoogeschool, Rotterdam, who jointly 
supervised the research which has resulted in this book. 
University of Malaya, May 1954. 
GRAHAM IRWIN. 
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A NOTE ON SPELLING 
Before the publication of the official Rules tor Romanizing Malay 
(Kuala Lumpur, 1904), the spelling of Malay names, at least so far as 
English writers were concerned, was very much a matter of personal 
taste. 'Brunei', for example, appears in nineteenth century English 
works as 'Bruni, Brunai, Bronai, Bronei, Bruneh, Bruné', etc., as weU 
as in the older variants, 'Burni, Bourni, Bournie, Borney, Borne', and 
'Borneo' (for 'Borneo Proper'). Dutch authors on the whole showed 
greater consistency, though 'Berow, Barow, Berau, Berauw, Baroe, 
Barong', and 'Brow' may all be seen in place of modern 'Berouw', while 
'Sambaliung, Sambaliong', etc. often occur where 'Sambalioeng' would 
normally be used today. 
In order to avoid confusion in these and similar cases, I have adopted 
the standard modern English and Dutch romanizations for the names 
of places in British and Dutch Borneo respectively, altering where 
necessary the spelling of words in quotations from original sources. 
Malay and Arabic personal names have been given in their modern 
English romanizations irrespective of source. 
The Chinese names in Chapter VIn have been transposed from 
the original characters in accordance with the (modified) Wade-Giles 
system. This has sometimes resulted in romanizations which are mar-
kedly different from the contemporary Dutch versions, many of which 
were taken from local Chinese dialects. In such cases I have reproduced 
these contemporary romanizations in appropriate footnotes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"The island of Borneo extends from 7° 7' north to 4° 12' south 
latitude, and from 108° 45' to 119° 25' east longitude; measuring at 
its extreme length nine hundred mil es, at its greatest breadth seven 
hundred, and in circumference three thousand ... Situated in the track 
of the most extensive and valuable commerce, intersected on all sides 
with deep and navigable rivers, indented with safe and capacious 
harbours, possessing one of the richest soils on the globe, abounding 
in all the necessaries of human life, and boasting commercial products 
that have in all ages excited the avarice and stimulated the desires of 
mankind, - with the exception of New Holland, it is the largest island 
known". 
This eulogistic description of Borneo was written in 1812 by the 
English merchant and travelIer, John Hunt.1 lts author believed that, 
given an enlightened administration, the island could quickly become a 
profitable field for European commercial speculation, and most con-
temporary observers, Dutch as weil as British, would have agreed with 
him. Yet, as the experience of the next eighty years was to show, such 
confident predictions were totally unjustified. Hunt's optimism was 
the result partIy of mistaken ideas about the economic geography of 
Borneo, and partIy of a failure to appreciate the problems involved in 
trying to convert a hostile and largely savage population from piracy 
and head-hunting to a more civilized - and a more commercial -
way of life. 
The "safe and capacious harbours" which he mentions, for example, 
exist only in the far north of the island. The West, South, and East 
Coasts are singularly free from suitable anchorages for European ships, 
and consist for the most part of mud banks and mosquito-infested 
mangrove and nipah swamps. Some of the larger rivers are navigable 
for hundreds of miles, but with one or two exceptions their mouths 
are blocked by sand bars, which permit entrance only at high tide, and 
1 'Sketch of Borneo, or Pulo Kalamantan', in Malayan Miscellanies, Vot. i, No.8. 
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then only for vessels of shallow draught. Hunt was also mistaken in 
thinking that the soit of the is land was exceptionally fertile. Unlike 
Java and Sumatra, Borneo shows no sign of recent volcanic activity. 
By comparison with theirs its soil is mature, having been leached out 
by centuries of tropical rain, and quickly spoits when the protective 
forest cover is removed. 
The melancholy story of past attempts to develop the resources of 
the island, moreover, did not suggest that its inhabitants would ever 
willingly acquiesce in European rule. Since early in the sixteenth 
century the Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutch, and British had all tried in 
various ways and at different times to establish relations with the 
coastal princes, but all their efforts had ended in failure. In the annals 
of European nations before 1800 Borneo figures chiefly as a land of 
treachery, violence, and sudden death. 
Modern ethnologists divide the native inhabitants of the country into 
more than forty separate peoples. Of these the best-known, though not 
the most numerous, are the Dyaks. It is usual nowadays to reserve this 
name for the so-called 'Land-Dyaks', and for the 'Sea-Dyaks' or 'Iban' 
of Sarawak, but during the nineteenth century it was often applied to 
other tri bal groups as weIl. All the aboriginals of Borneo, whether 
Dyaks or not, have remained at a very primitive cultural level. Some 
are nomadic forest-dwellers, living by fishing and by hunting with 
blow-pipe and poisoned dart; others have learnt rudimentary methods 
of agriculture. A hundred years ago head-hunting was practically 
universal among them, and in special circumstances is still liable to 
recur. A brisk traffic in Japanese heads sprang up between some of the 
East Coast tribes and the Allied invasion forces in 1945. 
Throughout its history Borneo has received numerous cultural 
infusions from the outside world. Archaeological evidence shows that 
it was weIl within the sphere of the Hindu colonization movement and 
that direct intercourse existed with India from very early times. 
Brahmin sacrificial posts dating from the fourth century A.D. have 
been found at Koetei on the East Coast, and recent discoveries near 
Sambas point to early Hindu influences on the West Coast also. During 
the heyday of the Buddhist kingdom of Sri Vijaya in Sumatra (c. 800), 
western Borneo was a favoured stopping-place on the long voyage from 
India to China. At this time probably most of the West Coast was held 
in subjection by Sri Vijaya. Af ter the rise of the Hindu-Javanese empire 
of Majapahit (c. 1300) the island came under Javanese influence, and 
a regular tribute was exacted by the Majapahit kings from all parts of 
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the coast. The people of Brunei, for example, a district in the north-
west, contributed "a jar of the young pinang fruit" every year.2 
Contacts with China also began at a very early date, possibly as long 
ago as the third century B.e. Between 600 and 1500 A.D. there are 
numerous references in the Chinese dynastie histories to visits whieh 
were paid to the Emperor of China's court by ambassadors from 'Po-Io, 
P'o-li, Po-ni, Ye-po-ti', etc. - names which are generally accepted as 
standing for places on the West Coast of Borneo. In the northern part 
of the island it is traditionally believed that a Chinese settlement once 
existed near the Kinabatangan River, and some of the North Borneo 
tribes certainly give every indication of being part-Chinese in origin.3 
During the three or four hundred years before the beginning of the 
European period, Borneo received frequent influxes of colonists from 
the Malay Peninsuia and from the islands of the Archipelago. The 
settlements formed by these immigrants - Malays from the west, 
Javanese from the south, Bugis and Sulus from the east and north-east 
- provided nuclei for the riyal states which soon sprang up all around 
the island. In some areas the new-comers succeeded in enslaving the 
original inhabitants, but they remained essentially seafaring and mer-
cantile peoples, and their influence was confined to the river valleys 
and coastal plains. 
Af ter the fall of Majapahit the religion of Islam, whieh had already 
spread from Sumatra to the Malay Peninsuia and Java, was carried 
across the sea to Borneo. The Muslim Sultanate of Brunei dates from 
the end of the fifteenth century, when traders brought the new faith 
from Malacca. During the following century Muslim dynasties were 
founded at Sambas, Soekadana, and Landak on the West Coast and at 
Bandjermasin on the South. The last-named was tributary to the 
Sultanate of Demak in north-eastern Java, while Sambas had ties with 
Johore and Soekadana with Soerabaja. All these coastal principalities 
lived by preying on one another and on passing ships, and by extorting 
2 Sir Hugh Low, 'Sëlesilah (Book of the Descent) of the Rajas of Bruni', 
JRASSB, June 1880, p. 2. Sir Richard Winstedt, 'A History of Malaya', 
JRASMB, March 1935, p. 19. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, 'A note on the Sambas 
finds', JRASMB, September 1949, p. 16. J. Eisenberger, Kroniek der Zuider- en 
OosterafdeeU"g van Borneo, p. 3. 
a Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, pp. 15 and 25-8. Sir Roland 
Braddell, 'A nöte on Sambas and Borneo', JRASMB, September 1949, pp. 3-5 
and 11. W. P. Groeneveldt, 'Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca', 
Miscellaneous Papers relating to Indo-China and the Indian ArchipellJ{}o, pp. 
223-34. H. R. Hughes-Hallett, 'A sketch of the History of Brunei', JRASMB, 
August 1940, pp. 24-5. 
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taxes and tolls from the aboriginal peoples whom they subjected to 
their rule! 
The earliest first-hand account of Borneo by a European is a des-
cription of the Sultanate of Brunei written by Anthony Pigafetta, one 
of the companions of Magellan. Pigafetta visited Brunei in 1521, 
shortly af ter his captain's death in the Philippines. He was very 
favourably impressed by the opulence of the Sultan's court, and 
estimated that the town contained "twenty-five thousand fires or 
families".!> This figure seems unduly high, but other sources confirm 
that Brunei was a powerful state at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century. From 1530 onwards it maintained a close commercial inter-
course with the Portuguese at Malacca, and in 1577 and 1580 the Spanish 
Government of the Philippines sent naval expeditions against it with 
the object of placing on the throne a Sultan favourable to their rule. 
In 1645 the wide-spread depredations of Brunei pirates led to a third 
Spanish attack. Neither the Spaniards nor the Portuguese, however, 
succeeded in establishing permanent dominion over Brunei or any other 
part of Borneo.6 
When the first Dutch merchant fleets began arriving in the East at 
the end of the sixteenth century, most of the island was still quite 
unknown to Europeans. With characteristic energy the Dutch soon 
opened commercial negotations with the Sultanate of Bandjermasin 
on the South Coast, for they hoped to develop a trade in pepper between 
Bandjermasin and Bantam in Java. In 1603 a factor was installed at 
the Sultan's capital, but four years later the Banjars lured the crew 
of a Dutch ship on shore and murdered them to a man. To avenge this 
outrage Netherlands forces attacked Bandjermasin in 1612, and 
destroyed it so completely that the Sultan had to move his court inland 
to Martapoera. Trade relations were not resumed untiI 1635. In that 
year the Sultan signed a pepper contract providing for the delivery of 
, Low, op. cit., pp. 1-2 and 6-7. E. Netscher, 'Kronijk van Sambas en van Soe-
kadana . .', TTLV, 1853, pp. 4-5. J. R. Logan, 'Traces of the origin of the 
Malay kingdom of Borneo Proper .. .', Journ. Ind. Arch., 1848, pp. 513-23. H. 
T. Colenbrander, Koloniale geschiedenis, Deel ii, pp. 280-1. 
I> Anthony Pigafetta, 'Account of MagelIan's Voyage', in The First Voyage 
Round the World (ed. Lord Stanley of Alderney), p. 114. 
6 J. R. Logan, 'Notices of European intercourse with Borneo Proper prior to 
the establishment of Singapore in 1819', Journ. Ind. Arch., 1848, pp. 499 and 
503. P. J. Veth, Borneo's Westerafdeeling, Deel i, pp. xxxiii-xxxvii. 
The Portuguese established a factory at Martapoera in 1690, but withdrew it 
four years later af ter an attack on three Portuguese ships. 
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pepper to the Duteh East India Company at a fixed priee, but this 
arrangement, too, was short-lived. In 1638 another Duteh ship was 
surprised, sixty-four Dutehmen were killed, and all their treasure and 
goods stolen. Forty more Hollanders lost their lives in an affray at Kota 
Waringin shortly afterwards. In 1664 a new contract was drawn up, 
giving the Company a monopoly of Bandjermasin pepper onee again 
but, af ter vainly trying for five years to obtain the stipulated deliveries, 
the Duteh withdrew from the South Coast in 1669 and did not return 
until the following eentury.7 
Similar eatastrophes befel their early establishments in the western 
part of the island. In 1610 a Duteh faetory at Sambas was attaeked, 
and all the Company's representatives put to death. Twelve years later, 
during a war between Soekadana and the Javanese state of Mataram, 
the Company's settlement there too was razed to the ground, though on 
this occasion no Dutch lives were lost. Later in the century the N ether-
lands Indian Government intervened in the politics of the West Coast 
with more success. When in 1698 the Raja of Landak, then at war with 
Soekadana, appealed for help to the Sultan of Bantam, the Dutch 
decided to support his cause, and the following year a combined 
Netherlands-Bantam-Landak force assaulted Soekadana. demolished it 
eompletely, and chased its ruler into the interior. From then on all the 
West Coast states recognized the suzerainty of the Sultan of Bantam 
and, since this prince was already a vassal of the Netherlands, the 
Company now possessed at least a theoretical supremacy over western 
Borneo.s 
Nevertheless. occasional punitive expeditions of this kind were no 
substitute for effective occupation, and if any lesson could be drawn 
from Dutch experienees in Borneo during the seventeenth century, it 
was that nothing less than the presence of permanent military garrisons 
would ensure the fulfilment of contracts signed by the local princes. 
Accordingly, when the Company negotiated a new pepper contract with 
Bandjermasin in 1747, it also obtained permission from the Sultan 
to erect a Government fort at Tabanio. In 1785 a dynastic quarrel within 
the Sultanate provided the opportunity for a further extension of 
T François Valentyn, 'Beschryvinge van het Eiland Borneo, en onzen Handel 
aldaar', in Olld en Niemt' Oost-Indien, Deel iii, Stuk 2, pp. 244-6. L. C. D. van 
D(ik, Neêrlcmd's vroegste betrekkingen met Borneo, den Solo-archipel, Cam-
bodja, Siam, en Cochin-China, pp. 1-18. E. B. Kielstra, De vestiging van het 
N ederlcmdsch gezag in den Indischen archipel, pp. 184-5. Colenbrander, op. cit., 
Deel ii, p. 280. 
8 Veth, op. cit., Deel i, pp. 201-9, 233-7. Colenbrander, op. cit., Deel ii, pp. 281-2. 
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Dutch power. The Company's forces intervened on the side of one 
of the contestants and, af ter winning his battIes for him, placed him 
on the throne on condition that he ceded his newly-acquired dominions 
to the Netherlands Indian Government. In 1787 the Dutch East India 
Company became the "sovereign lord, owner, and possessor of the whole 
kingdom of Bandjermasin".9 
The tactics of playing of! one native faction against another enabled 
the Dutch to increase their authority on the West Coast as well. In 
1772 an Arab pirate and adventurer named Abdu'r-Rahman had esta-
blished himself at the village of Pontianak near the mouth of the 
Landak River. When the Raja of Landak complained to the Sultan 
of Bantam about this flagrant violation of his territory, the Dutch saw 
a chance to take matters into their own hands. Having persuaded the 
Sultan of Bantam to surrender to them the dormant sovereign rights 
which he possessed in Borneo, they granted Abdu'r-Rahman full recog-
nition as Sultan of Pontianak, placed a factory at his capital, and 
encouraged him to suppress any state in the area which refused to accept 
their supremacy. This policy led in 1786 to a joint expedition by Dutch 
and Pontianak forces against Soekadana, and the following year the 
Bugis settlement of Mampawa was also attacked.10 
By 1787, therefore, by means of a mixture of force and diplomacy, 
the Dutch had successfully estabtished their influence in both western 
and southern Borneo. In the East Indies as a whoIe, however, their 
power was already beginning to dec1ine. Outwardly, the Dutch East 
India Company seemed as strong as ever, but its internal administration 
had become thoroughly inef!icient and corrupt. Defective accountancy 
and wild horrowings over a long period of years had reduced its finan-
ces to anarchy. When Holland entered the War of American Indepen-
dence in 1780, moreover, the British Navy blockaded Dutch home ports; 
this meant that the produce of Java could not he marketed, and the 
Company was soon on the verge of hankruptcy. Finally, when the 
Treaty of Paris of 1784 opened the Archipelago to the ships of all 
nations, the system of strict commercial monopoly upon which Dutch 
prosperity in the Far East traditionally depended could no longer he 
maintained. 
In these circumstances the Company's newly-won supremacy in 
9 Artic1e VI of the Contract of August 13th, 1787. (Quoted in C. Nagtegaal, 
De 'Voormalige selfbesturende en gouz1ernementslandschappen in Zflid-Oosl 
Borneo, p. 7). Kielstra, op. cit., pp. 186-7. 
10 Veth, op. cit., Deel i, pp. 254-60, 273-5. 
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Borneo became an embarrassment almost as soon as it had been 
achieved. In 1790 the authorities at Batavia declared that the settlements 
on the West Coast were "useless and intolerable nuisances",ll and a 
year later gave orders for them to be withdrawn. In 1797 the pro-
vinces ceded by the Sultan of Bandjermasin ten years previously were 
handed back to him and, by the close of the century, the only visible 
evidence that the Dutch East India Company had ever exercised 
authority in the island at all was one small Government fort at Tatas 
on the South Coast. 
Throughout the whole period during which the Dutch were attemp-
ting to develop a trade with Borneo they had to meet continuous and 
severe competition from the merchants of other nations, particularly 
from the Chinese. Every year large numbers of Chinese junks visitf'd 
all parts of the coast and carried away not only pepper, gold, and 
diamonds - the chief attractions for European traders - but also 
camphor, rattans, wax, resin, timber, and table delicacies like agar-agar 
(sea-weed), tripang (bêche-de-mer), sharks'-fins, and edible birds'-
nests.12 The arrival at Bandjermasin of a dozen or more Chinese junks 
annually was the principal reason why the Dutch were never able to 
hold the Sultan of Bandjermasin to his pepper contracts ; whenever 
possible he sold to Chinese merchants rather than to Dutch because the 
former offered him a better price. 
Another competitor in the Borneo trade from the early seventeenth 
century onwards was the English East India Company. The 'Petition 
of the Merchant Adventurers' presented to Queen Elizabeth in 1599 
had declared that Borneo was one of the places "abounding in great 
wealth and riches" where neither the Portuguese nor the Spaniards 
possessed "any castle, fort, blockhouse, or commandment".13 During 
the next hundred and fifty years repeated attempts were made by the 
English Company to gain a foothold in the island, but all were un-
successful. 14 Dutch jealousy was largely responsible, though an 
important contributory cause of the Company's failure was the in-
11 Quoted by Veth, op. cit., Deel i, p. 282. 
12 Valentyn, op. cit., Deel iii, Stuk 2, p. 237. John Leyden, 'Sketch of Borneo', 
in J. H. Moor, Notices of the Indian Archipelago and adjacent countries ..• 
(Appendix). Charles Assey, On the Trade to China and the Indian Archi-
pelago .. , pp. 7-8. 
111 Quoted in Johannes Willi of Gais, The Early RelatÏ<ms of England with 
Borneo fo 1805, p. 1. 
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competence of its local representatives. The memoirs of a merchant 
captain of the day, Alexander Hamilton, contain a description of the 
chief factor at Bandjermasin which may be taken as typical of the 
Company's servants in Borneo during the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. This official - "a Mr. Cunningham", Hamilton 
calIs him - "was bred a surgeon, and had turned virtuoso ; would spend 
whole days in contemplating on the nature, shape, and qualities of a 
butterfly or a shelIfish, and left the management of the Company's 
business to others as little capable as himself, so every one but he was 
master".15 
These early EngIish settlements on the Borneo coasts were founded 
primarily to provide points d'appui from which Great Britain could 
compete with the Netherlands in the spice trade of the Moluccas. 
Factories were maintained by the English East India Company for a 
similar purpose at Bantam (until the Dutch conquered this part of 
Java in 1682) and at other places in the Archipelago. But during the 
course of the eighteenth century the English Company's interest in 
spices declined, and almost all its attention outside the Indian sub-
continent became concentrated on China and the China tea trade. In 
British eyes Borneo was now of less importance as an outpost on the 
way to the Moluccas, but of increasing importance as the possible site 
for a much-needed commercial entrepot between the Straits of Malacca 
and China. 
In order to buy tea the Company's agents in China needed exchange 
commodities, since Great Britain's staple export at this time, woollen 
goods, was difficult to seil there. The Hong merchants at Canton would 
always accept bulIion, but the drain of precious metals to the East 
disturbed contemporary political economists, and the export of bulIion 
from England was frowned upon. Af ter the Seven Years' War, more-
over, the silver which the Company had been accustomed to earn by 
trading with the Spanish Philippines could no longer be obtained in 
quantity. A source of suitable exchange goods for the China trade was 
ultimately provided by India; opium and raw cotton carried to Wham-
14 Factories were maintained by the English East India Company at Soekadana, 
1612-22 and 1693-4, at Sambas and Landak, c. 1614, and at Bandjermasin, 
1615-55 (intermittently), 1700-7, and 1737-47. (T. C. P. Edgell, 'English trade 
and policy in Borneo and the adjacent islands, 1667-1786': M. A. Thesis, 
University of London, 1935, passim. Sir William Foster, England's Ouest of 
Easlem Trade, pp. 248-51). 
U5 Captain Alexander Hamilton, 'A New Account of the East Indies', in John 
Pinkerton, Voyages and Trcrvels, Vol. viii, pp. 458-9. 
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poa and Canton by the 'country ships' of Madras, Bombayand Calcutta 
found a ready sale, and financed the Company's tea purchases with 
complete efficiency. But this was a development of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, and large amounts of silver were still 
being exported direct from England to China as late as 1780. In the 
meantime, while the 'country trade' of India was still in its infancy, 
the Company had attempted to solve the problem of its unfavourable 
China trade balance by alternative means.16 
Between the north-east coast of Borneo and Mindanao stretches 
the long chain of islands known as the Sulu Archipelago. In 1759 
Alexander Dalrymple, a servant of the Company at Madras and an 
experienced traveIler in the Eastern Seas, suggested that Sulu would 
provide an ideal site for a British trading mart or emporium. A settIe-
ment in this area, he pointed out, would possess two great advantages: 
it would not only serve as a convenient 'counter' for the distribution 
of British and Indian goods to the Malayan islands, but also, by 
attracting to itself the southward-bound Chinese junk trade, would 
bring British woollens before the merchants of northern China, of 
whom few had ever been in touch with British manufactures of any 
kind because of the strict monopoly enforced by the Hongs at Canton. 
In Dalrymple's view, a British trading post in Sulu or in nearby Borneo 
would "extend the scene of traffic into the unfrequented extremities of 
Asia".17 
In June 1760 his plan was approved by the Governor and Council 
at Madras, and he immediately set sail for the Sulu Archipelago to put 
it into execution. Early the following year he persuaded the Sultan of 
Sulu to enter into provisional 'Articles of Friendship and Commerce' 
with Great Britain, and obtained permission to establish a factory 
within the Sultan's dominions. Af ter making a thorough examination 
of the area he decided that the island of Balambangan, off the northern 
tip of Borneo, would be suitable for the purpose, and here, on January 
23rd, 1763, he hoisted the British flag. Returning to Sulu in September, 
he thwarted a Dutch attempt to induce the Sultan to sign an exclusive 
commercial alliance with the Netherlands, and persuaded him instead 
16 C. Northcote Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern Seas (1793-1811), pp. 336-56. 
Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of Ch-ma 1800-42, pp. 5-17. 
Vincent T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire 1763-1793, 
Vol i, pp. 63-7. 
17 Alexander Dalrymple, A Plan for Ext~ing the Commerce of this King-
dom anti of Ih, East-India-Company, p. 89. Cf. Harlow, op. cit., p. 72. 
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to cede to the English East India Company the whole of north-eastern 
Borneo and part of the island of Palawan. This grant was formally 
confirmed by a treaty between Sulu and the Company on June 8th, 
1764.18 
Another nine years went by, however, before Dalrymple's diplomatie 
successes in Sulu were put to any effective use. British anxiety lest his 
schemes should lead to friction with Spain, whieh possessed long-
established, if shadowy, territorial claims in the Sulu Archipelago, and 
the Company's own preoceupation with the affairs of India, where the 
Mogul Empire was in process of final disintegration, were the principal 
causes of the delay. A small British factory was eventually established 
at Balambangan in 1773, but it was corruptly and inefficiently managed, 
fulfilled none of the purposes for which it was designed, and had to 
be hurriedly abandoned in February 1775 following an attack by a 
party of hostile Sulus.19 Another attempt, in 1803, to plant a factory 
at Balambangan also failed miserably. Af ter the garrison had nearly 
starved, the island was evacuated in 1805. The East India Company 
did not possess a 'station to the eastward' of its own until Sir Stamford 
Raffies founded Singapore fourteen years later. 
When the nineteenth century began, therefore, the British and Dutch 
Governments had come to regard Borneo from different points of view. 
For both nations the island had long provided a limited outlet for trade, 
and was expected to become more valuable in this respect in the future. 
But whereas the Dutch always thought of Borneo in relation to Java, 
and hoped, wh en circumstances allowed, to make it part of the Nether-
lands Indies, the British had no immediate territorial ambitions in the 
island. To them its significance was primarily strategic, for it lay on 
the flank of their vital sea routes to China. Throughout the century 
one of the mainsprings of British policy in Borneo was a belief that 
the northern portion of the island, where these trade routes met, must 
18 Cf. Alexander Dalrymple, A Full mul Cltar ProoI that tht Spaniards can 
havt no Claim to Balambangan (London, 1774). 
By the Treaty of June 8th, 1764, the Company obtained possession of the whole 
of northern Borneo from Kimanis on the West Coost to 'Towson Abai' 
(Terusan Abai?) on the East, together with Labuan, Banggi, Palawan, and 
all other islands lying to the north of Borneo. This huge area was not much 
smaller than the concession secured by Baron von Overbeek and Alfred Dent 
in 1877-8, which subsequently became the territory of the British North Borneo 
Company. 
19 Willi of Gais, op. cit., Chaps. III and IV. Harlow, op. cit., pp. 81-95. 
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in no circumstances he permitted to fall into the hands of a foreign 
power. 
During the season of the south-west monsoon (April to October) 
the normal route to China from England or India was via Sunda or 
Malacca Straits and the South China Sea - that is, to the west of 
Borneo. This channel was known as the 'Western Passage'. When 
the north-east monsoon was blowing it became impracticable, and ships 
clearing Sunda or Malacca Straits for China had to take either the 
'Eastern Passage', which ran south of Borneo and then north via 
Macassar Strait and the Sulu Sea (and thus to the east of Borneo), 
or the 'Pitt Passage' - south of Celebes and north between Halmahera 
and western New Guinea.20 Even in later years, when steam had 
replaced sail and the vagaries of the monsoon could be disregarded, 
northern Borneo retained its strategic significance in British eyes, since 
it flanked not only the shipping highway between Singapore and Hong 
Kong, but also the new and increasingly important trade route between 
China and eastern Australia, which passed through Palawan Passage 
and the Sulu Sea. 
Thus during the nineteenth century British interest in Borneo tended 
to become concentrated for strategic reasons on the northern part of 
the island, while the Dutch, for political and commercial reasons, sought 
to extend their influence in the southern. Sooner or later the policies 
of these two powers were bound to conflict. As the century progressed, 
developing competition between them - sometimes open, more of ten 
veiled - posed one vital question: how much territory in Borneo could 
he absorbed by the Dutch, who were the first in the field but the weaker 
nation, before the British, more powerful than their rivals but com-
parative late-corners, decided to stake out a claim? 
IlO Alexander Dalrymple. 'Memoir concerning the Passages to and from China', 
pp. 1-5: in General C ollection of N autical Publications. 
CHAPTER I 
RAFFLES AND BORNEO 
In August 1809 Lieutenant-Colonel S. J. van Thiel, a special 
commissioner appointed by the Governor-General of the Netherlands 
Indies, set sail from Batavia for Fort Tatas, a small Dutch outpost 
near Bandjermasin on the South Coast of Borneo. He carried with him 
instructions to hand over the fort and nearby barracks to the Sultan 
of Bandjermasin, and to transport the civil and military establishment 
of the South Coast Residency back to Java. Af ter a spasmodic and 
precarious existence lasting nearly two centuries, the oldest, and the 
sole remaining, Dutch settlement in Borneo was being broken up. 
The orders van Thiel had received from the Governor-General, 
Marshal Daendels, were prompted by harsh military necessity. Napoleon, 
the European master of the N etherlands, had sent Daendels to Java 
to organize its defences, and to assist, when opportunity offered, in 
the conquest of India. The passage of time, however, had converted 
Java into a beleaguered fortress rather than a potential springboard 
for invasion. The Dutch colonial navy had been swept from the 
Archipelago in two engagements in 1806 and 1807, fought off the coast 
of Java, and the Moluccas had been captured by a British admiral 
in 1808. With the prospect of a long British blockade ahead of him, 
Daendels was compelled to husband his resources in order to meet 
the attack he knew must come. By 1809 he was busy building strategic 
roads throughout the length of Java, training an army, and collecting 
munitions and warlike stores. He had no ships to keep open com-
munications with the Outer Islands, and no men to garrison the outposts 
and factories there. 
The settlement at Bandjermasin might have been retained a little 
longer had it been sufficiently prosperous to contribute to the govern-
ment revenues. As it was, so far from adding to the resources of Java. 
it could not even pay its own way. In 1809 government purchases of 
pepper, the staple export of southern Borneo, were causing "an annual 
10ss to the state of 4.4 rix-dollars per pikul - reckoning on the delivery 
of 3,000 pikuIs a year - which represents 14,750 rix-dollars in silver 
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money" .21 Serious at any time, losses like these could not be afforded 
in time of war, when the finances of Java were already stretched to 
the limit. The Residency of the South Coast of Borneo had become 
too expensive a responsibility, and must be discontinued. 
When he learnt that the Dutch intended to evacuate his territories, 
the Sultan of Bandjermasin was greatly dismayed. Their departure 
would mean that the position of prominence which he had enjoyed 
among his neighbours in recent years, and which he owed largely to 
Dutch protection, was in danger of being lost. Alone, he could not 
hope to defend hls kingdom for long, and he therefore turned for 
protection elsewhere, sen ding embassies through the Archipelago in 
search of assistance. One of these, dispatched soon af ter the Dutch 
evacuation, arrived at the British settlement of Penang, but on that 
occasion no response was forthcoming. A second, however, was sent 
to the British authorities at Malacca early in 1811, and events were 
to show that the Sultan of Bandjermasin could hardly have been more 
fortunate in his selection of time and place. His envoys were received 
by the Englishman most likely, at that time, both by position and 
inclination, to listen favourably to his proposals - the newly-appointed 
'Agent to the Governor-General with the Malay States', Thomas 
Stamford Raffles. 
The Bandjermasin embassy did not arrive at Malacca entirely un-
heralded. A Mr. Alexander Hare, one of the leading members of the 
British merchant community there, had been keeping an eye on events 
in Borneo for some time. He considered that the island offered golden 
opportunities for trade, even though two vessels he had sent to Bandjer-
masin in 1810 had returned "empty-handed and with nothing but 
meaningless promises".22 Now, however, he saw his chance, and it was 
Hare who introduced the Sultan's two envoys to Raffles. They requested 
protection for Bandjermasin, and proposed that a British resident, 
preferably Hare himseIf, should he appointed to act as adviser to 
the Sultan.23 
Raffles' presence in Malacca was the result of the long-expected 
decision to invade Java, taken by the British Government immediately 
21 Besluit of May 19th, 1809. (J. A. van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaat-
boek, Deel xv, p. 727). One rix-dollar (riiksdoolder) equalled 48 stuivers at 
this time, or about $ (Sp.) 1.6. 
22 Report of Commissioner van Boekholtz, 'Nederlandsch-Indië in 1817', TvNI, 
1861, i, p. 358. 
23 Cf. C. A. Gibson-HiII, 'John Clunies Ross and Alexander Hare, Merchant', 
JRASMB (1952, Pts. 4 and 5), p. 22. 
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af ter Napoleon's annexation of Holland in 1810. His main duty was 
to find out all he could about the best route to Java for naval convoys, 
about enemy strengths and dispositions, and about defensive preparations 
on the island. He also took upon himself the wider task of establishing 
contact with native rulers throughout the Archipelago in order to 
secure their co-operation when the British eventually assumed control 
of all Dutch possessions in the Indies. He therefore lost no time in 
opening friendly negotiations with the Sultans of Mataram and Madura, 
and with the Rajas of Bali and Lombok, and was soon able to turn 
his thoughts to Borneo. Already his own researches into the natural 
resources of the Archipelago had convinced him that this island, in 
particular, had suffered gravely from lack of attention in the past. He 
had received reports of the "very good pepper and rattans" obtainable 
at Bandjermasin and also of the "considerable quantities of fine wax, 
birds' nests, deers' horns and tendons, skins and wood" to he found 
there. "The island of Borneo", he wrote enthusiastically to the Gover-
nor-General of Bengal, the Earl of Minto, "is not only one of the 
most fertile countries in the world, but the most productive in gold 
and diamonds".24 
lt was not surprising, therefore, that the Sultan of Bandjermasin's 
envoys found Raffles ready to meet them more than half way. Their 
proposals fitted in perfectly with his instructions. Indeed, they did 
more; they agreed closely with the high plans he was already forming 
for the advancement of 'the British interest' not merely in Java but 
throughout the Eastern Seas. He wrote to Lord Minto early in 1811: 
"I trust your Lordship will approve of the measures 1 have taken (and 
will take) to encourage and support by hopes and expectation the 
declining authority and consequence of the Legal Sovereign of a 
Country so nearly connected with the scene of our more extended 
political operations".25 
When Lord Minto himself arrived at Malacca at the head of the 
Java expedition, further envoys from the Sultan of Bandjermasin were 
presented to him. To their reiterated request for protection and the 
sending of a British resident the Governor-General gave his emphatic 
approval. With the invasion of Java about to begin, the establishment 
of a British settlement in southern Borneo could not be long delayed. 
24 Raffles to Minto, June lOth, 1811. (Sophia Raffles, Menwir of the Life and 
Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles .. . , p. 59). 
215 Raffles to Minto, January 31st, 1811. (India Office Library MSS Eur. E. 
104, 'Raffles Collection 11' pp. 121-8). 
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In deciding to occupy Java, the British Government were influenced 
primarily by strategie considerations. In their view it was imperative 
that the Dutch possessions in the Far East, now under French control, 
should not be allowed to become naval bases from which attacks could 
be launched against British shipping employed in the trade to China. 
The Directors of the East India Company had agreed that Java would 
have to be occupied, but the undertaking was never regarded by them 
as more than a temporary expedient, a necessity brought about by the 
circumstances of war. Both Minto and Raffles, on the other hand, 
certainly based their hopes on the permanent retention of Java and 
its dependencies. When Raffles was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of 
Java he set about reorganizing its administration with the possibility 
of an indefinite British occupation always in mind, though he weIl 
understood, and regretted profoundly, that the fruits of his labours 
might be reaped by the Duteh. 
The fate of the Outer Islands (as the dependencies of Java were 
then called) was less certain. Marshal Daendels had been compelled to 
withdraw his forces from all islands east and north of Java before 
the British invasion began; and when, af ter a short campaign, Daendels' 
successor, General Janssens, made his submission to the British com-
mander, General Auchmuty, on September 18th, 1811, he was not 
allowed to make any reservations with respect to those parts of the 
Archipelago which were already in British hands. "General Janssens", 
ran the first artic1e of the capitulation, "will surrender to General 
Auchmuty the island of Java and its dependencies"; to which the 
British replied : "The events of the war having placed all the provinces 
of Java west of Samarang in the power of the British forces, General 
Janssens can make stipulations only for those which lie east of Sama-
rang, and which are not already in the possession of the armies of 
His Britannic Majesty".1l6 If the principle of 'present occupation' could 
be applied 50 strictly to Java in 1811, how much more appropriately 
could it be applied to the Moluccas, which had been under British 
control since 1808? And to Borneo, which the Dutch had entirely 
abandone.d in 1809? So Raffles argued, and it was with the future of 
'the British interest' in the Archipelago in mind that he turned his 
attention to those parts of the 'former' Dutch colonies which might 
be considered independently from the surrender of Java, and which 
26 Quoted in Octave-J.-A. eoliet, L'ilt de ]a'l.'a sous la domination fran,rme, 
p. 540. 
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he was confident could be withheld from the Dutch even though Java 
itself might be given back. On April 7th, 1812, in pursuance of this 
policy, and with the approval of the Governor-General of Bengal, 
Raffles instructed Alexander Hare (who had m.oved by this time to 
Java) to found a British settlement at Bandjermasin in Borneo by 
treaty with the Sultan of that place. 
The first appearance of the new 'raj' at Bandjermasin was scarcely 
likely to make a favourable impression on the Sultan and his court. 
Hare took with him an Assistant-Resident (Mr. van de Wahl), a Chief 
of Armed Police, two surgeons, a bookkeeper, a 'Malay writer', a 
small number of coolies, policemen, and artificers, and a boatswain for 
the wharf. This was a smaller establishment than any that the Dutch had 
maintained at Bandjermasin. There was no military force whatever.21 
Ostensibly, the settlement had a threefold purpose : to assist in the 
campaign against Malay piracy, to regulate the trade of southern Borneo 
and, in the confident phrase of the time, "to effect the general ends 
of civilization". These were the reasons given out in public ; privately, 
Raffles, at any rate, expected a great deal more from Bandjermasin. 
He hoped he was founding a settIement from which the British could 
not be dislodged even if Java were handed back to the Dutch; but this 
was naturally kept secret.28 
Hare approached his new task with confidence, for he did not expect 
any difficulty in negotiating a treaty with Bandjermasin. The Sultan, 
after all, had been asking for British protection since 1809, and was 
unlikely to refuse any reasonable terms offered him. But Hare knew 
that the only chance of securing a permanent British foothold in Borneo 
(and so meeting Raffles' real requirements) lay in making the new 
settIement pay for itself, and pay for itself quickly. If once Bandjer-
masin became a charge on the revenues, like Penang or Bencoolen, 
there was no hope whatever that the East India Company would long 
agree to its being retained. 
The immediate task, however, was to establish Great Britain's formal 
rights to possession and, on October Ist, 1812, af ter the usual protracted 
oriental preliminaries, the Sultan was persuaded to sign the desired 
agreement. By this 'Treaty of 1812', as it became known, the Sultan 
and Pëngerans of Bandjermasin ceded to the East India Company "in 
27 Raffles to Minto, May Ist, 1812. (Fac. Rec., Borneo, 1648-1814, Vol. I). 
28 Memorandum by B. S. Jones, India Board, 1824 (n.d.). (Dutch Records 'N. 
No. XIII). 
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full rights of sovereign jurisdiction" the former Dutch forts (Tatas 
and Tabanio), the Dyak provinces of southern Borneo, and most of 
the distriets and petty kingdoms on the South and East Coasts which 
were either practically or theoretically subject to them. The Sultan 
was released from all treaty or other obligations to the Dutch Govern-
ment, and it was specifically provided that the document now being 
signed bore no relationship to "the events which have subsequently 
placed the Eastern Possessions of that Government under the British 
Empire". Raffles guaranteed to maintain the Sultan in his title and 
hereditaments, and to defend him against all enemies "as weil European 
as Asiatie". For this purpose "an adequate force of light armed vessels" 
would be stationed off Bandjermasin. Any surplus in the revenues was 
to be divided equally between the Sultan and the Java Government, 
and no taxes, tolls or duties were to be levied by any local authority 
without the Resident of Bandjermasin's consent. The pepper monopoly 
would be continued and Government received the right to cut timber 
and mine gold and diamonds in all but a few places in the Sultan's 
dominions. Lastly, the Sultan was not to appoint his chief ministers 
without previously obtaining the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor 
of Java.29 
In no important respect was this Treaty different from the contracts 
which had earlier bound Bandjermasin to the Dutch and, at first sight, 
Alexander Hare seemed to have gained a considerable diplomatie suc-
cess. The Sultan had been induced to part with sovereign rights to a 
vast territory, and had received only vague promises of protection in 
exchange. In reality, however, the Treaty of 1812 meant very little. 
On his past showing the Sultan was not likely to abide by a 'scrap of 
paper' longer than served his immediate purpose. Moreover, most of 
the territories he 'ceded' so generously had only the haziest connections 
with his capital, and his Government had not exercised control over 
them for many years. He was therefore quite satisfied with his side 
of the bargain and, for the moment at any rate, the British were satis-
fied with theirs. The Java Government Gazette announced that Mr. 
Resident Hare had been "hailed throughout His Highness' dominions 
as the deliverer of that once powerful kingdom".30 
Alexander Hare, Resident of Bandjermasin, was a very remarkable 
29 Treaty of October lst, 1812. Oava Secret Consultations, December 17th, 
1812. Fac. Rec., Borneo, 1648-1814, Vol. 1). 
80 Issue of December 12th, 1812. 
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man - even by the standards of the Eastern Seas, which harboured 
many strange characters in the early days of the nineteenth century. 
Plausible, unscrupulous, and ambitious, he had an exceptional talent for 
making his superiors believe in his sincerity and in the vague, grandiose 
plans he brought forward. The desire of his life was to found a kingdom 
of his own where he could luxuriate in oriental splendour surrounded 
by slaves and ladies of the harem.31 Why he picked on Bandjermasin as 
a suitable place for the realization of such dreams is not known. Pro-
bably he had heard exaggerated reports of its possibilities from Bornean 
prahu captains who called at Malacca in the days when he was a 
merchant there. A visit he made to Borneo in 1809 on Lord Minto's 
instructions may have suggested to him that the invitingly fertile lands 
near the town of Bandjermasin gave him the scope he needed. What-
ever his original reasons were, however, Hare realized that the position 
he was in as Resident gave him a unique opportunity of gaining his 
own private ends as well as advancing the interests of Government; 
and on October Ist, 1812 (the same day that the Government Treaty 
was signed) he obtained from the Sultan of Bandjermasin a tract of 
land south of the capital, 1,400 square miles in extent, to be held by 
himself and his assigns "in full sovereignty and for ever".32 
This windfaU did not occasion any surprise, or even any immediate 
comment, in Batavia. For one thing, Hare had been granted permission 
to engage in trade as one of the conditions of his appointment, and it 
could be argued that possession of territory was a legitimate extension 
of that right. There was also a better chance of the pepper trade 
flourishing if one man combined the duties of Government represen-
tative and private owner of the chief pepper gardens. Raffles made 
only ane stipulation: Hare could hold his land only "on condition that 
he would always be ready to transfer his rights to Government, on a 
fair remuneration for improvements, should they at any time require 
it".33 
The truth was, as the Government of Java weU knew, that had it 
31 John Clunies-Ross once said of him: "He appears to he .... superficially 
clever, but vacillating and indecisive in character, and his greatest feature 
was his licentiousness in regard to all bodily indulgences". (Quoted by John 
Scott Hughes. Kings of the Cocos, p. 26). 
32 Act of Cession by the Sultan of Bandjermasin, 24 Ramadan 1227. (Quoted 
in P. H. van der Kemp, 'Het afbreken van onze betrekkingen met Bandjer-
masin onder Daendels en de herstelling van het Nederlandsch gezag aldaar op 
den 1n Januari 1817', BTLV, 1898, p. 108, and in Gibson-Hill, op. cit., p. 30). 
33 'Memorandum respecting the complaint preferred by Mr. Hare •.. .', (Dutch 
Records 'A', No. 12). 
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not been for Alexander Hare, a British settlement at Bandjermasin 
might never have been possible. It was Hare whom the Sultan had 
originally invited to establish himself there, not the East India Com-
pany. When Hare had first approached Raffles, it was to secure 
Government support for a step he feIt he had a right to take on his 
own account, with or without official approval. In the offer made by the 
Sultan to Hare, Raffles saw an opportunity to invest the enterprise 
with the authority of Government and "with the view of establishing 
a permanent connection". Indeed, the Java Government feIt under an 
obligation to Hare for his consenting to accept the appointment of 
Resident at all. An official position involved him in a "sacrifice of time 
and fortune". As a merchant he had no inducement to enter the service 
other than to obtain the support which a Government cloak of protection 
would give to his private ventures, and this fact, Raffles considered, 
"must have prevented his engaging in the undertaking unless allowed 
to follow at the same time his Commercial Pursuits".34 
Having acquired his private empire in Borneo, Hare set to work to 
make it pay. He seems to have had plenty of money, both his own and 
the Government' s; and he never worried greatly about distinguishing 
between the twO.35 His intention was to grow export crops, mainly 
rice and pepper, on his own land, and to exploit the Company's territory 
by mining and collecting jungle produce. He also wanted to make 
Bandjermasin independent of Java salt by constructing a proper salt 
works at Tabanio.36 
These plans might have worked out successfully had Hare not found 
that there was one commodity his money could not buy in Borneo -
labour. The small number of coolies the Sultan could provide for him 
was quite insufficient for his needs. A chronic labour shortage had 
existed in Bandjermasin for years. This was partIy due to the prefe-
rence of the Bandjar Malays for working on their own account (when 
they could persuade themselves that work was a desirabIe occupation), 
but mostly it was because a surplus male working population simply did 
not exist in the Sultanate - nor, for that matter, in any other part 
of Borneo. Hare soon realized that if the required labour force was to 
he obtained it must come hom overseas.With this in mind, he returned 
to Java late in 1812 to confer with the Lieutenant-Governor. 
114 'Minute by the Lieutenant-Govemor', February Hth, 1814. (Fac. Rec., Java, 
No. 40). 
35 Gibson-HiII, op. cit., pp. 44-5. 
:lil 'Extracts from a Joumal kept by John Ounies-Ross', forwarded by Ross to 
Raffles On January 17th, 18Z5. (India Office Library MSS Eur. C. 36). 
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The outcome of their deliberations was a series of circulars sent to 
British residents in Java urging them to recruit a labour force for 
the new British settlement at Bandjermasin. The first of these circulars, 
dated March 6th, 1813, instructed all residents to "ascertain if there 
be any healthy Buginese or others, not natives of Java, who, havin~ 
been in the Military Service of the late Government or otherwise. 
and being now out of Employ, are reduced to want or distress". Likely 
applicants were to be "assisted in proceeding to Bandjermasin when the 
favourable Monsoon arrives". The residents were also requested to use 
their influence through the J avanese Regents "to discover any persons 
who, with their families, would be inclined to adopt the same plan". 
No compulsion was to be used in execution of these orders; prospective 
emigrants were to be assured that they would be looked af ter by the 
Resident of Bandjermasin himself and given their own land to cultivate 
on arrival. 
The first circular produced little or no result, however, and the 
scheme did not long remain on a voluntary basis. The next, issued on 
May 31st of the same year, adopted a harsher tone. "All men and 
women", it said, "who have not aregular, visible mode of subsistence, 
and are observable for conduct rendering it expedient for the Tranquil-
lity of the Country to remove them, may be sent [to Bandjermasin]". 
These new orders were applicable to ordinary, native-bom Javanese, 
not, as before, only to undesirable bands of ex-soldiers who were 
wandering about the countryside and terrifying the population. The 
residents were also to make available "spearmen of good character" 
who would be sent to Bandjermasin for limited tours of duty as native 
police. And, most important of all, Bandjermasin was declared to be a 
penal settlement for convicts guilty of minor offences, and the popu-
lation was to be swelled still further by the granting of permission 
for the wives and children of offenders to accompany their husbands 
or fathers. 
These orders, slightly modified by subsequent circulars, lasted until 
the end of 1815, by which time three separate classes of persons had 
gone, or had been sent, to Bandjermasin. There were, first, convicted 
fclons, on sentences varying from a few months to transportation for 
an undefined period. Next, there were vagrants, vagabonds, and 
general undesirables, most of whom were under a technical 'sentence' 
of banishment. Lastly, there was an oddly-assorted collection of more 
or less bona {iele free emigrants, who ranged from those who took the 
advice of a propaganda leaflet written by Hare extolling tbe virtues and 
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salubrity of Bandjermasin, to those who responded to a Government 
memorandum drawing attention to the sad plight of offenders there, 
"who had hitherto laboured under much severity from the want of a 
proportionate f emale population". 3T 
Altogether, upwards of 3,200 persons were carried to Bandjer-
masin 38 (at a cast to Government of 25 rupees a head) to work in 
Alexander Hare's rice fields and pepper gardens. The great majority 
of them did not go of their own free will. Many we re branded as 
vagabonds and transported merely on the recommendation of the local 
Regents or Javanese police officers. There were few official investiga-
tions into individual cases, and incompetent evidence was aften admit-
ted in the inquiries that did take place. Many unfortunates Iisted as 
volunteers were undoubtedly 'over-persuaded'; many women were en-
ticed aboard Hare's ships and even aboard Government gunboats to 
be 'married' later to the 'colonists' at Bandjermasin.39 
A settlement composed chiefly of the least desirabie e1ements in 
Javanese society could not be said to have made a promising begin-
ning. Rare organizing powers would be needed at the top if Bandjer-
masin was to f10urish and, although Hare certainly had a marked talent 
for getting his own way with his superiors, he had no experience of 
planting and Iittle administrative ability. Within a short time the condi-
tion of his settlers was pitiable. Food and c10thing were inadequate; na 
more than a start had been made in laying out the pepper gardens when 
most of the labour available was absorbed in erecting buildings for the 
Resident's personal use; and attempts at gold and diamond mining 
collapsed before any pro fits had been made.40 The Sultan complained 
that the rowdier members of the community at the pepper gardens had 
become so "afflicted by God" that their excesses had driven out the 
original inhabitants of the area. 
Thus, by 1815, the first attempt of the British Government of Java 
to gain a permanent foothold on the coast of Borneo against the time 
when its own existence would cease seemed to be heading towards 
disaster. The occupation of Bandjermasin, however, was only one part 
3T The texts of the Government memoranda and circulars quoted in this and the 
two preceding paragraphs are included in a letter from John FendalI to the 
Marquis of Hastings of September 25th, 1817. (Dutch Records 'A', No. 12). 
38 Many guesses have been made at this figure. 1 have accepted the total calcu-
lated by the British Commissioners sent to Bandjermasin in 1817. (Ibid). 
89 FendalI to Hastings, September 25th, 1817. (Ibid). 
40 J. C. Baud, 'De Bandjermasinsche afschuwelijkheid ... .', BTLV, 1860, pp. 4-5. 
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of a much larger plan. The Lieutenant-Governor and his Council had 
already focussed their attention on other, and potentially more 
valuable, parts of Borneo, the west and north-west coasts. Here, the 
three most important native states, Pontianak, Sambas, and Brunei, 
though individually less influential than Bandjermasin, had a bigger 
combined population and a more vigorous overseas trade. Above all, 
western Borneo contained a number of powerful, independent, and 
prosperous Chinese gold-mining communities. 
The first Chinese miners (as distinct from traders) who came to 
the West Coast of Borneo were probably those brought from Brunei 
by the Panembahan of Mampawa between 1740 and 1745. The Sultan 
of Sambas soon followed the Panembahan's example, and Chinese 
settlements grew up at Seminis, Larah, Montrado, Mandor, and other 
places. Initially, heavy restrictions were laid on these communities by 
the Malay potentates: the miners we re not permitted to engage in agri-
culture nor carry firearms, they had to pay an annual tax of f 32,000 
in gold, Dyak headmen were placed over them as 'supervisors', and 
they were forced to buy everything they needed from the Malays at 
exhorbitant prices. By 1760, however, they had become strong enough 
to throw oft the Malay yoke, and from then onwards lived in indepen-
dent self-governing communities, known as 'kongsis'. 
In the days of the Dutch Rast India Company immigration from 
China to western Borneo was discouraged, and the greatest in flux of 
miners occurred af ter 1791, when the Company's forces we re with-
drawn from this area. By 1812 there may have been a total popula-
tion of 30,000, most of whom we re Hakkas, Hokkiens, and Cantonese. 
Raftles estimated that the output of the West Coast gold mines in 
that year was worth $ (Sp) 4,744,000. It seemed obvious to him that 
there were great economic possibilities in western Borneo and he set 
about the task of bringing it within his Government's sphere of in-
fluence.41 
His own direct interest in Pontianak and Sambas had been aroused 
while he was still stationed at Malacca as the Governor-General's 'Agent 
with the Malay States'. Then he had numbered among his many duties 
41 S. H. Schaank, 'De kongsi's van Montrado', TTLV, 1893, pp. 506-7 and 517. 
P. M. van Meeteren Brouwer, 'De geschiedenis der Chineesche districten der 
Wester-afdeeling van Borneo van 1740-1926', De Indische Gids, 1927, ii, pp. 
1057-8. D. W. C baron van Lijnden, 'De verhouding in welke het Gouverne-
ment staat tot de Chinezen en Dajaks op de Westkust van Borneo ... .', 
TvNI, 1853, i, p. 171. Sir Stamford Raffles, Tlle History of Java, Vol. i, 
pp.236-7. 
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the task of protecting British shipping in the Eastern Seas. "Having 
learned that the ship Commerce", he wrote to Lord Minto soon af ter 
his appointrnent, "had .... been disabled on the coast of Borneo by the 
loss of her rudder, and had drifted upon a small island .... I addressed 
a letter to the Sultan of Pontianak requesting his assistance. The 
Sultan, in his reply, stated that this vesse1 had been seized by the 
pirates of Serawa [Sarawak ], a small dependency on Borneo proper 
[Brunei] in conjunction with those of Sambas".42 To find out what 
had happened to the Commerce and a number of other missing ships 
and to establish an 'observation post' on the West Coast of Borneo, 
Raffles sent Mr. F. Burn to Pontianak early in 1811 as his political 
and commercial agent. 
On arrival, Burn discovered that the Raja of Sarawak had indeed 
captured the Commerce, had plundered and burnt her, and had sent 
the Captain and forty-five of her crew as slaves to Brunei. The cargo 
had been sold, and the second mate put to death "in a private manner". 
Before burning the ship, the Raja had written to the Sultan of Pon-
tianak offering her for sale, but this had been refused. Burn told 
Raffies that he himself had seen the correspondence.43 
The fate of the Commerce and the loss, shortly afterwards, of the 
brig M alacca (from which the Sultan of Sambas stole a cargo of 
tin valued at $ 14,(00) give some indication of the seriousness of 
the pirate menace on the West Coast of Borneo at this time. The 
number of ships lost through various forms of piratical outrage had 
been growing steadily for some years past and, paradoxically enough, 
this increase was due to British dominance at sea. When the Dutch 
navy was driven from the Eastern Seas in 1808, its police vessels 
disappeared at the same time, and the Royal Navy, loath to accept 
additional burdens while the European War was still in progress, did 
not take the place of the Dutch as the policeman of the Archipelago, 
with the resuIt that piracy flourished al most unchecked. 
Contemporary observers were agreed that at this period the head-
quarters of the marauders of the West Coast of Borneo was the 
Sultanate of Sambas. Most of the pirate chiefs in the neighbourhood 
had business or family connections there, and the dreaded Lanuns, 
the most powerful sea rovers in the Indies, used it as a base during 
certain times of the year. The claim of Sambas to pre-eminence in this 
42 Sophia Raffles, op. cit., pp. 46-7. John Leyden, op. cit., p. 95. 
a Buro to Raffles, February 12th, 1811. (India Office Library MSS Eur. E 1(9). 
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respect was undoubted, but it seems likely that its greatness had to 
some extent been thrust upon it. 
The decay of the Sultanate of Soekadana during the course of the 
eighteenth century had Ie ft the two states of Sambas and Pontianak 
rivals for the control of western Borneo. Sambas should have pos-
sessed a decisive advantage in this struggle, since the majority of the 
West Coast Chinese lived in its territory; and, as the Chinese were 
by far the largest consumers of taxabIe goods, the revenues of Sambas 
should have been swelled accordinglv. But Pontianak, largely because 
of the popularity of its harbour with European merchant skippers, 
succeeded during the early part of the nineteenth century in attracting 
most of the West Coast's overseas trade. The result was that bv 1812 
more goods were being imported through Pontianak for Sambas Chinese 
than were coming- in through Sambas itself, and Pontianak prospered 
as the trade of Sambas feU away. Thus, apart from the natural inclina-
tion of the people towards a life of plunder and violence, it was 
desperation and a desire for revenge against its riyal that earned for 
Sambas the reputation of being the worst of the "irregular and piratical 
ports" on the whole coast of Borneo. When Raffles wrote to the two 
most important Sultans on the West Coast about his wish to end the 
evil of piracy, it is therefore easy to see why the Sultan of Pontianak 
was ready to listen to him, while the Sultan of Sambas was not. The 
former knew that his greatest hopes of pro fit lay in legitimate trade; 
the latter derived his main revenues from piracy and extortion. 
British merchants were inclined in any case to favour Pontianak 
rather than Sambas. They had become accustomed to using the port 
during the days of Dutch rule "as an Entrepot for the clandestine 
importation of opium and Piece Goods into Java".44 When, af ter his 
arrival in Java, Raffles turned once again to the problems of Borneo, 
he was therefore in no doubt about the best policy to pursue on the 
West Coast. He would offer a guarantee of protection to the Sultan 
of Pontianak and the 'piratical state of Sambas' would he rigorously 
suppressed. 
Accordingly, a naval expedition under the command of Captain 
J. Bowen, R.N., sailed against Sambas in October 1812. Bowen's 
orders were to destroy the town and port completely, for Raffles wanted 
an example made of Sambas so that other pirates in the Archipelago 
might profit from its fate. On entering the river which leads up to the 
44 'Memorandum relative to the States of Sambas and Pontianak ••. .', Decem-
ber 2Oth, 1814. (Fac. Rec., Java, No. 65). 
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town, however, the attackers came under heavy fire from shore batteries 
and from the guns of a Lanun pirate squadron which chanced to be 
sheltering in the river-mouth at the time.45 It had been assumed by the 
authorities in Java that a display of force would be sufficient to bring 
about a capitulation; only a hundred soldiers accompanied the expe-
dition, and no preparations had been made for operations on land.46 
Finding himself without any means of outflanking the guns, Bowen 
was compelled to make an ignominious withdrawal. The effect of this 
fiasco on British prestige in Borneo may be imagined, but because the 
resources for a stronger expedition were not immediately available, the 
'public chastisement' of Sambas had to be postponed.47 
Raffles had already set out the main points of his policy for the 
West Coast in a dispatch of April 6th, 1812. There were, in the 
Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, too many "irregular States" in Borneo. 
Sambas was in a particularly evil condition ; the Sultan was in his dotage 
and his illegitimate son, Pengeran Anom, who was "an open pirate", 
had full charge of affairs. Eventually, Raffles considered, it should be 
possible to bring all the Borneo rivers under the British Government 
but, until Sambas could be more effectively dealt with, the first thing 
to do was to elevate the Sultanate of Pontianak to such a position that 
it could dominate the whole coaSt.48 
When approached on the subject of a formal treaty with Great 
Britain, the ruler of Pontianak made no demur. On the contrary he 
welcomed the prospect of British protection and himself suggested 
that a British establishment should be placed at his capita!. "I request", 
he wrote to Raffles, "the Honourable Company may di vide with me 
the land-rent and the Port Duties, placing twenty-four soIdiers with 
an English flag at Pontianak" . He added an imposing list of demands: 
for assistance in collecting tribute from the Chinese, for support against 
Sambas in a current boundary dispute, and for an assurance that the 
trade of Sambas would not be permitted to revive. "Above all things", 
he concluded, "I trust the English Company will not consider the con-
nection now to be formed as proceeding from any former alliance with 
the Dutch, lest Pontianak might again come under their rule when a 
45 Sir Spenser St. John, The Life of Sir James Brooke, Rajah of S(If'awak, 
p. 21 (quoting the evidente of an eye-witness). 
46 John Bastin, 'Raffles and British Policy in the Indian Archipelago, 1811-
1816, JRASMB, May 1954, p. 94. H. D. Levyssohn Norman, De britsche heer-
schappij over Java en onderhoorigheden (1811-1816), p. 101. 
47 Raffles to the Secret Committee, June 3Oth, 1813. (Fac. Rec., Java, No 60). 
48 Raffles to Hare, April 6th, 1812. (Ibid). 
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peace takes place in Europe, because the Dutch have long since entirely 
released Pontianak from any allegiance towards them" .49 
Such proposals must have been very attractive to Raffles, but he was 
not at this time considering the possibility of British settlements in 
Borneo in addition to Bandjermasin. Ris aim was the extension not of 
territory, but of trade; in March 1813 he sent John Runt to Pontianak 
as his Commercial Agent; 50 and, because no trade could flourish on 
the West Coast while Sambas still exercised its pernicious influence, 
he determined to settIe with this great pirate stronghold once and for all. 
The second British expedition to Sambas was considerably better 
planned than the first. A strong military force, commanded by Colonel 
Watson of the 14th Regiment, arrived off the river-mouth on June 23rd, 
1813, in company with a naval screen provided from Malacca. A letter 
was sent to the Sultan demanding the surrender of the pirate chief, 
Pengeran Anom, but no answer was received. The military detachment 
thereupon landed on an unprotected part of the shore and, af ter making 
a successful assault on the river batteries from the rear, captured the 
whole of the Sambas fortifications in a half-hour battle. A hundred 
and fifty of the enemy were killed and there were only eight fatal 
British casualties. Pengeran Anom, however, made good his escape into 
the interior.1I1 
Raffies now believed that the way was clear for the unfolding 
of his Bornean policy. His first step was to deciare a general blockade 
of all Bornean ports except Bandjermasin, Pontianak, and Brunei. No 
European ship was to be allowed access to any port except these three, 
though the native coastal trade was permitted to continue unmolested. The 
reasoning behind these drastic restrictive measures seems to have been 
as follows: Raffles knew he would never have naval forces at his 
command strong enough to enforce a real blockade of all pirate outposts 
in the vast island of Borneo, and he therefore decided to 'canalize' 
European trade on the three major ports where there was at least some 
hope of protecting it. Other ports in the Archipelago were similarly 
al Sultan of Pontianak to Raffles, 18 Rabi' I, 1228 (1813). (Fac. Rec., Java, 
No. 60). 'Memorandum relative to the States of Sambas and Pontianak ... .' 
(Fac. Rec., Java, No. 65). 
110 F. de Haan, 'Personalia der periode van het Engelsch bestuur over Java 
1811-1816', BTLV, 1935, p. 585. 
51 'Report of Colonel James Watson, July 3rd, 1813'. (Fac. Rec., Java, No. 60. 
Also printed in Major William Thorn, Memoir of the Conquest of !(Wa .... , 
pp. 327-30). General Letter of the Government of Penang, June 3Oth, 1813. 
(Fac. Rec., Straits Settlements, No. 185). 
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closed, and Raffles subsequently claimed that the broad aim he had in 
view was the reduction of the unfavourable trade balance of Java. 
"The adoption of this system", he wrote to the Supreme Government 
of India, "with the encouragement of the native trade to import the 
produce of the dependencies into Java, seems all that is necessary to 
tranquillize the Eastern Seas and at the same time enables Java in some 
degree to reduce the balance of trade whieh now stands so much against 
it".52 
Secondly, RaffIes appointed Captain Robert C. Garnham to be his 
'Special Commissioner to the Borneo Ports and Macassar', and sent 
him on a tour of the West Coast of Borneo in August 1813. The 
purpose of this mission was to encourage legitimate trade, and to hold 
up the spectacle of the fate whieh had overtaken Sambas as a warning 
to all piratical sultans and rajas on the coasts. "The intentions of Govern-
ment", Raffles told Garnham, "are decidedly not to leave eventually 
a Single Pirate on foot in the Eastern Seas".53 
On his arrival at Sambas on September IOth, 1813, Captain Garnham 
proclaimed a general amnesty and sent a letter to the Sultan offering to 
restore him to the throne on condition that a British resident was 
appointed to advise him. Continuing his journey up the coast, Garnham 
admonished the Raja of Sarawak, als 0 by letter,1I4 and then went on to 
Brunei to interview the Sultan. After announcing the purpose of his 
visit, the British Commissioner warned the Sultan that he must circu-
late due notiee of the intended blockade of all the N orth Borneo ports 
but his own, and that if any of his subjects should try to evade the new 
regulations the support of the British Government might be counted 
on to suppress them. "At this", Garnham later reported to RaffIes, 
"the Sultan and all his Pëngerans all expressed themselves much obliged 
and pleased".55 
On his return to Sambas the Commissioner found that the letter he 
had addressed to the Sultan had produced the desired results. On 
October 24th, aboard H.M.S. M alacca in Sambas Roads, His Highness 
was resto red to his ancestral rights and a treaty of perpetual peace was 
signed by which the Government of Java acquired a protectorate over 
ft Letter of May 12th, 1813. (Fac. Rec., Java, No. 60). 
53 'Instructions to Capt. Garnham, August IOth, 1813'. (Fac. Rec., Java, No. 60). 
114 Similar letters stressing the evils of piracy were addressed by Raffles to the 
Sultans of Koetei and Pasir on the East Coast. Their Highness' replies -
if any - do not appear to have survived. 
55 'Report of Capt. Garnham to Charles Assey, Sec. to Govt., Java .... Novem· 
ber lSth, 1813'. (Fac. Rec., Java, No. 40). 
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the dominions of Sambas, and power to alter the succession to the 
throne and make all necessary arrangements with regard to revenues 
and trade. 
Captain Garnham's diplomatie successes on the West Coast represent 
the high-water mark of Raffles' Bornean policy. In eighteen months 
the Lieutenant-Governor had founded a settlement at Bandjermasin, 
begun the work of suppressing piracy, arranged for the appointment 
of British residents at Pontianak and Sambas, and brought the Sultan 
of Brunei into the British foId. The four largest native states in the 
island either recognized British sovereignty or looked to the British 
Government for protection. Raffles' hopes for the future we re recorded 
in a minute he wrote for the Council of Java in February 1814: "The 
great Island of Borneo, the Sulu Islands, Lingga and Riouw, Bali, the 
East Coast of Sumatra, Siam, Cambodia, Cochin China, etc. are free 
from all connection with the former ruling Power in these Seas, and 
want but attention of a liberal and enlightened Government to add 
extensively to the Commerce of India and to the permanent political 
ascendancy of the British authority and influence in these Seas".66 
Unhappily for the Lieutenant-Governor of Java, however, the destiny 
of British rule in the East Indian Archipelago was to be decided not 
at Batavia, but in Calcutta and in London. 
During all this time Raffles had been conducting what amounted 
almost to a private campaign for the extension of British influence in 
Borneo and other parts of the Indian Archipelago. He was able to do 
this because of the comparative isolation of his position as Lieutenant-
Governor of Java. In Raffles' day, servants of the East India Company 
in distant outposts were of ten cut off for months (sometimes for years 
in time of war) from contact with higher authority. This was not due 
to any deliberate policy on the part of either the Directors in London 
or the Supreme Government of India; they had no wish to grant 
independence to subordinates in Batavia or Penang. Rather it was the 
result of the uncertainty and irregularity of sea communications in the 
early part of the nineteenth century. Raffles and his contemporaries 
were often obliged to take far-reaching decisions on their own account 
for sheer lack of appropriate instructions. Raffles himself sometimes 
acted in defiance of orders which he considered, rightly or wrongly, to 
&6 Minute by the Lieutenant-Governor, February llth, 1814. (Fac. Rec., Java, 
No. 40). 
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he out of date or irrelevant. It was not until the advent of the steamship 
and the te1egraph that the Home and Indian Governments were able to 
exert more than a remote and be1ated con trol over their possessions in 
the Far East. 
It is true that Raffles was more eager to take responsibility for great 
decisions upon himself than most men in his position would have been. 
But there was good reason for this. He knew that 50 long as his friend 
and patron, Lord Minto, was Governor-General of Bengal his plans 
were certain of a sympathetic hearing; and also (more important in 
view of the slowness of communications ) that he could be sure of 
Minto's support on those occasions when he had to act first and ask 
permission afterwards. Indeed, many of the schemes for which Raffles 
has been given the credit (or the blame) were more Lord Minto's than 
his own. Alexander Hare's establishment at Bandjermasin, for example, 
was undertaken on Minto's personal instructions, and Raffles' West 
Coast policy certainly did not go farther than the Governor-General's 
expressed intention. In September 1810 Minto had stated his general 
views in these words: "From the first decided establishment of the 
French Authority and even influence in Holland, I have regarded the 
expulsion of the Dutch power from Java and the Eastern Seas generally 
as one of those essential objects of national poliey on which British 
arms might perhaps be more beneficially employed than on any other".II'f 
While the war in Europe lasted and while Minto continued at the head 
of affairs in India, the Lieutenant-Governor of Java's position was 
secure. But when, on October 4th, 1813, a new Governor-General, Lord 
Moira, arrived in India, Raffles soon found he could no longer count 
on an almost automatie acceptance of his views. 
The arrival in Calcutta of a copy of Captain Garnham's Borneo 
instructions produced the first sign of a new coolness on the part of the 
Supreme Government. In January 1814, the Secretary to Government 
at Fort WiIIiam sent off a hurried dispatch to Batavia halting all plans 
for Borneo until more time could be given to the whole problem of the 
Eastern Seas. Governor-General Lord Moira, the dispatch implied, 
needed time to recover his breath. For the time being, His Excellency 
would con fine himself to a single observation: "The measures indicated 
to be in the contemplation of the Government of Java .... are liable to 
involve ultimately so heavy an expense, such a waste of Troops, and 
117 Lord Minto to Genera! Abercrombie, September 3rd, 1810. (Quoted in M. L. 
van Deventer, Het Nederlandsch gezag over Java, en onderhoorigheden sedert 
1811, p. ii. My itatics), 
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such important Political consequences as to require that they should 
not be engaged in without the previous consent of this Government".58 
Raffles, meanwhile, sensing that a c1earer presentation of his views 
was necessary if they were to make any headway in Calcutta, had 
drafted a lengthy memorandum embodying the main points of his case 
for the Governor-General's consideration. He based his arguments on 
the essential need, as he saw it, for separating British interests in the 
Archipelago fróm those of "the conquered colony of Java". Dutch 
connections with Borneo, Raffles contended, had been formal only, 
where they had existed at all. The native states in the island had 
repeatedly indicated their desire for "the protecting connection of the 
British power"; and it would he folly to allow them to share the 
political fate of Java. A line should be drawn to distinguish "the States 
in connection with the British Government exc1usively from those which 
have been dependent on the [former] ruling power". To carry out his 
policy, Raffles recommended that he himself, or any other suitable 
authority "residing to the Eastward" should be made "Agent to the 
Governor-General" in the Eastern Seas, with the duty of preventing 
"the possibility of British Policy and Arms being confounded and lost 
in any arrangement that may eventually take place".1i9 
By the time this memorandum reached Calcutta, Lord Moira had had 
time to consider the position more fully. In a dispatch of May 28th, 
1814, he examined Raffles' arguments and demolished them one by 
one. Supposing Java were retained by the East India Company, he 
wrote, there would then be no need for further British establishments 
in the Eastern Seas; British commerce would continue to be in the 
ascendant and the necessary protection for shipping against foreign 
encroachment and the dangers of piracy could be given from Java. 
If on the other hand Java and its dependencies were to be returned 
to their former owners, the Dutch would naturally view British settle-
ments in their immediate neighbourhood with jealousy and suspicion. 
The result would be a condition of perpetual disputes, "our commerce 
would be designedly obstructed on all occasions, and aresort to arms 
might become necessary to resent and to repress the wrongs done to 
individuals". It was quite wrong, Lord Moira argued, to take advantage 
of the temporary absence of the Dutch to advance policies inimical to 
58 Sec. to Govt., Fort William, to Sec. to Govt., Java, January 22nd, 1814. 
(Fac. Rec., Java, No. 40). 
59 Minute by the Lieutenant-Govemor, February Hth, 1814. (Fac. Rec., Java, 
No. 40). 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY BORNEO 31 
their interests. Further, he did not believe that the princes of Borneo 
were really anxious for British protection and, in any case, the process 
of 'civilizing' them would cast a great deal of blood and money. He was 
prepared to give a grudging approval to the continuance of the Bandjer-
masin settlement, but insisted that all other plans for Borneo be dis-
continued immediately; British residents on the West Coast he con-
sidered "quite unnecessary"; and no close arrangements were to be 
made with the Sultan of Brunei. As for the policy of confining the 
trade of Borneo to three ports, even if this were sound (which Moira 
did not for one moment admit), the Government of Java had no power 
to enforce such restrictions and no justification for attempting to do 
sa. All plans for blockading Borneo were to be cancelled forthwith.60 
These instructions placed Raffles in a difficult position. He had to 
abandon his 'grand design' for Borneo and at the same time try to keep 
faith with the native princes to whom he had held out such large hopes 
of support. In August 1814 he sent an agent, Captain Macdonald, to 
Sambas to grant a pardon to Pengeran Anom. Less than a week after 
Pengeran Anom had made his submission, the decrepit Sultan of Sambas 
died; and on September 17th the acting regent, the Pengeran Bendahara, 
wrote to Raffles requesting the appointment of a British official "to 
reside with us at Sambas for the purpose of carrying the orders and 
wishes of Government into effect and in order that we may duly 
receive and rightly comprehend the same".61 Raffles must have found 
this request both galling and frustrating, for he knew that, had he been 
authorized to comply with it, he might have been able to prevent the 
Sultanate of Sambas from lapsing into piracy again. As it was, he was 
compelled to break off all relations with Sambas and recognize the arch-
pirate, Pengeran Anom, as the new Sultan, since there was no one else 
capable of preserving even a semblance of government there. He can have 
derived small consolation from a Supreme Government dispatch of 
November Sth assuring him that the Governor-General "entirely con-
curred in the propriety of opening a friendly communication with the 
Chief of Samhas".62 No further attempts were made by British autho-
rities in Java to enter into treaty arrangements with the Bornean 
eo Sec. to Govt., Fort William, to Sec. to Govt., Java, May 28th, 1814. (Fac. 
Rec., Java, No. 41). 
el Pëngeran Bëndahara of Sambas to Sec. to Govt., Java, September 17th, 
1814. (Ibid). 
62 Sec. to Govt., Fort William, to Sec. to Govt., Java, November Sth, 1814. 
(Ibid). 
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princes, though Mr. Bloem, the Deputy Resident at Pontianak, retained 
his appointment until April 1815.63 
There was never any real chance of Raffles' hopes of British 
dominion in Borneo being realized. The sudden rebuff he received from 
the Government of India represented only one aspect of something 
more fundamental - the reassertion of the East India Company's 
traditional policy of 'trade, not territory' east of the Straits of Malacca. 
The Directors in London had never given their whole-hearted approval 
even to the temporary annexation of the Indies,64 and they did not 
believe that the commercial supremacy their ships had attained in the 
Far East would be endangered by the return of the Dutch to the Indian 
Archipelago. Moreover, the Company's experiences in Java to date gave 
no indication that the reten ti on of the is land would be financially worth 
while. Expenses had been in excess of revenue all through the years 
1811 to 1814, and the prospect of pouring funds into East Indian 
territories in the doubtful hope of obtaining far-off bene fits made no 
appeal to the Court of Directors in London. 
The British Home Government, too, had their reasons for favouring 
the return of the Dutch. As the war against Napoleon drew to a close, 
British Ministers, anxious to safeguard their country's security, turned 
their attention to the problem of re-establishing a strong Holland in 
Europe. It was clear that the stability of the new Kingdom of the 
Netherlands would largely depend on the prosperity it could derive 
from colonial possessions. The problem was, which of the Dutch 
colonies captured by British forces during the course of the war should 
be restored ? The West Indian 'sugar lobby' in the House of Commons 
strongly urged the retention of Demarara, Essequibo, and Berbice. 
Naval authorities were loath to give up the Cape of Good Hope and 
Ceylon, the former because of its general strategie value, the latter 
because of its excellent harbour at Trincomalee. But there was no 
similar pressure group working for the retention of the East Indies; 
as territorial possessions, the islands of the Archipelago had no obvious 
contribution to make to an Empire that was based on sea power and 
existed for the bene fit of trade; and the East India Company, the 
only authority likely to bene fit from continued ownership of them, had 
already expressed its lack of interest in their fate. 
88 De Haan, 'Personalia ... .', p. 500. 
6<t Cf. the Secret Letter of the Court of Directors of October 25th, 1816-
(Quoted in van Deventer, op. cit., p. 115). 
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Such was the background of the Convention between Great Britain 
and the Netherlands which was signed in London on August 13th, 
1814. This agreement laid down that "the Colonies Factories and 
Establishments which were possessed by Holland at the commencement 
of the late War, viz. on the Ist of January, 1803, in the seas and on 
the Continents of America, Africa and Asia, with the exception of the 
Cape of Good Hope and the Settlements of Demarara, Essequibo and 
Berbice" would be restored to Dutch sovereignty.65 Britain ceded the 
island of Banka in exchange for the Dutch possessions on the Malabar 
Coast of India, and suitable arrangements were made for safeguarding 
the property of merchants and land-owners likely to be affected by 
the change. But of the British settlement of Bandjermasin in Borneo, 
with whose ruler a treaty had been concluded only two years before, 
guaranteeing that his dominions would in no circumstances be restored 
to the Dutch, no mention was made. 
It is improbable that Lord Castlereagh, who signed the Convention 
of 1814 on behalf of Great Britain, would have allowed the terms of 
this treaty to influence him, had he been aware of its existence. But it 
is surprising nevertheless to learn that, at this time, not even East India 
House had received advice of any of Raffles' attempts to advance their 
interests on the coasts of Borneo. An East India House minute, written 
in 1818,66 af ter noting that Raffles, when Lieutenant-Governor of Java, 
had "actually proceeded to conclude a treaty with the Rajah of Bandjer-
masin in Borneo", observed that "this and some other transactions of 
Sir T. S. Raffles with the Chiefs of Sambas and Pontianak did not 
come under consideration at home until af ter the Convention of August 
1814, with the King of the Netherlands, had been concluded". The 
minute makes no attempt to explain why this was so. Probably the 
slowness of sea communications, the length of time taken to transmit 
information of this kind 'through the proper channels', and dilatoriness 
within East India House itself all contributed to the delay. Orders 
from the Secret Committee, in which the Treaty with Bandjermasin 
was "pointedly disavowed as an unauthorized and invalid act" were 
85 Text of the Convention of 1814, Artic1e I. (Fac. Rec., Java, No. 64). The 
Dutch were to resume control within six months of ratification by both 
parties. Ceylon, having been captured by British forces before J anuary lst, 
1803, did not come within the terms of the Convention of 1814. 
86 The minute is undated and unsigned and is included in a miscellaneous col-
lection of East India House documents (Fac. Rec., Java, No. 64) dating from 
1813 to 1820. Internal evidence suggests the date I have ascribed to it. 
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not issued until January 9th, 1815, and by this time, as we have seen, 
the Supreme Government of India, under Lord Moira's guidance, had 
taken matters into their own hands. 
By the time Stamford Raffles was relieved of his appointment as 
Lieutenant-Governor of Java in 1815, a moribund and unproductive 
settlement at Bandjermasin was all that remained of his Bornean 'grand 
design'. The decision to dismiss him was based on the Company' s 
disapproval of his financial and administrative policies in Java. So 
far as his actions in Borneo were concerned, Raffles was able to show 
that, during the early period of his rule. he had done no more than 
carry out Lord Minto's instructions and that, af ter Lord Moira's 
assumption of office, he had confined his jurisdiction to Java when 
ordered to do SO.67 
In 1824 Raffles described his past actions in Borneo in these words: 
"I will simply state, that the measures adopted with reference to this 
great and important island, had in view the opening its ports to general 
commerce and the final establishment of the British influence in 
Borneo, as far as might be necessary for securing that object. The 
Dutch, previous to the conquest of Java, had relinquished all title to 
interfere ; and had it been an object with the British Government, the 
command of the whole of that great island was placed entirely at our 
disposal".68 It was naturally with some bitterness that the former 
Lieutenant-Governor looked back on his failure in Borneo. The prize 
had been within his grasp, he feIt, and agreat opportunity had been 
thrown away. Legally, there was much to be said for Raffles' views; 
so far as formal contracts with native princes were concerned, the 
Netherlands had no better title to possession of Borneo in 1815 than 
Great Britain. But morally, he was wrong; for the British Government 
to have taken advantage of an accident like the war-time annexation 
of Java in order to deprive the Dutch of all access to Borneo (which 
was what Raffles wanted) would have been wholly unjustifiable. In 
all his minutes and dispatches, Raffles placed a high value on Borneo; 
it remained to be seen whether the Netherlands Indian Government 
would pro fit from their newly-restored possession. 
67 Raffles to the Court of Directors, January 27th, 1816. (Fac. Rec., Java, No. 61). 
68 Statement of the Services of Sir Stamford Raffles, p. 17. 
CHAPTER II 
TUE RESrORATION OF DUTCH RULE 
When, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention of 1814, 
the time came for the Dutch to take over Java and its dependencies 
from the English East India Company, King Willem I of the 
N etherlands entrusted this important and responsible task to three 
Commissioners-General, C. Th. Elout, Baron van der Capellen, and 
Rear-Admiral Buyskes. The departure of these officials from Holland 
was considerably delayed by Napoleon's escape from Elba and the 
subsequent crisis in Europe, but early in 1816 they reached Batavia at 
last and on August 19th of that year formally accepted the transfer 
of Java from John FendalI, Stam ford Raffles' successor as British 
Lieutenant-Governor. Routine matters of administration occupied the 
Commissioners-General for a time, but before long they began pressing 
for the return of certain of the former Netherlands Indian possessions 
in the Outer Islands, including Borneo. 
These requests were a source of some embarrassment to FendalI 
and his colleagues on the 'Board of Commissioners' (as the British 
authorities in Java were now called) for they were suffering from that 
lack of up-to-date instructions which experienced servants of the East 
India Company in distant stations had learnt to accept with resignation. 
Negotations concerning the transfer of the Java dependencies conse-
quently made slow progress. It was perhaps inevitable that a change of 
sovereignty involving so large an area should have given rise to a certain 
number of misunderstandings and asperities, but neither side, Dutch 
or British, can have had any inkling of the bitterness that would ulti-
mately be aroused by the apparently unimportant little settlement of 
Bandjermasin. 
By 1816 the colony which had been established four years previously 
by Alexander Hare was approaching collapse. Accounts were chaotic, 
trade had declined, and the production of rice and pepper had ceased 
almost entirely. More serious still, the settlement was fast becoming a 
heavy charge on the finances of the East India Company. From the 
beginning of 1812 to April 1816 the Company paid out no less than 
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649,685 rupees in a vain endeavour to bring prosperity to Bandjer-
masin, and received only 92,915 rupees in return; nearly half the total 
deficit of 556,770 rupees (about i 60,000) was incurred during 1815 
and the first four months of 1816.69 The Company realized, moreover, 
that once the greater part of the Eastern Archipelago had again become 
Dutch territory, a lone British outpost on the South Coast of Borneo 
would have no strategie and little commercial value; in time of war it 
would be an embarrassment, and in peace its trade would always run the 
risk of being strangled by the powerful commercial interests along the 
north coast of Java. 
In 1816 Bandjermasin was therefore viewed by the East India Com-
pany with much the same jaundiced eye as it had been by Marshal 
Daendels in 1809. There was no hesitation on the Company's part 
about abandoning an economie liability, just as there had been none on 
Daende1s'. As a matter of policy the decision was easily taken, but 
diffieulties soon crowded in on Lieutenant-Governor FendalI when he 
began to put his orders into effect. 
Fundamentally, the Anglo-Dutch controversy over Bandjermasin was 
due to British insistence that this particular settlement must be con-
si de red separately from other parts of the Indies. The Dutch were 
unwilling to make such a distinction. When, on June 27th, 1816, the 
British Lieutenant-Governor forwarded to the Dutch Commissioners-
General a list of places whieh were, in his view, fit subjects for negotiation 
between their two countries, Bandjermasin was not mentioned,70 
and the Commissioners-General assumed, wrongly, that this was 
an oversight.71 They took their stand on the first artic1e of the Con-
vention of 1814, which had dec1ared that all territories in the Eastern 
Seas which were Dutch possessions on January Ist, 1803, were to be 
restored to the Government of the N etherlands. The Dutch therefore 
put two questions to the British Lieutenant-Governor: was it not a fact, 
they asked, that Bandjermasin had been a Dutch possession in 1803? 
And was it not also a fact that this same colony was now in British 
hands? Since the answer to both these questions must be 'Yes', they 
69 'Account Current of the Charges of the Settlement of Band;ermasin', com-
piled by the Accountant's Office, Batavia, September 13th, 1816. (Quoted in 
Baud, op. cit., p. 24). 
70 FendalI to the Commissioners-General, June 27th, 1816. ('Register der Han-
delingen en Besluiten van Commissarissen Generaal over Nederlandsch In-
dien', 1 Mei tot 30 Augustus 1816). 
71 Commissioners-General to FendalI, July 4th, 1816. (Ibid). 
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could see no bar to the transfer. The Convention itsetf, they argued, 
had made na exception with regard to Bandjermasin, and it ill became 
those, who se duty it was merely to put that agreement into execution, 
to find one.n "The continued refusal", they added, "of the farmer 
provisional government of Java .... to deliver [Bandjermasin] over to 
the Netherlands. Government would be a positive and direct infraction 
of the rights which this Government has acquired by the treaty of the 
13th August 1814".73 
But the British Lieutenant-Governor could not view the matter in 
such clear-cut, logical terms, since he had to take other considerations 
besides these into account. In the first place, his Government was still 
bound by the terms of the Treaty negotiated by Alexander Hare in 
1812, which had declared that in na circumstances would Britain hand 
Bandjermasin over to any other European power. Fendall's problem 
here was to reconcile his country's conflicting obligations under these 
two treaties. The Convention forbade him to retain Bandjermasin; the 
Treatyof 1812 denied him the right to hand it back. Nor did any of the 
official instructions he had sa far received give him any assistance; 
neither the Prince Regent's 'Warrant for the Restitution of the 
Colonies' nor the orders of the Supreme Government of India con-
tained any reference to Bandjermasin at all. 
Secondly, FendalI had to contend with a change in attitude on the 
part of the Sultan. For years His Highness had been asking for 
European protection, but now, when the negotiations concerning the 
future of his kingdom were already in progress, he suddenly announced 
that he wished to rule his own country himself, "as the Rajahs of 
Pontianak, Kedah, and Acheen do". He agreed that the continuance 
of friendly relations with European powers was desirabIe, and promised 
that he would guarantee the safety of European traders, but he demanded 
that "all the servants of bath the English and Dutch Companies 74 he 
removed" from his dominions.75 
n "11 ne nous appartient pas à nous, qui ne sommes appelés qu'à mettre Ie dit 
traité en exécution, d'en faire". (Commissioners-General to FendalI, Sep-
tember ISth, 1816: Dutch Records 'A', No. 12). There was more than one 
suggestion from the Dutch side that Fendall's objections were no more than 
hair-splitting and prevarication. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Sic. Long after the demise of both the Dutch and English East India Com-
panies the word 'Company' continued to be synonymous with 'Government' 
in ordinary Malay speech. In Malaya this practice has survived to the present 
day. (Cf. kompeni punya, 'belonging to Government'). 
T5 Sultan of Bandjermasin to FendalI (n.d.). (Dutch Records 'A', No. 12). 
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The existence of a large, privately-owned concession at Moloeko gave 
rise to the third of FendaII's difficulties. Alexander Hare announced 
that he was going to retain possession of his 1,400 square mi Ie property 
whether Bandjermasin was handed back to the Dutch or not. FendalI 
had to take Hare's intentions with regard to Moloeko into account 
because the Convention of 1814 had laid down that the property rights 
of individuals electing to remain in transferred territories must be 
respected by the governments concerned. The Resident of Bandjer-
masin and others had "embarked their property in the positive or 
implied faith of government", and FendalI did not feel justified in 
closing the British establishment down finally until their claims had 
been investigated and, if necessary, met.76 
The Lieutenant-Governor sought to gain time by attempting to 
persuade the Dutch that, despite the terms of the Convention of 1814, 
their right to Bandjermasin was unfounded. He drew attention to the 
entries in the public records of Java which showed that Marshal Daen-
deIs had "formally and fully withdrawn" from southern Borneo in 
1809, and had resigned aU pretensions there; that Bandjermasin had 
not been included among the territories made over to the British 
Government by General Janssens in 1811, and had therefore not been 
acquired by the British by right of conquest; and that the colony was 
currently held by Great Britain "under a distinct and separate Cession 
voluntarily made by the Prince of the Country to the British Govern-
ment alone" . 7T 
These assertions were undeniable as statements of historical fact, but 
the Dutch regarded them as irrelevant. They retorted that Daendels' 
withdrawal from Bandjermasin was "an act entirely of a military 
nature", and that the MarshaU "had no right to abandon a posses-
sion .... without the Authority of the European Government".78 In 
making such an admission the Commissioners-General seriously 
weakened their case. The disobedience of a Dutch Governor-General 
was scarcely the concern of a representative of the English East India 
Company, and FendalI was not slow to point this out. "If Marshal 
Daendels has exceeded his power", he wrote, "he is responsible to his 
Government for having done so; the act itself has been conclusively 
executed, and the Sultan of Bandjermasin considered it so when he 
76 Minute by the Lieutenant-Governor, August 20th, 1816. (Ibid). 
77 FendalI to the Commissioners-General, July 15th, 1816. ('Register der Han-
delingen .... van Commissarissen Generaal', 1 Mei tot 30 Augustus 1816). 
78 Commissioners-General to Fendall, August 2Oth, 1816. (Ibid). 
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concluded the Treaty with the British Government of Java in the 
Year 1812".79 
The Commissioners-General were therefore obliged to drop this line 
of argument, but they continued to insist that Bandjermasin ought 
to be resto red to them, without further prevarication, under the terms of 
the Convention of 1814. Neither si de would give way, and the result 
was a deadlock. The British dilemma was summarized by the Board 
of Commissioners when it wrote, with a touch of exasperation: "The 
retention of [Bandjermasin] as a British Settlement appears equally 
as impracticable as its transfer to the Dutch". For their part, the 
Commissioners-General were unwilling to risk future Dutch influence 
in the area to the hazard of an entirely new approach to the Sultan -
knowing, as they did, that everything could be much more conveniently 
arranged by a simple transfer from the British to themselves. Each 
party to the dispute was therefore compelled to act independently of 
the other. The British instructed a three-man commis sion to go to 
Bandjermasin in order to arrange for the withdrawal of the East India 
Company's forces, and FendalI advised the Dutch of this intention, 
"Ieaving it open to them to proceed in their arrangements with his 
Highness as they thought proper". 80 
The three Bandjermasin Commissioners, Thomas Abraham, Robert 
Stuart, and Lieutenant Cathcart Methven, left Batavia for Borneo on 
September 30th, 1816. This was some time before the Dutch were 
ready to send similar representatives, but FendalI eXplained that "the 
advanced state of the season" made it necessary for the British Com-
missioners to proceed "without more delay".81 A difficult task awaited 
Abraham and his colleagues on their arrival. European powers have 
of ten found it more harassing to withdraw from colonies than to 
establish them. 
The Commissioners ran into trouble immediately they asked to see 
the Residency accounts. Alexander Hare was in Java at the time, on 
recreational leave in Rembang, and he was successfully resisting all 
Fendall's attempts to make him return to Borneo.82 He had removed 
T9 FendalI to the Commissioners-General, September 5th, 1816. ('Register der 
Handelingen .... van Commissarissen Generaal', 1 September tot 31 Octo-
ber 1816). 
80 Fendali to the Supreme Government, October 15th, 1816. (Dutch Records 
'A', No. 12). 
81 FendalI to the Supreme Government, October 14th, 1816. (Ibid.). 
82 Charles Assey to Alexander Hare, October IOth, 1816. (Ibid). 
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the whole of the general accounts of the settlement to Batavia, and 
his brother, John, whom he had left behind in charge of affairs, explain-
ed to the Commissioners that there was no other copy.83 
The problem of disposing of the convict and 'free settler' population 
on Rare's ri ce and pepper estates caused the Commissioners even 
greater perplexity. Their instructions allowed them three courses of 
action : they could hand the convicts over to the Sultan's care, remove 
them to another penal settlement, such as Penang or Bengal, or return 
them to Java. The first of these aIternatives proved impracticable when 
the Sultan refused to accept any new subjects, on the ground that he 
could not feed them; the second would have involved considerable delay 
and expense; and the third required the prior assent of the Dutch 
Commissioners-General, since by this time the British no longer had 
any power to make decisions affecting the internal administration of 
Java. There was the added complication that most of the convicts had 
been banished by Javanese courts to serve their time specifically in 
Bandjermasin, and tedious court proceedings would be required if these 
sentences we re to be changed.84 British authority, moreover, no longer 
extended to Javanese native courts. 
The disgraceful story of the colony's public accounts was repeated 
when the Commissioners began examining Rare's convict registers. 
They found that no accurate nominal roll of the Javanese in Bandjer-
ma sin existed. They were therefore obliged to make their own lists, 
and even these were sadly deficient. Against many large blocks of 
names they had to write: "No period specified in the sentences of these 
persons", or, "No record of the crimes of these Settlers". Some un-
fortunates were merely given serial numbers, which were bracketed 
together opposite the entry, "No record of names or crimes".85 
Anxious to avoid as much delay as possible in c10sing down the 
Bandjermasin settlement, the British Commissioners decided to ship 
convicts and free settlers alike back to Java. Not all the exiles, however, 
were willing to go. One eye-witness reported that two hundred and fifty 
of them "absconded into the woods" when the order for their removal 
was issued, and that "in general it was necessary to surround them with 
83 Bandjermasin Commissioners to FendalI, November 28th, 1816. (lbid). 
84 'Minute by General Keir', Proceedings of the Java Board of Commissioners, 
October Ist, 1816. (Ibid). 
85 A copy of these Iists was inc\uded in a dispatch from FendalI to the Supreme 
Government of December 26th, 1816. (Ibid). 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY BORNEO 41 
troops on the way from the colony to the place of embarkation".86 The 
arrival in Java of those that were successfully collected provoked an 
immediate outburst from the Dutch, who had already announced their 
unwillingness to receive them. Vet in the circumstances it is difficult 
to see what else the British Commissioners could have done. The Sultan 
had refused to accept responsibility for so boisterous an addition to his 
population ; they could not be left in Hare's charge, since he was not 
there, nor was his chief assistant, van der Wahl; and injustice would 
mere1y have been heaped on injustice if these natives of Java had been 
transported to Penang or Bengal, places still farther distant from the 
country from which, in the first place, most of them should never have 
been removed. 
Neverthe1ess, although the decision to send Hare's labour force home 
was probably correct, the methods used to carry out that decision gave 
the Dutch Commissioners-General cause for justifiable complaint. On 
November 22nd, 1816, for example, a shipload of 61 men, women, and 
children arrived unannounced off Grisek roads on the north coast of 
Java. No papers of any kind accompanied them. Their captain's only 
orders were to land his passengers at Grisek or, failing that, "some-
where else on the Javanese coast".87 The same thing happened at Rem-
bang on December 7th; 138 so-called bannelingen (exiles) appeared in 
the harbour, but the master of their ship had no lists of his charges 
whatever. Similar unexpected arrivals were reported from other places 
along the north coast.88 Some local Dutch officials refused entry to both 
convicts and free settlers alike until proper investigations could be 
made; others allowed them to land. As aresuit many notorious criminals 
we re released on Javanese society in the guise of 'free settlers' from 
Bandjermasin, and a number of outbreaks and disturbances were caused 
by them, particularly at Cheribon. The blame for these occurrences 
must ultimately be laid at the door of Alexander Hare for failing to 
distinguish in the records of his administration between genuinely free 
persons and convicted fe1ons. FendalI subsequently admitted to the 
Supreme Government of India that the Dutch had "too much ground of 
complaint in the Classification of the People", and an Anglo-Dutch 
commis sion of inquiry, appointed to deal with the unwelcome in flux, 
86 J. C. Ross to Raffles, January 17th, 1825. (India Office Library MSS Eur. 
C. 36.) 
87 Van der Kemp, 'Het afbreken ... .', p. 60. 
88 P. H. van der Kemp, Het Nederlondsch-lndisch bestuur in 1817, rot het ver-
trek der Engelsehen, pp. 68-79. 
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reported that "there are many individuals classed as Free People who 
cannot be said to have any Right to be landed in their native Country".89 
Meanwhile, final arrangements were being made for the withdrawal 
of the East India Company's establishment from Bandjermasin. Onee 
the Sultan was sure that the British were really going, he became 
extremely affable towards them, and gladly waived any claims he might 
have made against Hare for ruining his pepper gardens, lest the need 
for further investigations should delay the Commissioners' departure. 
He was delighted when Abraham presented him with a quantity of 
gunpowder "for eeremonial purposes and also for defence against the 
pirates", and overjoyed when his request was granted for an official 
deed of transfer restoring him to full sovereignty over his ancestral 
dominions. The Commissioners were surprised to find, however, that 
his prevailing mood of generosity extended to the N etherlands Govern-
ment as weil. They reported to Fendall that, in the course of their 
conversations with him, the Sultan had shown a degree of moderation 
and good humour for which they had not been prepared, and they had 
conc1uded that it was "quite unnecessary to pave the way further for the 
successful negociation of the Dutch" at Bandjermasin.90 
On November 9th, 1816, the East India Company's flag at Fort Tatas 
was hauled down for the last time. A fortnight later the three British 
Commissioners set out from the capital to Moloeko, where they pro-
posed to wait for a favourable wind to take them back to Batavia. 
On December 3rd, just eight days af ter the British officials had Ie ft, 
a Dutch warship dropped anchor in Bandjermasin River with the 
representative of the new ruling power on board. 
The new Dutch Commissioner for Borneo was Mr. Jacob d'Arnaud 
van Boekholtz. His appointment was notified by the Java Governm·ent 
Gazette on November 23rd, 1816, in the following words: "De Heer 
J. van Boekholtz, tot commissaris ter overname van het etablissement 
van Bandjermasin". The use of the expres sion, "ter overname", in this 
connection was unfortunate. It means "for the purpose of taking over", 
89 The report of this commission is inc\uded in Fendall's dispatch to the Supreme 
Government of December 26th, 1816. 
A Netherlands Indian Government decree of May 13th, 1817, finally decided 
the fate of Hare's settlers. Some were allowed to go free, some were banished 
anew or given terms of forced labour, and some were sent to work on private 
estates. (Van der Kemp, 'Het afbreken .... , pp. 130-4.) 
00 'Minutes of a Conference with the Sultan of Bandjermasin at Martapoera', 
October 2Oth, 1816. (Dutch Records 'A', No. 12.) 
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and the Gazette announcement indicated to FendalI and his colleagues 
that the Commissioners-General we re persisting in their view that 
Bandjermasin was no different from the other settIements already 
surrendered to them under the 1814 Convention, and ought therefore to 
he handed over on similar terms. The impression thus created may not 
have heen deliberate, but its effect was to embitter still further the 
strained relations between the two sets of commissioners in Batavia. 
Commissioner van Boekholtz, with a small civil establishment and 
sixty soldiers, made the voyage to Borneo in the colonial navy vessel, 
Iris. They found everything at Bandjermasin in ruins. The official 
houses of the Resident and the officer commanding the troops were 
uninhahitable; the local Bandjar population had occupied the cu stoms 
house; the barracks were der eli ct, and the only accommodation that 
could be found for the sol di ers was in the pepper godown. The 'fort' 
at Tatas turned out to he no more than a delapidated wooden palisade, 
ten or twelve feet high. lts only occupant was a mandur, or overseer, 
asleep on the ground; no guns or ammunition were to be seen any-
where; and the Sultan's flag flew overhead.91 
Van Boekholtz knew that his only hope of success lay in winning over 
the Sultan to a voluntary acceptance of Dutch sovereignty, since the 
meagre forces at his disposal would not he sufficient to command obe-
dience should any resistance be offered. The most recent communication 
from the Sultan, dated some six months before, had given no indication 
that Dutch rule would be we1come. His Highness had then dec1ared 
that he wanted "neither English nor Hollanders" in his dominions.9'J 
Would his attitude have changed now? 
There was no douht on this score in the minds of the Commissioners-
General at Batavia. They wrote to the Sultan suggesting that the pro-
posed renewal of former bands hetween Bandjermasin and the Govern-
ment of Java would he "sa much the more pleasing to His Highness 
since, Holland having heen raised to the status of a powerful king-
dom ... His Highness can now rely for ever on complete protection 
and indissoluble goodwill and friendship" .93 The Commissioners-
General took it for granted that the Sultan's apparent unwillingness 
91 P. H. van der Kemp, Oost-Indi>ë's herstel in 1816, pp. 411-12, and 'Het afbre-
ken .... ', pp. 67-8. 
92 Sultan of Band;ermasin to the Commissioners-General, May 28th, 1816. (Van 
der Kemp, Oost-Indië's herstel, p. 399.) 
013 Commissioners-General to the Sultan of Bandjermasin, November 9th, 1816. 
(Ibid., p. 403). 
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to acknowledge Dutch sovereignty was the result of British pressure. 
Complaining to Goldberg, the Chief of the Colonial Department in 
Holland, they wrote: "We have been told that although possession wiII 
not be retained by the English Company, the Sultan wilI be left as an 
independent prince; the re sult has been that the Sultan himself has 
written ... that he does not desire US".94 But with the British out of the 
way, the Commissioners-General feit, the Sultan would offer no ob-
jections. 
The British representatives at Bandjermasin had not in fact been 
guilty of poisoning the Sultan's mind against the new Java Govern-
ment; on the contrary, they had spoken of it in the highest terms.9Ii 
But in any case the confidence of the Commissioners-General that 
Dutch rule would be acceptable to him was fully justified. Van Boek-
holtz was welcomed with open arms, all his immediate requests were 
granted, and a definitive contract between the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands and the Sultanate of Bandjermasin was signed on New Year's 
Day, 1817, in the presence of the Sultan's court and all his pengerans. 
By this contract, the Sultan ceded to the Dutch Government "in full 
ownership and sovereignty... the island, town, and fort at Tatas, 
Kween, all the Dyak provinces, the districts of Mendawai, Sampit, and 
Kota Waringin with all their dependencies, together with Sintang, 
Lawai, and Djelai, Bakoempai, Tabanio, and Pagatan, with Poeloe 
Laoet, Pasir, Koetei, Berouw, and all their dependencies". (Article V). 
He granted to the Government of Java extensive wood-cutting, gold, 
and diamond concessions (Article IX), undertook to appoint only 
persons acceptable to the Dutch administration as his chief ministers 
(Article XI), and agreed to reject the diplomatie advances of other 
European powers (Article XIX). In return, the Java Government bound 
themselves "to stand by His Highness the Sultan and to proteet him 
with force of arms against all native and foreign enemies who threaten 
to destroy the peace, prerogatives, and safety of His Highness' house, 
lands, or people". (Article III).96 
The most striking feature of this contract was the unconditional 
support it guaranteed to the Sultan of Bandjermasin. By Article XIV, 
His Highness was allowed to retain "the free exercise of jurisdiction, as 
94 Dispatch of October 9th, 1816. L" A, Secret. (Ibid., p. 401.) 
95 'Minutes of a Conference with the Sultan of Bandjermasin ... .', October 2Oth, 
1816. (Dutch Records 'A', No. 12.) 
96 The text of the Contract of 1817 is given by van der Kemp in 'Het afbre-
ken .•• .', pp. 139-45. 
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weU civil as criminal. . . over all trespasses and misdemeanours com-
mitted by his own subjects within the boundaries of his own King-
dom".97 Vet Article III assured him, without any reservation, that the 
Government would support him against "all native and foreign 
enemies". It is true that the Dutch administration retained the right to 
control the succession to the throne and the appointment af the chief 
court officials (Articles X and XI), but its authority did not extend 
to the mass of the population; here, the Sultan's traditionally autocratic 
powers were left unimpaired. The third article of the contract, there-
fore, if interpreted literally, would have compelled the Dutch to 
intervene automatically on the Sultan's behalf against any rebellion or 
disturbance of the peace in Bandjermasin; and yet the fourteenth article 
denied them the power to investigate the rights and wrangs of particular 
cases. Almost any offence could be described by the Sultan as endange-
ring the "peace, prerogatives, and safety of his house, lands, or people", 
and the Dutch administration, lacking the means for detailed investi-
gation, would have diffieulty in contradicting him. The success of the 
system of indirect rule established by the Contract of 1817 was therefore 
likely to depend very largelyon the Sultan of Bandjermasin's willing-
ness to be guided by the Dutch in his domestic affairs; even more 
important for the future, the terms af this contract made it quite certain 
that the N etherlands Indian Government would be permanently 
involved, on one side or the other, in the dynastie struggles of the 
Sultanate. 
N evertheless, the Commissioners-General could congratulate them-
selves on having obtained the sovereignty over a vast tract of territory 
at relatively little cost. The readiness of the Sultan to make such hand-
some concessions after his recent display of independence is not easily 
explained. Stapel suggests that his motive was "possibly the fear of 
Dutch guns, but more probably the realization that European protection 
was necessary to him".98 Kielstra remarks that the Sultan presumably 
thought Dutch support indispensable because he was not the lawful 
occupant of the throne in the eyes of his people.99 In any case, as van 
der Kemp points out, many phrases in the contract wauld have had 
no more significance for him "than when, in the rieh phraseology of 
97 All other peoples in southern Borneo - Europeans, Chinese, 'Moors', Bugis, 
Macassars, Mandarese, Balinese - "not being subjects of Ris Righness", were 
placed under the direct jurisdiction of Dutch courts. (Artic1e XV). 
98 F. W. Stapel (ed.), De geschieden;s van Nederlandsch-Indië, Deel v, p. 157. 
99 E. B. Kielstra, De Indische archipel, p. 240. 
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the East, the whole house and all that is in it are placed at the disposal 
of the arriving guest".100 
To both van Boekholtz and the Commissioners-General, however, 
the immediate problem was not how to fulfil their new obligations to 
the Sultan of Bandjermasin but how to deal with the tenacious 
Alexander Hare. The sometime 'White Raja of Moloeko' was by no 
means reconciled yet to the loss of his Bornean kingdom. In October 
1816 he had demanded that the British Board of Commissioners should 
obtain estates for him in Java as compensation for those he seemed 
likely to lose in Bandjermasin, but this request had naturally been 
rejected. He had thereupon paid a brief visit to Borneo in order to 
instruct his second-in-command, Clunies-Ross,t°1 to oppose Dutch 
'aggression' against Moloeko with all possible means, but it was typical 
of Hare that he did not wait at Bandjermasin to see what the outcome 
of such resistance might beo 
Van Boekholtz was uncertain at first how best to proceed against 
the Moloeko estates. "It is my opinion", he reported to the Commis-
sioners-General, "that the land was indeed presented to [Hare] not 
only 'in full ownership', as private lands are held in Java, but with 
even more extensive rights - as can be seen from the deed of cession 
which is in Hare's hands in Batavia'',102 But the Government of Java 
were in no mood for legal quibbles. They advised van Boekholtz that 
"no eonsideration ean be given to the view that Mr. Hare, or anyone 
el se, other than the reeognized Government, possesses sovereignty or 
territorial rights [in Bandjermasin], or ean possess them",l°3 and 
orde red him to take over the Moloeko properties immediately. 
The Dutch Government's attitude to Hare at this time is wen 
iIlustrated by a private letter from Elout (the most forceful of the 
Commissioners-General) to the Colonial Department in Holland. "We 
have received a pressing request from the Sultan of Bandjermasin", 
he wrote, "for protection against Mr. Hare, whose endless pretensions 
our official and private letters have mentioned many times al ready. 
The necessary orders have been given for the resumption of his land 
by the loeal authorities. Mr. Hare and his representative have tried 
to lead us up the garden path (ons om den tuin te leiden) : he is a 
100 Van der Kemp, 'Het afbreken ... .', p. 77. 
101 John C1unies-Ross (1786-1854), who later achieved fame as the first 'King 
of the Cocos Islands'. (See Gibson-Hill, op. cit., passim). 
102 'Report of Commissioner van Boekholtz', in 'Nederlandsch-Indië in 1817', 
T1JNI, 1861, i, p. 358. 
103 Commissioners-General to van Boekholtz, May 31st, 1817. (Ibid., p. 363). 
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friend of Mr. Raffles, though held in contempt by all the other members 
of the former British administration here".104 Hare's friendship with 
Raffles was not likely to endear him to the Dutch Commissioners-
General. 
Clunies-Ross had meanwhile been taking all measures to put the 
Moloeko area in a state of armed defence. He hoisted the Union Jack, 
fortified the shore opposite the Dutch fort at Tabanio with three 
batteries of guns, and sent off a letter to the Government of Java 
reaffirming his employer's rights and demanding that they be respected. 
Ross' vers ion of events at Bandjermasin was, not unnaturally, the exact 
opposite of the account given by the Dutch. For him, the arch-villain 
was Hare's deputy-resident, van der Wahl, who, in Ross' words, had 
"oppressed the people, imposed arbitrary duties on trade, and turned 
the salt monopoly to his own advantage". Ross maintained that van der 
Wahl was hand in glove with the Sultan's chief minister, and that the 
two had been sharing the profits of a series of "improper dealings". 
Hare, on the other hand, had been kept in "complete ignorance of their 
proceedings until it was too late" .105 
This state of armed defence at Moloeko lasted for some time, while 
all parties to the dispute cast about in search of additional support for 
their arguments. The Sultan feigned complete ignorance of the whole 
affair. When asked about the terms of his original cession of land to 
Hare, he explained that he had 'lost' his copy of the deed, but that, so 
far as he could recall, the lease had been a temporary one, granted to 
Hare only while he retained his post of Resident of Bandjermasin. 
Hare himself turned to his former protector, Raffles (now Lieutenant-
Governor of Bencoolen), and offered, through him, to surrender his 
holdings to the British Crown, "without any stipulation for his own 
advantage, or remuneration, except what liberality may suggest".l06 
This proposal met with no response. The Supreme Government of 
India, having just abandoned one settlement at Bandjermasin, was 
hardly likely to be interested in another, situated in the middle of 
newly-acquired Dutch territory. 
The Sultan's opportune fit of forgetfulness strengthened the Java 
104 Elout to Goldberg, May 2Znd, 1818. (Quoted in van der Kemp, Het Neder-
landsch-lndisch bestuuI" m 1817 .... , p. 409). 
106 J. C. Ross to Raffles, January 17th, 1825. (India Office Library MSS Eur. 
C. 36). 
100 'Memorandum respecting the complaint preferred by Mr. Hare ... .' (Dutcb 
Records 'A', No. 12). Cf. Gibson-HiII, op. cit., pp. 50-2, where Hare's offer 
to transfer bis Moloeko estates to the Crown is discussed in detail. 
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Government's hand and, in May 1818, the Commissioners-General made 
their final decision regarding the disputed estates. They categorically 
denied that Hare had any legal title to Moloeko, and declared that his 
representative, Ross, had forfeited all right to favourable treatment 
because of his highhanded behaviour. The Dutch officials at Bandjer-
masin were ordered to take possession of Moloeko, if necessary, by 
force.10T 
A less obstinate man might weIl have given up at this stage, but 
Alexander Hare was both obstinate and optimistic. Even af ter the 
Dutch had taken over his lands he refused to admit defeat. He imme-
diately renewed his assault on the Government of Java with fresh 
demands for compensation, basing his claim on Article VIII of the 
1814 Convention, which had permitted six years' grace for the disposal 
of property in transferred territories. When this appeal failed, he turned 
finally to the Supreme Government of India in the forlorn hope that 
it might yet uphold his legal rights under the Sultan's original land 
concession. But unfortunately for Hare, his reputation arrived in Cal-
cutta before his plea. John FendalI was now back in Bengal, and when 
Governor-General Lord Moira asked for his advice, the opinions 
Fendall expressed of the former Resident of Bandjermasin were so 
damning that Moira wrote to the Dutch Commissioners-General dis-
claiming all intention of interfering in the matter. "Your Excellencies", 
said the Governor-General, "do not require to be informed of the 
sentiments entertained by us of the conduct of Mr. Hare and the 
proceedings connected with the Establishment formed by him at 
Bandjermasin, and you will not suppose that we can have any desire to 
screen a person whom we regard as a delinquent".108 
On October lIth, 1819, the Dutch Minister of the Colonies, A. R. 
Falck, sent the following message to King William of the Nether-
lands : "With regard to the lands which the sometime Resident Hare 
contends were presented to him by the Sultan of Bandjermasin, it 
appears anew how unfounded that claim is, and how necessary the 
resumption of these lands by the Dutch Government has been. On the 
part of the agent of the said Hare, there has been no further opposition, 
other than the signing of a protest of no significance'',109 
Side by side with these observations of the Dutch Colonial Minister 
may be placed the following quotation from an India Board minute of 
lOT Besluit of May 22nd, 1818. (Van der Kemp, 'Het afbreken .... ', pp. 156-8), 
108 Governor-General in Council to the Commissioners-General, November 7th, 
1818. (Dutch Records 'A', No. 28). 
109 Quoted by van der Kemp, 'Het afbreken ••. .', p. 92. 
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J uly 4th, written in response to a memorial presented by Alexander 
Hare to Lord Castlereagh. "Mr. Hare", it declared, "has been forcibly 
dispossessed; the Dutch may say that the Treaty they have now with 
the Sultan forbids the alienation of land to a foreign European, but can 
it be retroactive? The equity of such a proceeding can hardly be main-
tained in bar of Hare's right to compensation. This property was 
formally conferred on Hare when the Sultan was independent of the 
Dutch".110 
Hare was expelled from the Netherlands Indies early in 1820, and 
went to live at the Cape of Good Hope. From there he continued to 
plead his case through his brother in London and by means of memo-
rials to the British Treasury, but without success. In 1827 he settled 
in the Cocos Islands and, af ter disputing possession of them for many 
years with his former employee, John Clunies-Ross, was finally ejected 
in 1831. From Cocos he moved to Bencoolen and probably ended his 
days there or while on a journey into the Sumatran interior a year or 
50 later.lll 
Soon af ter Netherlands sovereignty had been proclaimed over 
Bandjermasin in January 1817, the West Coast states of Pontianak 
and Sambas also requested the return of the Dutch. Early in that year 
the Sultan of Sambas wrote to Resident Parvé of Samarang explaining 
that, since his attempts to obtain the assistance of the 'lord general 
Raffles' had come to nothing, he now desired the support of the present 
Government of Java, so that his lands might be better ruled.112 On 
another occasion, however, he wrote to Parvé to ask for "a copper-
bottomed vessel with two or three masts, carrying 18 guns, each of 
3 or 4 asta, 6 or 7 pikuis of gunpowder, and 96 good 'Company' mus-
kets",113 The obvious suitability of such a vessel for purposes of piracy 
suggests that the Sultan of Sambas was hoping that Dutch protection 
would not necessarily mean the end of his distinguished career as a 
pirate chief. N evertheless, the Government of Java advised him that his 
request for a Dutch Resident would be granted, and that a contract of 
friendship and protection would soon be offered him. 
The Sultan of Pontianak was not slow to follow his traditional 
110 Dutch Records 'A', No. 13. 
111 Gibson-HilI, op. cit., p. 96. 
112 Sultan of Sambas to Resident H. A. Parvé, March 4th, 1817. (P. H. van der 
Kemp, 'De vestiging van het Nederlandsch gezag op Borneo's Westerafdee-
ling in 1818-1819. Naar onuitgegeven stukken', BTLV, 1920, p. 119). 
lUI Ibid., p. 120. One asta equals about 1 ~ feet. 
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rival's lead. He told the Commissioners-General that he "gave thanks 
to God that the Dutch, his sometime brotherly friends, had again taken 
possession of the island of Java", and expressed the hope that between 
his country and the Dutch Government there would once again be the 
same amicable relations as had existed in the time of his father,114 
On June 9th, 1818, the Commissioners-General decided to take 
advantage of the friendly attitude of the two Sultans by sending an 
expedition to western Borneo. Commissioner van Boekholtz had by 
this time returned to Java from Bandjermasin and he was placed in 
command of the new expedition. The Commissioners-General told him 
that his main duties would be to 'show the flag' on the West Coast and 
in nearby areas, to renew former links with the coastal kingdoms, and 
also to suppress piracy, since it was clear that no new settlement had 
any chance of success until the pirate scourge had been removed. He 
was to negotiate contracts with the local princes where possible, and 
arrange for the cession to the Dutch Government of a proportion of 
the customs revenues in each state.lt5 
Van Boekholtz, supported by a force of 600 soldiers under the 
command of Major Muntinghe, reached Pontianak on July 18th. He 
was amicably received by the Sultan and, on August 9th, the Dutch 
flag was broken over the capita!. Almost immediately the Commissioner 
received an opportunity of demonstrating the usefulness of a Dutch 
alliance. The province of Tajan happened to be in revolt against 
Pontianak at the time, and the Sultan asked for Dutch assistance in 
pacifying it. Major Muntinghe, with a company of Ambonese soldiers, 
put himself at the head of the Sultan's forces, and within a very short 
time order was restored in Tajan.116 
Leaving the civil administration at Pontianak in the hands of Resi-
dent Hartmann, M untinghe and van Boekholtz proceeded up the coast 
to Sambas, reaching the river-mouth on September 2nd. As they entered 
114 Sultan of Pontianak to the Commissioners-General, October 7th, 1817. ('Ne-
derlandsch-Indië in 1817', TvN!, 1861, i, pp. 365-6). 
The reigning Sultan of Pontianak's father was the founder of the kingdom, 
Abdu'r-Rahman, whom the Dutch East India Company had recognized in 
1778. 
1111 'Instructions to Commissioner J. van BoekhoItz, June 19th, 1818'. (Van der 
Kemp, 'De vestiging ... .', p. 124. Veth, op. cit., Deel H, p. 4). 
116 Some douht exists about the justice of the Sultan's cause in this campaign. 
George Müller and Commissioners Roesier and Tobias all c1aimed later that 
Muntinghe fought on the wrong side and that, as aresuit, Dutch prestige 
with the princes of the Coast was seriously weakened. (See Veth, op. cit., 
Deel H, p. 10). 
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the river, they met a fleet of war-prahus commanded by the Sultan of 
Sambas in person. His Highness had apparently not yet received news 
of the arrival of the Dutch in western Borneo, and was much dis-
concerted at encountering them now, for he was just setting out on a 
piratical raid against his hereditary enemy, Pontianak. He quickly 
cancelled these arrangements, however, and warmly welcomed the 
representatives of the Netherlands Indian Government to his capital. 
There, formalities were soon concluded; the Dutch flag was raised on 
September 6th; and on the 23rd, George Müller was insta lIed as Acting-
Resident. 
The recognition of Dutch sovereignty by the Sultans of Bandjer-
masin, Pontianak, and Sambas brings the first stage in the development 
of Dutch power in nineteenth-century Borneo to a close. A promising 
start had been made, but as yet scarcely the outlines were clear of the 
many difficult tasks that lay ahead. No one could teil how long it would 
be before the Government of Java could expect any return on these, 
their first small investments in the vast, unexplored island of Borneo. 
Piracy had to be suppressed, trade" had to be stimulated, revenues col-
lected. There were innumerable treaties to be made with the petty 
kingdoms around the coasts, head-hunting Dyak tri bes to be pacified and 
civilized, powerful and independent Chinese mining communities to be 
brought into submission to Government. 
The accomplishment of any one of these tasks would need years of 
patient, hard work, free, if possible, from interference by other 
European powers. But al ready the unexpectedly swift restoration of 
Dutch influence to Borneo and other islands of the Archipelago was 
beginning to cause alarm in Great Britain and in India. For more than 
twenty years the English East India Company and private British 
merchants had enjoyed almost exclusive trading privileges in many 
areas towards which the power of the N etherlands now seemed to be 
moving closer every day. The merchants of Penang, in particular, 
feared that the old Dutch monopoly system would be reintroduced, 
while the Directors in London and the Supreme Government of India 
saw in Dutch encroachments towards the Straits of Malacca a 
dangerous threat to the East India Company's trade with China. The 
result of these various British apprehensions was a sudden revival of 
Anglo-Dutch competition in the Far East. The diplomatic 'honeymoon' 
following the settIement of 1814 was over. 
CHAPTER III 
THE TREATY OF 1824 
During the British occupation of Java the absence of Dutch 
competition had enabled the merchants of Penang to develop an 
extensive commercial intercourse with the Malay Peninsuia and the 
islands of the Eastern Archipelago. Consequently, when the Nether-
lands Indian Government began negotiations for the return of the 
settlement of Malacca - to which they were entitled under the Con-
vention of 1814, but which lay in the very centre of an area the British 
had come to regard as peculiarly their own - the merchants of Penang 
became thoroughly alarmed. They feared that the restoration of Dutch 
influence in Malacca would ruin the valuable trade they had built up 
with Perak, Selangor, Riouw, Lingga, the West Coast of Borneo, and 
other places. In June 1818, therefore, they requested Colonel Banner-
man, the Governor of Penang, to make such treaties "as may effectively 
secure the freedom of Commerce with these countries ... at least on 
the stipulation of being allowed to trade on similar favourable terms 
as may be granted to any other People or Nation".117 
Bannerman accepted this suggestion, and orde red Major John 
Farquhar, the Resident of Malacca, to proceed immediately to Riouw. 
Lingga, Pontianak, and Siak in order to secure a "free and unrestricted 
trade ... unfettered by the monopoly" which, he feared, "it would he 
the first object of the Dutch Government to establish".us Similar orders 
were issued to W. S. Cracroft with respect to Perak and Selangor.l111 
Farquhar chose Pontianak as his first port of call, and on July 21st, 
1818, set out from Malacca for the West Coast of Borneo. 
He arrived there on August 7th, just three weeks af ter the expedition 
commanded by Commissioner van Boekholtz dropped anchor in Pon-
117 'Letter of 13 merchants of Penang', June 8th, 1818. (Fac. Rec., Straits Sett-
lements, No. 66). 
11S General Letter of the Government of Prince of Wales Island, October 17th, 
1818. (Fac. Rec., Straits Settlements, No. 182). 
1111 Sec. to Govt., Prince of Wales Island, to Sec. to Govt., Fort William, 
June 26th, 1818. (c. D. Cowan, 'Early Penang and the rise of Singapore, 
1805-32', JRASMB, March 1950, p. 76). 
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tianak River. He was therefore obliged to sail away again almost at 
once with his mission unfulfiIIed, and with a volley of Dutch protests 
ringing in his ears. He later succesfulty negotiated commercial treaties 
with Riouw, Lingga, and Siak,12O but none of these was destined to 
have any permanent value. 
When the report of Farquhar's rebuff at Pontianak reached Bengal, 
Governor-General Lord Moira (now Marquis Hastings) was not dis-
posed to make any formal protest to the Dutch Government. "However 
much it may be regretted", he wrote, "that the Dutch should have 
pre-occupied the ground at Pontianak, and thus destroyed the indepen-
dence of a Port of considerable importance to our Commerce, I conceive 
th at the question is not of sufficient importance to authorize our 
entering into any discussion with the Dutch on the subjeet",121 Never-
theless, the Governor-General had no intention of forgetting- the 
Pontianak incident entirely. He added it to the growing list of provo-
cative actions which gave c1ear proof, in his opinion, of the "boundless 
pretensions of the Netherlands Government" and of the consequent 
threat to the East India Company's political and commercial position 
in the Eastern Seas. 
In 1814, it will be recalled, it had largely been as a result of op-
position from Lord Hastings that the ambitious plans for Borneo 
advocated bv Stamford Raffles had come to nothing. Since then, how-
ever, a marked change had taken place in the Governor-General's 
attitude to the whole problem of Anglo-Dutch relationships in the East. 
By 1818, Hastings was no longer so confident as he had been four 
years before abol1t the continued security of British trade bevond the 
Straits of Malacca, and in this revision of view Raffles himself had 
played an important part. 
Soon af ter taking up his duties as Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen 
in March 1818, Raffles began bombarding the Secret Committee of the 
East India Company in London with a series of proposals designed to 
proteet British interests against the rising tide of Dutch expansion. His 
main suggestion was that a c1ear line should Qe drawn between posses-
sions which the Dutch were legally entitled to resume l1nder the terms 
of the Convention of 1814 and those which were (or should be, in his 
opinion) independent of Dutch authority. In the latter category he 
120 Sec. to Govt., Prince of Wales Jsland, to Sec. to Govt., Fort Wi11iam, Sep-
tember lQth, 1818. (Ibid., p. 80). 
121 Minute by the Marquis of Hastings, October Z5th, 1818. (Dutch Records 
'A', No. 28A). 
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placed Pontianak, Sambas, Brunei, Koetei, and Pasir - the five most 
important native states on the 'Vest and East Coasts of Borneo. In 
addition, he demanded the establishment of a chain of British stations 
throughout the Archipelago, so placed strategically that they would 
effectively hinder the extension of Dutch power beyond his proposed 
demarcation line.t~ 
Even this would not be the most suitable solution to the problem. 
The experience of the past, Raffles argued, was that English and Dutch 
settlements placed si de by side on the same island always led to trouble. 
Ideally, therefore, the integrity of the larger islands should be preserved ; 
Java, for example, should remain Dutch, Sumatra exclusively EngIish. 
"With regard to Borneo", RaffIes declared, "the Dutch have not a 
shadow of a claim ... The great Is land of Borneo is thus very nearly 
at the disposal of any European Power that may have the incIination 
to command its resources... I would suggest either that the Dutch 
shouId be compelled to withdraw from Borneo altogether, or that at 
least the equator should form the boundary of their Settlements. As. 
however, the Dutch have no claim whatever to Borneo, I would hope 
the former arrangement would be preferred".123 
Although these suggestions we re made direct to the Secret Com-
mittee, they were automatically referred to Lord Hastings for his 
comments. Hastings did not agree with the more ambitious of RaffIes' 
plans, but there is no doubt that their effect, added to his own ob ser-
vations of the scene and the Penang Government's repeated warnings 
that trade would be ruined if Malacca we re returned to the Dutch, was 
to convince the British Governor-General that a halt must soon be 
called to Dutch imperialism. He set out his reasons for this decision 
in a dispatch to the Company in London usually known as the 'Minute 
of October 25th, 1818'. 
The importance of this well-known document in the history of 
Singapore has always been recognized, but it is no less valuable to the 
understanding of British policy in Borneo, since it clearly illustrates the 
part played byevents on that island in the alteration of Lord Hastings' 
attitude to the Dutch. After a brief introduction, the body of tht' 
minute continues as follows: 
It may be proper to premise the principal circumstances on 
122 Raffles to the Secret Committee, April 14th, 1818. (Dutch Records 'A' 
No. 29). 
123 The same to the same, July 3rd, 1818. (Ibid.). 
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which my suspicion of the Dutch is founded. The following are 
the most prominent, exclusive of the distinct tone and character 
of their discussions in the negotiations connected with the 
restitution of Java. 
Ist. Their positive refusal to enter into any pledge to main-
tain Treaties concluded by the British Government with Foreign 
Powers - though eminently beneficial to themselves. 
2nd. Their immediate occupation of Bandjermasin on the 
professed ground of their former Treaty, though this had been 
formally annulled by Marshal Daendels. 
3rd. Their recent proceedings at Palembang.l24 
4th. Their forcible occupation of Pontianak to which they 
had not the shadow of a pretention. 
5th. The jealousy and reserve, to use the mildest terms, th at 
have marked all their communications with the British Govern-
ment. 
6th. The collection of Establishments, Naval and Military, 
at Java, far more extensive than the occupation and defence of 
their existing possessions can require. 
Of these six points, the second and fourth referred directly to Borneo, 
while the first and fifth derived in large part from the heated contro-
versy over Bandjermasin. 
Af ter quoting the suggestions for checking Dutch expansion for-
warded at various times by Raffles and Bannerman, Hastings went on 
to state his own recommendations. British influence, he feIt, should be 
predominant in Atjeh, for it would be very serious for India if the 
northern tip of Sumatra were to fall into Dutch, French, or American 1211 
hands. Malacca should be retained, since if the Dutch made it a free 
port there would be a danger of its destroying the trade of Penang. 
Finally, the best all-round solution for both countries, in Hastings' 
opinion, would be for Britain to command the Straits of Malacca and 
Holland the Straits of Sunda.126 
124 A reference to the assumption of sovereignty by the Dutch (much to Raff-
les' disgust) over Palembang and other parts of eastern Sumatra in 1818. 
(See E. B. Kielstra, 'De ondergang van het Palembangsche Rijk', in Indisch 
N ederlrmd, pp. 197-241). 
126 During the period immediately following the Anglo-American War of 1812, 
the establishment of an American trading station at Atjeh or at some adjacent 
point was thought by the British to be a definite possibility. . 
1S6 See Dutch Records 'A', No. Z8A, for the full text of this minute. It also 
appears in précis form in No. 13 of the same series. 
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With the Govemor-General thinking along these lines, it is not sur-
prising that when Raffles visited Calcutta in October 1818 to present 
his case in person, his proposals were more sympathetically received 
than they had been for years. "I have just retumed from spending a 
week with Lord Hastings", he wrote on November 15th, "and am in 
high favour".l.2T The outstanding result of their meeting was the per-
mission Raffles received from the Govemor-General to found a British 
settlement at some point in the Straits of Malacca not already under 
Dutch sovereignty. Early in December Raffles sailed from Calcutta 
on the mission which led two months later to the founding of Singapore. 
The argument which raged back and forth between the Dutch and 
British Govemments over the possession of Singapore has no direct 
connection with the development of policy in Borneo, and consequently 
none with the present study. But during the course of the main diplo-
matic battle many general questions were discussed by the two Govem-
ments and solutions to them eventually hammered out. For the British 
the matter of trading rights in the Indian Archipelago was of the 
highest importance, and it was not only Dutch competition that they 
had to fear. Europe's long pre-occupation with the Napoleonic Wars 
had Ie ft the Far East wide open to American enterprise, and ships from 
New England had been visiting China and the Indian Archipelago in 
ever-increasing numbers. It was estimated in 1819 that American trade 
with China alone was currently employing 16,000 tons of shipping a 
year, compared with a British total of 20,000 tons.128 There was also 
a danger that the French, now that Mauritius had been taken from 
them at the peace treaty, would be looking for new harbours in the 
Southern Indian Ocean and perhaps beyond it; and Raffles drew atten-
tion to a possible threat from Russia, whose seizure of Japan and the 
Sandwich Islands was thought to be only a matter of time.l211 
These varied pressures were very much in the mind of the Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, when in August 1819 he instructed the 
British Ambassador in The Hague to take a stronger line over Dutch 
claims in the Archipelago. "There are two principles", he wrote, "{rom 
which the British Government can under no circumstances be expected 
to depart : the one is, they cannot acquiesce in a practical exclusion, or 
in a mere permissive toleration, of British commerce throughout the 
127 Quoted in Hugh E. Egerton, Sw Stamfard Roffles, p. 171. 
128 Assey, op. eit., p. 23. 
199 Raffles to the Supreme Government, January 8th, 1819. (Dutch Records 'A'. 
No. 28A). 
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immense extent of the Eastern Archipelago; nor can they consent so 
far to expose the direct commerce of this country with China to all 
the obvious dangers and disadvantages which would result, especially 
in time of war, from all the military and naval keys of the Straits of 
Malacca being exclusively in the hands of the N etherlands Govern-
ment".130 
The Dutch were unable to accept either of these principles; both 
seemed to threaten the very structure of their colonial system. They 
knew that British merchants had a considerable hold on trade in the 
Archipelago already; therefore, they argued, the granting to the British 
of equal trading privileges, however admirable in theory, would have 
serious results for the Netherlands in practice, since if all the harbours 
in the Indian Islands were declared free Britain, with her much greater 
industrial resources, would soon be able to engross aU the trade. 
The conflict of national interests here involved was so fundamental 
that th ere was no chance of a lasting settlement being achieved by the 
British and Dutch representatives in the East. In any case, such hostility 
had grown up between the Governments of India and Tava bv 1819 
that a common meeting-ground could scarcely have been found. On the 
one hand, the Dutch distrusted the British practice of acting first and 
asking permission afterwards in the hope that the home, authorities 
could be persuaded to recognize the fait accomPli: on the other. the 
British believed that local protests would have no effect until the 
colonial authorities in the Netherlands had agreed to abandon the policy 
of expansion. It was only on one point, therefore, that both sides were 
in complete accord. Lord Hastings echoed the sentiments of the 
Government of Java as weU as his own when he wrote in October 
1818: "It is in Europe that the only effectual remedy can be applied".131 
Towards the end of 1818 Baron Fagel, the Netherlands Ambassador 
in London, suggested to the British Government that a permanent 
settlement of Indian affairs was long overdue.l32 Lord Castlereagh 
agreed, and discussions between the two Governments would probably 
1110 Castlereagh to Clancarty, August 13th, 1819, Secret. (Dutch Records 'A', 
No. 13. Also reproduced in H. T. Colenbrander, Gedernkstukken der alge-
meene geschiedenis van Nederland Vtm 1795 tot 1840, VIII, i, p. 131). 
131. Minute of October 25th, 1818. 
182 C. M. Smulders, Geschiedenis en verklaring van het tractaat van 17 Maart 
1824 .... , p. 37. 
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have begun in the new year had Mr. A. R. Fa1ck, the Dutch Colonial 
Minister, been available to attend them. But he was absent in Vienna 
at the time, attending a conference on the future of the little German 
states, and it was decided that C. Th. Elout, the former Commissioner-
General, should represent Holland at the projected talks.133 
The selection of Elout was discussed by Fa1ck with the British Am-
bassador at The Hague, Lord Clancarty. In his report on this conver-
sation to the Foreign Office, Clancarty wrote: "M. de Fa1ck ... seemed 
to feel the propriety of not mixing more of Indian knowledge than was 
absolutely necessary in the projected negociation, professing himself 
to deprecate the larger and more essential interests of the two countries 
being in any wise influenced by local considerations; [the Dutch 1 will 
probably, therefore, have one Indian only [Elout] to join Fagel in the 
negociation".134 The almost casual attitude to Indian affairs shown by 
Fa1ck on this occasion contrasts strongly with the careful preparations 
made by George Canning who, with Lord Castlereagh, was appointed 
to represent Great Britain at the talks. Canning arranged for the East 
India Company to appoint a special 'Secret Select Committee', whose 
duty it would be to keep him constantly advised on Eastern affairs while 
the conversations were in progress.135 
The death of George III and the cabinet crisis over George IV's 
attempt to divorce Queen Carotine obliged the British Government to 
ask for a postponement, however, and it was not until half-way through 
1820 that the long-awaited discussions began. Elout arrived in London 
in mid-July and, having joined forces with Ambassador Fagel, met 
Canning for the first formal session on July 18th.136 Two days later 
it was decided that the British should prepare a 'dra ft project', setting 
out the main points they wished to raise during the discussions. 
Canning presented a long list of British proposals on July 22nd. One 
of these announced the East India Company's willingness to recognize 
treaties made by Holland since 1817 with the Bornean states of 
Bandjermasin, Pontianak, Sambas, and Mampawa, "such treaties having 
lal! P. H. van der Kemp, 'De geschiedenis van het Londensch tractaat van 
17 Maart 1824', BTLV, 1904. pp. 46-7. 
134 Clancarty to Castlereagh, August 2Oth, 1819. (Ibid.). 
135 Dutch Records 'A', No. 30. Cf. Cambridge History of the British Empire, 
Vol. ii, p. 601. 
136 Both Castlereagh and Canning were named as British plenipotentiaries, but 
Castlereagh was present only once and on an occasion when nothing con-
structive was achieved. 
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been communicated to the British Government and being found not to 
contain any article excluding British trade".18T 
The vexed question of Dutch territorial claims in the island of Borneo 
as a whole was also touched upon. This matter had first been raised 
as a result of MaJor Farquhar's abortive West Coast venture in 
August 1817. On his return from this expedition, Farquhar had toId 
Lord Hastings that the Dutch Commissioner, van Boekholtz, had 
sternly warned him "not to enter into any negociations with any of the 
Chiefs of Borneo, as the whole of that immense territory had come 
under the Dutch supremacy".188 A sharp correspondence had ensued 
between Hastings and Governor-General van der Capellen on the 
subject,189 but now in London, Elout made it clear that his Government 
"distinctly disavowed" any arrogation of supremacy over Borneo - a 
statement which officials in East India House noted, with marked 
prescience, might be valuable "at all events as an admission of 
principle" .140 
In addition to these two partial clarifications of policy in Borneo, 
the London talks of 1820 settled a few points of a more general nature. 
Canning, with RaffIes' past exploits in mind, gave an assurance that 
'free-lance' actions by British agents in the Archipelago would be 
disowned: the Dutch representatives agreed that all European ships 
should be given access to the Indian Islands (except the Moluccas); 
and both si des promised to exchange information on their future treaties 
with native princes.141 But most of the major issues which the London 
conference had really been called to settle - such as the debts still 
outstanding after the transfer of colonies in 1816, the suggested 'demar-
cation line', and, above all, the question of Singapore - were left in 
the air. It was consequently suggested by Canning that, since there was 
obviously insufficient agreement for a formal treaty, the best plan woutd 
be to record what had been achieved by an exchange of notes. This 
131 'Observations upon the State of the Negociation between the British and 
Netherland Governments ... .', India Board, March 1822. (Dutch Records 
'A', No. 30). See also Smulders, op. cit., p. 158 and van der Kemp, 'Lon-
densch tractaat', p. 82. 
188 Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee, July 17th, 1819. 
(Dutch Records 'N, No. 13). 
189 Hastings to van der Capellen, June 26th, 1819. Van der Capellen to Hastings, 
December 16th, 1819. (Ibid.). 
140 India House minute, included in 'Mise. Letters and Documents 1818-1824', 
(Ibid.). 
141 Aide mémoire of August 4th, 1820. (Quoted by van der Kemp, 'Londensch 
tractaat', p. 88). 
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was done, and the 1820 talks were allowed to die slowly away. Never-
theless, both Governments were still genuinely anxious for a settlement, 
and officially the negotations were merely adjourned, face being saved 
on the British side by the excuse that more information was needed 
from the Indies. Once this had been obtained, it was hoped that a final 
binding treaty could be made.142 
Meanwhile, the development of a critical situation in Europe had 
obliged the British Foreign Office to measure the value of Dutch 
friendship in other than purely Far Eastern terms. The urgent need to 
strengthen the new Kingdom of the Netherlands had been one of the 
chief reasons why the Dutch colonies were restored in 1814. Since then, 
Great Britain had feIt an increasing necessitv to maintain good relations 
with the Dutch Government. The United Kingdom had been drawing 
steadily away from her partners in the victorious wartime coalition -
Russia, Austria, and Prussia - and the fear of France and of a revival 
of Jacobinism was still strong. As a result, a powerful Kingdom of 
the Netherlands had become vital to Britain as a bulwark ag-ainst a 
possible French irruption into the North European plain.143 It was only 
by cultivating the smaller friendly powers, like Holland, that the 
traditional British policy of never allowing the Continent to be domin-
ated by one nation could be continued. In the early 1820's, just at the 
time when Stam ford Rafftes' occupation of Singapore had thrown 
Anglo-Dutch relations in the Far East into a turmoil, it was particularly 
important from the British point of view that nothing should be 
allowed to cause friction between the two countries at home. A peaceful 
settlement of the problems of the Eastern Archipelago had therefore 
become a matter not merely of local, but of European, urgency. 
Af ter an adjournment of three and a half years, the Anglo-Dutch 
talks on Far Eastern problems were resumed at Gloucester Lodge in 
London on December 15th, 1823. Their general object remained the 
same - to arrive at a definitive and lasting treaty between the two 
powers. Baron Fagel was nominated as before to represent the Nether-
lands, and George Canning, now Foreign Secretary, appeared again on 
the British side. The two new faces at the conference table were those 
of A. R. Falck, who could be spared to make the journey this time, 
and Charles Wynn, the British President of the 'Board of Commis-
142 Dutch Records 'A', Nos. 13 and 30. 
148 Cf. Sir Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822, p. 163 
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sioners for the Affairs of India'.144 Neither the Dutch nor the British 
minutes of these talks have survived; probably none were kept.145 
Sufficient evidence is available, however, for the main course of the 
discussions to be accurately determined. 
Arguments over financial matters occupied a great deal of the time, 
consuming several whole sessions. Since 1816 a number of British 
accounts against the Netherlands lndian Government had been awaiting 
payment; these were part of the aftermath of the 1814 Convention, 
and had provided a minor, but persistent, source of discord for years. 
Nowat last the matter was finally c1eared up, the Dutch representatives 
agreeing to pay i. 100,000 sterling in full settlement of all outstanding 
claims. 
Rather less time seems to have been devoted to the relatively much 
more important question of Singapore. By the end of 1823, Raffles' 
controversial little colony had been in existence for five prosperous 
years, and it was becoming increasingly c1ear to the Dutch Government 
that the East India Company would not lightly relinquish it. During 
the talks at Gloucester Lodge, therefore, Fagel and Falck used Singa-
pore more as a bargaining point than as a battle-cry; they hoped that 
by giving way to the British here, they would stand a better chance 
of extracting concessions elsewhere. In consequence, Canning and 
Wynn found to their surprise that although they had to struggle hard 
on the compensation question, they were not pressed as c10sely as they 
expected about the British title to Singapore. This prompted Canning 
to remark in a note to the Secretary of the Board of Con trol, "We 
have a good claim of money and a doubtful one (to say the least) of 
territory. [Yet] we carry our doubtful case and are foiled upon our 
clear one. . . Our situation is one altogether whimsical" .146 
As the talks proceeded, however, the British and Dutch plenipoten-
tiaries found much ground in common. Gradually they were able to 
resolve the countless difficulties and misunderstandings which had 
plagued their two countries in the East for so long and, by the end 
of January 1824, substantial agreement on all major issues had been 
reached. Another two months were to go by before the necessary con-
sultations with the colonial departments in London and The Hague 
144 Dutch Records 'A', No. 30. 
146 See van der Kemp, 'Londensch tractaat', p. 185, on the absence of Dutch 
minutes. Summaries of the proceedings at each session are to be found in 
Dutch Records 'A', Nos. 30 and 31. 
146 Canning to Courtenay, January 17th. 1824. (Dutch Records 'A', No. 31). 
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had been completed, but on March 24th, 1824, the "Treaty between 
His Britannick Majesty and the King of the Netherlands respecting 
Territory and Commerce in the East Indies" was signed at last. 
The fate of Singapore was decided by the TweHth Article of this 
Treaty. In its final form, this Article ran as follows: 
His Netherland Majesty withdraws the objections which have 
been made to the occupation of the Island of Singapore by the 
Subjects of His Britannick Majesty. 
His Britannick Majesty, however, engages, that no British 
Establishment shall be made on the Carimon Isles, or on the 
Islands of Battam, Bintang, Lingin, or on any of the other 
Islands South of the Straits of Singapore, nor any Treaty 
concluded by British Authority with the Chiefs of those 
Islands.147 
So far as Singapore itself was concerned, the article was plain enough, 
but the vital question for the future of Borneo was, What, precisely, 
was the meaning of the expression, "or any of the other Islands South 
of the Straits of Singapore"? 
Strictly speaking, the only parts of the East Indies that did not 
lie 'south of Singapore' were north-western Sumatra - from which, 
by a separate article of the Treaty, the British agreed to withdraw -
slightly less than half of Borneo, the northern tips of Celebes and 
Halmahera, and the small island of Morotai. Was it then the intention 
of Article Twelve of the Treaty of 1824 that Britain should henceforth 
be prohibited from colonizing or treaty-making throughout the whole 
length and breadth of the Indian Archipelago? 
This was certainly the view taken by many contemporary observers. 
T. J. Newbold, for example, an early historian of the British settle-
ments in Malaya, complained in 1839 that "the comprehensive little 
sentence 'Islands south of the Straits of Singapore' politically shuts 
us out from the richest part of Borneo, the tin mines of Banca, the 
islands of Billiton, Madura, Bali, Lombok, Sumbawah, Flores, and 
nearly the whole of the Celebes, in addition to the loss of Achin and 
147 The fuU text of the Treaty of 1824 is given in Sir William G. Maxwell and 
W. S. Gibson, Treaties rmd Engagements affecting the Malay States rmd 
Borneo, pp. 8-12. 
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the rest of Sumatra".148 A similar view was expressed six years later 
by a Dutch Minister of the Colonies, J. C. Baud. As a result of the 
Treaty of 1824, he wrote, "England may not establish herself nor con-
clude treaties with the rulers of any island lying to the south of 
1° 30' N., for that is the latitude of Singapore Straits".149 Many Dutch 
writers of the present day have taken the same line. H. T. Colen-
brander, for example, declares: "Af ter the Treaty of 1824 the only 
part of the lndies in which it was possible for England to establish 
her political authority was North Borneo",150 while B. H. M. Vlekke, 
describing the provisions of the Treaty in his book, N usantara,11S1 
writes: "Moreover, the British promised not to interfere further with 
Sumatra or any of the other islands of the archipelago". 
On the other hand, it has been suggested by some that the phrase, 
"Islands South of the Straits of Singapore", is to be understood in 
a more restricted sense, on the ground that its authors intended it to 
apply only to the immediate area of the Straits themselves. Those who 
hold this view point out that the purpose of Article Twelve was to set 
a limit to the amount of territory comprised by the term, 'Singapore', 
not to carve up the whole Archipelago between Dutch and British. 
Which of these interpretations is correct? The answer must be sought 
in the records of the conference between the men who drew up the 
Treaty, Canning, Fagel, and Falck. 
Towards the end of the London talks of 1823-4 Falck produced a 
'draft project' setting out the chief Dutch proposals. Appended to the 
main body of this draft were two special articles, the second of which 
contained the following far-reaching recommendation: "The contracting 
parties shall bear in mind that their respective possessions in the East 
lndies are divided by a cline of demarcation', beginning at the entrance 
of the Straits of Malacca at the parallel of Kedah (the 6th degree North 
Latitude) and terminating at the end of Singapore Straits, thus leaving 
148 T. J. Newbold, Political and Statistkal Account of the British Settlements 
in the Straits of Malacca, Vol. i, p. 17. The publicist, John Anderson, copied 
this passage direct from Newbold, and reproduced it the following year in 
his work, Acheen .... with Incidental Notices of the Traae in the Basten! 
Seas and the Aggressions of the Dutch, at p. 3. 
148 J. C. Baud to the King, August 3Oth, 1845, No. 302, Very Secret (Buit. 
Zaken, No. 3133). 
1110 Koloniale geschiedenis, Deel i, p. 329. 
1111 At p. 264. (My itaIics). 
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this is land to the North, and the Carimon, Battam, Bintang, and Riouw 
islands to the South ... " 1511 
The idea of an imaginary line delimiting the areas of British and 
Dutch aspiration in the Eastern Archipelago had first been put forward 
by Stamford Raffles.153 It was taken up again at the 1820 discussions, 
this time by the Duteh. Elout's plan had then been for the whole of 
Borneo to be placed on the Dutch side of the line, including the island 
of Balambangan and other parts of northern Borneo which had once 
belonged to the English East India Company.154 But this scheme was 
not pursued, mainly, it seems, because of Dutch fears that the British 
might not be willing to withdraw completely from Sumatra if they 
were too formallyand insistently excluded from Borneo. 
Now at the Gloucester Lodge discussions, however, a somewhat 
similar proposal was being advanced, but with this significant differ-
ence: the new line of demarcation was to end just east of Singapore; 
it was not intended to he prolonged as far as Borneo. Exactly what 
was in Minister Falck's mind when he made this new suggestion is 
not clear. A member of his staff, Hora Siccama, described many years 
later how Falck came home in great jubilation one day af ter asession 
with Canning and Wynn, and announced that "a great principle had 
been agreed": the Netherlands were to cede to England all their pos-
sessions on the mainland of India, and in return "Great Britain would 
withdraw from the islands". Then, by way of explanation, Falck drew 
a line on the map, which ran "from the northern tip of Sumatra, 
through the Straits of Malacca, around Johore, and af ter that, North". 
Asked if this meant that Borneo fell below the line, Falck replied, 
"Yes, but we may not get it in the Treaty; the English ministers will 
have enough trouble in Parliament as it is. The question will doubtless 
come up later - then it will be time enough to assert our rights. For 
the present it is sufficient for us that the British desire no further 
expansion of the possessions of the East India Company, and that they 
hope to provide once and for all against collisions between our two 
Governments" .155 
152 Smulders, op. cit., pp. 54-5. 
163 See pp. 53-4 above. 
lG4 Council of Ministers to the King, November 5th, 1845. (Buit. Zakm, No. 
3133). 
165 o. W. Hora Siccama to Jhr. Mr. P. J. Elout van Soeterwoude, October 26th, 
1858. (P. J. Elout van Soeterwoude, BiJdragen tot de geschiedenis der Mlder-
lumdelingen met Engeland, betreffende de overzeesche bezittingen 1820--1824, 
pp. 311-12). 
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Believing that he had secured a 'gentleman's agreement' on Borneo 
with bis British colleagues, Falck became the more anxious that the 
proposed division of the Archipelago should not cause unnecessary 
trouble. On January 9th, when asked by Canning to be more precise 
about the limits of bis demarcation Hne, Falck again explained that it 
was "intended to terminate af ter passing between Singapore and 
Riouw".156 Later in the same conversation, he "disclaimed any desire 
to make the Line more extensive than his Note proposed; the measure 
would create jealousy in other Powers; he objected to inc1uding Borneo; 
a line going through it would generate a probabiHty of collision".157 
Falck received strong support for tbis view from the Directors of 
the East India Company, who had their own reasons for preferring 
that Borneo should not be mentioned in re1ation to any demarcation 
Hne. During the season of the north-east monsoon the Company's 
China-bound ships of ten had to steer by the so-called 'Eastern Passage', 
which took them south of Borneo, and then up to China by way either 
of Macassar Strait or of Djailolo Passage. Both these courses ran 
through the heart of an area in which, on Falck's original proposal. 
the Netherlands would have the sole right of forming settlements. This, 
the Directors pointed out, would be "most unsafe in time of war".158 
The British and Dutch plenipotentiaries agreed, therefore, that the 
proposed demarcation line should not inc1ude Borneo, and should not 
extend beyond Singapore Straits. But in that case, they asked them-
selves, what was to be gained by having a demarcation line at all? If its 
only purpose was to provide an Anglo-Dutch boundary in the area of the 
Straits, this could be more easily achieved by Hsting the actual islands 
involved and giving them either to the East India Company or to the 
Netherlands East Indies. Such a method would have the advantage 
of avoiding any suggestion in the Treaty - likely to be much resented 
by foreign powers - that the Dutch and British were dividing the 
Archipelago between them. 
This reasoning was reflected in the draft proposals of February lst, 
1824, which were referred to the appropriate government departments 
in The Hague and London for approval. The section of this draft which 
eventually became Artic1e Twelve of the final Treaty ran as follows: 
His Majesty the King of the Netherlands withdraws all 
156 Dutch Records 'A', No. 30. 
15'1 Ibid. 
158 Secret Committee to Wynn, January 2nd, 1824. (Dutch Records 'A', No. 31). 
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objections to the occupation of the Island of Singapore by the 
troops and subjects of Great Britain. 
His Britannic Majesty, on the other hand, binds himself to 
ensure that no British establishments shall be set up on any of 
the remaining islands belonging to the ancient kingdom of 
Johore, and that no treaties are conc1uded by British authority 
with the Chiefs and Inhabitants of the same.159 
In an accompanying note to the Dutch Government Fagel and Falck 
explained that the second paragraph of this artic1e was considered 
necessary ICto prevent the English from c1aiming any future right to 
form connections with or exert influence over the islands of Lingin, 
Rhio and the Carimons". Commenting on this in The Hague, Mr. C. Th. 
Elout, as adviser to the Colonial Minister, remarked that, in order to 
avoid confusion, it might be better to substitute for "any of the 
remaining islands be10nging to the ancient kingdom of Johore" , the 
phrase, "the remaining islands lying in those parts".160 
Here is conc1usive proof that the Twetfth Artic1e of the Treaty 
of 1824 was not intended, in the Dutch view, to do more than set local 
limits to British and Dutch entitlements in the immediate area of 
Singapore. Either Falck's draft or Elout's amendment to it, had they 
been accepted, would have prevented innumerable misunderstandings 
and recriminations in the years to come. But both were rejected in 
favour of the vague and entirely unsatisfactory phrase, "any of the 
other Islands South of the Straits of Singapore". 
It is difficult to see why any such change should have been thought 
necessary. It may well have been made because, during the final drafting 
of the Treaty, some one suggested the inc1usion of one of those 'cover-
all' phrases, much beloved of lawyers, which are used to guard against 
unforseen omissions in lists of prohibited items. The legal mind, for 
example, might regard the listing of the "Carimon, Battam, Bintang, 
Lingin" islands as by itself insufficiently comprehensive, since there 
were many more islands besides these in Singapore Straits and near 
it, some of them not yet named. Nor was the wording of Falck's sug-
~9 'Project-tractaat van 1 Februari 1824', Fagel and Fa1ck to Ridder Reinhold 
(Dutch Foreign Minister), February lst, 1824. (Kol., 1845, No. 442, Very 
Secret). 
160 Nota of February 12th, No. 18. ('Diverse stukken over Borneo', ibid.) Elout 
van Soeterwoude, op. cit., p. 205. Van der Kemp, 'Londensch tractaat', 
pp. 171-2. 
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gested draft, "islands belonging to the ancient Kingdom of Johore", 
quite conc1usive either, since no one could claim to be able to de fine 
the limits of the ancient Sultanate of Johore with any degree of cer-
tainty. And the alternative proposed by Elout, "the remaining islands 
lying in those parts", though c1ear enough in its intention, was loosely 
phrased and might have led to legal quibbles later. 
However this may be, the wording of Artic1e Twelve of the Treaty 
of 1824 was changed, and in treaties, as in other legal documents, it is 
the written word that counts. From this time onwards the British 
Government were prohibited, by solemn obligation, from attempting 
to found settlements on "islands South of the Straits of Singapore". 
It would not be long before the exact meaning of these words was put 
to the test. 
While the negotiations which led to the Treaty of 1824 were taking 
place in London, the Dutch authorities in the East had been streng-
thening their hold on Borneo. Residents had been installed at Bandjer-
masin on the South Coast and at Pontianak and Sambas on the West 
(with Assistant-Residents at Mampawa and Landak), and by 1825 
these officials, helped by Government commissioners sent over from 
Java, had induced all the most important native princes in both areas 
to recognize Netherlands sovereignty. Attempts to subdue the indepen-
dent Chinese mining communities of the west had been less successful, 
but it was confidently assumed in Batavia that before long they, too, 
would be ready to submit to Dutch rule. 
In 1825, however, war broke out in Java, and the heavy financial 
burdens whieh this struggle imposed on the Government, added to the 
serious economie situation which had arisen as a result of unwise 
monetary policies pursued by Governor-General van der Capellen, 161 
made further expansion in Borneo quite out of the question. For the 
next five years all spare resources, both of men and materiais, had 
necessarily to be devoted to the war in Java. In the Outer Islands the 
poliey of van der Capellen's successor, Commissioner-General du Bus, 
consisted in hanging on to what had been gained, and refraining from 
all action which might cause the Government undue expense. The 
principles which guided him have been summed up as, "No extension 
161 G. Gonggrijp, Schets ener economische geschiedenis van Nederlands-Indië, 
pp. 90-1. 
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of territory; avoidance, if possible, of anything likely to lead to hostili-
ties ; but, at the same time, no cession of territory.l62 
During the administration of du Bus, therefore, Dutch Government 
establishments in western and southern Borneo, so far from being 
increased in size, were progressively cut down. In 1826 the province 
of Sambas was reduced to an Assistant-Residency,163 and all pretence 
at controlling the Chinese gold-mining kongsis was abandoned. A year 
later the Assistant-Residencies of Mampawa and Landak were 
abolished,164 and before long the only European officials Ie ft in the 
western part of the island were a Resident at Pontianak, an Assistant-
Resident at Sambas, and two customs inspectors at Tajan. In the south, 
equally drastic cuts were made. By 1830 Dutch sovereignty over the 
whole of that vast area was being upheld by the Resident of Bandjer-
masin, C. L. Hartmann, assisted by a single European clerk.l65 
This policy of economy, inaugurated by du Bus, was applied with 
even greater firmness by his successors, van den Bosch, Baud, and 
de Eerens. Preoccupied as they were with moneymaking in Java, the 
Governors-General of the Netherlands Indies between 1830 and 1840 
showed little interest in islands like Borneo, where no 'Culture System' 
could be profitably organized, and where existing Dutch settlements 
were regarded as costly nuisances. In 1833 the Residents of the South 
and West Coasts received instructions from Batavia that they must 
on no account interfere with the native princes or peoples amongst 
whom they were living unless Government property were directly 
threatened,166 and five years later the senior officials on the West Coast 
were forbidden even to set foot outside the immediate area of their 
Residencies.16T 
Throughout the decade of the 1830's, which Dutch writers stigmatize 
as the 'period of neglect' in the history of Borneo,16S the northern 
portion of the island lay open to colonization by other European powers. 
16'2 H. van der Wijck, De Nederlandsch Oost-Indische bezittmgen onder het 
bestuur van den Kommissaris-Gener.aal du Bus de Gisignies (1826-1830), p.47. 
163 Besluit of July 6th, 1826. (Stb., 1826, No. 27). 
164 Resolutie of June 22nd, 1827, No. 1. 
1611 Besluiten of September 13th and November 17th, 1826. (Stb., 1826, Nos. SO 
and 66). AlmaMk Vlm N ederlandsch-Indië, 1830. 
166 Resolutie of October 28th, 1833, No. 3. 
167 Besluit of September 8th, 1838, No. 4. The ban on journeys into the interior 
was not officially revoked until 1847 (Besluit of April 2Oth, 1847, L" W, 
Secret), although a number of expeditions to the Chinese districts and the 
Upper Kapoeas were in fact authorized during the intervening period. 
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A Dutch Government envoy had visited Brunei in 1823, and had 
presented a letter of friendship to the Sultan there, but no formal 
alliance had been concluded.l69 Since then, despite the objections of 
officials of the West Coast administration, who were dismayed at the 
ease with which British goods imported into Brunei from Singapore 
could he smuggled across the border into Sambas - to the great 
detriment of the Government customs revenues - the authorities at 
Batavia had made no serious attempt to renew contacts with the 
Sultanate. 
In 1831, for example, the Resident of the West Coast, D. J. van den 
Dungen Gronovius, suggested that a treaty of alliance and friendship 
should be negotiated with Brunei in order to forestall possible attempts 
by foreign nations or individuals to establish settlements there. He 
recommended, further, that the Sultan should be persuaded to cede four 
small provinces bordering on the northern frontier of Sambas - Lundu. 
Sematan, 'Sadoud' (Sadong ?), and Sarawak - since, if these we re 
added to the area already under Dutch control, the suppression of 
smuggling would be greatly facilitatedPO But the Government of Java 
accepted his proposals half-heartedly, and instead of sending to Brunei 
a Dutch plenipotentiary escorted by two warships, as he suggested, 
entrusted the mission to one of the Sambas pengerans, "an entirely 
unsuitable person", who remained at Brunei during nine months of 
'negotiations', and then returned empty-handed.l71 
Seven years later, in J uly 1838, it was reported to the Assistant-
Resident of Sambas, R. Bloem, that an English vessel had arrived at 
Sarawak from Singapore on a trading visit. In passing this information 
on to Batavia, Bloem pointed out that Sarawak had easy and direct 
communication with the interior of Sambas and that, under existing 
conditions, it was impossible to prevent English goods from heing 
168 P. J. Veth (op. cit., Deel ii, p. 443) gives 1827-46 as the 'period of negleet', 
and other authors mention 1830-43, 1825-40, etc. On the whoIe, it seems 
preferabIe to date it from the introduction of the Culture System in Java 
(1830), when a policy of absolute abstention in the affairs of Borneo came 
into effect, to the arrival of James Brooke in Sarawak (1839), when a con-
tinuance of sueh a policy became dangerous. 
169 Verschillende reisen en lotgevallen van P. P. Roorda VOIn Eysmga, Deel iv, 
pp.2-8. 
1'10 Resident of the West Coast to the Governor-General, January 23rd, 1831, 
No. 31, La B. (Kol., 1842, No. 256fW, Secret). 
171 Resoluties of March 12th, 1831, No. 50 (Art. iii), and October 28th, 1833, 
No. 3. See also 'Laboean, Serawak, de Noord-oostkust van Borneo, en de 
Sultan van Soeloe', Tf/NI, 1849, i, pp. 67-76. 
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smuggled in by this route. The only way to keep Engtish ships from 
coming there, he maintained, was to negotiate a contract with Bruneï.1~ 
The Government of Java reptied that it was contrary to the Treaty 
of 1824 to strike preferential bargains with native princes, that "no 
hindrance may therefore be offered to free navigation and trade in the 
Indian Archipelago", and that, with regard to the conclusion of an 
agreement with Brunei, "there exists no necessity for it".173 
Undeterred, Bloem pressed his case the harder by quoting extracts 
from the records of the Government salt warehouse at Sambas, which 
proved that the official salt trade (a Government monopoly at this time) 
had been seriously affected by smuggting through Sarawak. He also 
claimed that quantities of firearms and gunpowder were being imported 
legatly by the same means, and that these would soon get into the hands 
of Chinese miners or Malay pirates. But his arguments were of no 
avait. On February 8th, 1839, he received a letter from Batavia, ad-
vising him that "with regard to the trade of the Engtish at Sarawak. 
it is considered that nothing need be done; this trade should therefore 
be atlowed to take its own course".174 No more was said about a contract 
with Brunei. 
Six months later James Brooke, in his yacht, the Royalist, arrived 
off the entrance to Sarawak River. 
112 Assistant-Resident of Sambas to the Governor-General, July 17th, 1838, 
No. 90. (Quoted in 'Nota: Commissoriaal' , La G8, Secret, Buitenzorg, No-
vember 13th, 1841: Kol., 1842, No. 256fW, Secret). 
173 Besluit of November 13th, 1838, La ca, Secret. 
174 Besluit of February Sth, 1839, No. 14, Secret. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE WHITE RAJA OF SARAWAK 
James Brooke was born in 1803 at Benares, where his father was in 
the service of the East India Company. At the age of twelve he was sent 
to school in England, and af ter a somewhat haphazard education was 
gazetted as an ensign in the Bengal army in 1819. He served with 
distinction in the first Anglo-Burmese War, and early in 1825 received 
a severe wound which caused him to be invalided home. Halfway through 
1829 he began the return journey to India, but his ship was delayed by 
unfavourable weather, and he found himself stranded at Madras with 
insuf!icient time to reach Calcutta bef are his five-year period of 
convalescent leave was due to expire. He promptly resigned the Com-
pany's service, and set of! on a sight-seeing tour of China and the 
Eastern Seas. 
In 1834 he visited the Far East again, this time on a tra ding venture. 
The expedition was not a success financiaIly, but it whetted Braake's 
appetite for further adventures in distant lands. When his father died 
the next year and left him i 30,000, he was in no doubt about what he 
would do with his inheritance. "I am in treaty", he wrote in March 
1836, "for a schooner of 142 tons burden, which I propose shall carry 
me round the world".1711 This was the yacht, Royalist. After a short 
'working-up' cruise in the Mediterranean, he sailed for the East in 
December 1838 and arrived at Singapore five months later. 
Before leaving England Brooke published a prospectus of his voyage 
entitled, 'Expedition to Borneo'.t78 His main purpose at this time was 
scientific inquiry. He planned to explore the coastlines of northern 
Borneo and Celebes, making surveys, penetrating inland if the in-
habitants seemed friendly, and picking up general knowledge of the 
1"/& Quoted in Gertrude L. Jacob, The Ra;a of Sanrwak, Vol. i, p. 60. 
1"/& This paper was published in full in The Private Letters of Sir lames Brooke 
(Vol. i, pp. 2-33), in an abridged and slightly altered form in Captain the 
Hon. Henry Keppel, The EKpedition to Borneo of H.M.S. Dido for the 
SupfWession of Piracy, Vol. ii, Appendix 1, and was summarized in the 
lournal of 'he Royal GeograPhical Society, 1838, pp. 443-8. The quotations 
which followare taken from Templer's version, Vol. i, pp. 4-9. 
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area. On this occasion he was not interested in trade himself, but hoped 
that the information he obtained on his travels would be useful to the 
British commercial world. N evertheless, he was never really in sym-
pathy with this world and strongly opposed the view, held by many 
of his contemporaries, that civilization automatically followed in the 
steps of trade. He always feIt a sineere concern for native welfare, and 
considered that European commercial expansion had all too frequently 
led in the East to the brushing aside of what he described as the 
"indefeasible rights of the Aborigines". Even at this early stage in 
his career he was asserting that the activities of European governments 
"must be directed to the advancement of the native interests and the 
development of the native resources, rather than, by a flood of Euro-
pean colonization, to aim at possession only". He never departed from 
this view. 
The 'Expedition to Borneo' also shows that Brooke arrived in the 
East in 1839 with definite preconceptions about the Government of 
the Netherlands Indies. "The policy of the Duteh", he wrote, "has at 
the present day reduced the 'Eden of the Eastern Wave' [i.e. the Malay 
Archipelago] to a state of anarchy and con fusion as repugnant to 
humanity as it is to commercial prosperity". Brooke had agreat 
admiration for Sir Stam ford Raffles, and believed that the East India 
Company's withdrawal from Java in 1816 had been a major mistake. 
"The policy of the British in the Indian Archipelago", he declared. 
"has been marked by vacillation and weakness ... The position of the 
Dutch nation in the Far East, though apparently so imposing. is in 
reality far from strong, and their power would easily sink before the 
vigorous opposition of any European country ... The fact must always 
be borne in mind that the Dutch are masters of the Archipelago only 
because no other nation is willing to compete with them". 
Brooke's original intention had been to begin exploring Borneo at 
Marudu Bay, in the northern part of the island. But his plans changed 
while he was waiting at Singapore for the arrival of the south-east 
monsoon. "I have settled to sail for Borneo Proper [Brunei] ", he 
wrote to friends at home. "The rajah of the country is represented as 
favourable to Europeans, and has lately behaved in a civilized and 
proper way to a shipwrecked crew who feil into his power. On my 
way to the capital I propose looking at the coast as minutely as circum-
1T1' Brooke to TempIer, June 18th, 1839. (John C. TempIer (Ed.), The Private 
Letters of Sir lames Brooke, K.e.B., Ra;ah of Sarawak ••.• , Vol. i, p. SS. 
Hereafter cited as Letters). 
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stances will allow, and visiting Sarawak - the place whence small 
vessels bring the ore of antimony" .177 Governor Bonham of the Straits 
Settlements gave him letters of introduction to the court at Brunei, 
and the Singapore Chamber of Commerce asked him to take a present 
on their behalf to Raja Muda Hassim, the Brunei noble who had 
befriended the shipwrecked British seamen. Hassim was known to be 
in Sarawak at the time, and this gave Brooke a definite object for 
his voyage. 
In 1839 the territories claimed by the Sultan of Brunei extended 
from the far north of Borneo down to the frontier of Sambas at 
Tanjong Datu. The rivers along these seven hundred miles of coastline 
supported small populations of Malays and a few Chinese. The Malays 
lived partly by trade, partly by piracy, and partly by oppressing the 
Dyaks and other aborigines of the interior. The government of Brunei 
made scarcely any pretence at controlling them. The numerous chiefs 
who ruled the area acknowledged the formal suzerainty of Brunei, but 
sent the Sultan little or na tribute. Many of the rivers were in the 
hands of independent and piratical Arab sharifs who recognized na 
superior authority at all. 
Sarawak was one of the less important provinces at the southern 
extremity of the Sultanate. It was not marked on any British Admiralty 
chart and very little is known of it before Brooke's time. The Por-
tuguese historian, de Barros, included 'Cerava' in a list of the principal 
ports of Borneo during the early sixteenth century,17S and Leyden's 
'Sketch of Borneo' (published in 1814) mentions the place with dis-
favour, as the headquarters of "the piratical chief which lately cut 
off the ship Commerce".179 In the early 1820's, according to a Dutch 
account, there were about a hundred Malays at Sarawak, most of them 
pirates; the Chinese had only three houses; while two Brunei pengerans 
carried on the government and extracted th ree koyans of padi and two 
pikuIs of birds' -nests a year from the local Dyaks.l80 
Since then Sarawak had gained a certain notoriety as one of the 
most suitable places through which contraband goods like salt and 
17S Quoted by J. R. Logan, 'Notices of European intercourse with Borneo ... .', 
Journ. Ind. Arch. 1848, p. 503. 
179 John Leyden, 'Sketch of Borneo', originally printed in the Verhandelingen 
van het BQtaviaasch Genootschap der Kunsten en Wetenschappen, Vol. vii 
(1814), and later reproduced in J. H. Moor, Notices of the Indicm Ar-
chipelago .... , Appendix. 
lSO C. L. Blume, 'Toelichtingen aangaande de nasporingen op Borneo van 
G. Müller', De Indische Bij, 1843, p. 147. 
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opium could be smuggled across the border into Sambas. A smalt 
trade in antimony had also grown up between it and Singapore. The 
antimony ore was mined some twenty-five mil es from Kuching by 
forced Dyak labour, and was sold by the governor of Sarawak, Pengeran 
Makota, to Rappa and Henry, and to Moses and Johannes, two Singa-
pore commercial houses. This trade, however, had died out by 1839.181 
About four years before Brooke arrived at Singapore in the Royalist, 
a Brunei pengeran named Usop, who was an illegitimate son of the 
Sultan of Brunei's grandfather, began to cause trouble in Sarawak. 
In return for a sum of money to be paid on delivery, he arranged for 
the country to be made over to a brother of the Sultan of Sambas. 
Hearing about this, the Brunei Government naturalty made objections, 
and to gain his end Usop roused the local inhabitants to rebellion, the 
Sultan of Sambas agreein~ to supply the insurgents with arms and 
ammunition.l82 Usop had little difficulty in fin ding a pretext for genera! 
revolt, since the population was becoming restive under Pengeran 
Makota's harsh rule, and there was particularly strong resentment 
against the system of forced, and unpaid, labour which had been intro-
duced in the antimony mines. The rebels sent messages to the Assistant-
Resident of Sambas in May 1839, saying that they wished to be taken 
under Dutch rule, but the Government ot Java made no move to help 
them.l83 Tt was to suppress this rebellion that Raja Muda Hassim, an 
uncle by marriage of the reigning Sultan of Brunei and the chief 
minister of the Sultanate, had come to Sarawak. 
Brooke's yacht, the Royalist, arrived off Kuching, the principal town 
of Sarawak, on the morning of August 15th, and he and Hassim met 
for the first time later on the same day. When Brooke inquired how 
the civil war was progressing, the Raja Muda assured him that "there 
was no war, but merely some child's play among his subjects". He 
indicated, however, that it would be convenient if his visitor - and 
181 Brooke to TempIer, June 30th, 1850. (Letters, ii, p. 301). S. Bleekrode, 'Anti-
monium en platina van Borneo', TvN!, 1858, i, p. 110. 
182 Brooke to TempIer, September 25th, 1841. (Letters, i, p. 114). 
183 Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies to the Minister of the Colonies, 
November 3Oth, 1841, No. 578. (Kol., 1842, No. 256/W, Secret). 'Laboean, 
Serawak ... .', TvNI, 1849, i, pp. 74-5. Dedel to Aberdeen, March 2Oth, 1846. 
(C.O. 144/1). 
184 Brooke's journal, August 15th, 1839. The extensive journals which James 
Brooke kept of his experienees in the Far East are to be found in Keppel's 
Expediticn to Borneo of H.M.S. DUo .... , (London, 1846, 2 vols.), and in 
Captain Rodney Mundy, Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes .... 
(London, 1848, 2 vols.). 
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also his visitor's armed yacht - would remain at Sarawak for a while 
"as a demonstration against the rebels".184 
But Brooke was eager to have a doser look at the nearby rivers, and 
on this occasion did not stay long at Kuching. He spent the next month 
examining the Samarahan and the Lundu, which lie to the east and 
west of the capital respectively. Returning to Sarawak, he approached 
the Raja Muda about the possibility of opening up trade with Singa-
pore, recommending that the ships of every nation, and not merely 
those of the British, should be admitted to all Brunei territories. 
Hassim's expressions of goodwill towards the English encouraged him. 
and he formed the opinion that Singapore, if it so desired, might "gain 
the entire trade of the north-west coast of Borneo from Tanjong Datu 
to Marudu Bay".l811 When Brooke left Sarawak on September 19th, 
Hassim parted from him with great regret, saying, "Tuan Brooke, do 
not forget me". Af ter a brief inspection of a pirate settlement on the 
Sadong River, Brooke set out for an extended tour of southern Celebes. 
It was not until the end of August 1840 that he visited Sarawak 
again. When he arrived at Kuching he found to his surprise that the 
civil war was in much the same state as it had been the year before. 
Hassim asked for his assistance, and this time Brooke agreed to provide 
what support he could. "After our friendly communication", he wrote. 
lil could not, as an English gentleman, desert him".186 
Brooke spent the next two months trying to convince a reluctant 
Malay army that it could not win a war merely by sitting behind its 
stockades and waiting for the enemy to surrender. Early in November 
he threatened to desert his timorous allies altogether, and to prevent 
this the Raja Muda offered him the government of Sarawak. This was 
the first occasion upon which such a proposal had been made, but 
Brooke dedined it, feeling that if he accepted he would be guilty of 
taking an unfair advantage of another's extremity. He realized, more-
over, that a grant made while the war was still in progress and, con-
sequently, signed 'under duress' , would be difficult, if not impossible, 
to enforce later.18T But he agreed to continue his support for Hassim's 
army and, af ter many delays and one sharp engagement, in which he 
himself led a charge, he finally induced the rebels to lay down 
their arms. 
1811 Dido, i, p. 75. 
1116 Brooke admitted later, however, that he had al50 been impelled by a natura! 
curiosity to see how wars were fought in Borneo. (Ibid., pp. 142 and 151). 
18T Ibid., p. 210. 
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Soon afterwards Hassim offered him the government again, and this 
time Brooke accepted it. In February 1841 he received the title of 
'Resident of Sarawak'. The written agreement, however, drawn up by 
the Raja Muda to give effect to this appointment, gave the English 
visitor permission to live at Kuching only in order to "seek for profit" . 
Nothing was said about the transfer of sovereign rights which his 
previous conversations with Hassim had led Brooke to expect. When 
the Englishman drew attention to this, Hassim eXplained that the 
agreement was intended to serve merely as something which could later 
be shown to the Sultan, and did not represent the real understanding 
between them.188 Brooke was suspicious, but did not press the matter 
further at this stage. He undertook to re-open the antimony trade, and 
paid a short visit to Singapore to buy a vessel suitable for the purpose. 
When he returned to Sarawak, however, he found that the Raja 
Muda appeared to be in no hurry to make over the government. Nor 
was he able to induce either Hassim or anyone el se to supply more than 
a token quantity of antimony ore in exchange for the goods he had 
brought back with him from Singapore. Months dragged by with no 
apparent prospect of a final settlement. With the crews of two vessels 
to pay and an establishment to keep up at Kuching, Brooke found 
that his financial resources were dwindling rapidly. But then two un-
expected events brought matters to a crisis. The Honourable Company's 
steamer, Diana, arrived at Sarawak to inquire after a shipwrecked 
British crew who were reported to be in captivity at Brunei, and her 
approach, Brooke noted, "put the Raja Muda and the rest in an awful 
fright" ; 189 while, shortly afterwards, an agent of Pengeran Makota, 
the governor of Sarawak, attempted to poison Brooke's interpreter with 
arsenic. Incensed at this, Brooke decided to make a trial of strength. 
He landed an armed party from the Royalist, loaded her guns, and 
threatened to attack Makota. Two hundred Dyaks took his part, and 
Makota was abandoned except for a few immediate followers and 
slaves. "Af ter this demonstration", wrote Brooke, "affairs proceeded 
cheerily to a conclusion. The Raja was active in settling; the agreement 
was drawn out, sealed, and signed; guns fired, flags waved; and on 
the 24th September, 1841, I became the governor of Sarawak, with 
the fullest powers".190 
In July of the following year Brooke visited Brunei for the first 
188 Ibid., p. 213. 
189 Brooke to TempIer, September 25th, 1841. (Letters, i, p. 113). 
190 Dwo, i, p. 252. Brooke to TempIer, September 28th, 1841. (Letters, i, p.1l8). 
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time. J'he Sultan welcomed him effusively, and seemed quite willing 
to confirm the grant of Sarawak already made by Hassim. "I wish 
you to be there", he told Brooke, "I do not wish anybody else; you 
are my amigo, and it is nobody's business but mine; the country is 
mine, and if I please to give you all, I can".191 The Sultan, however, 
as Brooke soon found, was practically an imbecile, and not even master 
in his own house, much less in distant porti ons of his dominions like 
Sarawak. The most influential of his advisers in the absence of Hassim 
was Pengeran Usop, who by this time had returned to the capital. 
Somewhat surprisingly in view of his past attitude, Usop agreed to 
support Brooke's cause, and persuaded the Brunei council of pengerans 
to recommend to the Sultan that a definitive deed of cession should 
be signed. The formalities were completed at ten o'clock in the evening 
of August 1st, 1842, a date which, Brooke hoped, would be "marked 
with a white stone in the annals of Sarawak".192 In return for an 
annual tribute of $ 2,500, and on condition that neither the customs 
nor the religion of the inhabitants would he interfered with and that 
the country would not be alienated without his previous consent, the 
Sultan ceded Sarawak to Raja Brooke "with all its revenues and 
dependencies" .198 
The White Raja now had a clear title to his kingdom as weIl as a 
tremendous personal reputation along the entire north-west coast of 
Borneo. To the people at large he was the 'Tuan Besar', the Englishman 
who had miraculously ended the civil war in Sarawak and, in so doing, 
had performed a feat which not even the Raja Muda of Brunei had been 
able to achieve. But he knew that his rule would never be secure so 
long as it depended merely on prestige and paper agreements. For one 
thing, he was surrounded by enemies, both actual and potential; the 
pirate strongholds to the north, in particular, would have to he subdued 
before his little kingdom could flourish. He realized, too, that his own 
fast diminishing private fortune was quite inadequate to develop the 
resources of the country. His ultimate objective, he once said, was to 
transform Borneo into "a second Java". To achieve this he would need 
generous support from the commercial world and also from naval 
forces. The first essential, therefore, was to secure some form of 
British Government recognition for his raj. 
191 Dido, i, p. 325. 
192 Ibid., p. 332. 
198 Cf. S. Baring-Gould and C. A. Bampfylde, A History of Sarawak under its 
turo White Rajahs 1839-1908, p. 85. 
78 NlNETEENTH-CENTURY BORNEO 
The first move in the White Raja's campaign for recognition was 
the publication early in 1842 of his Letter trom Borneo. In form this 
was a private communication to a friend, James Gardner, but it was 
intended to be laid before the Colonial Secretary, Lord Stanley. 
"Although anxious to see a settlement under British influence and 
protection established here", Brooke declared, "I am indifferent whether 
it be formed under my own superintendence or under the direction of 
others, and am willing to transfer the rights and interests I have 
acquired to any successor who, with better means or better support, 
shall be able to carry my views into execution . . . On public grounds 
only I request the support of Government, or the assistance of the 
commercial community" .194 
It is important to notice the strings which Brooke attached to his 
proposal. He was willing to surrender his rights in Sarawak, but only 
to those who undertook beforehand to 'carry his views into execution'. 
The meaning of this phrase was made clearer in a letter he wrote the 
following year: "My object is to secure to the natives a permanent 
good, beyond the chances of my life. Of course, in the first place, I 
apply to the British Government; to the merchants; to the religious 
societies: if all are deaf or indifferent, it is then I propose applying 
to others more willing, and likewise able, to carry my views into 
effect".I95 In other words, Brooke was prepared to turn even to foreign 
nations for die support he needed, provided they would accept his 
terms; nothing must be allowed to interfere with the welfare of the 
people of Sarawak. 
Shortly before the Letter trom Borneo was published Brooke 
appointed a London merchant, Henry Wise, to act as his agent in 
England. Wise threw himself into the task of publicising Sarawak with 
immense enthusiasm. From the end of 1842 onwards he kept the Prime 
Minister, Sir Robert Peel, and other members of the Cabinet under 
a continuous barrage of letters and memoranda extolling Sarawak's 
great commercial possibilities. He had copies of his correspondence 
with Brooke printed in a series of handsome folio editions and cir-
culated to appropriate Government Departments. In numerous inter-
views with ministers and under-secretaries he stated his principal's case 
1114 J. Brooke, A Letter from Borneo, wilh fJOtices of tlle country and its inhabi-
tants, p. 6. 
195 Brooke to TempIer, March 22nd, 1843. (Letters, i, pp. 240-1). 
196 MacGregor to Wise, November lst, 1844. (A Selection from Papers relaling 
fa Borneo and the Proceedings al Sarawak of James Brooke, Esq .•... , First 
and SecOiJd Series, 1846, p. 67. Hereafter cited as Borneo Papers). 
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"with great spirit and, at the same time, with discretion", as a Board 
of Trade official later declared/96 and he was equally successful in 
persuading various Chambers of Commerce and East India Associations 
in England and Scotland to demand from the Government a more 
vigorous policy in Borneo. A similar propaganda campaign was being 
carried on by Brooke's friends, Gardner and TempIer, but Wise was 
by far the most efficient of the earlier protagonists for Sarawak. 
Because of the bitter quarrel which later developed between Brooke 
and his London agent, however - a quarrel for which the latter was 
largely, though not entirely, responsible - most writers on Sarawak 
have tended to belittle the importance of Wise's contribution. But a 
tribute which was paid to him by the First Lord of the Admiralty, the 
Earl of Haddington, at the end of 1844 shows that in some quarters 
at least there was real admiration for the achievements of Brooke's 
London agent. "I shall always be ready, if required", Lord Haddington 
told Wise, "to state the sense I entertain of the zeal and intelligence 
with which you have advocated the views of Mr. Brooke and, as I 
believe, the interests of the country, especially of the mercantile com-
munity, in the whole of this matter".197 Another observer, Thomas 
Church, the Resident Councillor at Singapore, made a similar comment 
in a letter to Wise in 1847. "I am quite satisfied", said Church, "and 
he must know it too, that Brooke would never have been in his present 
high and honourable position unless through your influence and labour; 
this he can never forget or adequately requite".198 
Wise's first success came at the beginning of 1843. As a direct result 
of his representations/99 a naval survey vessel, H.M.S. Samarang 
(Captain Sir Edward Belcher)/~oo which was on the point of leaving 
Falmouth for a seven-year tour of duty in the Eastern Seas, was given 
last-minute instructions by the Admiralty, first, to proceed to Sarawak 
to inquire into Brooke's position and, secondly, to report on the pos-
197 Haddington to Wise, October Ilth, 1844. (Ibid., p. 62). 
198 Church to Wise, May 27th, 1847. (e.O. 144/2). 
199 Foreign Office Minute of June 25th, 1846. (e.O. 144/1). 
200 Captain (later Admiral) Sir Edward Be1cher (1799-1877), who figures pro-
minently in this story, was one of the most experienced and, according to 
contemporary accounts, one of the most heartily disliked of the Royal Navy's 
survey officers during the mid-l9th Century. He conducted hydrographic 
surveys of the Pacific Ocean and Bering Straits (1825-8), the West and 
North Coasts of Africa (1830-3), the western coasts of both North and 
South America (1836-9), and, as commander of H.M.S. Samarang, of the 
coasts of China, Formosa, the Philippines, and the Indian Archipelago 
(1842-7). He served in the second China War, and in 1852 led an unsuccessful 
expedition to the Arctic to search for the lost explorer, Sir John FrankIin. 
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sibility of developing some coal seams which were known to exist at 
Brunei.2D1 
The presence of coal in Borneo was first reported by an American, 
G. Tradescant Lay, who visited Brunei in 1837 in the trading vessel, 
Himmaler. Lay's attention was drawn by the inhabitants to a small island 
not far from the capital called Pulau Churmin ('Mirror Island'), because 
of the brilliance of the sun's reflection on the outcrops of coal to be 
seen there. He was assured that ample supplies of the mineral could 
he obtained at many places near Brunei, and he himself found further 
signs of it at Kianggi.2D2 Four year later Captain Congalton of 
H.E.I.C.S. Diana refuelled his ship with Brunei coal when he called 
to piek up survivors from a British merchantman which had been 
wrecked nearby. Samples were forwarded to Calcutta for analysis, and 
the Government Coal Committee there reported that they were equal 
to the "best English" in quality, and "well adapted for steam pur-
poses".2D3 Consequently, Wise was able to give a thoroughly practical 
reason why the British Government should interest themselves in the 
northwest coast of Borneo at this time. Steamers were being employed 
more and more in the Eastern Seas and in the trade with China, and a 
supply of coal east of the Straits of Malacca which did not have to be 
transported all the way from England would be a great advantage. Wise 
also hinted that the Dutch might possibly get in first if the British 
Government did not secure a monopoly of Borneo coal while they had 
the chance. Brooke's great influence with the Brunei rajas, he argued, 
would make an exclusive coal grant easy to obtain.204 Before the 
Samarang had time to reach Borneo, however, Brooke had begun to 
receive naval support from another quarter. 
When the first China War came to an end in August 1842, H.M.S. 
Dido (Captain the Hon. Henry Keppel)2OIi was released from the China 
Station and ordered to Malacca to assist in suppressing piracy and in 
201 Captain Sir Edward Belcher, Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Samarang .. , 
Vol. i, p. 18. 
202 G. Tradescant Lay, Notes made durÏtng the Voyage of the Himmaleh in the 
Malayan Archipelago, pp. 138-9. 
203 Report of November 28th, 1841. (c.O. 144/t). lndian Government Political 
Letter of April 18th, 1842. (F.O. 12/3). 
204 Wise to Sir Robert Peel, December 13th, 1842. (Borneo Papers, pp. 1-2). 
Z05 Captain the Hon. (later Admiral of the Fleet Sir) Henry Keppel (1809-1904) 
joined the Navy in 1822 and, because of his family connections (he was a son 
of the Earl of AlbemarIe), achieved rapid promotion in the service, reaching 
the rank of Post-Captain in 1837. He is best known for bis attacks on the 
Borneo pirates, but he also helped to suppress the slave trade on the West 
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protecting British trade in the Indian Archipelago. While the Dido 
was at Singapore making ready for an attack on the Borneo pirates 
who had recently dealt harshly with the crews of the Sultana, Lord 
M elbourne, and other British ships, Captain Keppel made the acquain-
tance of James Brooke and offered him a passage back to Sarawak. 
Keppel and Brooke were thus able to discuss the whole pirate problem 
at length and they came to the conclusion that "the only way to strike 
at the root of the evil would be to destroy the piratical strongholds in 
the interior" .206 
Brooke was particularly anxious that an effective blow should he 
struck at the pirates of Saribas and Sekrang. These were two fierce 
marauding communities who lived in the area of the Batang Lupar, 
some sixty miles east of Kuching.207 They were known and feared up 
and down the whole length of the West Coast of Borneo, and their 
depredations sometimes extended as far as Bandjermasin and Celebes.208 
Each of these two communities consisted of distinct groups of Malays 
and Dyaks. The Malays belonged to the orang laut, the 'people of the 
sea', and had been in possession of their strongholds in Borneo since 
about the middle of the eighteenth century. When they arrived on the 
north-west coast, instead of fighting with the much more numerous 
Dyak aborigines, they took them into partnership, and gradually trained 
them in the art of piratical warfare. To begin with the Dyaks served 
merely as oarsmen in the prahus of the Malays, and when a trading 
vessel was captured they contented themselves with the heads of the 
crew, leaving the plunder to their superiors.209 But by 1840 their period 
of apprenticeship was complete, and they had become dangerous pirates 
on their own account. Even 50, Malay organization was still needed for 
large-scale operations. Half-bred Arah sharifs, whose claim to be des-
cended from the Prophet gave them a certain mystical glamour, and 
who combined fine executive ability with complete lack of scruple, 
Coast of Africa, commanded a naval brigade with distinction at the siege of 
Sevastopol, and fought an engagement with the Chinese at Fatshan Creek 
during the second China War (1857). He was promoted Admiral of the Fleet 
in 1877 and retired in 1879. His name is commemorated by 'Keppel Harbour' 
at Singapore. 
206 Admiral Sir Henry Keppel, A Sailor's Ufe under Four Sovereigns, Vol. i, 
p. 290. 
207 The Sëkrang (Skrang, Sakarran) River is a tributary of the Batang Lupar, 
and the Saribas enters the sea a dozen miles north of the Batang Lupar 
Estuary. 
208 Brooke, Letter from Borneo, p. 13. 
209 Captain the Hon. Henry Keppel, A Visit to the Indian Archipelago in H.M. 
Ship Meander, Vol. i, p. 128. 
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were the 'master minds' behind most Saribas and 5ekrang pirate 
expeditions. 
When not engaged in piracy, the Dyaks of both rivers went on head-
hunting forays into the territory of their neighbours. Other Dyak 
tribes were addicted to this practice too, but they normally attacked 
only their hereditary enemies; the Saribas and Sêkrang took heads 
indiscriminately. Brooke wrote of the former that they were "robbers 
by land and pirates by sea; their· hand is against every man and every 
man's hand is against them".210 
The Brunei pêngerans who governed the coast had teamt to play 
on this Dyak weakness for head-hunting. By threatening to turn the 
Saribas or the Sêkrang loose on a particular river, they found that 
they could quickly reduce its inhabitants to submission.211 But, as so 
of ten happens in such cases, the servants, realizing their power, began 
to turn against their masters. When the civil war was at its height in 
Sarawak, for example, the Saribas sent word to Raja Muda Hassim 
that they would not be available to support the government because 
they were busy fighting a war of their own elsewhere.212 
This was the anarchic and confused situation that James Brooke 
inherited. When, soon af ter assuming control in Sarawak, he ordered 
the Saribas and Sêkrang to stop their attacks on the tri bes which now 
owed him allegiance, they answered his warnings with defiance. The 
chief of the Sari bas hung a basket on a high tree, and boasted that it 
would soon contain the White Raja's head.213 It was high time, Brooke 
decided, that these troublesome "savages" were taught a lesson.214 
In May 1843 H.M.S. Dido, with Brooke and Keppel on board, 
arrived at Kuching, and almost immediately Raja Muda Hassim made 
a formal request for British naval assistance against the pirates. This 
demand may possibly have been prompted by Brooke, but there is no 
reason to suppose that Hassim made it unwillingly; having identified 
his fortunes with those of the White Raja, he had as much to gain 
from the extermination of the enemies of Sarawak as had Brooke. 
"This is to inform our friend", Hassim wrote to Keppel, "that there 
are certain great pirates of the people of Saribas and Sêkrang in our 
neighbourhood, seizing goods and murdering people on the high seas. 
210 Brooke to TempIer, October 19th, 1839. (Letters, i, p. 74). 
211 Dido, i, pp. 232 and 247. 
212 Ibid., p. 148. 
213 Ibid., p. 312. 
214 Brooke to his mother, June 22nd, 1842. (Letters, i, p. 198). 
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They have more than three hundred war-prahus, and extend their 
ravages even to Bandjermasin; they are not subject to the government 
of Brunei; they take much plunder from vessels trading between 
Singapore and the good people of our country. It would be agreat 
service if our friend would adopt measures to put an end to these 
piratical outrages". Keppel replied that he would take "speedy measures 
to suppress these and all other pirates", and decided to begin with the 
Saribas, hecause their strongholds were reported to he the best 
fortified.ll11i 
At the beginning of J une an oddly assorted squadron sailed from 
Kuching to carry out Keppel's plan. The force consisted of a pinnace, 
two cutters, and a gig from the Diáo, and a miscellaneous collection 
of craft belonging to Brooke's Dyak allies. Most of the Dyaks who 
joined the expedition were hoping for a chance to revenge themse1ves 
on their traditional enemies. According to Keppel, the 'Sow' Dyaks 
entered the fray "eager for heads and plunder".1l16 This was natural, 
since most Sarawak tribes had suffered from the raids of the Saribas 
pirates at one time or another. But there were obvious dangers in 
employing such ill-disciplined auxiliaries for work that was designed 
to pacify rather than inflame. Brooke was later subjected to heavy 
critici sm for 'setting a Dyak to catch a Dyak' in this way. That he 
was able to control his native allies at all was a remarkable tribute to 
his powers of leadership. 
The combined force quickly reduced the main Saribas strongholds 
at Padeh, Paku, and Rimbas, burning the settlements and fortifications 
to the ground, and capturing or destroying considerable numbers of 
guns and war-boats.217 The loss of their houses and stockades was a 
small matter to the pirates, for these could easily be rebuilt. In time, 
boats and guns, too, could be replaced. But the moral effect of Keppel's 
attack was tremendous. Never before had anyone dared to seek out the 
dreaded Saribas in their hiding-places. But now astrange new enemy 
had appeared, with heavy guns, superior marksmanship, and mysterious 
weapons,218 who was able to break through the strongest river obstacles 
and penetrate defences once thought impregnable. The chiefs of Padeh, 
!?lil Dido, ii, pp. 26-8. 
216 Ibid., p. 46. 
:111 Keppel to Vice-Admiral Parker, June 23rd, 1843. (P.P., 1852-3, LXI, 
pp. 284-6). 
218 Keppel was told later that "a common signal sky-rocket" fired during one 
of the night actions "caused more horror and consternation among the enemy 
than any thing else". (DiOO, ii, p. 58). 
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Paku, and Rimbas quickly came to terms, promising to mend their 
ways and attend a peace conference at Kuching. The expedition 
returned in triumph to Sarawak. 
Keppel was eager to follow up this success with a similar attack on 
the pirates of Sekrang, but much to his regret the Dido was almost 
immediately recalled to Hong Kong. Brooke, however, was not to be 
long without support from the Royal Navy. Less than a fortnight af ter 
Keppel's departure, Captain Sir Edward Belcher arrived at Kuching 
in H.M.S. Samarang. 
In accordance with the first part of his instructions Belcher spent 
some time examining conditions at Sarawak, and was about to leave 
for Brunei to have a look at the coal seams there when the Samarang 
ran on a sand bank. With Brooke's assistance the vessel was soon 
salvaged, but not before a whole concourse of ships had appeared in 
Sarawak River anxious to assist her. As aresuIt, when Belcher and 
Brooke set out soon afterwards on their way to Brunei, the Samarang 
had in company H.M.S. Harlequin, H.M. Steamer Vixen, the yacht, 
Royalist, and the British merchant brig, Ariel Z19 - "Quite an imposing 
fleet", Brooke commented, "and one sufficient to terrify the natives of 
the entire Archipelago". 220 
It was certainly quite powerful enough to impress the Sultan and 
pengerans of Brunei. When Belcher and Brooke arrived at the capital, 
the Sultan showed himself very ready to listen to their proposals. 
Belcher obtained the royal signature to a preliminary treaty with Great 
Britain, whereby the government of Brunei promised to foster trade, 
suppress piracy, and keep c1ear of alliances with other foreign powers,221 
and Brooke secured something his friends in England had been urging 
on him for some time - the ces sion in perpetuity of Sarawak. Brunei 
coal, on the other hand, Belcher found disappointing. The quality was 
good, but steam machinery would have to be installed to make the 
seams workabIe. ~ 
Leaving Brunei early in September, the Samarang continued on her 
way to Hong Kong, and did not reappear on the north-west coast of 
Borneo until August 1844; by this time Captain Keppel of the Dido 
Z19 Frank S. Marryat, Borneo aIId the IndÏOln ArC'hipelago, p. 24. H.M.S. Wan-
derer and H.E.LC.S. Diana also came to Sarawak to offer their services but, 
finding that these were not required, returned to Singapore. (Belcher, op. 
eit., Vol. i, pp. 55-7). 
220 Mundy, op. eit., Vol. i, p. 354. 
221 F.O. 1212. 
222 Belcher op. eit., Vol. i, p. 60. 
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had returned to Sara wak, and had begun an enthusiastic assault on the 
strongholds of the pirates of Sekrang. 
For this attack the Dido's boats were reinforced not only by five 
hundred of Brooke's Dyak auxiliaries, but also by four cutters belonging 
to the Honourable Company's steamer, Phlegethon, which had been 
borrowed from the Straits Government for the occasion. The forces 
available to Keppel were thus even more formidable than those which 
had so thoroughly subdued the Saribas the year before. Patusen, the 
chief Sekrang stronghold on the Batang Lupar, was "very extensive", 
Keppel said afterwards, Hand, af ter being weIl looted, made a glorious 
blaze" lasting th ree days.223 Fifty-six guns and vast quantities of 
ammunition were captured, including a ton and a half of gunpowder; 
and over two hundred war boots were destroyed.224 The force then 
proceeded up the Batang Lupar and its three main tributaries, the 
Sekrang, Undup, and Lingga, demolishing the fortifications and cutting 
through the obstructions which lay across its path. 
The Samarang returned to Sarawak just in time to participate in the 
final stages of these operations, but, finding that there was little for 
him to do, Captain Belcher took his ship back to Singapore. There he 
discovered that Governor Butterworth had a most unusual commission 
for him. The Indian Government had recently advised that a 'European 
female' was thought to be in captivity at Ambong, a smaIl pirate settle-
ment on the north-west coast of Borneo, about half-way between 
Brunei and Marudu Bay. The Governor asked Belcher to find out 
whether there was any truth in this rumour, and offered him the 
steamer, Phlegethon, to assist him in the search.22Ii 
A short time before, while the Dido and Samarang were still at 
Kuching, Belcher, Keppel, and Brooke had come to the conclusion that 
Raja Muda Hassim and his extensive entourage at Sarawak ought to 
be removed as soon as possible; 226 their presence was hindering the 
progress of the country and was acting as "a· dead clog on the advan-
cement of the Dyak interests".227 Belcher had thereupon offered the 
services of the Samarang to transfer them to Brunei, and now in 
Singapore he had been given a task which would take the Samarang 
past Brunei in the course of her search for the mysterious European 
223 Dido, ii, p. 90. 
224 Keppel to Governor Butterworth, September 4th, 1844. (P.P., 1851, LVI, 
Pt. i, p. 127). 
22l'i Belcher, op. cit., Vol. i, p. 163. 
226 Brooke to Wise, July 14th, 1844. (F.O. 12/2). 
22'7 Belcher, op. cit., Vol. i, p. 159. 
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female at Ambong.2'J8 He therefore advised Brooke that he was sending 
the Phlegethon to Sarawak, and that the Raja Muda and his train 
should be told to make ready for a passage in her without delay. 
So it came about that in October 1844 Brooke and Belcher once more 
made the journey to Brunei aboard the Samarang, while the Phlegethon 
was sent on ahead with the Raja Muda and a mottey collection of his 
friends and relations. As soon as they arrived at Brunei, the two 
Englishmen requested an audience with the Sultan. This was granted, 
although it was noticeable that the Brunei court's reception was not 
so cordial as it had been the year before. 
Nevertheless, the Sultan readily agreed to all his visitors' demands. 
Pengeran Usop was removed from his unofficial position as chief 
minister at the court, and Hassim was installed in his stead. Fresh 
assurances were also given of the Government of Brunei's firm desire 
to be on friendly terms with the British nation.2'J9 By themselves, 
however, such expressions of goodwill were worth littte, and Brooke 
decided to take the opportunity of securing a more permanent guarantee 
of the Sultan's continued good faith. In response to a direct suggestion 
from the White Raja, the Government of Brunei addressed the follow-
ing letter to Queen Victoria: "The Sultan and the Raja Muda Hassim 
desire to gain the friendship and aid of the Queen of England for the 
suppression of piracy and the encouragement and extension of trade; 
and to assist in forwarding these objects they are willing to cede to the 
Queen of England the Island of Labuan, and its islets, on such terms 
as may hereafter be arranged by any pers on appointed by Her 
Majesty".uo 
Meanwhile in London Brooke's energetic agent, Henry Wise, had 
been persevering with his campaign to secure official British recognition 
for Sarawak. For a time Wise appeared to be making good progress. 
The Admiralty agreed that Belcher should be instructed to report on 
Sarawak's possibilities as a naval base, and Brooke, hearing of this, 
began to toy with the idea of being made a British governor.231 But 
af ter this initial success Wise found it increasingly difficult to penetrate 
2'J8 Whether or not a white woman was in fact being held captive at Ambong at 
this time has been much debated by writers on Borneo. Belcher, at any rate, 
found no trace of one. 
2'29 Belcher to the Admiralty, November IOth, 1844. (F.O. 12/3). 
230 Belcher, op. cit., Vol. i, pp. 176-7. 
2131 Brooke to Tempier, April 13th, 1843. (Letters, i, p. 248). 
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thewall of Government apathy. The Foreign Secretary, the Earl of 
Aberdeen, refused to grant Brooke any diplomatic or consular status,231l 
and the Colonial Office opposed all suggestions that Sarawak should 
be converted into a Crown Colony. 
In August 1842, however, an event took place in the Far East which 
greatly strengthened Wise's hand - the signing of the Treaty of 
Nanking at the end of the first China War. This agreement opened 
Shanghai and other Chinese ports to the commerce of the world, and 
provided for the cession to Great Britain of the island of Hong Kong. 
Immediately Borneo, partieularly its north-west eoast, inereased in 
strategie significance. The expected growth of British trade with the 
new Chinese 'treaty ports' meant that coaling stations, harbours of 
refuge, bases from which Chinese and Malay piracy could be attacked, 
and other shipping facilities would soon be urgently needed east of the 
Straits of Malacca. "It will, sir, of course, not fait to strike you", Wise 
wrote in his pompous way to Sir Robert Peel, "that many advantages 
will accrue to the British nation by founding a Crown colony on the 
western side of Borneo, particularly as Sarawak would then form the 
connecting link between the British possessions of Singapore and 
Hong Kong".233 
Wise was also in the strong position of being able to offer to the 
British Government an almost unlimited choice of sites where such 
a eolony might be established. Sarawak was an obvious first preferenee, 
because it already possessed a stabIe government; but if not Sarawak, 
then anywhere else on the north-west coast of Borneo that Her 
Majesty's Government might be pleased to select. This was a large 
claim, but Wise was justified in making it. By 1842 the White Raja's 
influence in northern Borneo was so great that he was in a very real 
sense the master of local polities. "I am supreme! I with the Rajas of 
Borneo", Brooke wrote in July of that year, "and whatever I require 
I can procure. Do not imagine that a title to property here is as difficult 
to obtain as one in England ... If I desired I might have a dozen rivers 
besides Sarawak".2M Moreover, in a contemporary letter to Wise, 
Brooke made it clear that whatever he could win for himself he could 
also secure for the British Government. "In the present state of Borneo 
Proper", he declared, "for British protection against pirates and agaillst 
t31l Melville, Wise & Co. to Brooke, December 5th, 1842. (Borneo Papers, pp. 3-4). 
233 Wise to Peel, March 12th, 1844. (Ibid, p. 26). 
2M Brooke to the Rev. C. Johnson, July 19th, 1843. (Ibid., p. 23). 
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themselves, the Rajas would cede any quantity of territory".236 
Brooke consequently became very impatient at the Government's 
slowness to make up their minds whether they would accept his offer 
of Sarawak or not. In his opinion the establishment of a Crown Colony 
in Borneo ought not to be regarded as an end in itself, but merely as 
the first step in a much larger programme of British expansion through 
the Indian Archipelago. Ris own achievement, he considered, had 
pointed the way. With a little energy British influence could easily be 
extended from Borneo through the Sulu Archipelago and as far as 
N ew Guinea. By a series of agreements with native princes and by 
acquiring rights which, if need be, might be allowed to lie dormant for 
the time being, Great Britain could obtain nominal sovereignty over a 
vast stretch of territory which would be clear of the Dutch on the one 
hand, and the Spaniards on the other, and which could later be exploited 
when the necessary capital resources became available. 
Such plans, Brooke realized, lay far in the future. The immediate 
necessity was to establish permanent British influence over the Sultanate 
of Brunei. As early as March 1843 he had remarked in a letter to Wise 
that the ces sion of Labuan, a small island at the northern end of Brunei 
Bay, could easily be obtained from the Sultan.236 A settlement here 
would not only serve as a base for expeditions against the pirates, but 
would also provide a useful observation post from which a watch could 
be kept on happenings at the Sultan's capita!. At that time, however, 
the British Government were still engaged in weighing up the pros 
and cons of Brooke's proposal that recognition should be afforded to 
Sarawak, and he had therefore not bothered to approach the Sultan 
regarding a possible cession. 
As the months went by without any sign that Sarawak was ever 
to receive British recognition, Brooke and Wise came to the conclusion 
that a small island at the entrance to· Brunei Bay, though admittedly 
a poor substitute for Sarawak as a Crown Colony, would at least 
provide a valuable point d'appui from which British power could one 
day be expanded along the Borneo coast. Wise then put up the sug-
gestion that the Government would he more ready to agree to a 
settlement at Labuan if the Sultan of Brunei made a present of the 
235 Brooke to Wise, March 13th, 1843. (Ibid., p. 11). 
236 Ibid. Shortly afterwards Brooke wrote in his ;ournal: "The proper course 
for the British Government to pursue would he to obtain the monopoly of 
the Borneo coa! with the island of Labuan". (Mundy, op. cit., Vol. i, p. 339). 
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island outright.237 Brooke saw the value of this proposal, and induced 
the Sultan and Hassim to make the necessary offer of ces sion when 
he visited Brunei with Sir Edward Belcher in October 1844. 
When he took this step Brooke was acting entirely on his own 
initiative. In official circles in England he was still regarded as a private 
gentleman who had been invested by a Malay Sultan with autocratie 
powers over a small native state in Borneo. He had not been given 
authority to carry out negotiations of any kind and, because of this, 
he believed that the Government we re wasting valuable opportunities 
in not making better use of his unique position. He began to suspect 
that he was being regarded as a schemer and a job-hunter,238 and at 
one time even had serious thoughts of returning home in despair.239 
But at last half-way through 1844, two and a half years af ter 
Brooke's campaign to obtain recognition had begun, the Government 
took a first tentative step along the road which was eventually to lead 
to British dominion over a third of Borneo. On August 20th the Earl 
of Haddington (First Lord of the Admiralty) asked Wise if the White 
Raja would be willing to accept an unpaid appointment, other than that 
of consul. Wise replied by return of post that the Raja would be very 
willing to do so.24() A fortnight later Haddington wrote again to say 
that although a regular diplomatie appointment for Brooke was still 
"a matter for consideration" the Government had decided "to treat 
him in all respects as a confidential agent", and, further, that Captain 
Drinkwater Bethune, R.N., was being sent to Borneo "to report on 
the best place for the establishment of a naval station and harbour 
of refuge".241 
On February 17th, 1845, Bethune arrived at Kuching and handed 
Raja Brooke a letter from the Foreign Secretary, appointing him 
British confidential agent in Borneo.242 In accordance with his new 
instructions, Brooke hurried to Brunei to inform the Sultan and Raja 
Muda Hassim that their hopes of British support in the struggle against 
237 That this particular proposal was made by Wise and not by Brooke is shown 
by a letter which Brooke wrote to his London agent immediately af ter the ces-
sion had been obtained. "You mention in your letter", Brooke told Wise, "how 
desirabie it would be to possess Labuan, and your mention has induced me to 
gain a paper from the Sultan and Muda Hassim, offering the Island to the 
British Government". (Brooke to Wise, October 31st, 1844: F.O. 12/2). 
!J38 Brooke to Tempier, December 31st, 1844. (Letters, ii, p. 41). 
239 Brooke to Johnson, May 1844. (Ibid., p. 24). 
24() Wise to Haddington, August 21st, 1844. (Borneo Papers, p. 53). 
241 Haddington to Wise, September 6th, 1844. (Ibid., p. 54). 
242 Dido, ii, p. 163. Aberdeen to Brooke, November lst, 1844. (F.O. 12/2). 
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the pirates would soon be realized. The Sultan was obviously gratified 
at this news, and inquired when the English were coming to Labuan, 
adding, "I want to have the Europeans near me".243 
There was a partieular reason why the Government of Brunei should 
be anxious for British protection at this time. Reports had been received 
that a powerful Arab shari! named 'Usman, the chief of the Lanun 
pirates of Marudu Bay, was threatening to attack the capital. 'Usman 
was in league with Pengeran Usop, who since his dismissal from offiee 
the previous October had become the leader of the anti-British faction 
in Brunei polities. Hassim consequently feared that the two allies were 
planning a coup d'état, whieh would probably be aimed at himself. 
Usop was jealous of the Raja Muda's place in the Sultan's favour and 
anxious to regain his former pre-eminence, while 'Usman strongly 
resented the orders he had recently received from Hassim proclaiming 
that he would be treated as an outlaw unless he abandoned the practiee 
of piracy. 
The Sultan and the Raja Muda therefore made a formal request 
to Brooke, and also to Bethune who had accompanied Brooke to Brunei 
in H.M.S. Driver, for British naval protection. "The pirates are 
exceedingly displeased we have made an alliance with the English", 
the Sultan told Bethune, "and we would strongly recommend an attack 
upon Marudu, with a view to destroying the pirates who reside at that 
place".244 Brooke hastened to Singapore to enlist the help of Rear-
Admiral Sir Thomas Cochrane, the Commander-in-Chief of the Far 
Eastern Station, and on August 8th, in response to this plea, a British 
squadron of eight warships appeared off Brunei with the Admiral 
himself in command aboard his flagship, H.M.S. Agincourt.241S 
In the course of an interview with the Sultan, Cochrane demanded 
reparation from the Government of Brunei for illegally detaining two 
lascars from the crew of the Sultana, a British merchantman which 
had been struck by lightning and captured by pirates four and a half 
years before.246 The Sultan and Hassim promptly denied all respon-
sibility, and laid the blame on Pengeran Usop - which indeed was where 
it belonged - saying that they would be much obliged if the British 
Navy would take steps to punish him for his past misdeeds. Usop was 
243 DUo, ii, p. 166. 
244 Sultan of Brunei to Bethune, March 6th, 1845. (P.P .. 1852-3, LXI, p. 302). 
- The other ships were: H.M.S. Vestal, H.M.S. Daedclus, H.M.S. Cruiser, 
H.M.S. Wolverinl!, H.M. Steamer Vixen, and H.E.I.C. Steamers Pluto and 
Nemesis. 
246 Cochrane to the Sultan of Brunei, August 1845. (C.O. 144/1). 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY BORNEO 91 
sent for and, when he faited to appear, a shot was fired over his house. 
With a show of bravado he immediately ordered his own private 
batteries to reply, and a few minutes later the house was in ruins and 
its owner was fleeing for his life into the jungle.247 
Cochrane then orde red his squadron up the coast to Marudu Bay 
in order to dispose of Sharif 'Usman. On August 19th, af ter cutting 
through a heavy boom which guarded the entrance to the main pirate 
stronghold, five hundred and fifty marines and bluejackets advanced 
to the attack. 'Usman's forces were overwhelmed and his village burnt 
to the ground. "Marudu", Brooke wrote in his journal next day, "has 
ceased to exist". 248 
The triumphant outcome of the 'Battle of Marudu' gave the White 
Raja reason to believe that the first part of his self-appointed mission 
in Borneo was complete. The power of all the most dangerous pirate 
communities on the north-west coast had at last been shattered, though 
periodic vi sits from British warships would still be needed if the lesson 
they had received was to be driven home. Brooke himself had been 
granted an official position under the Foreign Office, and the British 
Government were beginning to listen to his views. Captain Bethune 
was busy looking for a suitable site for a naval station and harbour 
of refuge, a government with st rong British sympathies had been 
established at Brunei, and Brooke's own status as Raja of Sarawak 
was more secure than it had ever been before. 
Two main factors were respansible for his remarkable success: first. 
his astonishing capacity for handling native peoples, which amaunted 
at times almost to genius; and, secondly, the generous support, both 
direct and indirect, which he had received from the Royal Navy and, 
to a les ser extent, from the steamers of the East India Company's 
service. 
When Brooke first arrived in Borneo, he had been announced by 
letters from a British Governor, S. G. Bonham. This had helped ta 
create among the inhabitants an impression, later confirmed by the 
timely arrival of the steamer, Diana, that the British Government were 
behind him. Brooke himself noticed that the problem of dealing with 
247 Did", ii, pp. 170-1. Usop later made an unsuccessful attempt to seize power in 
Brunei, and when this failed retired to his feudal estates at Kimanis. He was 
subsequently captured while temporarily off his guard and strangled on or-
ders from Hassim. (Cf. E. Owen Rutter, The Pirate Wind, pp. 172-3). 
248 Dide, ii, p. 175. Brooke to Aberdeen, September 19th, 1845. (F.a. 12/3). 
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piratical Dyak tri bes was made easier for him because they believed 
he was backed by all the power of his country.249 He had not deliberately 
set out to create this impression. On the contrary, he was always most 
careful to avoid any suggestion that he had come to Borneo other than 
as a 'private gentleman'. But the belief was nevertheless widely held. 
This did not escape the attention of Colonel Butterworth, the Governor 
of the Straits Settlements. Reporting Keppel's success against the pirates 
of Sekrang in 1844, Butterworth told the Government of India that "a 
Mr. Brooke" had been a member of the expedition. "It necessarily 
foIlows", he went on, "that the people of the petty states through which 
the expedition passed ... will suppose that we were supporting Mr. 
Brooke and the Raja Pengeran Muda Hassim".250 
Captain Keppel's decision to attack the Saribas and Sekrang pirates 
was of the utmost value in consolidating Brooke's rule in Sarawak. 
There was no particular reason why Keppel should have selected these 
two communities for his first assaults. Indeed, he might weIl have 
begun with the Lanuns of Tempasuk or Marudu Bay, who were 
unquestionably more dangerous to European shipping. He made his 
decision, however, and later gave this reason for it: "It was with 
unfeigned pleasure that I then found that, while performing my duty 
in the suppression of piracy, I was, at the same time, rendering the 
greatest assistance and support to an individual in [Brooke's 1 praise-
worthy, novel, and important position".251 A most happy coincidence 
of duty and inclination for the future of Sarawak I 
The assistance given to the White Raja by Sir Edward Belcher was 
less direct, but equally valuable. In August 1843, it will be remembered, 
the Samarang, supported by four other British vessels, inc1uding two 
warships, carried Brooke to Brunei. It was on this occasion that he 
obtained from the Sultan the cession of Sarawak in perpetuity. A year 
later, Belcher's offer to convey Raja Muda Hassim and his family to 
Brunei in the steamer, Phlegethon, enabled Brooke to restore to power 
in the capital a government favourable not only to British, but also to 
his own, interests. Here again the presence of British warships on his 
doorstep - literally so, for Brunei River, the 'main street' of the 
capital, ran past the royal palace - can hardly have Ie ft the Sultan 
unmoved. The scene during the final conference between Captain 
249 DUo, i, p. 297. 
~ Butterworth to the Secretary to the Government of India, September 14th. 
1844. (P.P., 1851, LVI, Pt. i, p. 126). 
251 Diàc, ii, pp. 1-2. 
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Belcher, Raja Brooke, and His Highness of Brunei has been described 
by an eye-witness in these words: "The barge was so placed that the 
assassination of Mr. Brooke and the Europeans would have been 
revenged on the first discharge of our gun by the slaughter of hundreds; 
and in the main street lay the steamer, with a spring on her cabie, her 
half ports up, and guns loaded to the muzzle ... The platform admitted 
one of the steamer's guns to look into the audience chamber, the muzzle 
was pointed directly at the sultan, a man held the lighted tow in his 
hand".252 
Neither Keppel nor Belcher, however, acted at any time contrary 
to their orders in providing support for the White Raja. Faced with 
the problem of carrying out their duties in a country which neither had 
visited before, they turned automatically to the one Englishman who could 
claim to know the real state of aftairs on the north-west coast of Borneo. 
Some of the assistance they oftered was prompted by friendship and 
admiration, but most was given unconsciously. The mere presence of 
their warships,253 coupled with the fact that Brooke talked to them on 
equal terms, was enough to persuade the impressionable inhabitants of 
Borneo that the White Raja who ruled in Sarawak was a great man 
indeed. As Belcher remarked when the Sanw,rang dropped anchor oft 
Kuching only a fortnight af ter the Dido had left the Borneo coast, 
"The arrival of our frigate at this particular period was estimated ... 
beyond doubt, by the people of Sarawak, as a jealous interest on the 
part of the British Government in the aftairs of Mr. Brooke".254 
2ü2 Marryat, op. cit., pp. 114-15. The author was a midshipman in H.M.S. Smna-
rang. 
253 According to Keppel, the Didc was the first square-rigged vesse1 that had 
ever entered Sarawak River. (Dwo, ii, p. 6). 
2IW Belcher, op. cit., Vol. i, p. 22. 
CHAPTER V 
JAMES BROOD AND filE DureB GOVERNMENT 
By August 1845, through the united efforts of Raja Brooke and the 
Royal Navy, all local obstacles to the creation of a British colony on 
the north-west coast of Borneo had been removed. A pro-British 
government was in power at Brunei, the Sultan had announced his 
willingness to cede the necessary territory, and the Malay and Dyak 
pirates along the coast had not yet recovered from the devastating 
attacks of Keppel and Sir Thomas Cochrane. But no one could tell how 
long this favourable situation would last. Although British influence 
at Brunei had been greatly strengthened by the expulsion of Pengeran 
Usop and by the destruction of Sharif 'Usman's stronghold at Marudu 
Bay, a powerful opposition party still existed at the Sultan's court. 
The members of this party had long been reaping huge pro fits as the 
leading entrepreneurs of the local piracy and slave trade, and they 
rightly foresaw that a continuance of the recent British attacks would 
destroy their livelihood entirely. From Brooke's point of view, there-
fore, it was vital that the British Government should come to a decision 
on the question of a colony in Borneo before it was too late, before 
another Brunei palace revolution placed power in the hands of those 
who might not only persuade the Sultan to withdraw the offer of 
Labuan but might also compel him to denounce all past agreements to 
co-operate with Great Britain in the suppression of piracy and the 
promotion of trade. 
The British Government, however, had no intention of being hurried 
into a new colonizing venture on the coast of Borneo. Their slowness 
was no doubt partly due to the easy pace at which bureaucracy moved 
in those days, but it was also caused by the large number of Govern-
ment Departments that had to be consulted. Both the Admiralty and 
the Foreign Office had already had a finger in the pie: the Admiralty 
had issued instructions to Belcher to report on Sarawak and had 
ordered Bethune to search for a site for a naval station, and the Foreign 
Office had appointed the White Raja as their Confidential Agent in 
Borneo. But neither the Treasury, which would have to supply the 
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money, nor the Colonial Office, which would have to do most of the 
work, had yet given their consent to any plan for the creation of a new 
Crown Colony. 
The Admiralty's interest in Borneo was primarily strategie, and was 
the direct result of increasing British naval responsibilities in the Far 
East. The abolition of the East India Company's monopoly of trade 
with China in 1834, and the rise in the volume of the China trade 
generally af ter the opening of the 'treaty ports' in 1842, had greatly 
complicated the Royal Navy's task of protecting British merchant 
shipping east of Singapore. During the Napoleonic Wars Great Britain 
had acquired an extensive chain of naval bases covering the main sea 
routes to India and the East up to and inc1uding the Straits of Malacca. 
Ascension Island, the Cape of Good Hope, the Mauritius, Chagos, and 
Seychelles groups, Ceylon with its fine harbour at Trincomalee, and 
the Maldive, Laccadive and Andaman Islands were all either captured 
during the war or ceded to Great Britain at the peace treaty. But 
between Singapore and the China Coast there was a gap of nearly 
fifteen hundred miles without a single friendly port; along the whole 
length of this important maritime highway there was no base from 
which the Royal Navy could operate against Chinese or Malay pirates, 
and no harbour of refuge in which merchant shipping could shelter 
from the typhoons of the South China Sea. The absence of naval 
facilities in these waters had been of much less consequence when the 
East India Company's monopoly was in force, and when (as, for 
example, during the Napoleonic Wars) China-bound East Indiamen 
had been herded together in annual convoys which of ten did not touch 
land between the Cape of Good Hope and Canton. Under the convoy 
system, naval protection had been provided by a warship sailing in 
company with the merchantmen for the whole voyage,25/i and numerous 
naval bases had not then been so necessary.256 But by the 184O's the 
China convoys had disappeared, and British ships were trading in-
dependently to China in ever-increasing numbers from England, India, 
Singapore, and elsewhere, without any restrictions on their movements. 
To protect them, locally-based naval patrols were needed, and these 
in turn required more naval stations. The acquisition of Hong Kong 
in 1842 helped to solve the problem, but the fifteen hundred mile gap 
between Singapore and the China Coast still remained. The Admiralty 
255 C. Northcote Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern Seas, 1793-1813, p. 308. 
!156 Ships sailing independently, like the country ships of India, were expected, 
and were sufficiently weil armed, to look after themselves. 
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therefore turned their attention to the north-west coast of Borneo, 
which was situated conveniently between the two. 
A second reason for the Admiralty's interest in Borneo was the 
discovery of new coal deposits. It had been common knowledge since 
about 1841 that coal existed near Brunei, and during his visit of 
October 1844 Sir Edward Belcher was able to confirm rumours that 
there were further outcrops on Labuan as well. Samples of coal from 
both places we re sent for examination to Sir Henry de la Beche, the 
Director of the British Ordnance Survey, who reported that they were 
"of a quality quite equal to our best Newcastle".257 It was questionable 
whether Borneo coal could be produced at competitive prices, since the 
Admiralty's own suppHes were being landed at Hong Kong for as Httle 
as i. 1-17-0 a ton,258 but there were obvious advantages in having a 
'self-supporting' coal depot in the China Seas. If communications with 
Great Britain were cut in time of war, for example, coal would have 
to be brought all the way from Bengal or Australia, the only other 
sources of supply. 
In July 1844 Raja Brooke's campaign for a British colony in Borneo 
received powerful support .from John Crawfurd, a former Resident 
of Singapore. Prompted by Wise,259 Crawfurd drafted a long memo-
randum on Brooke's proposal for the information of the Admiralty. 
"I am of opinion", he wrote, "that a settlement on the north-west coast 
of Borneo... would be highly advantageous to this country - as a 
coal depot for steam-navigation, as a means of suppressing Malayan 
piracy, as a harbour of refuge for ships disabled in the China Sea and. 
finally, as a commanding position during a naval war. The island of 
Labuan has been pointed out for this purpose ; and as far as our present 
limited knowledge of it wiII allow me to judge, it appears to possess 
all the necessary qualities for such a settlement".260 
Crawfurd's advocacy cleared away any lingering doubts the Ad-
miralty may have had regarding the desirability of a naval station on 
2M Belcher, op. eit., Vol. i, p. 186. 
258 Cochrane to the Admiralty, April IOth, 1845. (P.P., 1852-3, LXI, p. 301). 
259 Wise submitted Crawfurd's name to the British Government, together with 
those of John Anderson (author of Practical and Commercial Crmsiderations 
relative to the Malayan Peninsuia, 1824), T. e. Robertson, Governor S. G. 
Bonham, and Dr. Horsfield, as persons qualified to recommend in the matter. 
Anderson, in particular, gave Wise valuable assistance, even to the extent 
of 'ghosting' some of his earlier letters to the Admiralty. (Anderson to Aber-
deen, July 14th, 1845: F.O. 12/3). 
260 e.O. 144/1. Crawfurd's memorandum also appears in full in the Borneo 
Papers and in Keppel's Dido, ii, pp. 212-26. 
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the Borneo coast, and led directly to the dispatch of Captain Drinkwater 
Bethune the following November.261 Bethune was instructed to pick 
out a position with a good anchorage, room for merchant vessels, 
sufficient depth of water for large ships, and shelter against the pre-
vailing winds. He was also told to make an examination of all known 
coal-fields in the area and to report where the best quality coal was 
to be found. Moreover, any locality which satisfied these requirements 
must he easily defensible and conveniently situated to act as a base 
from which expeditions might be launched against the pirates. Labuan 
had been recommended by Brooke and Crawfurd, but other pos si bIe 
sites must be investigated too. Above all, Bethune was "cautiously to 
avoid all intercourse with those districts settled by the subjects of the 
King of the Netherlands".262 
The Colonial and Foreign Offices were kept informed of these 
developments, and by the end of 1844 both had agreed with the Ad-
miraIty that a naval station on the Borneo coast was "indispensably 
necessary".263 The Treasury, too, had been induced to accept this 
view.264 But neither the Colonial Secretary, Lord Stanley, nor the 
Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Aberdeen, were prepared to go farther. 
A naval station was the most they would agree to. They could see no 
justification for a full-scale colonial establishment in Borneo, with a 
governor, appropriate administrative services, and a military garrison. 
What was required, they feIt, was a settlement more on the model of 
Ascension Island, a naval base in the South Atlantic which was 
exclusively under the Admiralty's jurisdiction, and ranked as one of 
Her Majesty's ships.26S For this reason the Colonial Office were in-
volved only incidentally in the earlier inter-departmental discussions 
regarding Labuan, but the Foreign Office, who had to keep an eye 
on the activities of other nations in the Far East as well as safeguard 
Great Britain's general strategic interests there, were much more in-
261 F.O. 1214. 
262 'Instructions from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to Captain 
Bethune, R.N., to inquire into the State of Coalfields in the Eastern Archi-
pelago', November Ist, 1844. (P.P., 1852-3, LXI, pp. 313-15). 
2iI3 Aberdeen to Brooke, November Ist, 1844. (F.O. 1212). 
264 Foreign Office Minute of June 25th, 1846. (F.O. 1214). 
2IJ5 In September 1845 Lord Aberdeen mentioned in conversation with Baron 
Dedel, the Dutch Ambassador in London, that the British Government were 
thinking of placing ua ship's company" on Labuan. (Dedel to Baud, Septem-
ber 23rd, 1845, Private: Buil. Zaken, No. 3133). Ascension Island remained 
under Admiralty supervision until 1922, when it became a dependency of St. 
Helena. 
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timately concerned. The nation which was most likely to object to an 
increase in British influence in Borneo, and whose counter-claims Her 
Majesty's Government had to be ready to combat, was, of course, th!" 
N etherlands. 
The Dutch Government first became aware of the existence of James 
Brooke when an article describing his projected visit to the Far East 
appeared in aParis journal.266 The implication of this article (published 
in October 1838 in the Gazette de France) was that the voyage of the 
Royalist marked the beginning of a British campaign to seize control 
of the whole of Borneo. From Singapore, the Gazette complained, 
Brooke would be able "easily to undertake excursions to the various 
parts of the great island of Borneo, possession of which the English 
have long coveted. Already masters of New Holland, once they have 
taken possession of Borneo they will announce that everything between 
the two belongs to them by droit dj enclave. Who will be able to hinder 
them? The wonder is that they have not declared themselves masters 
of all Polynesia. But that will come ... " 267 Soon afterwards the United 
Service JournalJ disclosing that Rear-Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland 
had sailed from Singapore with six warships to bring pressure on 
China in, the current opium dispute, announced that once the Admiral 
had completed his duties in China, he "purposed going to Borneo to 
arrange another important mercantile affair with the Dutch and British 
merchants".268 Both these reports were wildly inaccurate, but the Dutch 
were not to know this at the time, and accepted them as indications of 
a re-awakening British imperialism in the lndian Archipelago. So far 
as Brooke's expedition was concerned, however, their apprehensions 
were temporarily allayed when the Colonial Minister pointed out that 
the British Government were hardly likely to be behind an enterprise 
involving only one small schooner of 140 tons burden.269 
When Brooke arrived in the East in mid-1839, therefore, his ex-
planation that he was merely a private individual with no govern-
- J. C. Baud to the Minister of the Colonies, November IOth, 1838, No. 399. 
(Buit. Zaken, No. 3133). 
267 'Ethnographie et géographie: exploration de I'archipel asiatique: établissement 
des Anglais à Boritéo', Gazette de France, October 28th, 1838. At this time 
an Anglo-French dispute over Tahiti was causing bitter feelings on both sides 
of the Channel. 
268 'Letter from Portsmouth', October 2Ist, 1838, United Service Journal, 1838, 
iii, p. 401. 
269 Minister of the Colonies to the King, November 23rd, 1838. (Kol., 1838, 
No. 499, Secret). 
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ment connections of any kind, and no object other than the pursuit of 
knowiedge, was readily accepted in Batavia. Governor-General de 
Eerens granted permission for the Royalist to use ports in the Nether-
lands lndies without paying harbour dues, and recommended her owner 
to the good offices of Dutch officials.270 But some of Brooke's actions 
during a visit he paid to Celebes in 1840 revived Dutch suspicions as 
to his possible secret motives. On one occasion he gave a quantity of 
muskets and gunpowder to a Bugis chief who was in revolt against 
the Netherlands lndian Government. On another he tried to open a 
communication with the Raja of Bone,and this attempt failed,according 
to information received in Batavia, only because the Raja remained 
faithful to the obligations he owed to his Dutch overlords.271 These 
incidents persuaded the Netherlands lndian Government that Brooke's 
real aims were not "private and scientific" as had previously been 
supposed, but "official and political".272 
When news of the occurrences in Celebes reached The Hague, the 
Colonial Minister, J. C. Baud, asked his colleague, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, to find out whether or not the British Government 
were actively supporting Brooke.273 This request was passed to Baron 
Dedel, the Dutch Ambassador in London,274 who reported that he could 
see no cause for anxiety, since an English friend had positively assured 
him that Brooke had not been entrusted "with any political or commer-
cial scheme whatever".275 The Dutch Government's apprehensions were 
consequently quietened once again. 
Brooke himself, meanwhile, had returned to Borneo from Celebes, 
and had begun 'meddling', as contemporary Dutch accounts phrased it. 
in the Sarawak civil war. The Assistant-Resident of Sambas imme-
270 Governor-General to the Minister of the Colonies, February 8th, 1841, No. 2, 
Secret. (Buit. Zaken, No. 3133.) Brooke to Aberdeen, March 10th, 1846. (F.O. 
12/4.) Dedel to Aberdeen, March 2Oth, 1846. (c.a. 14411.) 
271 Governor of Makassar to the Governor-General, April 3Oth, 1840, No. 181'. 
(Kol. 1841, No. 66, Secret.) Dedel to Aberdeen, March 2Oth, 1846. (c.a. 144/1.) 
272 Governor-General to the Minister of the Colonies, ]uly 22nd, 1840, No. 24, 
L" G3. (Kol., 1841, No. 54, Secret). 
27.3 Minister of the Colonies to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 6th, 
1841. (Kol., 1841, No. 54, Secret). 
274 Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of the Colonies, February 16th, 
1841, No. 4, Secret. (Kol., 1841, No. 66, Secret). 
275 Letter to Ambassador Dedel of March 25th, 1841. No signature appears on 
this letter in the form in which it is included in the Dutch records. Dedel 
stated merely that it came from "a member of the Royal Geographical Society" 
(under the auspices of which Brooke's original expedition had been undertaken). 
(Dedel to Verstolk van Soelen, March 26th, 1841, No. 26: Buit. Zaken. 
No. 3133). 
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diately addressed a curt note to him, requesting, in so many words, that 
he would mind bis own business, and allow the inhabitants of Sarawak 
to mind theirs. This letter is not mentioned anywhere in the White 
Raja's journals, private correspondence, or public dispatches. In 1846, 
moreover, he told Lord Aberdeen that up to that time he had received 
two letters only from the Dutch authorities in Borneo, one dealing 
with the escape of some prisoners from Sambas gaol, and the other 
asking him to help in recovering a debt owed to the Sultan of Sambas 
by a Chinese kongsi which had migrated to Sarawak.276 Yet it seems 
most unlikely that he should not have received a letter of this importance. 
lts text 277 is as follows: 
"Dear Sir, 
A report has reached me that you are interfering in the affairs 
of Sarawak. I sincerely hope the rumour is entirely without 
foundation. You cannot be ignorant that all meddling in the 
political affairs or party dissensions at Sarawak by British sub-
jects would be a violation of Article 5 of the Treaty between 
their Netherlands and British majesties, and I must therefore 
protest against any interference of the kind, if you have been 
drawn into the contest now going on among the people of 
Sarawak. 
I trust this notification will be sufficient, and that you will 
feel the propriety of withdrawing from the scene of contest and 
leaving the Sarawak people to manage their own affairs. 
I am placed under the necessity of informing my Government 
of the report of your course, in order that it mayadopt such 
measures as may put an end to unjustifiable political inter-
ferences. 
Accept the assurances of my esteem, 
Y ours truly, 
R. Bloem, 
Adst. Resident van Sambas". 
But in any case, whether he received this letter or not, Brooke certainly 
paid no attention to it, and continued on his way undisturbed. 
In August 1841 the senior Dutch official in western Borneo com-
276 Brooke to Aberdeen, March 1Oth, 1846. (F.O. 12/4). 
277 R. Bloem to J. Brooke, November 14th, 1840, No. 98. (Kol., 1842, No. 256fW. 
Secret. Also reproduced in Emily Hahn, lames Brooke of Sarawak, p. 66). 
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plained to his Government that the English interloper at Sarawak was 
trading extensively in muskets and gunpowder. Since it was quite 
impossible, he reminded the Governor-General, to prevent smuggling 
across the Sambas border, an influx of firearms into Dutch Borneo 
would almost certainly cause trouble in Sanggau and Sintang, two 
districts with easy communication with Sarawak by river.278 A month 
later the Netherlands 1ndian Government were further informed that 
Brooke had been installed as sovereign ruler of Sarawak. This per-
suaded the Governor-General that a firm stand must be taken if British 
pretensions in Borneo were to be checked, and he advised Minister 
Baud that he was planning to establish a Dutch Government post in 
the Sultanate of Brunei.279 
This information arrived at The Hague almost simultaneously with 
a dispatch from London, containing a copy of the Letter trom Borneo 
- the document by which Brooke first offered to cede Sarawak to the 
British Government. 1t was no longer possible to doubt the reality of 
the White Raja's political aims. He had now publicly announced that it 
was his hope and intention to establish permanent British influence over 
the north-west coast of Borneo. Vet, on Baud's advice, and contrary 
to the wishes of the Governor-General, the Dutch home Government 
made no move to check him. The Colonial Minister's reasoning was as 
follows: in the first place, since the Government of the Netherlands 
1ndies did not themselves possess any sovereign rights in the Sultanate 
of Brunei, they would not be justified in attempting to exclude other 
powers from that part of Borneo; in the second place, existing Dutch 
settlements on the West and South Coasts were such poor advertise-
ments for the island as a whole that foreign nations were unlikely to 
want to compete seriously for possession of it. The British, in deed, 
already controlled most of the trade of Borneo from Singapore. "T 
think it will be advisable", Baud therefore told King William, "for us 
to let [Great Britain] have a free hand, and not cause an argument by 
the creation of a post" in Brunei.280 
Events were soon to show that J ames Brooke constituted the greatest 
threat to Dutch power in Borneo since Sir Stam ford Raffles, but, 
278 Commissaris-Inspecteur ·Donker to the Governor-General, July 31st, 1841, 
No. 310/8, Secret. (Kol., 1842, No. 256fVv, Secret). 
279 Governor-General to the Minister of the Colonies, November 3Oth, 1841, 
No. 578. (Ibid.) 
250 Minister of the Colonies to the King, May 19th, 1842, 1." A, No. 236, Secret. 
lBuit. Zaken, No. 3133). 
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curiously enough, it was not the actions of the White Raja of Sarawak 
that provoked the first Dutch protests against British interference in 
the island, but those of another, and less famous, private adventurer. 
In February 1844 the Y oung Queen and the Anna, two British 
trading brigs chartered in Hong Kong, and commanded by an enter-
prising Scot named the Hon. Erskine Murray, arrived at Koetei on 
the East Coast of Borneo. The local Sultan gave a warm welcome to 
Murray and his companions, and expressed the hope that theirs would 
be the first of many similar vi sits by British merchants. But when the 
leader of the expedition asked permission to take up permanent residence 
at Koetei in order to proteet British trade, his request was peremptorily 
refused. This should undoubtedly have served as a warning, but Murray 
very foolishly allowed his ships to be lured up the Mahakam River to 
Tenggarong, a small town some twenty-five miles from Samarinda. 
The Sultan immediately set up batteries of guns along the river banks 
to prevent their escape. Murray threatened to destroy the town if not 
allowed to proceed, but his bluff failed, and he and his men had to 
fight their way down to the coast amid a storm of hostile fire. There, 
when they had almost succeeded in running the gauntIet of the Sultan's 
guns, they were engaged by a large flotilla of pirates and three members 
of the expedition, inc1uding its commander, were killed.281 
Erskine Murray's plan to visit Borneo, like Brooke's, was first 
brought to the notice of the Dutch Government by a newspaper report. 
In November 1843 an artic1e appeared in the Priend of China, ex-
plaining that the objects of a voyage soon to be undertaken by two 
British merchant vessels to the coasts of Borneo were colonization and 
the promotion of trade.~82 The Dutch Government naturally deduced 
from this that Murray was hoping to emulate the achievements of the 
White Raja of Sarawak.283 From the Dutch point of view, however. 
the two cases were entirely different. The Sultanate of Koetei, unlike 
Sarawak, was part of the Netherlands Indies, and when the British 
281 Friend of China, April 20th, 1844. Sin,qapore Frl'C Press, May 23rd, 1844. 
Hong Kong Register, April 23rd, 1844. See also W. Cave Thomas, Murray's 
E.-rpedition to Borneo (published 1893), and Marryat, op. cit., p. 45. 
28' Frknd of China, November 2nd, 1843 (reproduced in the Javasche CouranI, 
Decembèr 3Oth, 1843). 
288 Minister of the Colonies to the King, July 27th, 1844, No. 343, Secret. (Buit. 
Zaken, No. 3133). 
This may weil have been Murray's true aim, though the Government of India 
expressed the opinion later that he had not been interested in settlement, only 
in trade. (Secretary to Government, Fort William, to the Secret Committee. 
November 23rd, 1844: F.O. 12/3). 
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press began demanding that the Royal Navy should be sent to avenge 
Murray's death, the Dutch decided that it was time to make a stand. 
Any British naval act ion against Koetei, Ambassador Dedel warned 
the Earl of Aberdeen, would be "a derogation of Netherlands sover-
eignty".284 The Foreign Secretary replied that his Department had no 
official knowledge of the activities of the Hon. Erskine Murray, and 
that, in any case, Great Britain would take no action which might 
infringe on Dutch sovereign rights.285 A small naval expedition was 
sent to Koetei by the Netherlands Indian Government themselves in 
March 1844, but Murray's murderers were not brought to justice. 
N evertheless, his tragic death did have one important consequence: it 
obliged the Dutch Government to inquire more c10sely into the position 
of the White Raja of Sarawak. 
During the six years from 1839 to 1844 Brooke was a private 
individual with no official backing and no government recognition. Tt 
would consequently have been difficult for the Dutch to have framed 
any charges against him during this period, even supposing they had 
wished to do so; there was no one to whom they could have addressed 
their complaints. But when early in 1845 he was appointed British 
agent in Borneo, and wh en in August of the same year Admiral 
Cochrane arrived at Brunei with eight British warships to support him, 
the Dutch decided, somewhat belatedly, that the Raja of Sarawak had 
become amenace to the security of their Far Eastern possessions. 
At the beginning of December a note was presented to the British 
Foreign Office by Ambassador Dedel. "It is a matter for regret", it 
said, "that Mr. Brooke has been placed in the position which he now 
occupies. In this position, in view of his known prejudice against the 
Netherlands, he can do much harm".2S6 Lord Aberdeen replied with a 
vigorous defence of Brooke's character and past proceedings, and sug-
gested that if the Dutch authorities in the East had crossed swords 
with him, this could only be because they had been interfering with his 
"Iegitimate objects and pursuits". Tt had been found necessary for Her 
Majesty's Government to appoint an agent in Borneo with the duty 
of assisting the local rajas to suppress piracy, and Mr. Brooke had 
been the obvious choice for the post.28T 
284 Dede! to Aberdeen, August 27th, 1844. (C.O. 144/1). 
285 Aberdeen to Dede!, November 2nd, 1844. (Buit. Zaken, No. 3133). 
286 Dede! to Aberdeen, December 2nd, 1845. (C.O. 144/1). 
28T Aberdeen to Dede!, December lOth, 1845. (C.O. 144/1. Kol., 1846, No. 52, 
Very Secret). 
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This explanation did not satisfy the Dutch Government, and Dedel 
attacked the White Raja again the following March. This time, he said, 
he was able to offer proof that Brooke was not a fit person to act as 
British agent in Borneo. The present ruler of Sarawak had shown 
conc1usively during a visit he had paid to Celebes in 1840 that he was 
anything but favourably disposed towards the Government of the 
N etherlands. On one occasion he had given "twe1ve cases of muskets 
and twenty barrels of gunpowder" to a Bugis chief named Datu Lom-
pulle', who was hostile to the Dutch.288 
Asked by Lord Aberdeen to give his own version of this event, 
Brooke was able to justify his conduct completely. At the time of his 
visit to Celebes, he eXplained, he was unaware that the Bugis chief 
in question was hostile to the Dutch Government, and the "three or 
four muskets, some c1oth, and small quantity of gunpowder" which 
he had given him had been intended solely as a present. So far from 
trying to stir up revolt in Celebes, he had advised every native chief 
he met to refrain from hostilities with all European powers, the Nether-
lands inc1uded.289 
A weakness in the Dutch case against Brooke was that the N ether-
lands Government had made no formal protest against his actions in 
Celebes at the time when they occurred. The incidents about which 
Dedel was instructed to complain in 1845 had apparently not been worth 
bothering about in 1840. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that although 
there had thus far been little either in Brooke's conduct or in his public 
pronouncements to which the Dutch could leg'Ïtimately take exception,290 
they were correct in thinking that he cherished no love for them. There 
is ample evidence· of this in his private correspondence. "I can lay open 
Borneo", he told Henry Wise at the end of 1841. "H, however, we do 
not take care, the Dutch will have it, and then farewell hope, for Dutch 
rule, with respect to natives, is a palsy, and death to British manufac-
tures ... Is the English lion for ever to crouch beneath the belly of 
the Dutch frog?" 291 Advising the governor of Sarawak against allowing 
the Netherlands authorities to gain a footing in Brunei, Brooke gave 
288 Dedel to Aberdeen, March ZOth, 1846. (c.a. 144/1). 
This letter was based on a dispatch from the Governor of Makassar to the 
Governor-General of April 3Oth, 1840, No. 181". (Kol., 1841, No. 66, Secret). 
289 Brooke to Aberdeen, September 8th, 1846. (F.O. 12/4). 
290 Ie. up to 1846, in which year the first volumes of Brooke's private journaIs, 
which did contain a few anti-Dutch sentiments, were published by Captain 
Keppel. 
291 Brooke to Wise, December IOth, 1841. (c.a. 14411). 
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warning that "it was easy to let them come, but... he would find it 
difficult to get rid of them ever af ter, and that the most fatal conse-
quences might ensue to his country".292 And lastly, describing the evils 
of Malay piracy to his friend, John Tempier, Brooke dec1ared that 
"those idiots, the Dutch ... encourage this vile traffic because it prevents 
the natives smuggling, and because it injures the trade of Singapore".293 
By the end of 1845 it had become c1ear to the Netherlands Govern-
ment that, as a result of Raja Brooke's prolonged advocacy, an attempt 
to found a British colony in Borneo would probably not be long delayed. 
Three years earlier, the Dutch Minister of the Colonies had viewed 
this prospect almost with equanimity.294 But since then he and his 
advisers had been receiving reports of greatly increased British naval 
activity along the north-west coast of the island, of an attempt by a 
British subject to found a colony in Dutch sovereign territory at Koetei 
and, finally, of the British Government's grant of virtual protection 
to the Raja of Sarawak. Consequently, when Dedel made his ëomplaint 
to Lord Aberdeen about Brooke's appointment as British agent, he 
also warned Her Majesty's Government that they we re prohibited from 
colonizing Borneo under the terms of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. 
Both contracting parties, he pointed out, had then expressly dec1ared 
that they would never all ow their territorial ambitions in the Indian 
Archipelago to come into conflict again. "The tendency, the spirit, the 
principal aim of the Treaty", Dedel urged, had been "to separate the 
possessions of the two powers in the East Indies for all time to come".295 
Aberdeen immediately replied that his Government were quite unable 
to accept any such interpretation of the Treaty of 1824. It must 
sure1y be obvious to the Dutch Government, he said, that in those 
parts of the Archipelago which the Treaty did not specify as forbidden 
ground to one or other of the contracting parties, the power of both 
to establish colonies or make agreements with native princes remained 
unimpaired. "Had it been intended", he went on, "that the provisions 
of Artic1e XII of the Treaty, which lays down the limits within which 
Her Majesty's Government are prec1uded from forming establishments 
or concluding treaties with the native chiefs, should be applicable to 
292 Brooke to Tempter, August ZOth, 1839. (Letters, i, p. 68). 
293 Brooke to Tempier, December Ist, 1841. (Ibid., i, p. 138). 
The Dutch were certainly jealous of Singapore, but Brooke's suggestion that 
they were not playing their full part in the struggle against the pirates was 
grotesquely inaccurate. 
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Borneo, that country would assuredly have been named... Her 
Majesty's Government cannot admit that the expression used in Artic1e 
XII with reference to any other islands south of the Straits of Singa-
pore can apply to Borneo".286 
To this line of argument, however, Dedel quickly produced an answer. 
It was certainly true, he said in a note of March 20th the next year, 
that Borneo had not been mentioned in the Treaty, but this had simply 
been because that island had not then been a "theatre of common 
occupation". Other islands where Netherlands sovereignty was ex-
clusively established had not been mentioned either. In 1824 it was only 
in Sumatra and Singapore that riyal agents of the two Governments 
were disputing "territorial possession or political ascendancy" J and the 
stipulations of the Treaty had therefore been confined to them. The 
vital point for present consideration was that the agreement of 1824 
had been based on an assumption that both parties were sincerely deter-
mined to make "a reciprocal renunciation of all territorial community" 
in the Indies. That they had indeed done so could be proved by reference 
to the supplementary note which the British plenipotentiaries had ad-
dressed to the Government of the Netherlands at the conclusion of the 
negotiations. On that occasion Canning and Wynn had formally placed 
on record that the object of the Treaty was ICto avoid a collision of 
interests" between the two countries.281 
In thus appealing to the spirit rather than to the letter of the Treaty 
of 1824, the Dutch Government were trying to make the most of a 
case which, it was privately admitted in The Hague, was not entirely 
convincing. During 1845 the Council of Ministers had conducted an 
investigation into Dutch rights in northern Borneo, and had come to 
the definite, if reluctant, conclusion that nothing in the Treaty prohibi-
ted the British {rom founding colonies there. "The Treaty of 1824". 
they reported to the King, "cannot be said to lay down a parallel of 
latitude to the south of which England may not establish herself ... 
The idea of a continuous geographical line delineating a southern limit 
of British influence in the Archipelago is therefore unfounded".288 
296 Aberdeen to Dedel, December 1Oth, 1845. (Ibid.) 
!19'1 Dedel to Aberdeen, March ZOth, 1846. (Ibid.) 
288 Earlier in the same year Minister Baud had expressed a contrary opinion. 
(See p. 63 above). Since then, however, he had apparently been won over by 
the arguments of the Council of Ministers, for the latter concluded their 
report to the King with the remark : "All this is the unanimous opinion of 
the Council, and also of the Minister of the Colonies". (Council of Ministers 
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The result was that, although the Dutch were unwilling to give Great 
Britain carte blanche in Borneo, Dedel's note of March 1846 did contain 
one important concession. The N etherlands, he assured Lord Aberdeen, 
did not believe that it was necessary to exclude British influence from 
the area entirely. "The cession of Labuan to Great Britain", he said, 
"and the establishment of a naval station in that island are not suscep-
tible to the same objections by the Netherlands Government, the latter 
not having extended its sovereignty to that part of Brunei which is 
situated opposite Labuan, and not expecting that such a step can lead 
to collisions, at any rate for the time being".299 In making this conces-
sion, the Dutch were following out the logic of their assertion that one 
of the chief objects of the 1824 Treaty had been to guard against 
'territorial community' in the Indian Archipelago. They obviously could 
not expect the British Government to agree to this interpretation, 
and at the same time to refrain from occupying Labuan, which was not 
part of the mainland of Borneo and was not, in any case, south of 
Singapore Straits.3OO 
Once again, however, the British Foreign Secretary replied that 
he could not accept the arguments put forward by the Ambassador of 
the Netherlands. "Af ter the most mature consideration", he dec1ared, 
"Her Majesty's Government have decided that there is nothing in the 
Treaty of 1824 to prevent the formation of British settlements in the 
districts of the Archipelago from which Great Britain is not in terms 
exc1uded by the Treaty ... Her Majesty's Government have no present 
intention of availing themselves of this circumstance for the purpose 
of establishing a colony of the crown, [but] they still cannot allow 
it for a moment to be supposed that they in any way acknowledge the 
obligation in no case to take such a step even if rende red expedient 
or necessary by circumstances the occurrence of which they at present 
do not anticipate".301 In simpIer language - Lord Aberdeen's meaning 
is nearly obliterated by diplomatie circumlocution - the British Govern-
ment were saying that although they did not at the moment intend to 
colonize Borneo, they reserved the right to do so. 
to the King, November 12th, 1845, Very Secret, L" B40: 'Diverse stukken 
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This exchange of letters marks the end of the first round in what 
ultimate1y proved to be an extreme1y tedious contest. For the time being 
the two Governments agreed to differ on the question of present and 
future British rights in Borneo. Forty years later Dedel's and Aber-
deen's successors were still arguing about what precise1y George 
Canning and Minister Falck had had in mind when they drew up the 
twelfth article of the Treaty of 1824. 
CHAPTER VI 
TIIE FOUNDING OF LABUAN 
In the opinion of Raja Brooke, it was not only the Government ot 
the Netherlands whose reawakening interest in Borneo might endanger 
the success of his plans. During the 1840's other nations, too, appeared 
to he developing ambitions in the island. "The French are evidently 
increasing their squadron in these seas", he wrote in April 1844, "and 
are desirous of forming a colony, as also are the Belgians and the 
Prussians".302 French warships later bombarded Basilan Island in the 
Sulu Archipelago in revenge for the murder of two members of the 
crew of the corvette, Sabine, which had called there to take on water,303 
but made no attempts at colonization, and Brooke's fears of Belgian 
and Prussian intervention also turned out to be groundless. But although 
Great Britain and the Netherlands were the only European powers 
with an active concern in Borneo there did seem to be a real danger of 
competition from the United States of America. 
In 1831 an American trading vessel, the Friendship, was captured 
by treachery while lying off Kuala Batu on the West Coast of 
Sumatra.304 After ordering reprisals,305 President Andrew Jackson 
announced that in future more efficient protection must be provided 
for American sailors and commerce in the Far East, and sent Edmund 
Roberts to negotiate treaties to that end in Borneo, Siam, and Japan. 
Ports were to be secured in which American vessels would be able to 
find refuge and security. Roberts was successful in Siam and began 
negotiations with Cochin China, but died at Canton before visiting 
either Borneo or Japan.306 
In 1836 a group of American business men in China decided to open 
302 Brooke to Johnson, April 17th, 1844. (Letters, H, p. 7). 
303 J. R. Logan, 'The piracy and slave trade of the Indian Archipelago', J01M'n. 
Ind. Arch., 1850, pp. 745-6. 
304 Ibid., p. 145. 
306 A year later U.S.S. Potomac attacked Kual:J. Batu, setting fire to the town 
and killing two hundred of the inhabitants. 
806 Cf. J. M. Callaghan, Americcm Relaticms in the Pacific cmd the For East, 
pp. 48 and 73-4. 
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regular commercial intercourse with Borneo. They hoped to obtain 
pepper, coffee, and any other "surplus products" which might be 
available in exchange for dollars, iron, and cloth.307 They chartered a 
brig, the Himmaleh, which arrived at Brunei the following year and 
sold its cargo at a good profit, but the experiment was not repeated. 
A few years later the 'United States Exploring Expedition' also visited 
Borneo under Admiral Charles Wilkes, who reported favourably to 
the American Government on the island's commercial possibilities.308 
Finally, early in 1845 the U.S.S. Constitution called at Brunei to offer 
the Sultan immediate protection and a commercial treaty in return 
for the exclusive right to work all coal deposits in the Sultanate. Her 
captain announced that he came from "the Sultan of America ... to 
bring cordial greetings, assurances of friendship, and the desire for a 
more intimate intercourse".309 Because of Brunei's existing agreements 
with Great Britain, Raja Muda Hassim postponed a decision on this 
American proposal until he had consulted Brooke. "I f the British 
Government are unwilling to afford us assistance", he told the White 
Raja, "we must then beg our friend to move that the existing arrange-
ments be cancelled, so that we may be in a situation to solicit aid in 
another quarter".310 Recounting this incident to Lord Aberdeen, Brooke 
pointed out that unIe ss Great Britain soon showed by positive action 
that she intended to fulfil her obligations to Brunei, there was more 
than a chance that the Sultan and his advisers would seek United States 
protection. The prolonged delay had already instilled into the native 
mind "a doubt touching the power of Her Majesty's Government", 
and the visit of an American warship had done much to strengthen 
this impression.311 
Meanwhile, Captain Bethune had completed his investigation into 
possible sites for a British naval station, and in October 1845 he for-
warded his long-awaited report to the Admiralty. Brooke had been 
working closely with Bethune, and was hopeful that on receipt of this 
report the British Government would at last come to some definite 
301 'Instructions from the Owners to Captain Fraser of the Himmaleh', November 
26th, 1836. (Quoted in Tradescant Lay, op. cit., pp. viii-ix). 
3(18 C. Wilkes, N arrative of the United States ExPloring Expedition (1838-1842), 
Vol. v, p. 360. 
309 Report of Lieutenant W. C. Chaplin, U.S.N., April 9th, 1845. (Copy in Kol., 
December 3rd, 1845, L" A, No. 2). 
310 Hassim and Pengeran Badru'd-din to Brooke, 1845 (n.d.). (P.P., 1852-3, LXI, 
p.307). 
811 Brooke to Aberdeen, June 28th, 1845. (F.O. 1213). 
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decision on their future policy in Borneo. But in this he was dis-
appointed. The effect of Bethune's report was to throw the whole 
question into the melting-pot again, for it proposed that a naval station 
should be established not at Labuan, but at Balambangan. 
The island of Balambangan, situated off the northern tip of Borneo, 
was weIl placed to act as an advanced base against the Lanun and 
Balanini pirates who infested the area, and also to command the strate-
gically important junction of the Sulu and South China Seas. The 
East India Company had attempted to found trading settlements there 
on two separate occasions, once in 1773 and again in 1803. Both had 
been total failures, but the fact of their existence had given Great 
Britain a title to the island, and Bethune's proposal was that this titIe 
should now be enforced. The main "military and commercial post" for 
the area, in his view, should be at Balambangan, while Labuan, which 
was "too valuable, looking to the prospective advantages of the case, 
to be given up", should be acquired by purchase from the Sultan of 
Brunei.3Ul 
Not only did this report confuse further a situation that was com-
plicated enough already, but it also chanced to arrive in England at 
a particularly unsuitable time. During December 1845 and January 
1846 a minor reshuffle occurred in Sir Robert Peel's Cabinet. The Earl 
of Ellenborough replaced Lord Haddington as First Lord of the 
Admiralty, and W. E. Gladstone succeeded Lord Stanley at the Colonial 
Office. Haddington had been the most receptive of Peel's cabinet 
ministers to Raja Brooke's ideas, and his departure from the Admiralty 
meant that much of Henry Wise's skilful propaganda campaign on 
behalf of a British colony in Borneo was now wasted. When, for 
example Wise sent a complete set of Borneo Papers to Lord Ellen-
borough and asked for the honour of an interview, the new First Lord 
replied that before granting such a request he would need time to study 
the 'book' which had been presented to him, and that he could not say 
at present how soon he would be able to do SO.313 
In the early part of 1846 scant attention to a comparatively un-
important question like Labuan was to be expected from either Peel or 
Gladstone. The Prime Minister was busy preparing for his final battle 
with the House of Commons over the repeal of the Corn Laws,814 
and the newly-appointed Colonial Secretary was more than fully 
812 Bethune to the Admiralty, October lst, 1845. 
31.3 H. S. Law to Wise, February 28th, 1846. (Borneo Papers, p. 85). 
814 E. L. Woodward, The Age of Reform 1815-1870, p. 118. 
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occupied in attempting to solve more urgent problems in Canada, the 
West Indies, and New Zealand.315 The Earl of Aberdeen, the only 
other minister who se department was directly concerned, had never 
been enthusiastic about the plan to form even a naval station in Borneo, 
and had agreed to it only af ter Stanley withdrew Colonial Office 
opposition at the end of 1844. As month af ter month went by with 
no sign from the British Government that they intended to take any 
further action, Brooke's friends in England began to fear that his 
great plans for Borneo were about to collapse. But suddenly in the 
middle of May the outlook changed, when reports arrived of a whole-
sale massacre at Brunei. 
When the Sultan of Brunei agreed to allow British naval forces to 
suppress piracy in his dominions, he inadvertently signed away a large 
part of his private income, because an important share of the Brunei 
state revenues was derived from the slave trade, and this in turn 
depended for its existence almost entirely on the proceeds of piracy. 
It was therefore a simple matter for Haji Saman, the leader of the 
opposition party at the Brunei court, to persuade His Highness that a 
continuance of friendly relations with Great Britain was certain to 
lead in the end to financial ruin. 
In addition to appealing in this way to the Sultan's avarice, Haji 
Saman also cunningly played upon his master's jealously of Raja Muda 
Hassim. His Highness had secretly been greatly mortified when Hassim 
was reinstated by Brooke and Belcher in October 1844 as Raja Muda, 
since he had been hoping to secure the succes sion for his son. By the 
use of tactics such as these and by fIattering the Sultan and listening 
to his countless grievances, Haji Saman eventually persuaded him to 
order the assassination of the Raja Muda and all the most infIuential 
members of the pro-British party at Brunei on the grounds that they 
were traitors to the throne. 
More than two months went by before any news of this outrageous 
piece of cruelty reached the outside world, and even then Raja Brooke 
learnt of the massacre of his friends only by accident. In the middle 
of March 1846 H.M.S. Hazard (Commander Egerton) ran aground on 
Muara Island at the southern entrance of Brunei Bay. While she was 
waiting for a tide to lift her clear, a canoe darted out from the shore 
bearing a native slave-boy named Japar, who had once been owned by 
315 See W. P. Morrel!, British Colanial Policy in the Age of Peel and RusselI, 
Pp' 68-9, 126, and 160-2. 
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Pengeran Badru'd-din, a younger brother of Raja Muda Hassim. 
Japar informed the captain of the Hazard that Hassim and no less 
than twelve other members of the Royal Family of Brunei were dead; 
that most of them had been murdered outright, although the Raja Muda 
and Japar's master, Badru'd-din, had committed suicide rather than 
fall into the Sultan's clutches alive; that forts were even now being 
constructed to defend the city; and that the Sultan, who had sworn 
that he would hold no more intercourse with Europeans, was openly 
defying the British Navy to come and do its worst. Japar himself had 
been obliged to remain in hiding for two months, and had only just 
been able to escape; he now wished to carry out his master's dying 
command that Tuan Brooke must be advised of the fate of his faithful 
Brunei allies.316 
The Hazard made all speed to Kuching and on March 30th Japar 
repeated his story to Brooke. The White Raja exploded with anger. 
"I can repair the loss in part", he wrote to Wise on April Ist, "but 
depose the Sultan, destroy Brunei, reinstate Muda Hassim's family 
are indispensable considerations . . . I am at war with this traitor and 
murderer, and such is my grief and rage that I would plunge a knife 
into his body if he was within arms' reach" .317 To Brooke the Brunei 
massacre was not only a blow to his personal prestige along the coast, 
but also a gross insult to the British Government. "I cannot but believe", 
he declared in a letter to Lord Aberdeen, "that a strong case exists for 
the protection of the survivors of Muda Hassim's family, and for the 
punishment of the offender, who, abandoning all good faith towards 
Her Majesty's Government, has, by an act of almost unheard-of 
treachery, butchered his nearest relations on account of their fidelity 
to their engagements and, in conjunction with the British authorities, 
having pursued the necessary measures for the suppression of piracy".318 
But Aberdeen was far away in England, and the situation demanded 
action at once. Without waiting for instructions from the Foreign 
Office, Brooke appealed direct to his friend, Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas 
Cochrane, the naval Commander-in-Chief of the Far Eastern Station. 
"I feel convinced", he told Cochrane, "you will act against this atrocious 
Sultan, and inflict upon him the punishment he has sought at your 
hands".318 
:U6 'Deposition of the native Tapper [Japar)'. (P.P., 1852, XXXI, p. 422). 
:117 Brooke to Wise, April Ist, 1846. (F.O. I2/4). 
318 Brooke to Aberdeen, April Ist, 1846. (P.P., 1852, XXXI, p. 422). 
319 Brooke to Cochrane, April Ist, 1846. (Ibid., p. 423). 
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Cochrane was not the man to turn a deaf ear to an appeal such as 
this. When he received Brooke's letter he was so impressed with the 
urgency of the situation that he also decided to act without waiting 
for definite orders, and on June 18th set saiI for Borneo from Singa-
pore with the Iargest force he could muster. Picking up Brooke at 
Kuching, the Admiral proceeded up the coast to Brunei in his 74-gun 
flagship, Agincourt, supported by H.M. Ships Iris, Hazard, Ringdove, 
and Royalist, H.M. Steamer Spiteful, and H.E.LC.S. Phlegethon.320 
The forts guarding the entrance to Brunei River were quickly reduced, 
and on July 8th the squadron swept upstream to the capita!. Af ter a 
heavy bombardment of the defences, British landing-parties under 
Captain Mundy of the Iris entered the town unopposed, and discovered 
that the Sultan and his court had al ready fled into the interior.321 
Brooke and Cochrane immediately set about reorganizing the govern-
ment of the Sultanate. Two of the very few pro-British nobles who 
had survived the massacre were placed in charge of the state, and 
Cochrane issued a proclamation to the effect that "i{ the Sultan would 
return and govern his people justly, abstain from acts of piracy and 
keep his agreement with the British Government, hostilities would 
cease, but on the other hand if the same atrocious system was again 
. carried on when the ships left the coast, the admiral would return 
speedily and burn the city to the ground".= The Sultan's morale, 
however, had not unnaturally been shattered by his recent experience, 
and for the time being nothing would persuade him to leave the 
security of his jungle hiding-place. 
Realizing that in these circumstances there was nothing more that 
he or his warships could achieve by waiting at Brunei, Cochrane re-
embarked his force and moved the whole squadron up the coast to 
Tempasuk. Af ter chastising some Lanun pirate settlements there and 
at Pandasan, he set sail for China with the main body of his fleet, 
leaving Captain Mundy with the Iris, Hazard, and Phlegethon to attend 
to affairs in Borneo. Mundy's orders were to revisit Brunei, make a 
settlement with the Sultan if possible, and then extirpate Lanun piracy 
along the whole of the north-west coast.323 
As Mundy made his way south to Brunei, a friendly prahu hailed him 
to pass on the news that the Sultan's sometime adviser and evil genius, 
320 Mundy, op. cit., Vol. ii, p. 116. H.M.S. Dcwdalus and H.E.LC.S. Pluto were 
also ordered to Borneo, but arrived too late to take part in the action. 
321. Cochrane to the Admiralty, July 9th, 1846. (P.P., 1852-3, LXI, p. 25n. 
322 Mundy, op. cit., Vol. ii, p. 175. 
lIS1 Ibid., p. 208. 
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Haji Saman, was lurking in Membakut River, a small stream flowing 
into Kimanis Bay. An armed party was sent up the river to capture him, 
but the Haji proved as elusive as his master, and Mundy's men had to 
be content with destroying a few fortifications and gun positions. Af ter 
this episode Brooke continued on his way to Brunei in the Phlegethon, 
while Mundy went back to Kimanis to assure the local inhabitants that 
he would proteet them should Haji Saman dare to show his face in the 
area again. 
The Phlegethon and the Iris met by chance off Labuan on August 
24th, and Brooke reported that his mission to Brunei had been com-
pletely successful. The Sultan had at last been induced to return to his 
palace, had humbly asked pardon for his past follies, and had re-ratified 
all his former engagements.324 Brunei polities were now once again back 
to normal, and would remain so provided British warships continued 
to patrol the coast. But although the course of local affairs was again 
running in his favour, the question which most concerned the White 
Raja was, would the Sultan of Brunei's rebellion have any effect on 
the slow-moving authorities in London, and make them agree at last to 
the establishment of a British settIement in northern Borneo? 
Towards the end of May 1846 the British Foreign Office received 
a strongly-worded memorial from the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce. 
The merchant community of Glasgow, asserted this document, were 
unanimously of opinion that a much more vigorous British policy was 
needed in the Eastern Seas. A naval station should be established imme-
diately between Singapore and China to protect British trade; the island 
of Labuan appeared to be ideally suited for this purpose.325 Two days 
later a similar memorial arrived at the Foreign Office from the Glasgow 
East India Association, complaining that the Dutch had taken possession 
of Bali,326 an island which had long been regarded as "the chief granary 
for Singapore". The loss of Bali's rice supplies, said the Association, 
would be a severe blow to British trade in the East. How much longer 
were the Dutch to be permittted to expand their influence in the Indian 
Archipelago in this way? A firm stand must be taken at once against 
further encroachments by the Government of the Netherlands Indies.321 
324 Ibid., pp. 234-6. 
325 Glasgow Chamber of Commerce to Aberdeen, May 21st, 1846. (F.O. 1214). 
326 The 'First Bali Expedition', as it is called, took place early in 1846. It achieved 
no decisive results, and the Dutch sent a second in 1848 and a third in 1849. 
(Cf. Colenbrander, op. cit., Deel iii, pp. 175-6). 
321 Glasgow East India Association to Aberdeen, May 23rd, 1846. (F.O. 12/4). 
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These two memorials arrived at the Foreign Office simultaneously 
with the first reports to reach England of the massacre of the pro-
British party at Brunei. When the news of this disaster became public 
property, more letters and memorials began pouring into the Foreign 
Office and other Government Departments from the Chambers of 
Commerce and East India Associations of London, Manchester, and 
Liverpool, as weU as several fresh entreaties from Glasgow. All of 
them complained of past Government apathy, pointed out the dangers 
of the present situation, and demanded that the Sultan of Brunei's offer 
of Labuan be accepted by Great Britain without delay.328 
On receipt of the news from Brunei, however, the Foreign Office 
had already taken action on their own account. On May 26th they 
inquired from the Admiralty what was being done about a naval station 
or settlement on the Borneo coast.329 The Admir;tlty replied that at the 
moment nothing was being done. The Lords Commissioners could not 
proceed in such a matter on their own initiative. It was a question for 
the Colonial Office - indeed, for the whole Government.330 The 
Foreign Office retorted that this was a surprising change of attitude 
on the Admiralty's part; had it not been agreed in 1844 that a naval 
station was "indispensably necessary" in Borneo? Had not Captain 
Bethune been sent to the Far East especially to select a site for one? 
The Foreign Office considered that they were "justified in thinking 
that the Admiralty would take measures to secure the objects contem-
plated by Her Majesty's Government".331 
Faced with the suggestion that they were trying to evade a respon-
sibility that properly belonged to them, the Admiralty took refuge in 
precedent. When the decision had been taken to occupy Port 
Essington,332 they pointed out, the necessary instructions had been 
issued by the Colonial Office, although the actual work of establishing 
the settlement had been done by the Royal Navy. If Labuan was now 
to be occupied, a similar procedure should be followed. "We do not 
consider ourselves j ustified", they said, "in annexing territory to the 
British Crown without the express direction of a Secretary of State". 
328 Many of these documents used al most identical language. They may possibly 
all have been instigated by Henry Wise. (The originals are in F.O. 12/4). 
M9 Foreign Office to tbe Admiralty, May 26th, 1846. (Ibid.) 
330 Admiralty to the Foreign Office, May 27th, 1846. (Ibid.) 
331 Foreign Office to the Admiralty, May 3Oth, 1846. (Ibid.) 
832 An abortive trading settlement on Cobourg Peninsuia on the north coast of 
Australia, founded in 1838. 
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In any case, Captain Bethune's report had recommended Balambangan 
in preferenee to Labuan as the most suitable site for a base against the 
pirates, although in the Admiralty's own opinion a "moveable force" 
would be better than either. If the proposed naval station were planted 
down in the very middle of the pirate strongholds, the enemy would 
be able to spy on the movements of British warships as they were 
assembling for the attack. A mobile striking force, on the other hand, 
with no fixed base nearer than Singapore, could pounce on the pirates 
without warning.333 
The Foreign Office answered shortly that they considered "the expe-
diency of establishing a naval station to protect trade and suppress 
piracy as already settled by what passed in October 1844". They could 
not agree that Balambangan was preferabIe to Labuan. The British 
Government had a firm title to the latter, and had al ready told the 
Dutch that it would be occupied.334 But the Admiralty's obvious 
reluctance to take any action at all in the matter convinced Lord Aber-
deen and his staff that nothing was to be gained by continuing an 
unprofitable argument, and they turned for assistance to the Colonial 
Office. 
Mr. Secretary Gladstone, however, was just as much against a settle-
ment in Borneo as the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. He 
pointed out in a note to Lord Aberdeen that it was "no part of the 
policy of Her Majesty's Government to establish any colony on the 
coast of Borneo". All that had ever been suggested was "a naval station 
and harbour of refuge" - obviously a task for the Admiralty. Even 
this more limited plan had not yet been finally agreed to, as the Foreign 
Office appeared to as su me ; the Treasury, for example, had not yet 
given their formal assent. In any case, there was little practical diffe-
rence between colonies and naval stations so far as the problems of 
administration were concerned. The two types of settlement always 
tended to coalesce. "We may prohibit the use of land or the erection 
of houses upon it", said Gladstone by way of illustration, "but how 
can we prevent or punish those who may be inclined to disobey the 
prohibition?" Once a permanent establishment of any kind had been 
set up, laws and regulations always had to be provided, labour forces 
333 Admiralty to the Foreign Office, June 5th, 1846. (Ibid.) The Admiralty's 
reluctance to take the initiative with regard to Labuan may have been due to 
the difficulties they had experienced in the Falkland Islands a short time 
before. In 1832 the Royal Navy received orders to annex these islands, but 
was not relieved of administrative responsibitity for them until 1843. 
234 Foreign Office to the Admiralty, June 8th, 1846. (Ibid.) 
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supplied. expensive administrative machinery instituted. In an area 
like Borneo there was the additional difficulty of a mixed population, 
which would inevitably complicate the problems of local government. 
From a more general point of view, moreover, it was c1ear that the 
British Empire already had more responsibilities than it could carry. 
"The multiplication of colonies at the other end of the world", Glad-
stone declared, "must at all times be a matter for serious consideration; 
but especially at a time when we have already land almost infinite to 
defend that we cannot occupy, people to reduce to order whom we have 
not been able to keep in friendly relations, and questions in so many 
different departments of government to manage". For all these reasons, 
he and his advisers had decided that they could take no action until 
further thought had been given to the matter by the Government as 
a whoIe. Almost apologetically, Gladstone explained to Lord Aberdeen 
that he had feit it would be better to put his objections in the form of 
a private memorandum rather than in an official answer, because "the 
battle seems to have been hot between you and the Admiralty".3311 
Towards the end of June the Foreign Office staff compiled a compre-
hensive history of the Labuan question to date, and forwarded it to 
Gladstone in an attempt to make him reconsider his decision. Tt was 
now too late, said the Foreign Office. for the Colonial Secretary to 
dissociate himself from the Borneo proposals. The relevant documents 
on Labuan and re1ated matters had long been in the possession of the 
Colonial Office, who ought to have put forward their objections earlier, 
instead of allowing others to pledge themse1ves to a course which 
apparently was "diametrically opposed to the views of the Department 
whose province it was to carry the same into effect". There were at 
least six good reasons why the Labuan plan could not be abandoned 
at this stage. First, the Government could not now tell the parties 
concerned that a settlement in Borneo had never been contemplated. 
Secondly, the Dutch had been informed that the island definitely would 
be occupied. Thirdly, the merchant community we re pressing for more 
vigorous action. Fourthly, "prospects of support and protection" had 
been held out to British subjects. Fifthly, it was already being c1aimed 
by some (the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, for example) that 
the Brunei massacre was the result of official negligence. And, lastly, 
if Raja Brooke were killed, his death would inevitably be blamed on 
Her Majesty's Government. The threat of competition from other 
8315 Minute by W. E. Gladstone of June 18th, 1846. (CO. 14411). Quotations from 
this minute appear in Henry L. Hall, The Colcnial Office, pp. 174-5. 
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powers had also to be taken into account. The Americans were trying 
to obtain a footing at Brunei, and the French at Sulu. As for the Dutch, 
"the archives of the Foreign Office are crowded with representations 
of the injuriotls effects to British interests arising from the extension 
of Dutch influence and dominion in the Eastern Seas".336 
At this point, however, inter-departmental discussions on Labuan 
came to a sudden halt. On the very day that the Foreign Office's appeal 
to Gladstone was signed, June 2Sth, Sir Robert Peel's Government was 
defeated in the House of Commons over a coercion bilI for Ireland.33T 
Peel resigned four days later, and early in July Lord John RusselI 
accepted the Queen's invitation to become the new Prime Minister. 
RusseII appointed Earl Grey as his Colonial Secretary and Lord Palmer-
ston as his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Both appointments 
were of great significance for the future development of British policy 
in Borneo. 
The first member of the new Government to look into the Labuan 
question was Benjamin Hawes, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the 
Colonies. "We have now to decide", he toId his chief, Earl Grey, 
"whether we abide by Mr. Gladstone's position or by Lord Aberdeen's". 
Hawes studied the arguments assembIed by the Foreign Office, and 
became convinced that the occupation of Labuan was desirabIe. The 
island, he believed, was weIl suited as a settlement for all "political, 
moral, and commercial purposes". With encouragement it could become 
a valuable emporium for trade similar to Singapore.338 
But Sir James Stephen, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the 
Colonial Office, remained unconvinced. He warned Hawes of the danger 
that the addition of Labuan to the British Empire might be the first 
step in a ruinous policy of expansion. He referred to the "territorial 
accretions" (as he called them) which would "infaIIibly be made to it 
on the mainland of Borneo". If a colony were really necessary, then 
by far the wis est plan would be to persuade the East India Company to 
accept responsibility for founding and maintaining it. "The Company", 
said Stephen with feeling, "act with all the unembarrassed simplicity 
of movement which belongs to absolute, not to say despotic, power". 
Tt was true that they were "notoriously inefficient", and that, in conse-
quence, a settlement in Borneo under their auspices would co st more 
than one supervised by the Colonial Office, but they enjoyed the 
336 Foreign Office Minute of June 25th, 1846. (F.O. 1214). 
&37 W oodward, op. cit., p. 118. 
838 Minute by B. Hawes (n.d.). (C.O. 144/1). 
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supreme advantage of not having to submit annual estimates to the 
House of Commons.338 
Stephen's reference to 'territorial accretions' raises the interesting 
question of why the British Government never seriously considered 
Sarawak as a possible site for the proposed settlement. Brooke himself 
pressed unceasingly for acceptance of the offer he had made in 1842. 
Although he welcomed the decision to turn Labuan into a naval station, 
he always thought it a poor substitute for his own fine kingdom at 
Sarawak. "It is a very short-sighted view", he wrote, "which ties us 
up in smaU islands".340 
There were three main reasons why the White Raja's offer of Sara-
wak was not accepted. In the first place, Labuan was c1early preferabIe 
to Sarawak as a naval station. Belcher, af ter inspecting the harbour 
facilities at Kuching on behalf of the Admiralty, reported that they 
were inadequate.341 Labuan, on the other hand, as Brooke himself 
admitted, possessed an excellent harbour by comparison,342 and many 
other advantages as weIl. Brooke recorded the following description 
of it in his journal: "An island of about fifty feet high; 343 twenty-five 
miles in circumference; woody; timber good; water from wells and a 
few smaU streams, which, af ter a drought, are dry; natives say, water 
never fails. Anchorage good for the climate; weU protected from the 
N.E .... situation of contemplated town low; climate healthy ... The 
island of Labuan, for the purposes of refuge for shipwrecked vessels, 
of a windward post relative to China, for the suppression of piracy, 
and the extension of our trade, is weU suited".344 
Secondly, the fact that Labuan was an island increased rather than 
detracted from its value in the eyes of the British Government. The 
troubles caused by the Maoris of New Zealand af ter they had agreed 
to accept British sovereignty in accordance with the Treaty of Waitangi 
(1840) were fresh in mind. The Government were afraid that the same 
story would be repeated in Borneo if they set up an establishment on 
the mainland there. The fear of becoming entangled in domestic 
squabbles acted as a powerful deterrent to Stanley, Gladstone, and 
Aberdeen, and may weU have been the chief reason why John Craw-
838 Stephen to Hawes (n.d.). (CO. 144/1). 
34() Brooke to TempIer, December 22nd, 1843. (Letters, i. p. 3(9). 
341 Belcher, op. cit., Vol. i, p. 33. 
342 'Labuan' is Malay for 'harbour' or 'anchorage'. 
343 The highest point on Labuan is, in fact, 336 feet high. 
344 Dido, ii, pp. 167-8. 
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furd refused to recommend Sarawak as a suitable place for a British 
settlement when his ad vice on the matter was sought in 1844.846 
Finally, it must be remembered that 'island-taking' was in line with 
the strategie policy of the day. Recent examples were the Falkland 
Islands and Hong Kong. Islands could be protected by sea-power, 
without the need of expensive military garrisons. Moreover, in view 
of Labuan's possibilities as an emporium for trade, there were some 
who thought that an optimistic parallel could be drawn with that most 
succes sf uI of island entrepots, Singapore. 
Labuan was therefore selected in preferenee to Sarawak, and by the 
time the new Government took office there also was general agreement 
that, wh ether the Borneo settlement was to be a Crown Colony or only 
a naval station, its administration, as Gladstone had pointed out, would 
ultimately have to be undertaken by the Colonial Office. Everything 
now depended on the attitude adopted by Earl Grey. Conflicting advice 
had been given him by his two Under-Secretaries, Hawes and Stephen, 
and he had to decide which of their recommendations he would accept. 
It did not take Grey long to make up his mind. Halfway through 
J uly 1846 he set the seal of Colonial Office approval on the plan to 
create a British colony in Borneo. He later eXplained to Lord J ohn 
Russell that on taking office he had been greatly impressed by the 
memorials which had been received from Manchester, London, and 
Glasgow, "earnestly praying" that the island would be occupied. 
Pressure from the commercial world seems to have been the principal 
reason for his decision.846 Stephen's suggestion that responsibility 
should be shifted to the East India Company was disregarded by Grey 
entirely.847 
The necessary orders for the foundation of the colony were issued 
to the Admiralty on July 24th by Lord Palmerston. As weIl as providing 
for the occupation of Labuan, these instructions signified· that it was 
the Queen's command that ships of the Royal Navy stationed in the 
Far East were to give "proper and efficient protection" to Mr. James 
Brooke, and were also to maintain "a sufficient force on the coast of 
84& See Crawfurd's evidence before the Select Committee on Army and Ordnance 
Expenditure, July Sth, 1850. (P.P., 1850, X, pp. 718-19). 
846 Earl Grey, The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration, Vol. 
ii, pp. 265-6, and Speech in the House of Lords, April 18th, 1850 (H ansard, 
Ser. iii, Vol. 110, Col. 490). 
847 See Grey's evidence before the Select Committee on Army and Ordnance 
Expenditure, June 14th, 1850. (P.P., 1850, X, pp. 652-3). 
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Borneo for the purpose of protecting British interests".348 The White 
Raja's five year long battle for recognition was over. 
Meanwhile Admiral Cochrane's attack on Brunei had been carried 
out, although Palmerston was not aware of this when he issued the 
order to occupy Labuan. At the end of August Captain Mundy, who 
had been placed in command of all Royal Naval vessels on the coast 
of Borneo af ter Cochrane's departure for China, tried to re-open nego-
tiations with the Sultan of Brunei. The mere rumour of the approach 
of a British wars hip, however, was sufficient to send the Sultan 
scurrying off into the jungle again. M undy made a second attempt 
three weeks later, and this time His Highness summoned up the courage 
to remain at the capital to receive him. Gunboats from H.M.S. Iris 
were anchored opposite the palace, and a marine guard lined the terrace 
leading to the royal audience chamber. "The Sultan received me at the 
entrance of the audience-hall", Mundy wrote later, "and the marines, 
who were drawn up in a position directly enfilading the divan, presen-
ted arms as I stepped over the threshold, and made their pieces teU weU 
together. I observed the old monarch trembie in his slippers". The 
Sultan readily gave his visitor an assurance that he would submit to 
any terms which Admiral Cochrane or Raja Brooke might be pleased 
to dictate.349 
Af ter this episode Mundy returned in the Iris to Singapore, and 
waited there in the hope that orders would soon be received from the 
Commander-in-Chief in connection with Labuan. In this he was not 
disappointed, for on November 2Sth dispatches arrived from Hong 
Kong directing him to go at once to Brunei, secure a formal deed of 
cession from the Sultan, and then take possession of Labuan in Her 
Majesty's name. On the way back to Brunei he caUed at Kuching to 
talk the matter over with Raja Brooke, and both men agreed that the 
Sultan would almost certainly demand a sum of money in exchange 
for the deed of cession. Mundy's difficulty was that financial arrange-
ments regarding Labuan had been mentioned neither in the 1844 
agreement nor in the orders he had received from Admiral Cochrane. 
Brooke was satisfied, however, that a little firmness would soon bring 
the Sultan to heePlio 
On December ISth Mundy brought the Iris to anchor in Brunei 
348 Palmerston to the Admiralty, ]uly 24th, 1846. (C.O. 14411). 
349 Mundy, op. cit., Vol. ii, pp. 262 and 264. 
3150 Ibid., p. 289. 
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River. The following morning he sent his first Lieutenant, Heath, to 
the capital with letters for Pêngeran Mumin, the Chief Minister at the 
Sultan's court. The contents of these letters, according to Mundy's own 
account, were as follows: "They gave a sketch of my instructions, but 
at the same time set forth the indignation which was feIt by the English 
Government at the Sultan having fired at the Queen's flag,351 and that 
it would greatly depend upon the conduct of his Highness and the 
pëngerans ... whether or not pacific relations be renewed". The Captain 
of the Iris believed that the plan he was adopting of "keeping up the 
prospect of another visit from the admiral, the English raja, and the 
fleet, would be the best antidote against violent opposition from the 
ill-disposed pëngerans, and the piratical party in general".3112 In other 
words, the Sultan must cede Labuan, or run the risk of being chased 
into the jungle again! 
When Mundy presented himself at the palace two days later, all his 
demands were met. The Sultan and pengerans held out for com-
pensation, as expected, but by a judicious rattIing of the sabre Mundy 
eventually obtained the royal signature. As he himself put it, "The boats 
in line of battle in front of the palace, and the marines with fixed 
bayonets on the threshold of the audience hall, though a picturesque 
group, we re by no means calculated to encourage any act of violence".3113 
The treaty to which the Sultan and Captain Mundy set their hands 
on December 18th, 1846, was brief and to the point. It contained only 
th ree articles: 
1. Peace, friendship, and good understanding shall subsist for ever 
between Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and 
His Highness the Sultan of Borneo Proper, and their respective 
Heirs and Successors. 
2. His Highness the Sultan hereby cedes in full sovereignty and 
property to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, 
Her Heirs and Successors for ever, the Island of Labuan and its 
dependencies, the Islets adjacent thereto. 
3. The Government of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and 
Ireland hereby engages, in consideration of the cession above speci-
fied, to use its best endeavours to suppress Piracy, and to proteet 
8111 A reference to Admiral Cochrane's attack on Brunei of the previous July, in 
which affray the Sultan's guns had, in fact, fired first. 
352 Ibid., pp. 293-4. 
8113 Ibid., p. 298. Mundy to Cochrane, January 12th, 1847. (C.O. 144/2). 
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lawful commerce, and the Sultan of Borneo, and his ministers, 
promise to afford every assistance to the British authorities.354 
Mundy presented the Sultan with a silver-mounted telescope, em-
barked his marines, and sailed the Iris across Brunei Bay to Labuan. 
There, at twelve noon on December 24th, in the presence of the assem-
bled pëngerans of Brunei - but not of their master, who had excused 
himself from the ceremony on the ground that a journey on the open 
sea always made him seasick - the island of Labuan finally became 
part of the British Empire.355 
Although by the end of 1846 Raja Brooke had good reason to be 
satisfied with the development of his Bornean poIicy, his own personal 
position was still a matter of considerable difficulty and anxiety to him. 
The status of Confidential Agent granted him by Lord Aberdeen had 
been official recognition of a kind, but his services in that capacity 
were unpaid. Aberdeen had in fact been content to take advantage of 
Brooke's prestige in order to promote British commercial and strategie 
interests in Borneo, and at the same time had refused to give him a 
regular diplomatie appointment lest Great Britain should become too 
deeply involved in the island's domestic polities. Brooke himself never 
made any attempt to capitalize on his unique position, and might have 
been wiIIing to carry on indefinitely as 'honorary' British agent had 
his private finances been able to bear the strain. But year by year the 
fortune which he had inherited from his father was slowly being eaten 
away by the expenses of the day to day administration of Sarawak. 
It was therefore fortunate for Brooke that the new Foreign Secretary 
did not share his predecessor's nervousness. Early in 1847 Palmerston 
appointed him 'Commissioner and Consul-General to the Sultan and 
Independent Chiefs of Borneo' at a salary of i 500 a year.356 
In May of the same year, on the Foreign Secretary's instructions,35T 
354 F.O. 93/16 (1). 
35'5 Mundy, op. cit., Vol ii, pp. 305-7. See also F. E. Forbes, Five Years in 
Chitna ... , pp. 287-8, and Rutter, op. cit., pp. 199-212. 
356 The appointment was back-dated to February 24th. (Foreign Office to Wise, 
March 16th, 1847: C.O. 144/2). 
357 Foreign Office to Brooke, January 25th, 1847. (F.a. 12/5). These instructions 
also contained a suggestion that the Sultan should be persuaded to cede "an 
additional district extending to a certain distance inland from the coast", 
the object being to prevent interference with Labuan. Nothing came of this 
proposal, however; it may have been inspired by the analogy of Province 
Wellesley. 
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Brooke went to Brunei to negotiate a new treaty with the Sultan, 
designed to secure permanent British con trol over the commerce of the 
north-west coast. In addition to laying down certain conditions of free 
trade and free access for British merchant vessels to Brunei ports, this 
treaty forbade the Sultan to make "any cession of an island or of any 
settlement on the mainland in any part of his dominions to any other 
nation, or to the subjects or citizens thereof, without the consent of 
Her Britannic Majesty".3ó8 If the White Raja had been able to foresee 
the trouble and irritation this seemingly innocuous article would later 
cause Sarawak, he might not have been 50 ready to obtain the Sultan's 
signature to it! 
Soon af ter completing his mission to Brunei, Brooke set sail from 
Borneo for his first visit to England in nine years. In 1838 he had left 
it as an unknown adventurer. He returned a national hero. The publi-
cation of his journals by Captain Keppel in 1846 had familiarized the 
fashionable world with his exploits, and he was fêted and lionized 
wherever he went. Government Departments sought his advice on the 
problems of the Far East, and he received a knighthood from Queen 
Victoria for the great services he had rendered to his country. When 
the time came to appoint a Governor for the new colony of Labuan, 
Grey and Palmerston had no need to look farther than the man who 
had already shown such outstanding ability in dealing with the inhabi-
tants of the Bornean coasts. On January 22nd, 1848, Brooke was 
created Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Labuan at the princely 
salary of i 2,000 a year.3ó9 He returned to the East aboard H.M.S. 
Maeander, a vessel specially detailed by the Admiralty for the purpose, 
and commanded by his old friend and champion, Captain Keppel, and 
entered upon his new duties the following September.360 
In many ways, the year 1848 may be taken as the apex of Sir James 
Brooke's career. His position as Raja of Sarawak was secure as never 
before, and he had a positive assurance from the British Foreign Secre-
tary of continued naval support for his independent kingdom. The 
assassination of Raja Muda Hassim had incidentally provided him with 
358 Treaty of May 27th, 1847. (F.O. 93/16 (2). Copy in Maxwell and Gibson, op. 
cit., pp. 143-7). 
359 Grey to Brooke, January 22nd, 1848. (P.P., 1847-8, XLII, pp. 251-2). 
The Governor of the Falkland Islands, for example, was receiving f. 800 a 
year at this time, as also was the Governor of Western Australia. Even the 
Governor of New Zealand received only f. 2,500 a year. (See P.P., 1847-8, 
XL, pp. 393-9). 
800 M aeander, i, p. 32. 
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a pretext for cutting the last formal links which bound him to the 
treacherous Sultan of Brunei, and af ter 1846 the annual tribute of 
$ 2,500 which he had been paying for four years was discontinued. 
Admiral Cochrane's naval operations of the same year raised the White 
Raja higher than ever in the esteem of the local population. The Dyaks 
of the interior, for example, were staggered to hear of the fall of 
Brunei, which they had always regarded as the greatest power on 
earth.361 Sarawak itself was steadily growing in importance and pros-
perity. Kuching had now become a substantial town of 45,000 inhabi-
tants,362 and Brooke estimated the total value of its exports at betweën 
two hundred and two hundred and fifty thousand dollars a year.363 
The White Raja's very success, however, contained within itself the 
seeds of future disaster. The glare of publicity which greeted him on 
his return to England also illuminated the methods by which he had 
achieved his present extraordinary position. It was soon being whispered 
by some that these methods were not altogether creditable, either to 
their author or to those who had given him protection and support. 
Particular criticism was directed at his effective but admittedly ruthless 
treatment of the Borneo pirates. Were the expeditions of Keppel, 
Cochrane, and others, it was asked, really a necessary part of the Royal 
Navy's duty to protect British commerce in the Far East? Or we re they 
the outcome of an unscrupulous desire on the part of this so-called 
White Raja to subject innocent savages to his will? As these attacks 
grew in strength and virulence, Brooke and his friends were shocked 
to discover that they were largely inspired by the man who had once 
been Sarawak's greatest protagonist, Brooke's London agent, Henry 
Wise. 
361 Spenser St. John, Rajah Broake, p. 80. 
362 M C1eandl!1", ii. p. 2. 
383 Brooke to Tempier, March 5th, 1850. (Letters, ii, p. 276). Accurate figures 
of the export and import trade of Sarawak are not available for the period 
up to 1857 since all Brooke's records at Kuching were destroyed during the 
Chinese Insurrection. 
CHAPTER VIl 
THE pmATE CONTROVERSY 
When James Brooke was created Raja of Sarawak in 1841, the 
British commercial world assumed that as soon as he had set up a 
government he would be asking for financial support. The Singapore 
Free Press pointed out in an editorial that the means of a private 
gentleman were insufficient for the purpose in hand, and that the new 
enterprise could succeed only if full publicity were given to it in India 
and in England.364 It was generally taken for granted that under 
judicious management Sarawak could become a useful new market for 
British manufactures and a profitable field for British capital invest-
ment.3M 
Brooke knew that his personal fortune was inadequate but, unlike 
the merchants, he regarded his new kingdom not as an estate to he 
worked for profit but as an instrument placed in his hands by fortune 
for the purpose of raising a native population in the scale of civilization. 
For this reason, although anxious to obtain financial support, he flatly 
refused to accept it other than on the terms he himself laid down. One 
cannot but admire Brooke's high principles, but it is less easy to sym-
pathize with his naive assumption that British capitalists could he 
persuaded to invest money in Sarawak primarily to improve the con-
dition of the inhabitants and only secondarily in the hope of obtaining 
dividends. 
One member of the commercial world who certainly did not share 
the White Raja's scruples was his London agent, Henry Wise. From 
the beginning of his association with Brooke, Wise was sure that if 
once the White Raja could be made to see the immense commercial 
possibilities of Sarawak, he would soon abandon his altruistic attitude 
and agree to entrust his affairs to the capable hands of business men. 
In taking this view, Wise was the victim of a triple misconception. 
a64 Issue of J anuary 13th, 1842. 
365 G. F. Davidson, for example, devoted a lengthy appendix in his hook, Trade 
and Travel in the Far Bast (1846), to a description of the methods he con-
sidered Brooke should adopt in order to attract capital and labour to Sarawak. 
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In the first place, he completely misjudged the White Raja's character, 
for Brooke was never really interested in trade or profit-making and, 
like many Victorian gentlemen, rather looked down upon those who 
were. "Wise, .. builds much upon my ignorance of business matters", 
Brooke drily remarked to his friend, John Tempier, on one occasion, 
"and because I am no merchant he concludes I have no sense".366 
Secondly, Wise was very much in error in believing Sarawak capable 
of producing a rapid return on investments. And, thirdly, he seems to 
have genuinely misunderstood the true nature of Brooke's grant from 
the Sultan of Brunei. In a letter to Lord Haddington of April 1844, 
he asserted that the Sultan, imbued with "an anxious desire for a more 
close and intimate connection with the British Government", had ceded 
"a valuable portion of his territory at Sarawak ... for the purpose of 
forming a commercial establishment".367 
To some extent Brooke was himself responsible for raising false 
hopes in his agent's mind. During the period when the chief concern 
of both was to obtain British Government recognition for the new settle-
ment, he of ten made use of expressions which seemed to indicate -
to Wise, at any rate - that fortunes were almost to be picked up in 
Borneo for the asking. "For the country", he wrote in September 1841, 
"what shall I say? I could not wish a richer; its soil is fine, and 
admirably calculated for the culture of rice, coffee, nutmegs, or 
cotton".368 On another occasion he told his agent: "I do not myself see 
why this opening should not lead to results similar to India itself".369 
Finally, and most significant of all, it was Brooke who first put for-
ward a proposal that a company should be formed to develop the 
resources of Sarawak. Early in 1843 he instructed Wise to investigate 
the possibility of forming a public company with a capital of "from 
i 300,000 to i 500,000", and recommended that "plantations, diamond 
mines, etc., and a monopoly of antimony and opium" should be held 
out as inducements to prospective shareholders.37o 
Wise deduced from these instructions that the way was clear for the 
exploitation of Sarawak and, since he himself was to share in the 
pro fits, considered that his fortune was as good as made. With great 
- Letters, i, p. 284. 
367 Wise to Haddington, April 12th, 1844. (Borneo Papers, p. 28. My italies). 
3'68 Brooke to Wise, September 24th, 1841. (Ibid., p. 10). 
36'9 Brooke to Wise, March 14th, 1843. (Ibid., p. 11). 
370 Wise thought of forming a 'Borneo Company' at about the same time, but 
the first definite proposal along these Iines came from Brooke. (Cf. Brooke 
to TempIer, April 14th, 1843: Letters, i, p. 256). 
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enthusiasm he set about the task of interesting the City of London in 
a Bornean development project. In doing so, however, he used methods 
which caused Brooke to suspect that a commercial 'bubble' was being 
promoted. "I trust [Wise] has not committed me by garbling or high 
colouring my statements", he wrote to TempIer in April 1843. "I fear 
it because ... he has so evidently misconstrued my meaning and expres-
sions about commerce. This annoys me, because I thought I had been 
guarded enough to prevent any rash commercial speculation".371 As time 
went on Brooke's suspicions were confirmed, and he decided to put 
a stop to these exaggerated descriptions of Borneo once and for all. 
"I wish you", he told TempIer, "to state plainly and roundly my 
opinion ... that the N. W. coast of Borneo offers no immediate oppor-
tunity for British manufaçture, beyond the quantity yearly supplied 
from Singapore".372 Wise, however, continued to use the most extra-
vagant language in the course of his promotion campaign. 
The White Raja's determination to prevent the exploitation of 
Sarawak by speculators became even stronger when the Rayal Navy 
began taking action against the Borneo pirates. As his prestige grew 
as a result of the exploits of Keppel and Sir Thomas Cochrane, so his 
need for assistance from the commercial world dec1ined. He ultimately 
came to the conclusion that a public company would not, af ter all, be 
required to ensure the security of Sara wak and that, if he were ever 
to carry out his true mission of civilizing his subjects, he must break 
free from the distractions of trade. One of the c1earest statements of 
his views on this point is contained in a letter he wrote in March 1846. 
"I can in no wise participate", he said, "in profits which may arise out 
of the formation of a company, or any other project started in England, 
for it is incumbent on me to continue independent in order to judge 
correctly the measures calculated to bene fit this country, and a correct 
judgment is only to be farmed whcn all prospects of pecuniary advan-
tage have been discarded, excepting such as flow naturally in the course 
of time and improvement".373 All that Sarawak really needed for 
stability, he decided, was a safe and steady revenue. In 1846 he succeeded 
in putting his finances on a more or less satisfactory basis,374 and 
371 Brooke to TempIer, April 13th, 1843. (Ibid., p. 249). 
3'n Brooke to TempIer, August 1843. (Ibid., p. 281). 
373 Brooke to Wise, March Ist, 1846. (P.P., 1850, X, p. 1244). 
374 Soon af ter Brooke became Raja of Sarawak, he commuted all taxation into 
a single revenue, to he derived from the export of antimony ore. An opium 
farm was added later, together with some other small levies, such as an 
annual rice tax on the Dyaks. Before long, however, the funds collected by 
9 
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from then on did everything he could to frustrate the commercial 
penetration of his kingdom. 
Such a poIicy inevitably aroused resentment in the business wor Id. 
J. R. Logan, the editor of the lournal of the Indian Archipelago, who 
was wiIIing to give Brooke fuIl credit for humanitarian motives, strongly 
disapproved of his attitude to commercial enterprise. "With the feelings 
which Iie at the bottom of [his] views", wrote Logan, "we entirely 
sympathize, but we would earnestly deprecate any attempt to enforce 
that seclusion from promiscuous contact with Europeans which Sir J. 
Brooke evidently deerns it desirabIe to carry out to a certain extent, 
if practicabIe. We think it 50 impracticable that we might as weIl attempt 
to oppose a law of nature".375 As an absolute ruler Brooke was of 
course free to dictate what poIicy he chose in Sarawak, but protests 
from the commercial world became more vigorous when he sought to 
apply similar restrictions to areas of Borneo which were not under 
his immediate control. Vnder the terms of Articles Il and III of the 
Treaty of 1847 with Brunei - a treaty Brooke had negotiated -
British merchants were entitled to trade and acquire property within 
the Sultan of Brunei's dominions, and merchants taking advantage of 
these facilities naturally expected to be given protection and support by 
the official speciaIly appointed by the Government for that purpose, 
Brooke himself. 
The first clash between the White Raja and British speculators 
occurred as a result of the discovery of antimony ore near the Bintulu, 
a river which was subject to the Sultan of Brunei. In November 1847 
the Singapore firm of GIiddon & Co obtained a ten-year mining lease 
of this area in exchange for an annual royalty.376 They appIied to the 
these means were found to be inadequate, and he instructed Wise to arrange 
for a syndicate to take over the antimony and opium monopolies on a five-
year lease. The offer was aocepted by the firm of Melville & Street, who 
agreed to pay an annual royalty of f. 2,500. But during the commercial crisis 
of 1847-8 this firm, like so many engaged in the eastern trade, went bankrupt, 
and in 1849 the antimony and opium monopolies reverted to Government. The 
following year the antimony mines were leased to a new syndicate, R. and 
J. Henderson & Co., and the opium farm was taken over by a member of 
Brooke's staff at Kuching, and run as a state enterprise. These arrangements 
remained in force until the Borneo Company began operations in 1856. 
(Letters, iH, pp. 14 and 123. P.P., 1850, X, pp. 1242-7). The revenues of 
Sarawak, however, did not meet expenses until af ter 1850, when agreat 
influx of Chinese from Dutch Borneo occurred. (Spenser St. John, The Life 
of Sir James Brooke ... , p. 65). 
375 J. R. Logan, 'Borneo', JOf/rtl. Ind. Arch., 1848, p. 496. 
376 Gliddon & Co to Rear-Admiral Inglefield, December 7th, 1847. (e.O. 1441Z). 
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Admiralty 377 for ratification of their lease, but were told that no 
decision could be given until Sir James Brooke had had time to go 
into the matter on his return from Europe. An examination of the anti-
mony fields, however, convineed them that the ore could not be landed 
at Singapore under $ 1.65 a pikuI, at which price mining operations 
would be uneconomic, and they lost interest in the scheme.378 
In the meantime an independent adventurer named Robert Burns 
had prevailed upon the Singapore representative of Hamilton, Gray & 
Co to lend him sufficient capital to obtain a concession in the same area. 
Burns was a grandson of the poet and had already gained considerable 
experience in Borneo, where he had shown himself to be an explorer 
of no mean ability. He was the first European to make an excursion 
into the far interior of the Sultanate of Brunei, and contributed a 
valuable description of the Kayan people to the Jaurnal af the lnáian 
Archipelaga.379 Of his character it is difficult to form a just estimate. 
The quality of his writing shows that he was far from being the 
"disreputabIe adventurer" of the Sarawak histories, and the fact that 
he succeeded in living for some time among the wild Kayan argues that 
he can hardly have been as tactless and overbearing as has sometimes 
been suggested. On the other hand he undoubtedly had a fiery temper, 
was cru de and predatory (particularly where women were concerned), 
and by the standards of his time was not an ideal representative of 
western civilization in the Eastern Seas.380 
Burns arrived at Brunei early in 1848. Af ter an argument with the 
Sultan and his ministers, he secured an antimony concession and pro-
ceeded to look over the ground at Bintulu. He had been there a month 
when a letter arrived from A. C. Crookshank, Brooke's deputy at 
Kuching, advising the chiefs of Bintulu that they need not work the 
antimony mines unless they and their peoples genuinely wished to do 
50.381 But Burns persuaded the chiefs to pay no attention to this letter. 
Soon afterwards Brooke himself returned to the East, clothed in his 
new dignity of Governor of Labuan. On the way through Singapore 
377 From December 1846 (when Labuan became a British possession) to Septem-
ber 1848 (when its Government first began to function) the Admiralty were 
responsible for the administration of British policy in north-western Borneo. 
3'78 Gliddon to Hume, November 25th, 1851. (P.P., 1852, XXXI, p. 452). 
379 R. Burns, 'The Kayans of the North-West of Borneo', JOUr/I. Ind. Arch., 
1849, pp. 138-52. 
380 Cf. Tom Harrisson, 'Robert Burns - the first Ethnologist and Explorer of 
Interior Sarawak', The Sar(RJJok Museum Journal, November 1951, pp. 463-77. 
381 Crookshank to the Chiefs of Bintulu, January Sth, 1848. (P.P., 1852-3, LXI, 
p. 347). 
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he told Mr. Nicol, the representative of Hamilton, Gray & Co, that the 
time was not opportune for working antimony at Bintulu,382 and when 
he reached Kuching he sent a letter to the chiefs which was couched 
in far stronger language than Crookshank's had been. "I request that 
in future", he wrote, "whenever an Englishman [sic] does wrong like 
Mr. Burns, my friends will order him out of their country, and hold 
no intercourse with him ... Every English trader must obey the Govern-
ment of the country in which he carries on his business ... Let the 
traders, therefore, in my friends' country, be confined to their own 
business; and if they represent themselves to be great people, possessed 
of power, or talk as Mr. Burns talked, my friends will know that they 
speak falsely, and are men without shame".383 
This letter was conveyed to Bintulu by the East India Company's 
steamer, Phlegethon. When its contents became known, the chiefs 
refused to have anything more to do with Burns, and he was obliged to 
return by the steamer to Singapore. He later went back to Brunei in 
order to recover his lease money, but lost his temper when discussing 
terms with the Sultan and behaved generally in such an insuiting manner 
that he would almost certainly have lost his life then and there had the 
Brunei pengerans not been afraid of Raja Brooke's vengeance.384 
Af ter this incident the Sultan wrote to Brooke to say that he would be 
grateful if Mr. Burns were dissuaded from visiting the antimony fields 
again.385 Burns retired to Labuan and spent some time trying to 
persuade the fishermen there to ferry him over to Bintulu, but they 
were all too much in awe of the White Raja's displeasure to agree. 
He then chartered a merchant schooner and began trading along the 
coast. Before long, however, he was in trouble again, on one occasion 
for defaulting on debts and on another for assaulting the captain of 
his own schooner. His chequered career came to an abrupt end in Sep-
tember 1851, when he was murdered by pirates in Marudu Bay. 
Robert Burns may weU have been something of a scoundrel and a 
'general undesirable' and it is possible that if Raja Brooke had not 
engineered his expulsion !rom Bintulu blood would have been shed. 
382 An unnecessary warning, as it turned out, since Nicol had already decided 
that the Bintulu speculation was a bad one. (Nicol to Brooke, March 3Oth, 
1852: P.P., 1852, XXXI, p. 545). 
383 Brooke to the Rajas of Kayan and Kinneah (n.d.). (P.P., 1851, XXXVI, 
pp. 5-6). See also Moeander, ii, p. 92. 
384 'Minutes of a Conversation between Mr. Low and Pangeran Makota', January 
llth, 1849. (P.P., 1852, XXXI, pp. 546-8). 
a85 Sultan of Brunei to Brooke, Rabi' 11, 1266 (1849). (Ibid., p. 548). 
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But it was at least doubtful if the White Raja's treatment of him was 
consistent with the duties of a British consul-general. Brooke made no 
attempt to prove or dis prove the accusations against Burns before 
ordering his summary ejection, and the question suggests itself - Who 
was the White Raja of Sarawak that he should piek and choose between 
those who were eligible to trade under the privileges of the 1847 Treaty 
and those who were not? As the North British Mail indignantly 
demanded: "Why should not Mr. Robert Burns be as free to explore, 
to open mines, to establish trading relations in the Archipelago as Sir 
James Brooke? What was Sir James Brooke but a poor friendless 
adventurer when he began his career in the Eastern Seas? Is Borneo 
to be less accessible to the enterprise of British subjects since than it 
was before? So long as Mr. Burns does not poach on Sir James 
Brooke's manor, we do not see why the latter should be suffered to 
interfere with him".386 
The whole matter may be summed up by saying that whether the 
White Raja's handling of the Burns affair was morally justifiable or 
not, it was undoubtedly questionable at law. Few would cavil at his 
statement of general principles when he wrote: "Better would it be to 
abandon our settlements and our trade in [the Eastern Seas] and to 
leave the native population to its miseries and its own wild sense of 
justiee, than to expose it to the unrestrained licence of European specu-
lators".387 But by applying his exclusion policy indiscriminately he was 
laying himself open to the charge that he was using his official position 
as Governor, Commissioner, and Consul-General in order to benefit 
his private position as Raja of Sarawak. 
Brooke might have been able to carry through his plan to bar 
speculators from Borneo had he confined himself to chasing away 
adventurers like Burns, who had little influence or backing. But when 
he became involved in a similar dispute with Henry Wise over the 
exploitation of Borneo coal he was matching himself against a much 
more formidable adversary. The circumstances surrounding the long 
battle between Brooke and Wise were immensely complicated, but may 
be briefly summarized as follows. 
In August 1846 the Sultan of Brunei granted Brooke aconcession 
to work "the whole of the coal found in the country extending from 
386 Issue of October 7th, 1851. (F.O. 12/12). It must be remembered that a paper 
Iike the North British Mail was in honour bound to support a grandson of 
Scotland's national poet whether he was a scoundrel or not. 
~!17 Brooke to Earl Granville, January 5th, 1852. (P.P., 1852, XXXI, p. 461). 
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Mengkabong- as far as Tanjong Baram" in return for an annual 
payment of $ 2,000 for the first year and $ 1,000 for each subsequent 
year of operations.888 This constituted a practical monopoly of all coal 
then known to exist on the mainland of northern Borneo. Brooke had 
no intention of mining it himself, but had the agreement drawn out in 
his own name because the Sultan was unwilling to grant a concession 
to anyone else.889 In November, on Brooke's behalf, Wise offered this 
concession to the British Government, who declined it, but stated that 
there would be no objection to a private firm taking up the option.890 
The following October Brooke transferred all his rights in Borneo coal 
to Wise unconditionally.891 
Meanwhile the coal beds on Labuan were attracting attention. The 
previous April Lieutenant Heath, of H.M.S. Wolf, had made a detailed 
survey of the various seams on the island and had reported favourably 
on them to Rear-Admiral Inglefield, his Commander-in-Chief.8M 
Inglefield contracted with a beachcomber named William Henry Miles 
to supply Labuan coal to the Royal Navy in the Far East at [1 a ton.893 
By scratching at surf ace outcrops Miles succeeded in producing a small 
quantity of very inferior coal, which was duly loaded into the bunkers 
of H.M. Ships calling at the island and later provoked blistering 
criticism from the engineers who we re obliged to use it. 
It was at this stage that Wise conceived an ambitious scheme to 
make a 'corner' in Borneo coal. Ris first step was to gain control of 
the fields in Labuan. In January 1848 he secured a thirty-year lease 
of all coal lying under the surface of SOO acres of land - a sufficient 
area for his purpose - for a rental of [100 plus a royalty to govern-
ment of 2/6 a ton on output in excess of 1,000 tons per annum.894 
Next he applied to the City of London for the necessary capital to 
oromote a Borneo mining company. He approached R. and J. Henderson 
and Co, but they would not accept his terms. Other firms were also 
tried without success. He eventually persuaded Messrs. Melville and 
888 'Grant of the Sultan of Brunei', AUlnlst 23rd, 1846. (Ibid., p. 628). 
389 Brooke to TempIer, August 24th, 1846. (L~tters, ii, p. 152). 
890 British Government permission for the private exploitation of Borneo coat 
had atready been given tentatively in October 1845. 
891 Brooke to Wise, October 6th, 1847. (P.P., 1852, XXXI, p. 628). Governor 
Bulwer to Earl Granville, May 23rd, 1873. (F.O. 12/48). 
892 See Forbes, op. cit., pp. 318-22. Forbes was a member of the survey party. 
893 Agreement of September 7th, 1847. (c.a. 14412). 
894 Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners to the Colonial Office, ]anuary 
26th, 1848. (P.P., 1847-8, XLII, pp. 258-9). 
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Anstruther to enter into partnership with him, and with their assistance 
founded the Eastern Archipelago Company, of which he became the 
managing director.3911 In July he sold his rights in both Labuan and 
Brunei coal to this company on terms which were astonishingly favou-
rable to himself, in view of the fact that he had paid nothing for them 
in the first place. In 'compensation' for the surrender of his rights, 
he was to receive: i 6,000 within four months of the final organization 
of the Company, i 3,000 per annum for ten years from the same date, 
i 10,000 worth of shares, i 2-10-0 % of all bonuses and dividends 
declared, except when the total annual dividend was less than 
i 7-10-0 %, and a salary of i 800 a year plus bonuses and percentages, 
the whole not to exceed i 1,800 in any one year.396 
Brooke watched these developments with increasing concern. It was 
most undesirable, in his opinion, for the monopoly of such a strategi-
cally important commodity as coal to be in the hands of one man. He 
also con si de red that a royalty of $ 1,000 per annum was an absurdly 
small sum to be given to the Sultan of Brunei as compensation for the 
surrender of all the coal in his dominions. Moreover, he further 
maintained, the grant he had obtained in 1846 was never intended to 
be exclusive, but only permissive; it conveyed a right to mine coal, not 
to monopolize it.897 Wise disagreed strongly with this view, and both 
he and Brooke appealed to the Colonial Office, supporting their claims 
with different translations of the original document of cession.898 
This argument was in fuU swing when Brooke learnt with dismay 
that he had another and more personal reason to be dissatisfied with 
his London agent. When the firm of Melville & Street went bankrupt 
during the commercial crisis of 1847-8, Brooke lost nearly i 10,000, 
and he ascribed this disaster, probably correctly, to Wis e's faulty 
handling of his affairs.889 A year and a half earlier, moreover, a number 
of letters from Brooke to J ohn TempIer containing uncomplimentary 
references to his London agent had chanced to fall into the latter's 
811& Brooke to Grey, November 24th, 1851. (P.P., 1852, XXXI, pp. 803-4). 
896 C.O. 144/10. 
897 Brooke to Wise, November 2Oth, 1848. (P.P., 1852, XXXI, p. 632). 
898 Brooke to Sir John Pakington, July 22nd, 1852. (P.P., 1852-3, LXI, pp. 349-50). 
899 Brooke to Earl Desart, April lOth, 1852. (P.P., 1852, XXI, p. 820). 
The cÎrcumstances of this loss are not clear. Brooke never recovered any 
damages. St. John once remarked cryptically of his hero, "Mr. Brooke never 
lmew what was the true state of his affairs". (Spenser St. John, The Life of 
Sir lames Brooke . .. , p. 65). 
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hands.400 This gave Wise a further reason for bearing a grudge against 
the White Raja. Each decided that he had been disgracefully treated 
by the other, and in November 1848 Brooke broke finally with Wise. 
after an association lasting more than ten years.401 From being the 
staunch supporter and able advocate of Sarawak, Wise immediately 
became its most bitter enemy, and the dispute over Borneo coal con-
tinued more fiercely than ever. 
The Eastern Archipelago Company, which began mining operatiom: 
early in 1849. was a dismal failure from the outset. Shortsightedness 
on the part of the di rectors was the main cause of its difficulties. They 
could not be persuaded to supply their manager at Labuan with suffi-
cient capital to set the enterprise on its feet. On J une 2Oth, 1849, for 
example, the paid-up capitalof the Company was 1. 51,455. Vet on 
November 2nd of the same year its Labuan manager was obliged to 
ask the local Government Treasurer for a loan of $ 600 in order to 
pay his workmen's wages. Wise, however, laid all the blame for the 
Company's slow progress on the Labuan Government, and particularly 
on Governor Brooke, whom he accused of vindictiveness and petty 
obstruction. Once again both sides carried their dispute to the ColoniaJ 
Office. 
On examination many of Wise's charges against Brooke turned out 
to be either frivolous or based on plain untruths, but on at least three 
occasions he scored victories over his opponent by persuading the 
British Government to reverse rulings Brooke had already given. In 
April 1850 the Colonial Office consented to a rise in the price of Labuan 
coal being supplied to the Admiralty, though Brooke was strongly 
opposed to any change.402 The following November Earl Grey decided 
an argument about the exact limits of the Labuan coal lease in favour 
of the Company and against Brooke's advice.403 And at the end of 
1851 the Foreign Office supported Wise's interpretation of the Brunei 
400 Admiral Sir Henry Keppel, A Sailor's Life uooer Four Sovereigns, Vol. ii, 
p. 63. Jacob, op. cit., Vol. ii, pp. 7-8. 
tol In 1838 Wise, then a partner in the firm of Gardner, Urquhart & Co, had 
helped Brooke to fit out the yacht, Royalist. When he became the White 
Raja's London agent at the end of 1841, he withdrew from this concern and 
founded the house of Melville, Wise & Co, which later became incorporated 
with Cruikshank, Melville & Co. In August 1845 Wise withdrew from this 
partnership also in order to devote his full attention to Bornean a/fairs. 
402 Minute by Earl Grey, April 26th, 1850. (C.O. 144/6). 
403 Grey to Brooke, November 21st, 1850. (P.P., 1852, XXXI, p. 789). Minute 
hy Herman Merivale. (C.O. 144/4). 
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coal concession in preference to the White Raja's.404 These were minor 
triumphs in themselves, for they brought about no improvement in the 
fortunes of the Eastern Archipelago Company, but they had a 
detrimental effect on the relations between Sir James Brooke and the 
British Government, which we re already showing signs of friction. 
Brooke's period of office as Governor of Labuan was perhaps the 
least successful episode in his otherwise spectacular career. The real 
trouble was that in accepting the position he had taken on more res-
ponsibility than one man could bear. He was already the Raja of an 
independent kingdom - a task which would have kept most men more 
than fully occupied - and his duties as British Commissioner and 
Consul-General involved him in a great deal of travelling. During the 
whole of 1849 he spent only thirty-nine days at Labuan itself.-
But, apart from this, it must be admitted that the White Raja, by 
both character and past experience, was ill-suited for an appointment 
in the public service. He was too fond of having his own way and toa 
impatient of interference in his plans. He also never lost sight of the 
fact that Great Britain would never have achieved her present position 
in Borneo if it had not been for his efforts and his sacrifices. Captain 
Keppel, who loyally supported Brooke on every other occasion, had 
little favourable to say about his administration of Labuan. "Never, 
my dear Wise", he told the former agent in September 1849, "did you 
ever make such a mistake as when, with indefatigable labour and 
perseverance, you raised that misshapen, useless structure, the Labuan 
government; I believe the Eastern Archipelago Company would· have 
been thriving had that government never been formed ... My friend 
Brooke has as much idea of business as a cow has of a clean shirt. 
Napier 406 is no better ... Scott, the Civil Engineer,407 is a clever, 
first-rate man; he has done the only good that has been done, and is 
the only pers on that ought to have been sent out ... I can assure you 
that I am not sorry to be moving away from this station".40S 
404 Foreign Office Memorandum of November 28th, 1852. (F.O. 12/35). Minute 
by Herman Merivale. (e.O. 144/7). Earl Granville to Brooke, December 31st, 
1851. (P.P., 1852, XXXI, p. 669). 
405 Evidence of Earl Grey before the Select Committee on Army and Ordnance 
Expenditure, June 14th, 1850. (P.P., 1850, X, p. 653). 
406 Lieutenant-Governor William Napier, who was later dismissed by Brooke, 
perhaps unjustly and certainly on inadequate evidence, for inefficiency and 
peculation. 
407 J. Scott (more properly the 'Government Surveyor') who later became Gover-
nor of British Guiana. 
«18 Keppel to Wise, September 2nd, 1849. (e.O. 144/6). 
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It would be quite unfair, however, to ascribe all the early difficulties 
of Labuan to incompetent administration. Brunei was hostiIe to the 
new colony from the first, partly for reasons of commercial rivalry,409 
and partly because slaves from the mainland of ten sought sanctuary 
at Labuan in the hope of gaining their freedom. An outbreak of malaria 
also gave the colony a bad name, and the merchants of Singapore were 
slow to take advantage of its possibilities as a trading centre. But the 
fact remained that during Brooke's governorship Labuan fulfiIIed none 
of the purposes for which it had been founded, and cost the British 
Exchequer an average of l 9,000 a year to maintain. 
The White Raja returned to England for health reasons in the 
spring of 1851. Soon af ter his arrival he instituted legal proceedings 
against the Eastern Archipelago Company for fraud. He eventually 
won this case and the Company's charter was revoked, but from every 
point of view it was unfortunate that the instigator of the action had 
been the Governor of Labuan. The Company were able to claim, with 
considerable justification, that the duties of a British governor did not 
include attacking the only commercial concern which had so far been 
established in his colony, and which he had been specifically instructed 
by the Colonial Secretary to protect. 
Between 1847 and 1851, by trying to exclude European speculators 
from Borneo and by pursuing the Eastern Archipelago Company all 
the way from the coal mines of Labuan to the Court of Queen's Bench 
in London, the White Raja drew upon himself the hostility of a 
powerful section of the British commercial world.410 By following 
courses of action which suggested that when the interests of Sarawak 
were involved he was liable to forget his responsibilities as an official 
of the British Government, he damaged the reputation he had won for 
impartiality and strict personal integrity. Only if these two considera-
tions are borne in mind is it possible to understand the astonishing 
virulence of the attacks which he now had to face, both in the press 
and in the House of Commons, against the measures he and the Royal 
Navy had been taking to suppress piracy along the north-west coast 
of Borneo. 
By the middle of 1849 six years had gone by since Captain Keppel's 
409 Brooke to Palmerston, January 9th, 1851. (F.O. 12/9). 
'1.0 The directors of the Eastern Archipelago Company included the Earl of 
Albemarie, Sir James Campbell, Mr. Hamilton Lindsay, Captain Nairne (a 
director of the P. & O. Co), and Captain Bethune, R.N. 
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assault on the Saribas, and five since his expedition against the Sëkrang. 
Both these pirate communities had consequently had ample time to 
forget the lesson they had received from the 'gallant Didos' and had 
relapsed once more into indiscriminate marauding. As a re sult, when 
in September 1848 Keppel and Brooke returned to Sarawak in H.M.S. 
M aeander on their way to establish the Government of Labuan, they 
realized that the work of suppressing Dyak piracy would have to be 
undertaken all over again. The Sultan of Brunei appealed for their 
assistance,411 and they both publicly pledged themselves to crush the 
Saribas and the Sëkrang as soon as the arrival of the dry monsoon of 
1849 made "boating operations" possible.4u But to Brooke's dismay 
the Maeander was ordered to China almost immediately, and plans 
for large-scale expeditions against the pirates had to be temporarily 
abandoned. 
The White Raja did what he could with his own resources to keep 
them in check, and demanded fresh naval support. Af ter an acrimonious 
correspondence with Rear-Admiral Sir Francis Collier, C.-in-C. of the 
Far Eastern Station, who con si de red that the Navy had more im-
portant work to do elsewhere, he eventually secured the services of 
H.M.S. Albatross (Commander Farquhar),413 and on July 24th, 1849, 
a powerful force set sail from Kuching for an as sa uit on the pirates 
of Saribas. In addition to the boats of the Albatross, the expedition 
included H.M. Brig Royalist, H.EJ.C.S. Nemesis, the steam-tender 
Ranee, Brooke's personal war-prahu (the Singh Rajah), and seventy 
native prahus manned by 2,500 Dyak auxiliaries.414 
Information had been received that a large bala, or pirate fleet, was 
making its way back to Saribas af ter a raid on the River Rajang, fifty 
411 Sultan of Brunei to Brooke (n.d.). (P.P., 1850, LV, pp. 32-3). 
412 Brooke to Palmerston, February 2nd, 1850. (Ibid., p. 30). Spenser St. John, 
The Life of Sj,y !ames Brooke ... , p. 170. 
413 In June when it seemed Iikely that the Albatross was about to he withdrawn 
without firing a shot, Brooke protested to Collier: "I was not aware until 
I perused your recent communication that Her Majesty's Ships were com-
missioned for non-employment in the public service". (C.O. 144/3). This is 
Brooke at his worst. It was certainly no way for the Governor of a small 
British colony to address a Rear-Admiral Commanding-in-Chief, least of all 
Sir Francis Collier, whose choleric temper is sufficiently indicated by the 
following story: "He had once been summoned before a bench of magistrates, 
and having uttered a great oath the chairman fined him five shillings for 
swearing. He looked grimly at the bench of three magistrates, drew a gold 
coin from his pocket, threw it on the tabie, and said, 'n - -- your eyes all 
round, and that will make up the sovereign'''. (Spenser St. John, The Life 
of Sir !ames Brooke ... , p. 146). 
414 Maeander, i, pp. 148-50. 
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miles Up the coast to the north. Brooke and Farquhar decided that their 
best plan would be to ambush this fleet on its return, and disposed 
their forces sa as to cover all possible entrances to the enemy's strong-
holds. On the night of July 31st the pirates fell into the trap. 88 Saribas 
prahus were destroyed and about 300 pirates killed outright; a further 
500 died later in the jungle or af ter reaching their homes. Spectacular 
destruction was caused by the steamer, Nemesis. At the height of the 
action she drove right through the struggling mass of prahus, catching 
up boats and occupants in her paddle-wheels and crushing them to a 
pulp. The total casualties on the British side were "two natives killed 
and about six wounded" .415 
Such was the famous 'Battle of Batang Marau' , the greatest blow 
ever struck at Dyak piracy, and the immediate cause of the attack 
upon the policy and reputation of Sir James Brooke.416 For the next 
four years everyaspect of the White Raja's rule in Borneo was to be the 
subject of the most intense controversy, both in England and in the 
East. Singapore society resolved itself into 'pro-Brooke' and 'anti-
Brooke' factions, the Free Press supporting and the Straits Times 
opposing him. In London the Times, the Westminster Review, and 
other papers declared in his favour, while the Daily News, the Spec-
tator, and the Examiner were against him. In the Houses of Parliament 
the problems of Borneo were discussed with an interest never shown 
before. 
Criticism of the White Raja took two main forms. He was attacked 
in his private capacity as sovereign of Sarawak, and in his public 
capacity as a servant of the British Crown. Of the two, the campaign 
to destroy his personal reputation was the more violent and the less 
justifiable. It was led by the prominent Radical, Joseph Hume, and 
carried on in the press and on public platforms chiefly by spokesmen 
of the London Peace Society and the Aborigines Protection Society. 
Louis A. Chamerovzow, for example, the secretary of the London 
Peace Society, published a violent attack on Brooke in 1851, entitled 
Borneo Facts verses Borneo Fallacies. Equally intemperate were 
A Naval Execution, by 'W.N.', and Adventures of Sir James Brooke, 
K.e.B., Rajah of Sarawak, "Sovereign de facto of Borneo Proper", 
415 Farquhar to Collier, August 25th, 1849. (P.P., 1850, LV, p. 18). 
416 An exaggerated account in the Straits Times of an engagement between the 
N emeSÏJs and a Balanini fleet in 1847 had already aroused some unfavourable 
comment, but it was the action at Batang Marau which provoked the real 
assault on Brooke's Borneo policy. 
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late Governor of Labuan, by George Foggo. Many of the accusations 
made in these works were taken up by contemporary newspapers and 
periodicals, apparently without any attempt at verification. None is 
worth refuting in detail. The authors betray a total ignorance of 
Bornean affairs and many seem to have had no qualifications for under-
taking the task of explaining them. Foggo, for instance, was 'Secretary 
to the National Monuments Association'. 
The burden of complaint in these publications and manifestos was 
that Sir James Brooke had started an unholy crusade against "innocent 
natives" and "peaceable traders" in order to advance his private 
interests. He was a "butcher" who had "murdered the savages into 
subjection". He had created pirates where there were only poor un-
civilized Dyak tribes engaged in occasional civil war. He had persuaded 
the Royal Navy to suppress these harmIess children of nature not 
because they merited punishment but because they had refused to 
submit to his tyrannical rule. 
This whole indictment rested on the assumption that, properly 
speaking, there was na such thing as a Dyak pirate. N either the Saribas 
nor the Sekrang, it was pointed out, had yet learnt the use of firearms; 
they therefore could not be regarded as pirates since they were ob-
viously not a danger to European shipping.417 It was certainly true 
that Dyak methods of warfare were unsophisticated by western 
standards. The Saribas bala demolished by Farquhar, for example, had 
only four small brass guns in the whole fleet,418 and Brooke himself 
noted in a letter to Lord PaImerston: "Should these pirates become 
possessed of musketry, which is but toa probable, the result must he 
deplorable".419 But it was quite absurd for Hume and his supporters 
to argue that because the Saribas and the Sekrang were not amenace 
to large European ships they were harmIess to small native trading-
prahus. His contention that Brooke's 'victims' were only engaged in 
legitimate civil war was equally preposterous. Their depredations 
extended for hundreds of miles along the coast, and their attacks were 
made indiscriminately on Malays, Chinese, Dyaks, or anyone else who 
had the misfortune to cross their path and had not the strength to 
resist them. 
Hume and the others who assailed the White Raja on personal 
417 Speech by Joseph Hume of July IOth, 1851. (Hansard, Ser. iii, Vot. 118, 
Cols. 443-7). 
418 Deposition of the native Siup. (P.P., 1850, LV, pp. 33-4). 
419 Brooke to Palmerston, March 6th, 1849. (Ibid., p. 14). 
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grounds damaged their case by embellishing it with wild exaggerations 
and wholesale distortions of the truth. Their speeches and writings 
reveal that they did not understand the real situation in Borneo, and 
they were far too ready to believe everything to Brooke's detriment 
that was reported to them. By quoting garbled extracts from his private 
journals,420 and by relying on the evidence of incompetent and in-
accurate witnesses, they weakened an indictment which, with the use 
of greater subtlety, could have been made very much more formidable. 
Brooke realized this, and commented shrewdly: "They are asses ta 
have pushed the attack with such perceptible malignity and personality; 
a cooler tone would have answered their purpose better".421 
Hume was on comparatively firm ground, for example, when he 
charged the White Raja with unnecessary cruelty. Many observers 
were appalled at the apparently heartless manner in which hundreds of 
savages had been struck down by British guns on the coasts of Borneo 
without having the means or the opportunity to fight back.422 Brooke's 
employment of Dyak auxiliaries also came under critici sm ; 423 the 
communities from which they were drawn, it was claimed, were in-
distinguishable from those against which they had been sent. Some 
of his friends undoubtedly did him considerable harm by publishing 
highly-coloured accounts of the scenes of carnage which accompanied 
many of his expeditions. Horace St. John, for example, writing in 
1852, at the height of the controversy, gave the following description 
of Keppel's assault on the Sekrang: "A great conflict took place, 
420 Brooke gave his journals to Captain Keppel with instructions that they were 
to be published if it were considered desirabIe. Keppel submitted them 'in 
the raw' to Mr. Jerdan, the editor of the Court lournal, who allowed Wise 
to see them. (Keppel, A Sailor's Life Iinder Four Sovereigns, Vol. ii, pp. 31 
and 63). When the proof of the first edition came from the printers, Wise 
persuaded the publishers to suppress it, on the ground that the journals as 
they stood would cause a scandal. He later c1aimed that he saved the White 
Raja's reputation by deleting several passages which gave especially grim 
details of operations against the Borneo pirates. This claim has been generally 
believed, but a comparison of the suppressed edition (a copy of which is in 
the British Museum) with the published version shows that the only important 
deletions made by Wise were some of Brooke's more outspoken criticisms of 
the Government of the Netherlands Indies. 
421 Jacob, op. cit., Vol. ii, p. 29. 
422 Cf. A. Audiganne, 'Politique coloniale de I' Angleterre: expédition de Bornéo', 
Rl!'llUe des Deux Mondes, 1846, pp. 645-70. 
423 Cf. D. C. Steyn Parvé, De handelingen vatn Sir lames Brooke op Borneo, 
[Ictoetst aan de officiële Engelsche bescheiden en de bestaande traktaten, 
pp. 140-65, and the 'Letter from fifty-three merchants of Singapore', to 
T· Hume, January 1851 in P.P., 1852, XXXI, pp. 489-92. 
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thousands being engaged on both sides - a mass of boats drifting 
along the stream, while the Dyaks were spearing and stabbing each 
other, decapitated trunks, and heads without bodies - scatlered about 
in ghastly profusion. The result of all these operations was most 
satisfactory".424 
Brooke was ruthless in his treatment of the Saribas and the Sëkrang 
but he cannot fairly be accused of inhumanity. There were numerous 
occasions on which he restrained his followers from unnecessary 
brutality, and he always tempered justice with mercy whenever he 
considered that circumstances warranted it. But he helieved that tribes 
like the Saribas could be persuaded to abandon their marauding prac-
tices only by being taught to respect the power of a British fleet. "A 
system of piracy", he wrote, "can only he put down by a system of 
repression; it requires knowiedge, and a course of alternate severity 
and conciliation to effect it".42Ii There can be no doubt that this policy 
was the right one. Af ter Farquhar's attack of J uly 1849 the Saribas 
abandoned piracy altogether, and settled down to trade and agricul-
ture.426 They would never have deserted their traditional occupation if 
it had not been for the grim lesson of Batang Marau. 
The real instigator of the personal defamation campaign against the 
White Raja was his discarded agent, Henry Wise, who supplied Hume 
and others with most of the 'evidence' which was presented on their 
side during the controversy. Bitterly resentful at not being allowed to 
speculate freely in Borneo, Wise suddenly discovered in 1849 that 
Brooke's operations against the pirates, against which he had made no 
murmur of protest during the preceding five years, were "dreadful 
proceedings ... unjustifiable on the ground of justice and humanity".42T 
lt was Wise, too, who initiated most of the complaints which were 
made against Brooke's actions as a servant of the Crown, and in the 
long run these caused more damage to the White Raja's stauding with 
the British Government than all the vituperative assaults on his private 
character .428 
424 Horace St. Joho, The Maloy Archipelago: its History and Present State, 
Vol. ii, p. 292. 
425 J. Brooke, 'Memorandum 00 Piracy', July 31st, 1852. (P.P., 1852-3, LXI, 
p. 346). 
- Speoser St. Joho to Lord Malmesbury, September 21st, (Ibid., p. 374). 
42T Wise to Lord Joho RusselI, November 26th, 1849. (P.P., 1850, LV, p. 1). 
428 lt is not possible to indicate here more than the esseotial features of Hume's 
case against Raja Brooke. His accusations fill scores of folio pages io the 
Parliamentary Papers from 1850-54. A summary of bis views may he foood 
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Criticism of Brooke in his capacity of British Commissioner and 
Consul-General in Borneo and Governor of Labuan was expressed at 
various times by Gladstone, Cobden, Bright, Sidney Herbert, and the 
Earl of Ellenborough, as weU as by Joseph Hume and several other 
political figures of less importance. Unlike Hume, none of these states-
men was biassed against the White Raja personaUy. Cobden's primary 
object, for example, was to force the British Government to abandon 
their policy of allowing the Royal Navy to be used to further the 
White Raja's aims. In a letter to John Bright of December 1849, af ter 
deploring the "sentimental mania which gave Brooke all his powers 
of evil", Cobden wrote: "It shocks me to think what fiendish atrocities 
may be committed by English arms without rousing any conscientious 
resistance at home, provided they be only far enough off, and the 
victims too feebie to trouble us with their remonstrances or groans ... 
The Peace Society and the Aborigines Society are shams if such deeds 
go unrebuffed. We cannot go before the world with clean hands on any 
other question if we are the silent spectators of such atrocities".429 
Gladstone's purpose, too, was to discredit the administration which had 
sanctioned Brooke's poliey, not to attack the White Raja's character. 
He blamed the Admiralty and the Foreign Office, not Brooke, for the 
"butchery" which had occurred at Batang Marau. In his opinion, British 
ships should not have been allowed to participate in the action in the 
first place. He declared that Sir James Brooke was "a man of philan-
thropy truly Christian", and refused to support Hume's demand for 
a public inquiry on the grounds that it was framed in such a way as 
to hold the wrong party responsible.43Q 
Strangely enough, interest in Bornean piracy was first aroused in 
the House of Commons by a matter which had no direct connection 
with Sir James Brooke at all. Early in 1850 a number of extremely 
heavy claims for head-money were submitted to Parliament in 
respect of naval operations on the coasts of Borneo and nearby 
islands, and Radicals like Cobden, Bright, and Hume were quick to 
ri se in protest against what they regarded as a disgraceful waste of 
public funds. In aecordance with an Act of 1825, the erews of H.M. 
in the pamphlet he published in 1853, entitled A Letter to the Right Honourable 
the Earl of Malmesbury ... relative to the Proceedmgs of Sir James Brooke, 
K.C.B., etc., etc., ÏIn Borneo. (Copy in the India Office Library). 
429 Quoted in John Morley, The Life of Ricltard Cobden, Vol. ii, pp. 55-6. 
43() Speech of July lOth, 1851. (Hansard, Ser. Hi, Vol. 118, Col. 485). See also 
W. E. Gladstone, 'Piracy in Borneo and the Operations of July 1849', The 
Contemporary Review, 1877, pp. 181-98. 
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Ships engaged in operations against pirates were entitled to a reward 
of i. 20 for each pirate taken or killed during an attack, and i. 5 for 
every 'piratical person' not taken or killed but known to have been 
alive at the beginning of the battle.431 The Act was designed to en-
courage the suppression of piracy in the West Indies, and was passed 
at a time when numerous freebooters were operating in that area under 
letters of marque purporting to be issued by certain of Spain's insurgent 
South American colonies.432 The scale of awards laid down may have 
been appropriate to the conditions of the West Indies in 1825, but it 
seemed startlingly generous when applied to the results of naval 
engagements in the East Indies twenty years later. 
For their services at the Battle of Batang Marau Commander 
Farquhar and his men received i 20,700. The calculations were made 
as follows: 500 pirates 'destroyed' at i 20 per head equals i 10,000; 
2,140 pirates 'dispersed' at i 5 per head equals i 10,700; total, 
i 20,700.433 Farquhar was promoted for his efficient handling of the 
operation, and his personal share of the head-money awarded was 
i 2,757. This was handsome pay for one night's work by any standards, 
especially as the British part of the force had sustained no casualties 
and had really been in very little danger. The Earl of Ellenborough 
complained in the House of Lords that head-money was being paid 
out for the destruction of Borneo pirates armed with spears and swords 
at a rate which was "four times the amount ... given to those who 
captured or destroyed ships and vessels in action with a national 
enemy" .434 
The head-money system was also regarded with suspicion because 
on most occasions the only witnesses of the Royal Navy's battles with 
pirates in the Eastern Seas were the sailors themselves. Since no one 
could look over their shoulders, the temptation to submit inflated figures 
of enemy casualties must have been strong indeed. In at least one case 
it seems to have been irresistable. When H.M.S. Samarang had a brush 
with some prahus off the coast of Halmahera in June 1844, her crew 
were awarded i 11,900 head-money. Evidence collected later suggests 
431 'An Act for encouraging the Capture or Destruction of Piratical Ships and 
Vessels', 6 Geo IV, Cap. xlix. 
432 William Senior, Naval History in the Law Courts, pp. 100-1. 
433 'Certificate of Recorder of the Court of Judicature of Prince of Wales Island, 
Singapore and Malacca', October 8th, 1849. (P.P., 1850, LV, p. 24). Head-
money return, referring to operations of J uly 31st, 1849. (P.P., 1851, LVI, 
Pt. i, p. 155). Buckley, op. cit., Vol. ii, p. 509. 
434 Speech of April 18th, 1850. (Hansard, Ser. iii, Vol. 110, Col. 483). 
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not only that the number of enemy was exaggerated, but that in all 
probability some of the prahus attacked were not pirate vessels at all.4311 
According to contemporary Dutch accounts the vessels engaged by 
Belcher's force were korra korras which belonged to the Residency of 
Ternate and were returning home af ter making their annual politietogt 
(police-trip) to the coasts of New Guinea. Belcher claimed that 350 
'pirates' were killed in the action off Halmahera, but the figures given 
by the Dutch Resident of Ternate (who presumably would have had 
no reason for sealing them down) were 16 killed and 40 wounded.436 
The Act of 1825 was repealed early in 1850, and replaced by one 
a good dealless accommodating. Soon afterwards the House of Com-
mons was presented with a bill for f. 100,000 representing the amount 
of head-money earned by the Navy during the previous year's oper-
ations. Payment was agreed to, despite strong protests from the 
Radicals.437 Brooke, as the author of the policy which had made these 
awards possible, received a large measure of the blame, though he 
himself did not benefit from them financially. 
The White Raja also eame under fire from Hume, Sidney Herbert, 
and others for combining the Governorship of Labuan with private 
trading activities at Sarawak. In Herbert's opinion, this "could not be 
otherwise than prejudicial to the interests of the Crown".438 Brooke's 
defence was that he had not personally been involved in direct com-
mercial transactions since leasing the Kuching antimony mines in 
1846 - two years before taking up an appointment in the public 
service - and that all pro fits derived from the sale of antimony had 
been, and were still, devoted to the expenses of the State of Sarawak.439 
Earl Grey had already explained to a Parliamentary Select Committee 
in 1850 that at the time the Government had seen no valid reason why 
Brooke should not retain possession of Sarawak concurrently with 
holding public office,440 but Brooke's critics were not satisfied. They 
produced a wealth of evidence, supplied by Wise, which seemed to 
403'5 Marryat, op. cit., p. 54. WiIliam Senior, 'An Early Victorian Windfa1I', The 
Mariner's Mirrar, 1911, pp. 80-3. Cf. Rutter, The Pirate Wind, pp. 133-43. 
436 Resident Helbach to the Governor of the Moluccas, June llth, 1844. (Buit. 
Zaken, No. 3133). 
437 'Debate on the Navy Estimates', May 23rd, 1850. (Hansard, Ser. m, Vol. 111, 
Cols. 294-311). 
436 Sidney Herbert to Brooke, July Ist, 1852. (Letters, m, p. 130). 
439 Sir James Brooke, A Vindicatian of hls Character and Praceedings ... , p. 17. 
Brooke to TempIer, October llth, 1850. (Letters, m, pp. 14-15). TempIer to 
Hawes, July 2nd, 1850. (P.P., 1850, X, p. 1242). 
440 P.P, 1850, X, p. 655. 
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show that the White Raja had discriminated unfairly against British 
merchants who attempted to trade freely in Borneo. Gliddon, the one-
time s{leculator in Bintulu antimony, for example, accused Brooke of 
"trafficking jealousy and unscrupulous malevolences"."l 
Nevertheless, up to the end of 1852 all Hume's efforts to persuade 
the House of Commons to order an official investigation into the affairs 
of Borneo ended in failure."2 In December of that year, however. 
Lord Derby's Government feil, and a coalition headed by the Earl of 
Aberdeen took its place. The new cabinet included Gladstone and Sidney 
Herbert, both crities of the White Raja. When the new Prime Minister 
consented to a Commission of Inquiry in March 1853, it was assumed 
by Brooke's friends that he had done so because of pressure from 
Gladstone and Herbert, and because the support of Hume and the 
Radicals was needed if the coalition were to survive. The White Raja, 
it has been said, was "thrown to them [i.e. the Radicals ] as a peace-
SOp".443 The truth was, however, that Aberdeen and his Foreign 
Secretary, the Earl of Clarendon, had a sufficient reason of their own 
for wanting an inquiry into Bornean affairs. 
When Brooke was arranging matters in Brunei af ter Admiral 
Cochrane's attack on the capital of July 1846, he took the opportunity 
of obtaining from the Sultan a fresh titIe to his kingdom of Sarawak.444 
"The Lord Sultan", stated this document, "grants the province of 
Sarawak ... unto the Tuan Besar, James Brooke, Esquire ... to he 
ruled in accordance with the wishes of the Tuan Besar ... ""11 No 
mention was made of annual tribute, though the sums to be paid by 
the White Raja to the Sultan and other Brunei nobles had been specified 
in all previous agreements. (The stipulation was retained, however. 
that $ 4,000 (Sp) would be paid to Brunei on the demise of Brooke 
or of his heirs.) From 1846 onwards, therefore, the State of Sara wak 
was de facto independent of Brunei. 
A Foreign Office Memorandum of January 1853, however, reveals 
that the British Government had not yet recognized this change in 
status. Indeed, until Hume brought the matter to public notiee in 
March 1852, the Government were not even aware that a fresh grant 
had been made. The Memorandum notes further that Brooke had 
441 Gliddon to Hume, November 25th, 1851. (P.P., 1852, XXXI, p. 458). 
442 Hume's motions demanding an inquiry were defeated by overwhelming majo-
rities : July 1850, 169 to 29; July 1851, 230 to 19. 
443 L. A. Mills, 'British Malaya 1824-1867', JRASMB, November 1925, p. 26l. 
444 See pp. 125-6 above. 
4411 Grant of August Znd, 1846. (Maxwell and Gibson, op. cit., p. 186). 
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acquired his new title before he received an appointment as British 
Commissioner, and asks: "Would such a commission have been issued 
had Her Majesty's Government considered him as an independent 
Prince ?" 446 
It seemed to both Aberdeen and Clarendon that Brooke's claim to 
unrestricted sovereignty over Sarawak, and also the charges which had 
been laid against him of hindering British commercial enterprise in 
Borneo needed closer examination. A convenient method of doing this 
would be by means of the Commission of Inquiry for which Hume 
and others had been pressing for so long. "The incompatibility of 
[Brooke's] character of Rajah and Consul", wrote the Prime Minister 
in a private note to the Foreign Secretary, "his relations with native 
chiefs, and his employment of British forces in their internal disputes 
afford reasonable grounds for inquiry. Complaint has been made that 
the general interests of British commerce have been injured by the 
position of Sir J. Brooke, and the influence exercised by him in support 
of his own monopoly ... Sir J. Brooke should be informed of our 
intentions, but I would bring no charges, although, of course, complaints 
must be received. On our part, it should be a fair and impartial 
inquiry".447 Accordingly, when Clarendon issued instructions for a 
Commission, he stated that the first question it had to answer was 
whether the White Raja's position at Sarawak was "compatible with his 
duties as British Consul-General and Commissioner for Trade, and 
with his character of a British subject". And he added this warning 
for the Commission's guidance: "It is to be observed that by no act 
of Her Majesty's Government has countenance ever been given to 
Sir James Brooke's assumption of independence, and that his posses-
sion of Sarawak has never been considered otherwise by them than as 
a private grant" .448 
When the Government's decision to hold an inquiry was first an-
nounced, Brooke welcomed it, for he feIt confident that an impartial 
investigation would finally clear him from Hume's vindictive charges.449 
But his attitude changed abruptly when he learnt the Commission's 
terms of reference, and he protested vigorously to Clarendon that the 
independenee of Sarawak had long been recognized and had never been 
446 Foreign Office Memorandum of January 16th, 1853. (F.O. 12/14). 
447 Aberdeen to Clarendon, March 24th, 1853. (Abera'een Papers: British Museum 
Add. MS. 43188, p. 56). 
448 Clarendon to Sir Charles Wood, June 21st, 1853. (Jacob, op. cit., Vol. H, 
p. 91). 
~49 Brooke to Clarendon, April 4th, 1853. (F.O. 12/13). 
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questioned byany previous Foreign Secretary.4IIO Brooke was seriously 
in error here. The truth was that the matter had never received detailed 
consideration. Even Lord Palmerston, one of the White Raja's staun-
chest supporters, confessed in 1850 that he found it quite impossible 
to comprehend the precise nature of the relationship between Sarawak 
and the Sultanate of Brunei.4151 
The Commission "appointed to inquire into certain matters connected 
with the position of Sir James Brooke" conducted its investigations at 
Singapore, and was in session from September llth to November 2Oth, 
1854. It consisted of two members, Messrs. Prinsep and Devereux, 
both of the East India Company's service. On the charges of tradillg 
while holding public office and of obstructing the Eastern Archipelago 
Company, the Commissioners exonerated the White Raja completely, 
but they decided nonetheless that his position as ruler of Sarawak was 
incompatible with his holding office under the Crown - a decision of 
academie interest only, since he had resigned all public appointments 
simultaneously with protesting against the Commission's terms of 
reference the previous September.452 Neither Commissioner was in any 
doubt about the piratieal nature of the Saribas and the Sëkrang; but, 
whereas Devereux believed that the punishments inflicted on them had 
been "just and expedient", Prinsep thought that Brooke's practice of 
"acting in consort with savage allies" made it undesirable that he should 
be entrusted with power to call for British naval support against pirati-
cal tribes. The Commissioners also failed to agree on an answer to the 
most important problem they were called on to solve - the nature of 
the White Raja's position at Sarawak. Prinsep held that Brooke was 
"a vassal of the Sultan of Brunei", though admittedly "holding by a 
tenure very lax and easy to be thrown off altogether"; while Devereux, 
who was prepared to concede th at Sarawak was in fact independent 
of Brunei, expressed a doubt whether Brooke, as a British subject, 
could "attain to the position of being an independent rul er of a foreign 
country" .4153 
Thus, although the White Raja emerged from his long ordeal with 
his personal reputation undamaged, the findings of the Singapore 
Commission of Inquiry were unsatisfactory to him and his supporters 
from every other point of view. Sarawak was now farther than ever 
400 Brooke to Clarendon, September 27th, 1853. (Ibid.) 
4151 Minute by Lord Palmerston, October 12th, 1850. (F.O. 12/8). 
4152 Brooke to Clarendon, September 24th, 1853. (F.O. 12/13). 
453 'Reports of the Commissioners' ... , P.P., 1854-5, XXIX, pp. 4-21. 
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from recognition either as a British colony, which he had originally 
hoped it would be, or as a state in its own right, which he was beginning 
to realize it would have to become if it was to survive. The mere fact 
that an inquiry had been held, moreover, had two far-reaching conse-
quences. The interrogations to which he had been subjected not only 
embittered Brooke towards the British Government, with the result 
that relations between Sarawak and the Foreign Office deteriorated 
from this time onward, but also seriously damaged his reputation with 
his Bornean subjects. Sarawak was soon to be beset by numerous 
economic and political difficulties and its ruler, deserted as he thought 
by Great Britain, and abandoned by the Royal Navy, had every reason 
to be alarmed at the rapid progress which his Dutch neighbours were 
making in their efforts to extend their rule in western, southern, and 
eastern Borneo. 
CHAPTER VIII 
TIIE DmCH REACTION 
Until James Brooke established himself at Sarawak, the Dutch did 
not attempt to exercise more than a nominal sovereignty over their 
possessions in the southern part of Borneo. Experience had taught them 
that the island could not be developed either easily or quickly, and 
during the 1830's, when interest was concentrated on Java and the 
Culture System, Borneo became a kind of protected reserve, with a 
few settlements dotted around its coasts to act as signposts warning 
would-be trespassers not to interfere. Keeping up appearances in this 
way was expensive,454 yet the Dutch never contemplated withdrawing 
from the island entirely. They assumed that when the resources 
required to exploit it became available their patience would be rewarded 
by appropriately rich returns. 
Such a policy of neglect was practicabie only so long as there was 
no fear of foreign competition. Thus, when it became clear that Raja 
Brooke's object at Sarawak was neither scientific inquiry nor trade, 
the Dutch realized that they would have to safeguard their possessions 
more efficiently or run the risk of losing them. Sarawak itself was 
outside their sphere of influence, it was true, but Brooke's success there 
might easily encourage other fortune-hunters to carve out private king-
464 During the period 1839-62 expenditure exceeded revenue on the Borneo 
Westkust by f. 7.8 million, and on the Zuid- et! Oostkust by f.4.2 million. 
Almost all the other Outer Possessions were equally unprofitable, the respec-
tive net deficits being: Benkoelen, f. 2.5 m.; the Lampongs, f. 1.5 m.; Palem-
bang, f.5.5 m.; Riouw, f. 2.7 m.; Celebes, f.9.8 m.; the Moluccas, f. 8.6 m.; 
and Timor, f. 0.9 m. The West Coast of Sumatra, however, showed a net surplus 
of f. 3.5 m. in the same period, and the profits on tin-mining in Banka were 
so considerable that they cancelled out the losses sustained elsewhere in the 
Outer Possessions. Between 1839 and 1862 Banka with Billiton returned the 
huge net surplus of f. 71.2 million. 
(These figures are adapted from the 'Verslag van het beheer van Neder-
landsch-Indië ... over het jaar 1854', Staatscourant, Bi/blad, 1856-7, 11, xx, 
2, pp. 147-50, and from 'De financiëele resultaten van het bestuur der Buiten-
bezittingen van 1839 tot 1862', De Indische Gids, 1890, ii, pp. 1336-9. For 
various technical reasons, explained in the second of these authorities, they 
are approximate only). 
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doms for themselves in parts of Borneo over which the Dutch, though 
possessing sovereign rights, had no actual control. Foreign Govern-
ments, too, might be preparing to challenge Dutch power in the island. 
British and French interest in the Eastern Archipelago generally had 
shown a marked increase since the opening of trade with China in 1842. 
For these reasons the Netherlands Government decided that their 
existing claims to sovereignty over Borneo and the other Outer Pos-
sessions must be more clearly defined and, when this had been done, 
publicly proclaimed as a guide and as a warning to the outside world. 
Towards the end of 1842, J. C. Baud, the Minister of the Colonies, 
orde red a search to be made in the archives at Batavia with a view to 
codifying the huge mass of contracts and agreements upon which the 
title of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to its Far Eastern territories 
was based.455 This investigation revealed many gaps and discrepancies, 
and it was therefore decided to send special commissioners to the Outer 
Possessions with orders to place Dutch sovereign rights in these areas 
as far as pos si bIe beyond doubt. A 'Commissioner and Inspector for 
Borneo, Riouw, and Lingga', A. L. Weddik, was appointed in May 
1844.456 
Eleven years previously, however, Governor-General van den Bosch 
had forbidden all activity in Borneo which might conceivably cause 
the Government unnecessary expense. This meant that officials of the 
Borneo administration rarely, if ever, moved beyond their head-
quarters, and were tbus completely ignorant of the real state of affairs 
in the districts over which they ruled. Resident A. M. E. Ondaatje of 
Bandjermasin, for example, did not once venture up the Barito River 
even as far as Marabahan during the ten years after he took up his 
appointment in 1836.457 
In order to combat the growing threat of foreign interference, there-
fore, Baud relaxed the restrictions imposed by van den Bosch. In 
November 1843 he granted permission for Dutch officials in Borneo to 
undertake "scientific exploration, administrative measures, the sup-
- Kabinetsrescript of November 3rd, 1843, L" G4ö, Very Secret. Minister of the 
Colonies to the Governor-General, November 4th, 1843. (Kol., 1843, No. 459/W, 
Very Secret). Orders were also issued for new maps to be drawn of all the 
Netherlands Indian possessions. (See J. E. de Sturler, Het grondgebkd van 
Nederlandsch Oost-Indië ~n verband mt't de tractaten met Spanje, Engeland. 
en Portugal, pp. 37-41.) 
«i6 Besluiten of May 12th, 1844, No. 35, and June 2Znd, 1844, No. 2. 
457 Weddik to the Governor-General, September 27th, 1846. (Kol., 730"/15). 
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pression of small revolts, and the regulation of quarrels.468 Even the 
establishment of new military posts was authorized, although prefe-
rence, the Minister considered, should be given to the extension of 
Dutch power by peaceful means, such as the negotiation of fresh con-
tracts, the levying of annual taxes, and the distribution of flags and 
batons. These batons or canes (stokken) were embossed with the arms 
of the N etherlands, and were designed to act as symbols of Dutch 
sovereign power. Three months af ter Baud issued these instructions, and 
as if to emphasize the need for them, Erskine Murray arrived in Koetei 
River on his ill-fated trading venture.459 The attention of the authorities 
in Batavia was thus immediately drawn to the East Coast, with which 
there had been no official contact of any kind since 1834. 
In the mid-nineteenth century the East Coast of Borneo was ruled 
by a number of more or less independent native princes, none of whom 
was comparable in power or influence to the Sultans of Pontianak, 
Sambas, or Bandjermasin. To the north, bordering on Brunei, lay 
Tidoeng, or the 'Tidoengsche landen', a cluster of eight paramount 
chieftainships, nominally subject to the adjoining Sultanate of 
Boeloengan. South of Boeloengan were Goenong Taboer and Sam-
balioeng, situated on either si de of the River Koeran. These four 
districts had once formed the Sultanate of Berouw, an ancient kingdom 
which had been partitioned in 1770 af ter a civil war; suzerainty over 
'Berouw' was claimed by the Sultan of Sulu as weil as by the Sultan of 
Bandjermasin. To the south of Sambalioeng lay Koetei, the largest of 
the East Coast states, and between Koetei and Tanah Boemboe (the 
eastern part of Bandjermasin) lay the smaller Sultanate of Pasir.460 
In 1817 the Sultan of Bandjermasin had ceded the whole East Coast 
'in full sovereignty' to the Government of the Netherlands Indies. 
4158 Minister of the Colonies to the Governor-General, November 4th, 1843. (Kol., 
1843, No. 459, MI, Very Secret). See also H. Colijn, Politit'k beleid en be-
stuurszorg in de bu~tenbezittlngen, Deel i, pp. 29-33, and Stapel, op. eit., 
Deel v, p. 301. 
459 See p. 102 above. 
460 'Borneo: staatkundige verhouding van het Nederlandsche Gouvernement, op-
gemaakt in verband der Nota te zamengesteld bU het Ministerie van Kolo-
niën'. (Kol., 1846, No. 160, Secret). J. Hageman, 'Aanteekeningen omtrent een 
gedeelte der Oostkust van Borneo', TTLV, Deel iv (1855), pp. 71-106. 
Repeated changes of name have been responsible for much confusion in the 
history of the East Coast of Borneo. Sambalioeng, for example, was known 
as 'Tandjong' from 1770-1834, and as 'Batoe-poetih' from 1834-50, while 
'Berouw' was still being used to describe the area between Koetei and the 
Sulu border long af ter the Sultanate of that name had ceased to exist or had 
been reduced to a shadow of its former self. 
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Between then and 1844, however, eastern Borneo had been visited by 
Dutch officials on only two occasions. In August 1825 George Müller, 
a former Resident of Sambas, negotiated a contract with the Sultan 
of Koetei (which was not ratified by Batavia), and in 1834 Dutch 
warships chastised a Sulu pirate sharif at Batoe-poetih. Following this 
attack, the rulers of Goenong Taboer and Sambalioeng submitted to 
Dutch suzerainty and bound themselves to abstain from piracy and 
protect trade.461 Needless to say, these agreements were disregarded 
as soon as the ships under whose guns they had been signed departed 
from the coast. 
In 1844, therefore, Dutch influence in eastern Borneo was virtually 
non-existent. This was why Erskine Murray's escapade caused so 
much uneasiness in Batavia. Admittedly, he and some of his companions 
had been murdered, but that was not to say that other adventurers 
might not be more successful. In October Commissioner Weddik was 
orde red to the East Coast to investigate Murray's death, and also to 
strengthen the honds between the local rulers and the Dutch Govern-
ment. A new contract was obtained without difficulty from Koetei -
largely, it seems, because the Sultan expected to be punished for the 
murders, and was thankful to be let off with a caution 462 - and a 
fortnight later a similar agreement was secured from the Sultan of 
Pasir.463 During November Lieutenant J. van Capellen of the Dutch 
Navy negotiated fresh treaties with Boeloengan, Goenong Taboer, and 
Sambalioeng. All these agreements contained clauses prohibiting 
Europeans other than those of Dutch extraction from establishing 
themselves in the territories of the rulers concerned.464 
Scarcely had van Capellen left the north-east coast when H.M.S. 
Samarang (Captain Sir Edward Belcher) arrived at Goenong Taboer. 
Belcher had received word that a British merchantman, the Premier, 
had been wrecked on a nearby reef, and that her crew were being held 
to ransom by the Sultans of Goenong Taboer and Boeloengan. On 
arrival, he was informed that the white members of the Premier's crew 
had already been rescued by van Capellen,465 but he decided to improve 
the occasion by negotiating provisional treaties of friendship and com-
~1 'Algemeen overzigt van de staatkundige gesteldheid van Nederlandsch-Indië 
over de jaren 1839-1848 (Borneo)'. (Kol., 1851, No. 27 bis, Secret). 
4e2 S. C. Knappert, 'Beschrijving van de onderafdeeling Koetei', BTLV, 1905, 
p.582. 
463 A. H. F. J. Nusselein, 'Beschrijving van het landschap Pasir', ibid., p. 567. 
4'64 Hageman, op. cit., p. 104. 
465 J. van Capellen, 'Brow: 1844'. (Kol., n.d.) 
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merce with both Sultans on behalf of the British Government. The 
peoples of Boeloengan and Goenong Taboer, he found, we re "extremely 
anxious to induce Englishmen fo settle amongst them, offering ground 
to build houses upon, gratuitously".466 Belcher's treaties were not con-
firmed by Great Britain,46T but the fact that they had been signed at 
all was striking proof of the ineffectiveness of the Dutch system of 
contract-making without actual occupation. Less than two months 
before, both these Sultans had promised to have nothing more to do 
with any foreign power other than the Netherlands.468 
These various moves on the East Coast coincided with Minister 
Baud's modification of the rules governing the activities of local Dutch 
officials. Baud, however, was no expansionist. Like van den Bosch, he 
believed that all available resources should be devoted to the exploitation 
of Java and Sumatra. Many phrases in his 1843 instructions indicated 
that he was nervous lest a too sudden removal of the curb on activity 
in Borneo should encourage the Government of the Indies to plunge 
forward into a career of reckless imperialism. But by 1845 he had 
come to realize that Dutch sovereign rights in the island could not be 
upheld unless the authorities in Batavia were given greater freedom of 
action. "Borneo", he wrote - with Brooke and Murray very much in 
mind - "has become the point de mire of all kinds of speculative 
enterprises".469 In October 1845 he laid down three principles by which 
future policy was to be guided. All import and export duties were to be 
abolished, since smuggling prevented their being collected in any case, 
Christian missions were to be encouraged and the work of the mis-
sionaries identified as much as possible with the administration,470 and 
greater efforts were to be made to exploit Borneo's mineral wealth.471 
The appointment of J. J. Rochussen as Governor-General of the 
- Belcher, op. cit., Vol. i, p. 234. 
4IIJ7 Copies may be found in F.O. 12/86. 
468 Contemporary Dutch writers c1aimed that these treaties were extorted by 
Belcher under threat from the guns of the Samarang. The only authority for 
the incident is his own account, which naturally does not support this view. 
- Letter of October 28th, 1845, Semi-official. (Quoted by Colijn, Politiek beleid, 
Deel i, pp. 34-6). 
470 OIristian missionaries were not permitted to enter Borneo until 1836. The 
Dutch feared that they would be killed, and that expensive punitive expeditions 
would then have to be sent to avenge them. Two members of the Rheinische 
Missions Gesellschaft visited the Chinese districts of Sambas in 1838. (E. Doty 
and W. J. Pohlman, 'Tour in Borneo •. .', The Chmese Repository, Vol. viii, 
pp. 283-310). 
471 Letter of October 28th, 1845. 
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Indies earIier in the same year made it certain that these new instruc-
tions would be acted on with alacrity. Possession in name only, Rochus-
sen believed, was a totally inadequate guarantee of future Dutch 
sovereignty over the Outer Possessions. He hoped to extend his Govern-
ment's rule from one end of the Archipelago to the other, and was 
ready to use force if necessary to achieve his purpose. "He who is 
sparing at seedtime", he said, "cannot expect to reap a rich harvest".4T2 
After conferring with Commissioner Wed dik, Rochussen suggested 
to Baud that the existing administrative structure in Borneo should be 
reorganized in order to give it greater cohesion and permanence. His 
proposals were accepted, and in December 1845 he was given authority 
to place the various establishments in the island under unified control. 
Permission was also granted for the appointment of a 'Governor of 
Borneo and Dependencies'.4T3 The public announcement of these changes 
declared that they were prompted by a desire on the part of Govern-
ment to improve the efficiency of the Borneo administration and to 
promote the "moral and religious civilization" of the population.4T4 But 
the text of the Cabinet decision authorizing them shows that they were 
primarily intended to impress foreign nations, particularly Great 
Britain. The creation of a Government of Borneo, it was hoped, would 
not only emphasize that the greater part of the island was Dutch 
territory, but would also remove the stigma attaching to such tities as 
'Resident of the West Coast', and 'Resident of the South and East 
Coast', by which the heads of the local administration were currently 
known, and which implied - with embarrassing accuracy - that Dutch 
ruie did not extend into the interior.475 The new arrangements came 
into force in February 1846. Commissioner Wed dik became the first 
Governor, and it was announced that the capital of Borneo would be 
at Sin tang, more than three hundred miles up the River Kapoeas in 
the western part of the island.476 
During the next four years an effort was made to extend Dutch 
influence to the remoter areas. In April 1846 H. von Dewall was 
4111 Quoted by H. Colijn, Neerlands Indië, Deel ii, p. 13. 
473 Minister of the Colonies to the Governor-General, December 19th, 1845. (Kol., 
1845, No. 443/Q1, Very Secret). 
474 Besluit of February 28th, 1846. The text of the preamble of this decree may 
be found in C. J. Temminck, COflp-d'<Eil général sur les possessions néer-
landaises dans l'Inde archipélagique, Vol. ii, p. 150. 
4711 Kabinetsbeschikking of December 17th, 1845, La H/44, Very Secret. 
476 Besluit of February 28th, 1846. Minister of the Colonies to tbe King, May 
12th, 1846. (Kol., 1846, No. 133, Secret). 
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appointed gezaghebber (administrator) of the East Coast, with head-
quarters at Koetei,477 and the formidable task of confirming the many 
states scattered along the eight hundred miles of coastline entrusted 
to his care in their allegiance to the ruling power. By the end of 1850, 
with assistance from Resident Gallois of Bandjermasin, he had nego-
tiated new contracts with every ruler of importance in the area.478 
In March of the same year the northern limit of the territory c1aimed 
by the Dutch was fixed at 40° 20' North Latitude.479 A short time 
before a proposal had been put forward that the boundary should be 
extended to 6° 25' North, approximately the area of Sugut River, which 
enters the sea fifty miles north-west of Sandakan, the future capital 
of North Borneo. The scheme came to nothing, however, chiefly because 
the extra stretch of coastline which would be gained was not thought 
sufficiently productive to warrant the expense of suppressing the pirates 
who inhabited it.480 
On the West Coast the energies of the Dutch administration were 
chiefly taken up in safeguarding Sambas and the Upper Kapoeas basin 
against encroachments from Sarawak. Raja Brooke was known to be 
corresponding with the Panembahan of Sanggau and other native rulers 
in Dutch Borneo with a view to increasing the existing frontier trade, 
and raids by Sarawak Dyaks against the Dyaks of Sambas were com-
mon.481 In the opinion of one Dutch official, it was only because the 
Netherlands Government controlled the mouth of the Kapoeas (and, 
consequently, the traffic which moved up and down this 'great canal', 
as it was called, of western Borneo) that the princes of the interior did 
not go over to the White Raja en bloc.482 To provide a counter-weight, 
therefore, to the prestige which Brooke had won for himself on both 
sides of the border, the Assistant-Residents of Pontianak and Sambas 
4"l'f Beslutt of April 24th, 1846, No. 3. 
478 J. G. A. Gallois, 'Korte aanteekeningen, gehouden gedurende eene reis langs 
de Oostkust van Borneo .. :, BTLV, 1856, pp. 221-63. Hageman, op. cit., 
pp. 76, 82, 86, 100, 105-6. Nusselein, op. cit., p. 567. Knappert, op. cit., p. 582. 
419 Kabinetsbeschikking of March 15th, 1850, L" Q5. (Kol., 1850, No. 84/G, Very 
Secret). 
480 Rapport by A. Weddik, February 1850. (Buit. Zaken, No. 3134), H. von 
Dewall, 'Aanteekeningen omtrent de Noordoostkust van Borneo', TTLV, 
Deel iv (1855), pp. 423-58. 
481 Brooke to the Panembahan of Sanggau, April 2nd, 1845, Assistant-Resident 
of Pontianak to the Governor-General, August 14th, 1846, No. 29, and Sep-
tember 5th, 1846, No. 37, Secret. (Kol., 1847, No. 49, Secret). 
482 Rapport of Lieut. O. van Kessel, quoted in Assistant-Resident of Pontianak 
to the Governor-General, April 26th, 1847, No. 101124, Secret. (Kol., 1847, 
No. 335, Secret). 
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were sent on tour through their provinces during 1847 to 'show the 
flag', and to renew the oaths of allegiance of the native princes.483 The 
N etherlands Indian Government sought by these means to prevent 
the southward expansion of Raja Brooke's influence, and aIso to 
forestall any attempt by foreign nations or individuals to found settle-
ments in imitation of his kingdom at Sarawak. 
Confirming the allegiance of native princes, however, was something 
that could have been done just as weU under the old administrative 
system, and the institution of a 'Government of Borneo and Depen-
dencies' did not of itself help to increase Dutch prestige in the island. 
As a diplomatie gesture, the new organization was put into effect too late 
to be of value, since by 1846 Great Britain had already rejected the 
Dutch interpretation of the Treaty of 1824, and had reserved her right 
to found colonies in Borneo if the need arose. As a practical measure, 
adopted to achieve greater efficiency, it was equally unsuccessful. The 
selection of Sintang as the site for a capital, for example, was quite 
inappropriate. In 1846 the interior of Borneo was completely unknown. 
No white man had yet crossed the island from one side to the other in 
any direction.484 Vet the Home Government's plan for a centralized 
administration envisaged the construction of a network of roads and the 
Iinking of the principal rivers at their souree by means of canals.485 
A scheme involving such insuperable engineering problems would 
presumably never have been proposed had the Minister of the Colonies 
possessed an accurate knowledge of the geography of Borneo. Governor-
General Rochussen was better informed, and although he obeyed the 
order to set up a central capital, he pointed out that efficient over land 
communications could not be developed without immense expenditure, 
which, in the circumstances, he considered unwarrantable.486 Sintang 
did not in fact function as an administrative headquarters for the whole 
is land at any time. Weddik never took up permanent residence th ere, 
and in 1847, while still retaining his official appointment as Governor 
483 Besluit of April 2Oth, 1847, L" V·:, Secret . 
.a4 The German geologist, Heinrich von Gaffron, was the first to do so. Between 
December 1846 and January 1847 he crossed from Kota Waringin on the 
South Coast to Pontianak on the West. (See H. von Gaffron, 'Beschrijving 
van het westelijke gedeelte van de Zuid- en Oosterafdeeling van Borneo .. .', 
BTLV, 1860, pp. 243-346). 
485 'Briefwisseling over de reorganisatie van het bestuur van Borneo'. (Kol., May 
lIth, 1849, La A, No. 1). 
i86 Governor-General to the Minlster of the Colonies, February Z8th, 1846, No. SS, 
L" G. Secret. (Kol., 1846, No. 150N, Secret). 
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of Borneo, was sent on special duty as a commissioner to the 
Moluccas.487 
By 1848 the authorities at The Hague had realized that the original 
plan to establish a centralized administration for Borneo had been a 
mistake. Accordingly, Rochussen was told to refrain from taking any 
action in the matter, at any rate for the time being. But now a fresh 
problem arose: How could the 'Government of Borneo' be abolished 
without creating a false impression of Dutch intentions ? It would be 
impossible merely to return to the old system of coastal residencies, 
since that might weIl imply that Dutch sovereign rights in the interior 
of the island were being abandoned or modified. The Governor-General 
was therefore instructed to reorganize the Borneo administration a 
second time, but to do so in such a way that foreign nations would be 
given no indication of future plans, and no opportunity to draw 
inferences damaging to Dutch prestige from the titles of officials 
invested with the governing power.488 
Rochussen solved the problem by dividing Dutch Borneo into twc 
mutuaIly independent administrative areas - the Westerafdeeling 
(Western Division) and the Zuid- en Oosterafdeeling (South and 
Eastern Division). By this expedient he removed the disadvantages of 
a single government and, at the same time, through the selection of 
appropriate titles, laid emphasis on Dutch claims to sovereignty over the 
interior as weIl as over the coasts. There was already a Resident at 
Bandjermasin, who took charge of the new South and Eastern Division, 
and a Resident was now appointed for the Western Division in place 
of the former Assistant-Residents of Pontianak and Sambas. The 
office of Governor of Borneo, however, was to remain unfilled "until 
such time as the condition of the country and of the inhabitants renders 
a central establishment for this official both pos si bie and necessary".489 
Meanwhile, in Holland, the 'Constitutional Revision' of 1848 had 
been peacefully carried through. The violence of the February riots 
in Paris and the possibility of similar outbreaks spreading to the Nether-
lands, coupled with the threat of interference in the country's domestic 
affairs from revolutionary governments springing up around it, con-
verted King William H, as he himself said, from a diehard to a 
revolutionary overnight. In November he consented to a new Funda-
487 See W. R. baron van Hoëvell. 'Onze roeping op Borneo', TvNI, 1825, ii,p. 193. 
488 Kabinetsmissive of September 9th, 1848, No. 247, L" YI1, Secret. (Kol.) 
- Besluit of August Z7th, 1849, No. 8. (Sté., 1849, No. 40). No 'Government 
of Borneo' was reconstituted until July 1 st, 1938. 
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mental Law (Grondwet) for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, drafted 
largely under the influence of the Liberal leader, Thorbecke.490 Direct 
voting was introduced and the franchise extended, restrictions on 
freedom of speech and assembly were relaxed, and the States-General 
were given a greater measure of control over public finance, including 
the colonial revenues. 
The 'Year of Revolutions' in Europe also marked a turning-point 
in the history of Anglo-Dutch rivalry in Borneo. Because of the un-
certainty of the general political situation, Dutch statesmen after 1848 
feIt obliged to be more careful than their predecessors to ensure that 
disputes over Far Eastern affairs did not cause friction between Great 
Britain and the Netherlands at home. "When I take into consideration 
the present state of affairs", wrote the Dutch ambassador in London 
in June 1849, "and how important it is just now for our country to 
maintain friendly relations with our English neighbours, then it seems 
to me to be of the utmost importance that the prevailing atmosphere 
of goodwill should in no circumstances be disturbed.491 The policy 
instigated by Baud in 1845 of trying to halt British expansion in Borneo 
by making formal diplomatic protests to Her Majesty's Government in 
London was therefore abruptly abandoned. Early in 1849 when a copy 
of the British treaty of May 1847 with Brunei found its way to The 
Hague, the Dutch Government remained silent, even though in accor-
dance with one of the provisions of this treaty the Sultan of Brunei 
had promised never to grant territory to a foreign power without 
British consent, thus submitting to a degree of British control over his 
dominions which it had been a prime purpose of Dutch diplomacy 
during the preceding four years to prevent. In March 1850 the. Dutch 
Cabinet came to the reluctant conclusion that the Government of the 
Netherlands "must acquiesce in the actions of Great Britain on the 
north-west coast of Borneo".492 
Within the island itself Dutch policy also underwent a minor revo-
lution at this time. The period immediately following the accession of 
the Liberals to power in Holland sawa steady strengthening of op-
position to the Culture System and to the methods of compulsion upon 
which it was based. It was true that not even the Liberals were yet 
prepared to set aside the long-established principle that colonies existed 
490 P. J. Blok, History of the People of the Netherlands, Vol. v, pp. 457-61. 
491 Schimmelpenninck to Lightenveldt, June 22nd, 1849, No. 107. (Buit. Zaken, 
No. 3134). 
492 Kabinetsbeschikkmg of March 15th, 1850, LA Gil, Very Secret. (Kol., 1850, 
No. 84fT, Very Secret). 
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solely for the henefit of the mother country, but many among them, 
notably Wolter Robert Baron van Hoëvell, believed that the existing 
system pressed upon the inhabitants of the Indies with unnecessary 
severity. The Culture System had not been applied in Borneo, but van 
Hoëvell was critical of Government poliey there also, declaring that 
direct Dutch rule ought to be substituted without delay for the extor-
tionate tyranny of the Malay princes. The Chinese of the West Coast 
he regarded as useful, if fractious, colonists, but he could find nothing 
good to say about the Malays. They were "an evil and shiftIess 
people ... lazy, morally and physically corrupt, slaves to idleness and 
gambling, intolerant and fanaticai". Raja Brooke had demonstrated in 
Sarawak what could he done to check them, and so alleviate the misery 
of the aboriginal Dyaks, but the N etherlands Indian Government had 
thus far made no attempt to follow his example. "We must thank God 
as men and Christians", wrote van Hoëvell, "that others have under-
taken what we ourselves should properly be doing" .493 
Several years were to pass before any progress was made towards 
placing Dutch Borneo under direct rule, but in the meantime the claims 
of those who wished to see the Outer Possessions thrown open to 
private enterprise had begun to receive attention. In August 1848 the 
Minister of the Colonies, J. C. Rijk, declared that the underdeveloped 
parts of the Indies would never become worthwhile economie assets 
until the Dutch commercial world was given free access to them. The 
Colonial Government by itself would be quite unable to supply the 
capital needed to bring them into full production, since its finances 
had to bear heavy annual burdens on behalf of the motherland. Ex-
perience had shown, moreover, that governments were not as a rule 
successful in organizing industrial or commercial undertakings, which 
were "in all respects better entrusted to the con trol and interest of 
private persons".494 Shortly afterwards a Government-inspired article 
appeared in the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant giving particulars of 
certain iron-ore deposits discovered not long before in the district of 
Tanah Laoet, in south-eastern Bandjermasin. This article prompted 
the firm of Daehne & Co, of The Hague, to apply for a mining con-
cession, and their request was forwarded to Batavia for consideration.495 
Governor-General Rochussen, however, was not in favour of the 
400 Baron van Hoëvell, 'Onze roeping op Borneo', pp. 187 and 191. (Quoting 
words used by himself in 1848). 
'M Minister of the Colonies to the King, August 22nd, 1848, L" A, No. 1. 
WIl Department of Colonies to the Governor-General, November 8th, 1848, 
No. 1/653. 
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development of the Outer Possessions by private enterprise. He had 
already investigated the possibility of exploiting the iron of Tanah 
Laoet, and had decided against starting a Government mine there when 
his experts told him that the ore could not he raised cheaply enough to 
compete with imports from Europe.496 The whole area was wild and 
uncivilized, he told the authorities in The Hague, and it would he 
foolish to allow a private firm to operate there. H, after learning all 
the facts, Daehne & Co still wished to take up a concession, they would 
have to assume full responsibility should disaster overtake them. The 
Government of the Indies would be unable to offer them any special 
protection, and could not assist them to obtain labour or transport.497 
These hard truths were communicated to Daehne & Co, who thereupon 
took no further interest in iron-mining in Borneo.498 
Rochussen's attitude to private speculators may be compared to Raja 
Brooke's. Both believed that the commercial penetration of the Indies 
by European capitalists would have to be carefully controlled, or it 
would lead to endless conflicts and disturbances. But whereas Brooke's 
main concern was to prevent undesirable Europeans from corrupting 
his beloved Dyaks, Rochussen opposed the influx of capitalists on 
different grounds. In his opinion private individuals should not be 
encouraged to enter a field which properly belonged to the Netherlands 
Indian Government alone. That Government must first establish effec-
tive rule in the Outer Possessions. Not until then would it be wise to 
call on the ondernemingsgeest of the Dutch nation to develop these 
barbarous areas. 
The Governor-General's views were not welcome in official circles 
in The Hague, where support for the principle of development through 
private enterprise continued to prevail. In February 1850 C. F. Pahud, 
the new Colonial Minister,499 appointed a special commission to inquire 
into "the tin-mines of Banka in particular and mining in the N ether-
lands Indies in general".5°O Presenting its findings at the end of July, 
this commission reported that it had been unable to agree on the 
question of Banka tin, but that its unanimous opinion was that the 
496 Besluit of March 3Oth, 1847, No. 13. 
497 Governor-General to the Department of Colonies, June 17th, 1849, No. 30616, 
Semi-official. 
498 Department of Colonies to Daehne & Co, January 17th, 1850, No. 5/46. Cf. 
R. Broersma, Handel en bedriif in Zuid- en Oost-Borneo, Chap. I. 
499 Four Colonial Ministers succeeded one another in quick succession during 
1848-9. J. C. Baud was fotlowed by J. C. Rijk, G. L. Baud, E. B. van den 
Bosch, and C. F. Pahud in that order. 
500 Koninklijk Besluit of February 25th, No. 26. 
NlNETEENTH-CENTURY BORNEO 163 
exploitation of all other minerals should be left to private enterprise, 
and that Government mines already operating in the lndies should be 
turned over to entrepreneurs.501 Pahud accepted these recommendations, 
and the following October announced that Dutch firms would hence-
forward be granted free access to the mineral wealth of all parts of 
the lndian Archipelago except Java and Banka.l502 
The way was now clear, at least in theory, for the exploitation of 
Dutch Borneo by private mining companies. Pahud's announcement 
was followed in June 1852 by the inauguration of a Government Mining 
Service,lI03 whose geologists were soon submitting lengthy reports on 
the mineral resources of the lndies. These were published in the newly-
founded Natuurkundig Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indië,lI04 and 
could therefore easily be consulted by firms contemplating investment 
in the Outer Possessions. Previously, most reports of scientific dis-
coveries made by colonial servants had been Wed away in the archives 
at Batavia, unread save by officials of the Government of the lndies. 
Despite agreat increase in public knowiedge, however, private enter-
prise achieved very little in Dutch Borneo before the 1880's. The 
obstacles to be overcome deterred all but a few speculators, and these 
few met with little success. 
The nature of the difficulties encountered both by Government and 
private concerns is weIl illustrated by the case of coal-mining in the 
South and Eastern Division. The motives which prompted the Dutch 
to mine coal in the lndies were similar to those which led the British 
to interest themselves in Brunei and Labuan. lndeed, if anything, the 
Dutch had a better reason than their rivals to fear being cut off from 
European supplies in time of war, since their Navy, unlike the British, 
did not hold command of the sea. The increasing use of steamers, the 
mechanization of the sugar industry in Java and, later, the development 
of railways, made it all the more desirabie to have areliabie local supply 
of coal.l5OII 
Four Government mines were brought into production in the South 
and Eastern Division at various times between 1846 and 1888. These 
501 'Rapport der speciale kommissie .. .', July 24th, 1850. (The text is in NTvNI, 
1851, pp. 80-107). 
502 KoninkliJk Besillit of October 24th, 1850, No. 45. 'Verslag van het beheer ..• 
over het jaar 1851', Staatscoltrcmt, Bijblad, 1853-4, 111, xxxvi, 2, p. 278. 
1103 Besluit of June 3rd, 1852, No. 5. (Stb., 1852, No. 37). 
504 This journal was published at Batavia from 1851 onwards by the Natuur-
kundige Vereeniging in Nederlandsch-Indië. It was edited by Dr. P. Bleeker. 
5015 Alex L. Ter Braake, Mining in the Netherlands Indies, p. 59. 
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were the Hoop (1846-8) on the River Riam Kiwa, east of Bandjer-
masin, the Oranje-Nassau (1848-84) and its subsidiary, the Assahan 
(1872-81), near Pengaron, and the Pelarang (1861-8) near Samarinda 
in Koetei.506 The first and last-named were of slight importance, but 
the Oranje-Nassau and the Assahan between them produced roughly 
300,000 tons of coal in thirty-six years.50T The only private mine of 
consequence was the Julia Hermina (1856-9), which was located ten 
miles south-west of Martapoera, and belonged to the 'N.V. tot bevor-
dering van mijnontginning in NJ.'.50S 
Hopes were high in the 1850's that the exploitation of the coal 
resources of Borneo would quickly free the Netherlands Indies from 
dependence on foreign supplies. For a time this confidence seemed to 
be justified - from 1854 to 1858 all Government requirements of 
'steam-coal' were met by the output of Pengaron alone 509 - but in 
the long run neither Government nor private mines fulfilled expec-
tations. A protracted wrangle among the experts about whether Borneo 
coal was 'black' or 'brown' did its reputation much harm, and caused 
Dutch shipping and commercial firms to be chary of using it.510 High 
transportation costs, a shortage of skilled workmen, the unsuitability 
of the local timber for pit-props, outbreaks of sickness among the 
miners, and persistent flooding in the underground shafts all added to 
the production difficulties.511 It was soon discovered that Borneo coal 
could not be marketed in Java cheaply enough to compete with coal 
imported from abroad. 
Many of these difficuIties might have been overcome had the local 
Malay rulers been willing to co-operate with the Dutch Government. 
506 C. de Groot, 'Bijdragen tot de geologische en mineralogische kennis van ... 
Zuid- en Oosterafdeeling van Borneo', NTvN!, 1857, pp. 3-30. Theodor 
Posewitz, B01'1neo: its Geology cmd Mineral Resources, p. 461. 
507 Broersma, op. cit., p. 69. Posewitz (op. cit., p. 467) gives 241,770 tons. Exact 
figures are difficult to calculate because in some years 'slag' was included 
in the official totals of the coal mined. 
508 'Verslag van het beheer ... over 1856', Staatscourant, BiJblad, 1858-59, II, Ixv, 
p. 695. 'Maatschappij tot bevordering van mijnontginning in Nederlandsch-
Indië', TvN!, 1856, i, pp. 312-13. 
- C. de Groot, op. cit., p. 30. 
510 See the articles by C. de Groot and S. Bleekrode in TvN!, 1850, ii, pp. 201-4, 
and in NTvN!, 1852, pp. 341-2; 1859, pp. 313-28; 1861, pp. 29-41, 370-7; and 
1868, pp. 69-148. 
Posewitz (op. cit., p. 27Z) suggests that this dispute was largely caused by 
variations in the quality of coat from Bornean mines sent to the experts for 
ana!ysis. 
511 Posewitz, op. cit., p. 464. 
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Unfortunately, however, the Sultan and pengerans of Bandjermasin 
were opposed to the establishment of any mines, either Government or 
private, in their dominions. This was the more serious because the 
richest coal-bearing lands happened to be in the district of Martapoera, 
which was still under the Sultan's direct contro!. "It is much to be 
desired", wrote Rochussen in 1849, "that the coals lie on Government 
territory, and that Martapoera is part of that territory. Perhaps the 
uncertainty which surrounds the succession [to the throne of Bandjer-
masin] wiU provide an opportunity of bringing these districts under 
Government rule ... this must be left to the skill of the official standing 
at the head of the administration at the time".512 
These remarks by the Governor-General were Httle more than an 
expres sion of hopes for the future of coal-mining in Bandjermasin, in 
which he had always taken agreat personal interest. But they marked, 
nevertheless, the beginning of an entirely new trend in Dutch policy 
towards the island as a whoie. Minister Baud had authorized a departure 
from the principle of abstention, but had not been in favour of using 
military means to further political ends. But now, from 1850 onwards, 
the Netherlands Indian Government began to use force in order to 
bring under direct rule those parts of Dutch Borneo which they had 
thus far failed to' subdue. The areas which first feIt the effects of this 
new policy of armed intervention were the Chinese districts of the 
Western Division.51.3 
By 1850 the gold-mining kongsis of western Borneo had achieved 
lil2 Quoted by E. B. Kielstra, 'Het Sultanaat van Bandjermasin', De Indische 
Archipel, pp. 241-2. 
51.3 In the section which fotlows I have not attempted to provide a detaited mili-
tary history of the 'kongsi-wars' of 1850-4, since to do so would involve an 
excursion into a subject outside the scope of the present study. My purpose 
has rather been to analyse the political motives behind the military events. 
Comprehensive accounts of the various Dutch expeditions during this period 
are to be found in E. B. Kielstra, 'Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van Borneo's 
Westerafdeeling', De Indische Gids, 1889-90, 1893-4; in W. A. van Rees, 
Montrado: geschied- en kri,jgskwndige bijdrage betreffende de onderwerping 
der Chinesen op Borneo; and in 'De verwikkelingen van het Nederlandsch-
Indisch Gouvernement met de Chinesche bevolking op Westelijk Borneo toe-,. 
gelicht', TvNI, 1853, ii, pp. 273-410. A useful modern summary is P. M. van 
Meeteren Brouwer, 'De geschiedenis der Chineesche districten der Wester-
afdeeling van Borneo van 1740-1926', De Indische Gids, 1927, ii, pp. 1057-1100. 
J. W. Young, 'Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van Borneo's Westerafdeeting', 
TT LV, 1895, pp. 499-550, supplements and corrects Kielstra's account. 
Descriptions of the social life and organization of the kongsis are contained 
in J. J. M. de Groot, Het kongsiwesen van Borneo Creferring to the kongsi 
Lan Fang of Mandor) and in S. H. Schaank, 'De kongsis van Montrado', 
TTLV, 1893, pp. 498~il2 (referring to the kongsis of Sambas). 
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complete de facto independence. They were living under their own 
laws, levying their own taxes, and punishing criminals according to 
their own ideas of justice. They regarded the Sultan of Sambas as 
merely the rul er of a neighbouring state, and flouted his attempts to 
exert authority over them. An annual poll-tax which they paid to the 
Dutch Government was considered by them to be simply a 'present' 
offered by one sovereign power to another. In any case, the sum in-
volved was quite insignificant - f.5,600 a year, which represented 
only 20 doits per head of the Chinese population of Sambas.514 
The most powerful of the kongsis was the Ta Kang ('Great Port' 
or 'Creek'),515 which dominated the Montrado-Larah area, in the centre 
of the gold-fields. South of Montrado lay the lands of the kongsi Lan 
Fang ('Fragrant Flowers Association'),516 with headquarters at Mandor. 
and to the north, in the general area of Sepang, Seminis, and Pemang-
kat, we re the lands of the San T'iao Kou ('Three-Branch Water-
course').5lT All three kongsis 518 were bitterly hostile to one another. 
and in 1837 there had been pitched battles in the gold-fields.519 The 
basic cause of this rivalry was the increasing exhaustion of the Sambas 
mines. By the mid-nineteenth century many of them had been worked 
out, and a fierce struggle was in progress for control of the remainder. 
Pressure exerted by the Ta Kang on the San T'iao Kou had al ready 
caused substantial emigration to Sarawak, and miners in all districts 
were beginning to abandon gold-digging in favour of agriculture.520 
A considerable trade had grown up through the years between the 
Chinese of western Borneo and Singapore. Some of this trade was 
legitimate, but smuggling was very prevalent. Three commodities in 
particular were imported iIIegally: salt, which was a Government mono-
poly, and therefore expensive; opium, which was farmed by the 
Pengeran Ratu of Sambas at a handsome profit ; and gunpowder, which 
was a prohibited article. The smugglers either brought their goods over 
the border from Sarawak or sailed them up unguarded rivers and 
creeks on the Sambas coast. 
514 Report by the Assistant-Resident of Sambas, August 25th, 1848. (TvNI, 1853, 
i, pp. 191-2). 120 doits equal one guilder. 
515 Contemporary Dutch romanizations: Tai Kong, Taykong. 
516 Contemporary Dutch: Lanfon, Lanfong. 
517 Samthiaokeoe, Sam tiankeo, Sam-thiao-keeuw. 
518 Smal1er kongsis were established at Boedoek and Loemar, but these were 
under Ta Kang contro\. 
519 Schaank, op. cit., pp. 547-9. 
li20 Cf. Jacob Ozinga, De economische ontwikkeling der Wester-afdeeling van 
Borneo, pp. 220-2. 
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Both the Malay and Dutch authorities in western Borneo feIt they 
had good reason to resent the independent attitude assumed by the 
Chinese of the interior. It was well known that the gold-miners made 
up by far the richest section of the population - the Pëngeran Ratu 
of Sambas told Assistant-Resident van Kervel that the mining kongsis 
produced approximately 80,000 tae1s of gold a year - yet they con-
tributed little or nothing to the state revenues. Dutch officials sent to 
Montrado and emissaries from the Sultan of Sambas were treated by 
the Chinese headmen with disdain. The Malay princes were particularly 
annoyed at having to deal circumspectly with the kongsis because this 
lowered them in the estimation of their own subjects. They felt both 
humiliated and impotent, and consequently looked to the Government 
of the Netherlands Indies for support against the foreign barbarians 
established in their midst.llu 
The first indication that the Dutch were about to take a sterner line 
with the kongsis came at the beginning of 1850. In February of that 
year a prahu carrying contraband opium, salt, and gunpowder from 
Singapore discharged its cargo at a factory belong~ng to the kongsi 
Ta Kang at the mouth of the Sedauw River. Following a protest from 
the Malay opium farmer at Sambas, Assistant-Resident R. C. van 
Prehn Wiese demanded the surrender of both vessel and cargo. The 
kongsi headmen refused to obey, and prepared to defend the prahu by 
erecting a stockade around it. Van Prehn Wiese then suggested to the 
Resident of the Western Division, T. J. Willer, that the offending 
vesse1 should be seized by force. Wilter replied that there were not 
enough Government troops available on the West Coast at the moment 
for operations of this kind, but he dec1ared a blockade of the river 
and told the kongsi headmen to send the captain of the prahu and ten 
members of its crew to Sambas for trial. This order was repeated twice, 
but no heed was paid to it by the rul ers of the Ta Kang.lI22 
Meanwhile Willer had applied to Batavia for military support. In 
April Governor-General Rochussen ordered the frigate, Rifn, which 
was about to sail for China, to call at the West Coast in order to make 
a demonstration of force.lI23 Soon af ter this vessel reached Pontianak 
an argument developed between her captain and Resident Witler about 
the best way to employ her services. Due partly to this controversy, 
521 Report of the Assistant-Resident of Sambas, August 25th, 1848. 
1122 Van Meeteren Brouwer, op. cit., pp. 1076-7. 
lI'J!3 Besluit of April 17th, 1850, No. 9. 
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and partly to the cowardly behaviour of some auxiliaries supplied by 
the Sultan of Sambas. an attack on the stockade in the Sedauw River 
failed ignominiously, and the captain of the Rijn, much to the Resident's 
disgust, sailed his ship away to China. 
Heartened by this defensive success, the rulers of the Ta Kang 
decided to drive the Dutch right out of Sambas. To do so, their troops 
had to cross the lands of the San T'iao Kou, which consequently allied 
itself with the Government in the hope that its gold-mines, long coveted 
by the Ta Kang, would thereby be protected. By the end of August, 
however, Ta Kang troops had captured all the districts belonging to 
the San T'iao Kou including Pemangkat, the seaport which rontrolled 
the approaches to Sambas. 
While these operations were in progress, the Dutch Government 
reinforeed their West Coast garrisons with two companies of infantry 
and a detachment of artillery under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Sorg. Early in September Sorg met the Chinese in a fierce battle before 
Pemangkat and won the dav, though he himself received a wound from 
which he later died. The officer sent to take over his command, Lieute-
nant-Colonel Ie Bron de Vexela, was instructed to safeguard the coastal 
areas against Chinese attack and to blockade the rivers, but not t':> 
become entangled with the enemy in the interior. A minor engagement 
took place near Pemangkat in October, but the wet monsoon set in 
soon afterwards, and Ie Bron withdrew the bulk of his troops to 
Sambas.1IlI4 
The kongsi Ta Kang had no cause to be dissatisfied with its military 
achievements to date, nor to be apprehensive about the future. A 
delegation from this kongsi, however, arrived unexpectedly at Pontia-
nak at the end of December and made an act of unconditional surrender 
before Resident Willer.lI25 A provisional agreement was drawn up, 
whereby the kongsi promised to pay an indemnity and an annual tax 
in gold, to refrain from seditious activities, and to submit to Govern-
ment control over its domestic affairs. Three Chinese accompanied the 
Resident to Batavia early the following year to obtain the Governor-
General's approval of the new arrangements.1I26 
This seemingly unnecessary 'kotow' on the part of the Chinese had 
its origin in the internal polities of the Ta Kang. Some members of 
524 Van Meeteren Brouwer, op. cit., pp. 1077-9. 
lI2'li JatVoosche Courant, January 22nd, 1851. 
526 'Politiek verslag over 1851: Westerafdeeling van Borneo'. (Kol., 1853, No. 225, 
Secret). 
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this kongsi were in favour of combining all the mining communities in 
Sambas in a federation 521 under Dutch protection. Others, especially 
those who belonged to the secret brotherhood of the San Tien Hui 
('Three Dots Society'),528 preferred a policy of armed resistance to 
the N etherlands Government. The first group was made up of the 
traditional leaders of the kongsi, men of substance, who had most to 
lose in an unsuccessful struggle against the Dutch, while the second 
was drawn from the ranks of the under-privileged,li29 who sawa chance 
of seizing control in the confusion created by a war. The delegation 
which went with Willer to Batavia represented the 'peace at any price' 
party among the Ta Kang leaders. 
The decision which now faced Rochussen - whether to accept the 
submission of the Chinese or not - was not an easy one to make. In 
the first place, he was greatly embarrassed by lack of precise infor-
mation about the real state of affairs in the Borneo mining districts. 
Such knowledge as existed in Batavia on the subject was derived 
almost exclusively from Malay sources. "So long as the kongsis ruled 
the Chinese districts", wrote Resident Willer in August 1851, "they 
evaded all direct contact with European officials ... We do not know 
the Chinese, nor their affairs, and they do not know us, nor our prin-
ciples and motives. The Sambas Court and the Chinese know one 
another much hetter, and draw profit from this circumstance to our 
disadvantage".1130 No Dutch official at this time could speak any of 
the dialects of Chinese used by the miners,1i31 and very few had ever 
visited the gold-fields. Secondly, Rochussen had to consider his Govern-
ment's obligations to the Sultan of Sambas, and also to the Dyak 
population, many of whom were suffering greatly under the burden 
of exactions imposed on them by the kongsis. Thirdly, the Chinese of 
UT The Ta Kang was itself a federation, and had grown to its present dominant 
position by absorbing smaller kongsis. The original union of Montrado kong-
sis, the Ho Shun ('Harmonious Agreement'), dating from 1776, was by 1850 
synonymous with the Ta Kang. 
528 Or 'Sam Tiam Foei'. Also known as the 'League of the Three Fingers'. 
529 Only those members of a kongsi who held at l&'.st one share in the exploitation 
of its mines were entitled to vote at its assemblies, and only those born in 
China were eligible for office. (Schaank, op. cit., p. 575. J. J. M. de Groot, 
op. cit., p. 17). Rivalry between various Chinese secret societies was responsible 
for much of the internal strife which developed within the kongsis in their 
later years. 
G80 Letter of the Resident of the Western Division, August 22nd, 1851, No. 22, 
Secret. 
1131 J. J. Rochussen, Toelichting en verdediging 'VOn eenige daden 'VOn mijn bestuur 
in Indië, p. 40. 
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Borneo were, at least in theory, subjects of the Government of the 
Netherlands Indies already, and amenable to its laws. Strictly speaking, 
the negotiation of treaties with them was out of place. Any regulation 
of their affairs ought properly to be ef!ected by decree or proclamation, 
not by bargains negotiated between equal parties. Fourthly, the rights 
of the defeated kongsi San T'iao Kou had to be borne in mind. By 
the beginning of 1851 nine-tenths of the members of this kongsi had 
migrated to Sarawak in order to escape the ravages of the Ta Kang. 
It would obviously be unjust to the remainder if the rebel Chinese were 
permitted to absorb their lands, since the San T'iao Kou had been the 
only kongsi (apart from the neutral Lan Fang) which had not taken 
up arms against the Government. On the other hand, if these con-
siderations made it desirabIe that the Government' s will should be 
imposed by force, it was difficult to see where the necessary troops 
would come from. Dutch military resources in the Indies were already 
strained through having to deal with recent revolts in Palembang, 
Banka, and Bantam. As yet, moreover, no plans whatever had been 
worked out to provide for the eventual administration of the Chinese 
districts if and when the kongsis we re brought into subjection. 
Af ter examining the provisional agreement arranged by Resident 
Willer with the Ta Kang delegation, Rochussen came to the conclusion 
that it could not be approved. Insuf!icient care had been taken of the 
rights and interests of the Sultan of Sambas, of the loyal kongsi San 
T'iao Kou, and of the Dyaks at present living under Chinese rule.58!1 
He accepted in principle, however, the plan to disband the rebel kongsis, 
and sent Willer back to Pontianak to enter into further negotiations 
with the Chinese leaders.lI33 On arrival Willer found that within the 
Ta Kang the peace party seemed to be firmly in control, and he appoin-
ted one of its most influential members, Chêng Hung,lI34 as kaptai 
('Regent') over the districts of the Ta Kang and its subordinate 
kongsis.lI315 The Sultan of Sambas signified agreement with these 
arrangements, and Willer set of! once more for Batavia to obtain fresh 
instructions. 
Meanwhile Mr. A. J. Duymaer van Twist had replaced Rochussen 
as Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies. Having no immediate 
knowledge of Bornean af!airs himself, van Twist was obliged to base 
1132 Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
- Besluit of March 27th, 1851, L" H. Secret. 
534 Tjang-pin, Tjang Ping, Tjhiang-Fen, etc. 
li3II Governor-General to the Minister of the Colonies, August 22nd, 1851, No. 16, 
L" F 1, Secret. (Kol.J 1851, No. 281/M, Secret). 
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his judgments and policies on the advice given him by his official 
counsellers in Batavia. One of these was Major-General Penning 
Nieuwland, who in the previous year had unsuccessfully tried to per-
suade Rochussen to order the forcible suppression of the kongsis 
without further delay, on the grounds that they were ua mutinous rabble 
from foreign parts".1136 He now gave similar advice to Rochussen's 
successor, but van Twist was not yet convinced that a military ex-
pedition was necessary, and from September 1851 to February 1852 
Resident Willer had to wait at Batavia to learn the new Governor-
General's pleasure. At last approval was given for the setting-up of an 
administrative structure essentially similar to the one organized by 
Willer the previous year. For the time being no further militaryaction 
was to be taken against the insurgents, and the coastal blockade was 
to be lifted. Regulations were drawn up governing taxation, and 
provision made for the more effective protection of the Malays and 
Dyaks living in the Chinese districts. Chêng Hung was confirmed in 
his appointment as Regent, and the Ta Kang was to be allowed to 
retain a large measure of control over its own domestic affairs.53T 
Returning to the West Coast at the end of March, Willer began the 
task of disbanding the mining kongsis. It soon became apparent, how-
ever, that the majority of the Chinese of Montrado were bitterly 
opposed to the idea of losing their traditional customs and system of 
administration. They announced that they were unwiIIing to abide by 
the agreements made on their behalf by Chêng Hung and the 'peace 
party' who had now clearly become unrepresentative of opinion in the 
Ta Kang as a whoie. During- the remainder of the year Willer tried 
repeatedly to persuade the Montrado Chinese to agree to the Govern-
ment's proposals, but as the months went by it seemed increasingly 
likely that a new order could be established in western Borneo only 
by force of arms. 
In February 1853 Mr. A. Prins, the General Secretary to Govern-
ment at Batavia, was sent to the West Coast as a special commissioner 
with instructions to break the deadlock.1I38 His orders were to arrange 
matters peacefully if possible, but to be careful to act only by procla-
mation and decree ; no more contracts or agreements were to be 
1186 E. B. Kielstra, 'Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van Borneo's Westerafdeeling', 
De Indische Gids, 1889, i, p. 350. 'Borneo en de heer Rochussen', TvNI, 1854, 
i, p. 29. 
58T Besluit of February 16th, 1852, No. 1 (Kol., 1853, No. 41/E, Secret). 
538 Besluit of Decemher 29th, 1852. 
!In Beslu;,t of ]anuary 31st, 1853, L- H, Secret. 
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negotiated with any of the kongsi leaders; and the rights of the Sultan 
of Sambas were to be safeguarded in any arrangements made.539 At 
this time the military commandant of the Western Division was a 
Major Andresen, who had replaced Ie Bron de Vexela at the beginning 
of 1851. Since taking up his appointment Andresen had been sending 
a series of reports to Batavia expressing strong disapproval of the 
Chinese policy of Resident Willer. His view was that the plan to abolish 
kongsi rule entirely was amistake, because a high level of production 
in the gold-fields could be maintained only if the existing administrative 
structure were kept in being. All would be weIl if the recalcitrant 
kongsis were given a sharp lesson. When, soon af ter arriving in Borneo, 
Commissioner Prins set out on an inspection tour of the gold-fields, 
it was Major Andresen who accompanied him, not Resident Willer, and 
before long Prins had been completely won over by his military adviser's 
arguments. In April the Ta Kang miners we re formally declared to be 
in a state of rebellion against the Dutch Government.II4O In May Willer 
was sent on 'leave' to Java, and when the Commissioner left Borneo 
himself a Httle later, Andresen was placed in charge of all political as 
weIl as military affairs in the Western Division.1I41 Finally, in July, all 
immigration into western Borneo from China was strictly prohibited.1I42 
Meanwhile the number of attacks on isolated Dutch garrisons by 
bands of armed Chinese had been steadily increasing, and there seemed 
to be no chance whatever of a reconciliation being effected between the 
kongsis and the Government. Andresen therefore visited Batavia to seek 
the Governor-General's approval for a major punitive expedition. This 
was granted, but the approach of the wet monsoon caused the post-
ponement of the campaign until the following year. When at last in 
May 1854 more than 2,000 troops arrived on the West Coast and began 
to invade the gold-fields, Chinese resistance collapsed abruptly. On 
June 2nd, as Government forces marched into Montrado in triumph, 
the kongsi headmen, clad in penitential white, knelt before them in the 
dust in token of submission.543 
By this subservient behaviour the Montrado Chinese may have been 
hoping to gain through diplomacy the victory that had eluded them in 
114() Approved by Besluit of July 8th, 1853, No. 14. 
1141 Assistant-Resident van Prehn Wiese took over the civil administration of the 
Division, but he had to follow Andresen's advice in all political matters. (Van 
Meeteren Brouwer, op. cit., p. 1083). 
1142 Publicatie of July 8th, 1853. (Stb., 1853, No. 56). 
1143 'Verslag van het beheer ..• over het jaar 1854', Staatscourant, Bijblad, 1856-
57, 1I, xx, 2, p. 124. 
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the field. If so, they were to be quickly disillusioned. The terms imposed 
by Andresen were designed to end once and for all the power of the 
Chinese of western Borneo to make war. His orders provided for the 
total dismemberment of the kongsi system of government, the demo-
lition of all stockades and fortifications, and the confiscation of arms, 
ammunition, and all other property, including houses and mines. Dutch 
troops were stationed in the three principal kongsi-houses. 
In November Commissioner Prins, who had meanwhile returned 
from Java, issued a 'provisional regulation for the civil administration 
of the newly-conquered Chinese territories'. From the former kongsi 
lands a new province was created, the 'Assistant-Residency of Mon-
trado' . This was to be ruled directly by Dutch officials with the help 
and advice of approved Chinese headmen and of the Pengeran Têmeng-
gong of Sambas.644 The task of rounding up rebel leaders and sup-
pressing small outbreaks occupied the Dutch forces until the middle 
of 1856, but all resistance was eventually crushed, and the administrative 
structure established by Prins (re-enacted by Government Decree in 
1857) 645 remained in force without substantial modification until the 
progressive decay of the gold-mines of western Borneo deprived the 
Chinese districts of their value and importance. 
Some writers on the history of the mining kongsis have criticised 
the Netherlands Indian Government for its failure to support Resident 
Willer's Chinese policy in 1851-2. Had this been done, it is suggested, 
many of the subsequent difficulties might have been averted.1>46 It is 
certainly true that there was considerable vacillation on the part of the 
authorities in Batavia, and that an earlier decision one way or the other 
would have saved a good deal of fruitless negotiating with the Chinese. 
But it is by no means certain that the adoption of Willer's proposals 
would have solved the fundamental problem facing the Dutch, which 
was how peacefully to absorb into their administrative system an alien 
society, divided against itself and already in process of decay. By 
supporting Chêng Hung and the Ho Shun, Willer was protecting one 
section of this society, the magnates, against another, the under-
644 Provirioneel reglement of November 3rd, 1854, later confirmed by Besluit of 
March 12th, 1855. The kongsi Lan Fang was excepted from these provisions. 
It retained a measure of independence until 1884 when, on the death of kapten 
Lin Ah Sin, it was absorbed into the Dutch administration. 
54iIi Besluit of June 25th, 1857, No. 25. (Stb., 1857, No. 67). 
546 See, for example, E. B. Kielstra, De vestiging van het N ederlandsch gel1O{} 
in den Indischen Archipel, p. 181, and van Meeteren Brouwer, op. cit., pp. 
1081 and 1083. 
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privileged - a policy which must surely have led to an explosion sooner 
or later. It is not without significance that when Commissioner Prins 
first visited Borneo at the beginning of 1853, Chêng Hung, the so-called 
'Regent', was living at Sambas "in fear of his life".547 
The plain. fact was that some of the Chinese of the West Coast saw 
advantages in living under a European government while others did not. 
This being 50, Dutch rule had to be imposed by force if it was to be 
imposed at all. It was ironical, nevertheless, that one of the chief 
reasons why Willer's suggestions were rejected in Batavia was the 
insistence of Governor-General Rochussen on the need to safeguard 
the rights of the Sultan of Sambas. Two years later this same Sultan 
was deposed by van Twist for intriguing against the Government with 
the very Chinese against whom Rochussen had been trying to protect 
him.548 This is not to ~ay that Rochussen's attitude was incorrect, for he 
had no choice in the matter. The Sultan's right to Dutch support was 
unquestioned, being based on formal contractual guarantee. All the 
Malay princes of Borneo with whom the Dutch had made treaties were 
entitled to similar protection against hostile elements in their own 
kingdoms. In return the Netherlands Indian Government had obtained 
certain reciprocal concessions, inc1uding the right to govern the 
succession to the throne, and this right it was now about to invoke, 
with far-reaching results, in the Sultanate of Bandjermasin. 
By virtue of contracts negotiated between 1817 and 1826, the Dutch 
Government had acquired from Bandjermasin full sovereign powers 
over the greater part of tbe territory which later became the South and 
Eastern Division. The areas surrendered comprised the soutb-west and 
east coasts and certain provinces in the interior, none of which had 
actually been subject to the Sultanate when the contracts were signed, 
and over which the Dutch, at least until the 1840'5, exercised no more 
than nominal rule themselves. The lands of the Sultanate proper, how-
ever, which were the most populous and by far the most valuable part 
of the Division, had never been placed, even theoretically, under direct 
Dutch rule, and in 1849 were still being administered by the Sultan 
and his pengerans, acting as vassals of the Dutch Government. In that 
year, as we have seen, it had been suggested by J. J. Rochussen that 
these lands shouid be made gouvernementsgebied (direct ruie territory), 
547 Kielstra, 'Bijdragen .• .', De Indische Gids, 1889, ii, p. 1148. 
CI48 Van Meeteren Brouwer, op. cit., p. 1083. 
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and opened to European commercial enterprise as soon as possible. 
In 1852 the heir-apparent to the Sultanate of Bandjermasin died, 
leaving many sons, of whom two became serious contenders for the 
position of Sultan Muda. These were Tamjid Illah, born to the late 
heir by a Chinese woman, and Hidayat UIlah, a younger man than his 
rival, but the son of a princess. In accordance with local adat the latter 
was unquestionably the lawful heir.648 Pengeran Tamjid, however, who 
was unpopular as weIl as being 'low-born', and saw that his only chance 
of ousting Hidayat was to curry favour with the Dutch, assured the 
Resident of Bandjermasin that he would grant everything the Govern-
ment wanted if they, in turn, would support his candidature. On the 
Resident's advice the authorities at Batavia accepted these terms, and 
in June 1852 formally endorsed the appointment of Tamjid as the new 
Sultan Muda.550 When the strength of the opposition to him later 
became known, they regretted their choice, and recalled the official who 
had advised it, but did not reverse the original decision.661 Accordingly, 
when the death occurred in November 1857 of Sultan Adam, the 
reigning prince, Tamjid was immediately raised by the local Dutch 
administration to the throne, amid much popular discontent and in 
direct defiance of the deceased Sultan's will. The situation was further 
complicated by the appearance of a third pretender, Prabu Anom, 
who was an uncle of both Tamjid and Hidayat. Isolated disturbances 
and demonstrations followed, culminating at the beginning of 1859 
in the general revolt known to historians of Indonesia as the 'Bandjer-
masin War'.662 
The ensuing struggle caused considerable loss of life and immense 
damage to property in many parts of southern Borneo. Although by 
1862 Dutch troops had won the upper hand, the 'state of war' in 
Bandjermasin did not end officially until 1867, and even then, peace 
was restored only in the coastal areas and in the lower basin of the 
Barito. Roving bands of insurgents, operating from strongholds in the 
interior, continued to harass the Government's forces for many years, 
and numerous punitive expeditions had to be sent against them before 
648 E. B. Kielstra, 'De ondergang van het Bandjermasinsche rijk', De Indische 
Gids, 1890, ii, pp. 2396-7. 
560 Besluit of June IOth, 1852, L' Cl, Secret. 
651 Besluit of ]anuary, 14th, 1853, No. 3. 
liiI52 The chief authorities for the military history of the Bandjermasin War are: 
W. A. van Rees, De Bandjermasinsche krijg van 1859-1863, and H. G. ]. L. 
Meyners, Bijdragen tot de kennis van het Bandjermasinsche ,.ijk, 1863-1866. 
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the last traces of the insurrection were finally stamped out at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.553 
Nevertheless, the resort to arms had provided the Dutch with a con-
venient pretext for establishing the system of direct rule throughout 
the rebel territories. In June 1860 the Sultanate of Bandjermasin was 
declared to have 'lapsed', and the former Sultanate lands were placed 
under the control of Dutch Government officials.554 The suggestion 
put forward by Governor-General Rochussen eleven years previously 
had now been carried into effect, but the introduction of direct rule 
was not immediately followed by the economic prosperity he had en-
visaged. For one thing, the cost of the war and of its sequel left the 
Government without any money to spare for innovations or improve-
ments and, for another, private speculators were understandably reluc-
tant to invest in a country in which lives and property could not yet 
be properly safeguarded. A particularly cogent example of the disasters 
that might overtake the unwary speculator was provided by the case 
of the privately-owned Julia Hermina coal mine near Pengaron. Within 
a few days of the outbreak of the war, this mine was utterly destroyed 
by the rebels, and its European staff murdered to a man. Capitalists 
did not renew their interest in southern Borneo until the decade of 
the 188O's.555 
The establishment of direct rule in Bandjermasin and in the Chinese 
districts of the West Coast brought to an end the sequence of events 
which had been set in train by the arrival of James Brooke in Sarawak 
in 1839. In order to meet the threat of foreign interference, the 
Government of the Netherlands Indies had been obliged to extend their 
effective rule to many areas which before the foundation of Sarawak 
had been entirely neglected. The Dutch had still to find a solution, 
however, to the more fundamental problem of how to derive pro fit 
from the lands they had absorbed, and in this their perplexity was 
shared by the British, who had thus far failed in their efforts to develop 
the resources of the northern part of the island. 
1953 E. B. Kielstra, 'De Bandjermasinsche Sultanspartij', Indisch Nederland, 
pp. 284-305. 
lil54 Besluit of December 17th, 1859, LA Kil, Secret. Proc1amation by Commissioner 
F. N. Nieuwenhuijzen, June lIth, 1860. 
1155 Broersma, op. cit., p. 14. 
CRAPTER IX 
TUE STATUS OF SARAWAK 
During the peri ad from 1850 to 1870, while the Dutch were 
strengthening their hold on western and southern Borneo, British 
interest in the is land had been steadily dec1ining. Ta same extent this 
was due to a change in the c1imate of opinion in Britain herself, for 
during these twenty years the influence of the Separatists and of the 
anti-imperialists of the Manchester School was at its height, and con-
temporary British statesmen were thinking more of getting rid of 
existing colonies than of acquiring new ones. Borneo had ceased to 
attract attention, moreover, because of the dismal failure of the settle-
ment at Labuan, which seemed incapable of fulfilling any of the pur-
poses for which it had been founded. With the example of Labuan 
befare them, not even the staunchest supporters of colonial expansion 
could see any advantage in increasing Britain's imperial responsibilities 
elsewhere in Borneo. 
Labuan had been founded, it will be remembered, for three main 
purposes : to serve as a coal-depot for British shipping, to provide a 
base for the suppression of Malay piracy, and to act as an entrepot 
for the trade of the north-west coast. 
As a coal-depot, the colony never lived up to expectations, despite the 
efforts of no less than four mining companies which carried 011 
operations there and on the mainland at Muara (Brooketon) at various 
times between 1849 and 1880. These were the Eastern Archipe1ago 
Company (1849-58), the Labuan Coal Company (1860-5), the Amal-
gamated China Steamship and Labuan Coal Company (1865-6), and the 
Oriental Coal Company (1869--80).656 These concerns became bywords 
in the East for inefficiency, and there is na doubt that they were very 
wasteful and extravagant. Yet the chief difficulty they encountered 
was not of their own making. The problem of obtaining a suitable 
labour force always defied solution. Malays migrating from Brunei 
1566 Between 1882 and 1888 W. C. Cowie & Co (later Cowie Bros) worked the 
Labuan and Muara coalfields with more success, and in 1888 sold the mainland 
rights to the Government of Sarawak. 
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'signed on' at the Labuan coal mines for brief periods, but returned 
home again as soon as they had earned enough money to satisfy their 
immediate needs.557 Coolies imported from Singapore were equally 
unreliable. Some, whose constitutions were already weakened by over-
indulgence in opium, bhang, and arak, quickly died of fever. Others left 
the island immediately their indentures expired.558 Nor was the labour 
situation much improved when in 1857 the colony became a penal 
settlement for long-sentence convicts from Hong Kong.559 For huma-
nitarian reasons the Colonial Office would not all ow prisoners to be 
employed underground, except as volunteers, and this prohibition was 
maintained when convicts from Singapore began to be sent to Labuan 
after the transfer of the Straits Settlements from the East India Com-
pany to the Colonial Office in 1867.560 As aresult, although convict 
labour was of great assistance in the construction of public works,561 
and in the loading of coal into the bunkers of visiting ships,56\1 
it did not help to solve the real problem, which was how to find 
even a small number of willing and efficient underground workers. 
Finally, the superior quality and comparative cheapness of English and 
Welsh coal on sale at Singapore forced the price of the Labuan 
product down so far that between 1850 and 1868 it had to be marketed 
at an average loss of i 1 a ton in order to sell at all.563 
As a base for the suppression of Malay piracy, Labuan was equally 
ineffective. It was true that the depredations of the Lanuns and Balanini 
decreased markedly during the second half of the nineteenth century, 
but this was due on the one hand to general economic causes, and on 
the other to the exploits of Dutch, Spanish and British naval forces 
operating from Java, Manila, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Sarawak. 
The Government of Labuan did not possess so much as a single gun-
li57 Lieutenant-Governor Scott to the Colonial Office, June 29th, 1853. (c.a. 
144/11). Governor Edwardes to the Rt. Hon. Henry Labouchere, March 12th, 
1857. (c.a. 144/14). 
658 Labuan Coal Company to the Duke of Newcastle, December 12th, 1863. (c.a. 
144/22). Labuan Coal Company to the Colonial Office, July IOth, 1864. (c.a. 
144/23). 
"The labour market at Labuan", stated a Colonial Office Minute of 1867, "is 
perhaps the worst in the world. It is supplied from the most dissolute classes 
of the population of Borneo". (c.a. 144/26). 
559 Colonial Office to Sir John Bowring, June 1857. (Copy in c.a. 144/14). 
580 Minute by Sir Frederick Rogers. (c.a. 144/26). 
581 Minutes of the Legislative Council of Labuan, August 6th, 1870. (c.a. 434/1). 
582 Governor Pope-Hennessy to Earl Granville, February 24th, 1869. (c.a. 144/29). 
003 Pope-Hennessy to the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos, November 18th, 
1868. (P.P., 1868-9, XLIII, pp. 297-9). 
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boat of its own before 1877. When British warships visited the north-
west coast of Borneo, they usually based themselves on Kuching, not 
least, according to one disgruntled Governor of Labuan, because of 
"the very few attractions we have in this colony for naval officers".564 
Indeed, so far from hel ping in the campaign against the pirates, Labuan 
indirectly hinde red it, for its Government had made no attempt to 
restrict by law the sale of arms and ammunition, and many of the 
'peaceful traders' who frequented its markets became pirates again 
as soon as their prahus cleared Victoria Harbour.~65 
Finally, as a commercial emporium, the colony completely failed 
to justify the British Government's hopes. Onlya small fraction of the 
local prahu trade and very few European ships were attracted to it. 
The larger vessels avoided Labuan because the inadequacy of its 
wharves and warehouses caused expensive loading delays,500 while the 
smaller preferred to pick up their cargoes at Brunei and in the rivers 
along the coast.567 During the 1860's only one white trader, Captain 
ROSS,568 called regularly at Labuan, and the maintenance of steam 
communications between the British Empire and its lonely outpost on 
the Borneo coast thus depended entirely upon the goodwill of a private 
merchant.569 
On several occasions members of the Colonial Office staff in London 
suggested that Labuan was an extravagance and that the settlement 
there ought to be withdrawn. "I firmly believe", wrote the Assistant 
Under-Secretary, T. F. Elliot, in 1858, "that, on its own merits, the , 
place ought to be abandoned" .570 But Lord Carnarvon, the Parliamen-
tary Under-Secretary, thought it should be retained "not for ever, but 
664 Pope-Hennesy to Earl Granville, April llth, 1870. (c.a. 144/31). 
In its earliest days Labuan had possessed some slight valuè to the Navy as a 
coal-depot, but by the 1880'5 the greatly increased endurance of steamships 
had made an auxiliary coal station between Hong Kong and Singapore 
unnecessary. (Admiralty to the Colonial Office, February 2nd, 1886: c.a. 
144/62). 
565 Governor Callaghan to the Rt. Hon. Edward Cardwell, J anuary 26th, 1865. 
(c.a. 144/24). Minutes of the Legislative Council of Labuan, May 8th, 1866. 
(c.a. 434/1). 
566 Governor Edwardes to Labouchere, December 8th, 1856. (P.P., 1857-8, XL, 
pp. 359-62). 
567 The same to the same, April 29th, 1858. (P.P., 1859, Sess. H, XXI, pp. 627-9). 
li68 The exploits of Captain Ross are described in the memoirs of his son, J. D. 
Ross, Sist). YeCN"s: Life and Advenfure in the Par East (1911). 
l561l Governor Bulwer to the Earl of Kimberley, December 5th, 1872. (c.a. 144/38). 
Bulwer to the Earl of Carnarvon, July 4th, 1874. (c.a. 144/42). 
~70 Minute by T. F. Elliot, April 26th, 1858. (C.O. 144/15). 
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for five or six years" in view of the growing importance of British 
trade with China.571 Carnarvon's view prevailed, and 'Micawberism' 
regarding Labuan became al most an official Colonial Office policy. 
One coal company af ter another went bankrupt, but as each new 
Governor took charge of the island he persuaded his superiors in 
Downing Street that prosperity was just around the corner. This did 
not prevent the strictest economies being imposed, however, and by 
1888 the European administrative staff had been reduced to two, an 
Acting-Governor and a gaoler. The gaoler lived two miles from the 
capita I at Victoria, and in any case there were only seven convicts for 
him to look af ter. Being uneducated, he was of little assistance to the 
unfortunate Acting-Governor, an ex-naval officer named Hamilton, 
who had been retired from the service medically unfit. Hamilton was 
not only 'Acting-Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Labuan and its 
Dependencies and Acting Vice-Admiral of the same', but Colonial 
Secretary, Judge, Police Magistrate, Harbour-Master, Coroner, and 
Postmaster-General as weIl, and was forced to adopt many curious 
expedients to keep within the colonial regulations. On one occasion 
he had to make written application to himself as Colonial Treasurer for 
the funds he needed as Colonial Surveyor to build a new sanitary block 
at the civil hospita1.572 This farcical situation came to an end on January 
Ist, 1890, when the island of Labuan, while still retaining the status of 
a British colony, was handed over for administrative purposes to the 
North Borneo Company.513 
1t would be incorrect, however, to gauge the importance of Labuan 
solely in terms of its success or failure as a colony. From 1861 onwards 
the office of Governor of Labuan was merged with that of British 
Consul-General to the native states of Borneo, and it was upon the 
advice of their Consul-General that the Foreign Office necessarily had 
671 Minute by the Earl of Carnarvon, April 26th, 1858. (Ibid.) A similar view 
had been expressed by Mr. Secretary Labouchere in 1856. (Colonial Office to 
the Treasury, November 26th, 1856: P.P., 1857, XXVI, pp. 518-19). 
572 Acting-Governor Hamilton to the Colonial Office, April 2nd, 1888. (C.O. 
144(65). Memorandum by A S. Hamilton, September 19th, 1888. (Ibid.) Cf. 
W. H. Treacher, 'British Borneo: Sketches of Brunai, Sarawak, Labuan and 
North Borneo', JRASSB, 1890, pp. 46-7. 
573 In 1871 Governor Pope-Hennessy had suggested that Labuan should be united 
with the Straits Settlements, but his proposal was rejected on the advice of 
Sir Harry Ord. ('Memorandum on the Union of Labuan to the Straits Set-
t1ements', P.P., 1872, XLIII, pp. 567-71. Sir H. Ord to the Earl of Kimberley, 
September Ist, 1873: C. O. 144/41). The Colonial Office resumed control again 
in 1906, when Labuan was transferred from the British North Borneo Com-
pany to the Government of the Straits Settlements. 
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to rely when decisions were made affecting Brunei or Sarawak. More-
over, when the interests of these two states came into conflict, as of ten 
happened during the second half of the nineteenth century, the Sultan 
of Brunei automatically turned for support to the local representative 
at Labuan of his ally, the Queen of England, against his over-mighty 
vassal, the Raja of Sarawak. 
The failure of the Singapore Commission of Inquiry of 1854 to 
c1arify Sir James Brooke's position vis-à-vis the British Government 
meant that solutions had still to be found to two major problems, both 
primarily legal in nature, and both baffling in their complexity. They 
may be stated briefly as follows: first, Was Sarawak an independent 
state or technically a fief of the Sultanate of Brunei? and secondly, 
Were the responsibilities of its ruler - granting that he was in fact 
independent - compatible with the allegiance which he owed as a 
British subject to his own soverign? Brooke himself believed that he 
could answer both these questions satisfactorily, but the British Govern-
ment proved extremely reluctant to accept either his reasoning or his 
conc1usions. 
The White Raja first laid claim to complete independence for his 
territory in a letter to the Foreign Office of March IOth, 1852. In this 
letter he asserted that his rights in Borneo were derived from a double 
title: he had not only been granted unrestricted sovereignty over Sara-
wak by the Sultan of Brunei in 1846, but he had also been raised to his 
present position as Raja by the free and unfettered choice of its inhabi-
tants, who had themselves thrown off the Brunei yoke before his arrival 
in Borneo in 1839.574 He later reaffirmed these claims when giving 
evidence before the Commission of Inquiry 575 and on many subsequent 
occasions. 
In order to strengthen his case Brooke drew attention to two events 
which had occurred some years before the question of Sarawak's 
independence first arose. As long ago as March 1849, he pointed out, 
Lord Palmerston had given Foreign bffice blessing to the use of a 
distinctive Sarawak flag - a cross of pale red and black on a yellow 
field.576 This, in Brooke's opinion, was tantamount to recognition of the 
territory's independent status. Again, in May 1850 a treaty had been 
1574 F.O. lZ/lZ. 
1575 P.P., 1854-5, XXIX, p. 222. 
1576 Brooke to Palmerston, March 14th, 1849. Palmerston to Brooke, June ZOth, 
1849. (P.P., 1851, LVI, Pt. i, pp. 141-2). 
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concluded, on American initiative, between Sara wak and the United 
States.1m This showed that at least one of the great powers was willing 
to grant his claim to independence, and Brooke was at a loss to under-
stand why Great Britain should not follow America's lead.578 
A serious flaw in the White Raja's case was the existence of financial 
obligations as between Sarawak and the Sultan of Brunei. When in 
1846 he had obtained a grant of the rivers from Cape Datu to the 
Samarahan, he had taken the opportunity of freeing himself from the 
burden of paying annual tribute.579 Since then, however, he had 
acquired a huge new tract of territory. In 1853 the northern boundary 
of Sarawak was extended to beyond the Rajang basin, and in exchange 
Brooke had agreed to pay the Sultan an annual sum of $ 1,500. The 
original arrangement, moreover, by which Sarawak was obliged to pay 
$ 4,000 to Brunei on the accession of a new Raja was still in force. 
The question of Sarawak's independence was first put to the test in 
1855, when Spenser St. John, a personal friend of the White Raja's, 
was appointed British Consul-General to the native states of Borneo.68O 
Brooke promptly informed the new Consul-General that he could not 
take up his duties until he had secured an exequatur from the Govern-
ment of Sarawak.681 But when St. J ohn asked the British Government 
for permission to do so, supporting his application with a vi go rous 
defence of Sarawak's claim to independence, the Foreign Office refused 
to be drawn.582 "As a British subject", they told St. J ohn, "Sir J ames 
Brooke cannot acquire independent sovereignty without permission from 
the Crown,583 such a position being inconsistent with the allegiance 
which he owes to his own Sovereign, and which, without the consent 
577 J. Balestier (American Envoy and Minister to Southeast Asia) to G. Ruppell 
and A. Crookshank (Brooke's representatives at Kuching), May 27th, 1850. 
(F.O. 12/8). 
A month later a similar treaty was conc\uded between the United States and 
Brunei. In both cases the object of the Americans was to secure reciprocal 
trading rights and protection for their shipping in the harbours of northern 
Borneo. 
578 Brooke to the Earl of Clarendon, September 27th, 1853. (F.O. 12/13). 
579 See p. 126. above. 
680 This office had been resigned by Brooke in September 1853. His resignation, 
however, was not formally accepted until 1855. 
1181 Brooke to St. John, October 25th, 1855. (F.O. 12/22). 
682 St. John to Clarendon, November 3rd, 1855. (Ibid.) 
583 In accordance with strict legal theory, the Crown automatically acquired 
sovereignty over any territory which came into the possession of a British 
subject. (See Sir Arthur Berriedale Keith, The Constitution, Administrati<m, 
and Laws of the Empire, p. 289). 
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of that Sovereign, he cannot put off".584 Since Brooke had not received 
the necessary royal permis sion, it followed that he could not be con-
sidered as an independent prince, and consequently that an exequatur 
from his Government need not be obtained by a British consul serving 
in Borneo. 
His failure to secure recognition became the more serious for Brooke 
in 1857, when some of his Chinese subjects rose in revolt against his 
rule. Many Chinese communities in Southeast Asia had become greatly 
excited at the news of the British withdrawal from before Canton the 
previous year, and disturbances had broken out at Singapore and in 
other places. Representatives of the powerful secret society of the 
Thian Ti Hui ('Heaven and Earth League') came over from Malaya to 
Borneo in the hope of creating trouble there also.585 Partly because of 
their intrigues and partly because the Sarawak Government had recently 
punished a gold-mining kongsi at Bau (near the Sambas border) for 
opium-smuggling, a band of armed Chinese descended on Kuching in 
February 1857, destroyed most of the principal buildings, and murdered 
several of the European inhabitants. The White Raja himself barely 
escaped with his life. His Malay and Dyak subjects remained loyal to 
him, however, and with assistance from the Dutch at Pontianak and 
from the newly-founded Borneo Company, order was restored in 
Kuching and the shattered administration set on its feet again.586 
Nevertheless, the 'Chinese Insurrection of 1857', as it became known, 
went far to convince Brooke that Sarawak could not survive long 
without more effective European protection. At the height of the revolt 
he even went so far as to order the Borneo Company's local manager 
to "offer the country, on any terms, to the Duteh" - an act of sur-
render he would earlier have regarded as unthinkable. 
Early· in 1858, while on a visit to England to regain his health, he 
was asked by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, to submit definite 
proposals regarding the future of his kingdom. In a memorandum dated 
February 4th of that year, he suggested that Sarawak should be trans-
1584 Foreign Office to St. John, April 9th, 1856. (F.O. 12/23). This dispatch was 
based on advice given to the Foreign Office by the Law Officers of the Crown 
on Febrnary 15th of the same year. (F.O. 12/35). 
586 Spenser St. John, Life in the Parests of the Par Bast, Vol. H, p. 356. Baring-
Gould and Bampfylde. op. cit., p. 189. 
586 L. V. Helms, Pioneering tin the Par Bast, pp. 193-4. Helms was the first 
manager of the Borneo Company, Limited, which was formed in 1856 to 
exploit the mineral and jungle products of Sarawak. Brooke received a loan 
of i 5,000 from this company to tide him over the immediate financial crisis 
caused by the Chinese Insurrection. 
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ferred to the Crown in fuIl sovereignty at once, but that he and his 
staff at Kuching should continue to administer it for the time being, 
since its revenues were not yet sufficiently large to support a fuIl-scale 
colonial government. Sarawak was to become "a British possession with 
a native administration superintended by Englishmen". In compensation 
for the surrender of his sovereign rights, Brooke proposed that the 
money which he had laid out on the development of the area since 
1839 should be refunded to him, and that a further sum, representing 
the value of the state revenues and other public property should be made 
available to him either immediately or when the Colonial Office assumed 
full contro1.587 
The Prime Minister at this time was Lord Palmerston, who in the 
past had of ten supported the policy of expanding British influence in 
Borneo. If the decision had rested with Palmerston, Sarawak might 
wen have become a British colony then and there. But on February 
19th, only a fortnight af ter Brooke's proposals had been put forward, 
Palmerston's Government was defeated in the House of Commons, and 
he resigned the following day. The new Prime Minister was the Earl 
of Derby, and the Earl of Malmesbury succeeded Lord Clarendon at 
the Foreign Office. Brooke had therefore to begin his campaign for 
recognition all over again. 
In August he submitted fresh proposals to Sir Edward Bulwer-
Lytton, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies. These were 
worded slightly differently from those he had made earlier, and showed 
that since February the White Raja had changed his ground. Although 
still willing for Sarawak to be made a Crown Colony, he stated that 
he now preferred that it should become a British protectorate. Under 
a protectorate, he believed, he would be free to order his country's 
internal affairs as he himself thought fit, whereas under the Colonial 
Office the religion, laws, and customs of the inhabitants might be 
interfered with. He therefore asked the British Government to extend 
formal protection to Sarawak, and at the same time to become its 
"public creditor" by taking over the state debt, amounting at this time 
to approximate1y i. 50,000.588 In return, Great Britain was to have the 
right of establishing a Crown Colony at a later date should her interests 
require it.589 
587 J. Brooke, 'Memorandum for the Earl of Clarendon', February 4th, 1858. 
(F.O. 12/25). 
588 This figure represented the total sum which Brooke had invested in Sarawak 
since its foundation, plus i 5,000 which he owed to the Borneo Company. 
589 The fuU text of this memorandum is given in Jacob, op. cit., Vol. ii, pp. 268-71. 
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The immediate response of the British Government was not encoura-
ging, and for the next five years Brooke fought hard to secure 
acceptance of these proposals, in whole or in part. His campaign to 
win recognition was conducted with a certain urgency, for the internal 
condition of Sarawak was far from satisfactory. The Chinese Insur-
rection had been followed in 1859 by the 'Musahor Revolt', in which 
two of his officers were treacherously murdered at Fort Kanowit on 
the Rajang. There was also a constant fear that the Bandjermasin War; 
then convulsing southern Borneo, would spread to the north-west coast. 
In many parts of the East, moreover, where, as in Sarawak, small 
white minorities were governing large, half-civilized native populations, 
the terrors of the Indian Mutiny were fresh in mind, and the prevailing 
atmosphere was one of fear and suspicion, in which rumours of im-
pending revolution gained easy currency. 
The British Government's persistent refusal to recognize his claims 
obliged Brooke to turn elsewhere for the support he needed. Early in 
1859 he was considering the possibility of surrendering his kingdom 
to the Dutch.590 He obtained a temporary re spi te from financial worries 
in April of that year, when a famous philanthropist, Miss Angela (later 
Baroness) Burdett-Coutts, paid the debt he owed to the Borneo Com-
pany,591 but early the following year he was again seeking foreign 
protection, this time from Emperor Napoleon III of France. A further 
grant of money from Miss Coutts enabled him to buy asteamer, and 
he assured her that "the services of such a vessel" would justify him 
590 Many writers assert that Brooke in fact offered his country to the Netherlands 
and that his offer was rejected. (Cf. Colenbrander, op. cit., Deel i, p. 330. 
E. B. Kielstra, De Indische Archipel, p. 201, and Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, 
op. cit., p. 242). 
I have been unable to find evidence in the records of the Dutch Foreign 
Ministry that such a proposal was ever made. Halfway through 1858 the 
London Times advocated the absorption of Sarawak by the Netherlands 
Indies and, as aresuIt, the Dutch Ambassador in London received orders 
from The Hague "to bring to the notice of His Excellency Lord Malmesbury 
that the Government of the Netherlands have no idea whatever of taking 
advantage of the offer [which the Times suggests wil\ soon be made] and by 
accepting which they would acquire a protectorate or sovereignty over the 
country of Sarawak." (Minister of Foreign Affairs to Baron Bentinck, Sep-
tember 2Ist, 1858, No. 1, Secret: Buit. Zaken, No. 3134). 
Brooke undoubtedly had thoughts of transferring his country to Holland at 
this time. It may be that he approached the Dutch Ambassador privatelyon 
the subject and that the Ambassador's reply did not encourage him to make 
a more formal offer. 
591 Brooke to Miss Burdett-Coutts, June 3rd, 1859. (Rajah Brooke &- Baroness 
Burdett Coutts (Ed. E. Owen Rutter), p.62). 
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in "maintaining Sarawak independently till circumstances... accom-
modate the differences with the British Government".1i92 But late in 
1860 he was negotiating with the Duke of Brabant for the transfer of 
his dominions to Belgium. 
Not all Brooke's friends and advisers were in sympathy with these 
efforts to obtain protection from foreign governments. lndeed, his 
nephew and heir, Captain J. Brooke Brooke, wh om he had left in charge 
of the Sarawak Government in 1858, was violently opposed to the idea 
of ceding the country to anyone, even to the British. Unlike the White 
Raja, Captain Brooke was satisfied that Sarawak could struggle through 
its present difficulties unaided, and, in a letter to the British Foreign 
Secretary, went so far as to protest formally against the proposed 
transfer.1i9s His nephew's insubordination forced Sir J ames to hurry 
back to the Far East early in 1863 in order to regain control of his 
kingdom. By public1y opposing the Raja's policy, Captain Brooke 
brought into the open a quarrel which was essentially private in 
nature,lI94 and, in the interests of Sarawak, should have remained so. 
The House of Brooke may have been divided against itself, but it was 
unwise to proclaim this fact from the housetops. Captain Brooke's 
action helped to confirm the impression already formed by the Foreign 
Office that the White Raja's authority in Borneo was ephemeraI, and 
that no usefuI purpose would be served by becoming directly involved 
in the fortunes of his kingdom. 
In deciding on the best policy to be adopted towards Sarawak, the 
British Government had a choice of four possible courses of action. 
First, they could waive all Iegal technicalities, recognize the White Raja 
as an independent sovereign, but refrain from any positive intervention 
in the affairs of Borneo. The difficulty here was that, Iike any other 
1192 Brooke to Miss Burdett-Coutts, June 6th, 1860. (Ibid., p. 78). 
The White Raja also received a testimonial of i. 8,800 at about this time, 
subscribed by a group of his admirers in England. 
- Captain Brooke Brooke to Lord RusselI, October 26th, 1862. (F.O. 12130). 
594 The real reason for the falling-out of uncle and nephew was J ames Brooke's 
recognition of the existence of his ilIegitimate son, George, whom Brooke 
Brooke feared might supplant him as the heir-apparent of Sarawak. Following 
the code of the Victorian Age, the White Raja's early biographers avoided 
all reference to this by-blow of their hero's younger days, and speculations 
regarding the mysterious 'Reuben George Brooke' were consequently a favou-
rite topic of conversation in pre-War Borneo. In her recent hook, Jmnes 
Brooke of S04'(1'lvak (London, 1953), however, Miss Emily Hahn bas given a 
full account of tbis matter (pp. 223-30), and satisfactorily c1ears up many 
otber problems connected with the secret history of the First White Raja 
of Sarawak. 
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British subject residing in a savage land, Brooke already had a right 
to the protection of his mother country from foreign states or indivi-
duals who threatened to take his life or steal his property. In practice, 
therefore, for the Foreign Office to recognize him as Raja would be 
equivalent to granting him a protectorate. By claiming to be the head 
of an independent state without renouncing his nationality, Brooke 
was really trying to have the best of two worlds. His constant applica-
tions for British naval support we re strictly incompatible with his 
insistence on being regarded as a sovereign prince.595 
Next, the British Government could accept the offer of Sarawak, 
pay the compensation Brooke demanded, and convert his kingdom into 
a Crown Colony. But all the evidence seemed to show that such a colony 
would he an even greater drain on the Imperial Exchequer than Labuan 
which, small though it might be, was costing some :E. 6,000 a year at 
this time to maintain.596 "We only know this", wrote Bulwer-Lytton 
in 1859, "that the present Proprietor, keeping the most modest Estab-
lishment he can, is unable to make both ends meet, and is in debt ... 
The probability is, therefore, that the Colony would not be self-sup-
porting".597 The British Government, moreover, had yet to be convinced 
that Brooke possessed actual sovereign rights to dispose of. His 
assertion that he held his country both by the will of the people and 
by covenant with Brunei was regarded by the Foreign Office as absurd, 
while the existence of such clearly defined financial obligations to the 
Sultan made his claim to complete independence logically untenable.1I98 
Thirdly, and this was the course favoured by most of Brooke's sup-
porters in England, the Foreign Office could guarantee the stabitity 
of Sara wak by formally declaring a protectorate over it. But here again 
the probable disadvantages seemed tikely to outweigh the possible 
benefits. When a deputation of Glasgow, Manchester, Liverpool, and 
London merchants waited on the Prime Minister, Lord Derby, in 
November 1858 to urge him to grant a protectorate, he told them that 
there was "a very strong argument ... against sanctioning such under-
takings as those of Sir James Brooke ... If every English subject were 
59Ii Foreign Office Minute of June 3rd, 1861. (F.O. 12129). 
596 During the period 1857-64 the following Parliamentary grants in aid were 
voted on behalf of Labuan: 
1857 i 3,894 1861 
1858 6,790 1862 
1859 5,438 1863 
1860 6,893 1864 
111'1' Minute by Sir E. Bulwer-Lytton, 1859 (n.d.). (F.a. 
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to be allowed to settle in any district he might think fit, and afterwards 
to call upon the Government as a matter of right to give him military 
and civil protection, and to secure him from the consequences of 
conduct which was not in the slightest degree anticipated by the 
Government, it must lead the Government into endless difficulties and 
expenditure".599 This dictum was later endorsed by the Earl of Claren-
don, who declared in 1869 that he "did not fancy protecting a British 
rajah who might want our support but defy our authority".600 
The fourth course open to the British Government was the one they 
eventually adopted, namely, to reject Brooke's claims and proposals 
entirely. The friends of Sarawak were greatly disgusted at what they 
regarded not only as a betrayal of a man who deserved better of his 
country, but as a foolish, if not criminal, blindness to the value of 
British interests in Borneo. Yet Brooke's plans were defeated not so 
much by official ignorance and apathy as by the belief then prevailing 
in England that there were too many British colonies already. In view 
of the aggressiveness of British policy in Borneo in the 1840's, it seems 
safe to say that if, in 1858, Her Majesty's Government had really 
wanted Sarawak, they would not have allowed i. 50,000 and a few 
unsolved legal conundrums to stand in their way. 
Although a protectorate for Sarawak was thus definitely denied 
him, Brooke had the satisfaction of winning one minor battle with the 
Foreign Office - the argument about British consular representation 
at his capita!. In August 1863, through the personal intervention of 
Lord Palmerston,601 Cabinet approval was given for the appointment 
of a British consul specifically to Kuching, and instructions were issued 
by the Foreign Secretary that this official was to obtain his exequatur 
from "Sir James Brooke, Raja of Sarawak".602 Historians of Sarawak 
have always claimed that this order marked the "full and complete" 
recognition of the country's independence,603 and Palmerston, at any 
rate, certainly intended it to convey that implication.604 But, whether 
by accident or design, the commis sion furnished to Mr. Ricketts, the 
599 The Times, December lst, 1858. 
600 Minute by the Earl of Clarendon. (F.O. 12/40). 
601 Palmerston was persuaded to exert his influence in this matter by Mr. John 
Abel Smith, M.P., who was in turn acting on behatf of Miss Burdett-Coutts. 
(See Rajah Brooke & Baroness Burdett Coutts, p. 213). 
602 Memorandum by Earl Russen, August 1863. (F.O. 12/42). 
603 Cf. Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, op. cit., pp. 280-1. 
604 In a letter of May 22nd to Lord Russell, Abel Smith wrote: "I am happy 
to add that [Lord Palmerston] has authorized me to ten you that he has no 
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first British consul to Kuching, was drawn up in such a manner as to 
leave the British Foreign Office a loop-hole through which they could 
escape whenever the demands of the Sarawak Government for 'fuIl 
and complete' recognition were strongly pressed. As framed by the 
Foreign Office staff, Ricketts' commission made no mention of the 
'dominions' of the sovereign to who se territory he was being appointed, 
and he was instructed to obtain his exequatur, not from the Raja of 
Sarawak, but from "the local authorities".605 Whether these 'local 
authorities' were European or native was not laid down. In consequence, 
as late as 1877 the Foreign Office were able to claim that "as a matter 
of constitutional law it is competent to the Queen to recognize [the 
Raja of Sarawak ] as a sovereign prince, but no suck recognition kas 
taken place".606 
When at the end of 1863 Sir James Brooke sailed from Borneo for 
the last time on his way to permanent retirement in England, he left 
behind him a country with a weIl-organized internal administration, 
but without that guarantee of protection from a European power which 
for more than twenty years he had vainly tried to secure. In 1866 he 
made one final attempt to persuade the British Government to accept 
sovereignty over his kingdom,607 but once again his offer was rejected. 
"It seemed of neither sufficient political nor commercial importance", 
wrote the Colonial Under-Secretary of the day, C. B. Adderley, "to 
tempt us 450 miles inland [sic] from Labuan, and we had found 
Asiatic Stations already too burdensome financially. Sarawak imports 
coal from Labuan, and is worth more to the Crown as a foreigt) 
objection to the immediate recognition of Sarawak, and he repeated that it 
will be a pleasure to him to find himself in a position to do anything agreeable 
to Sir James Brooke." 
005 Memorandum by Sir Edward Hertslet, December 29th, 1876. (F.O. 12/42). 
606 Foreign Office Minute of 1877 (n.d.). (Quoted in C.O. 144/49: my italics). 
In 1869 Charles Brooke, the Second White Raja, asked for an invitation to 
a royal levee, but refused to attend when he was told that he would have 
to be presented as 'Mr. Brooke', or not at all. (Foreign Office Minute of 
May 24th, 1869: F.O. 12/34B). Five years later, when he again sought per-
mission to attend a levee in his sovereign capacity, the matter was referred 
to Queen Victoria, who was "graciously pleased to consent to the suggestion 
that he should write on his card and be presented as 'Mr. Brooke (Rajah of 
Sarawak)'." He was told privately, however, that in all other respects he 
would rank as a private individual. (Memorandum by Sir Edward Hertslet, 
December 29th, 1876: F.O. 12/42). 
During the reign of Edward VII approval was eventually given for the 
Rajas of Sarawak to take precedence at Court immediately af ter the ruling 
princes of India. (Ranee Margaret of Sarawak, My Life in Sarwwak, p. 311). 
607 Brooke to Lord Stanley, November 3rd, 1866. (F.O. 12/35). 
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customer than it would ever become as a subject".608 Two years later, 
on June llth, 1868, James Brooke died at his home in Devonshire, and 
the Raj passed to his nephew, Charles Johnson Brooke, the Tuan 
Muda.609 
808 C. B. Adderley, Review of "The Colonial Policy of Lord J. Russell's Ad-
ministration", by Earl Grey, 1853; and of Subsequent Colonial History, p. 343. 
00II 'The Last Will and Testament of Sir James Brooke, K.C.B., First Rajah of 
Sarawak', April 1Sth, 1867. This document was not published in full until 
seventy-eight years after James Brooke's death, because it made incidental 
reference to his illegitimate so", George. It may he found in a pamphlet 
entitled, The Facts about Sarawak (London, 1946). 
CHAPTER X 
THE PARTITION OF BORNEO 
The dominions inherited by the Second White Raja of Sarawak 
extended from Cape Datu on the Sambas border to Cape Kidurong, 
a small promontory seven miles north of the mouth of the Bintulu 
River. The greater part of this territory had been acquired in two huge 
'bites' : the first in 1853, when the Rajang Basin was absorbed, and the 
second in 1861, when the frontier was moved up the coast to beyond 
the Bintulu. The motives which prompted the Sarawak Government to 
demand this second ces sion were primarily economie. The country 
between the Rajang and the Bintulu inc1uded the districts of Oya and 
Mukah, which together supplied most of the sago then being exported 
from Kuching to Singapore. Native traders from Sarawak visiting the 
sago districts had of ten been maltreated by the local Brunei chiefs, 
and taxes and to11s levied on their goodS.610 The Sarawak Government 
had therefore considered it imperative to remave these obstructions to 
a trade that was vital to the country's prosperity, and the cession 
of 1861 had been negotiated, the Sultan of Brunei receiving a com-
pensation for the loss of this territory amounting to $ 4,500 annually.6ll 
This policy of expansion northwards, begun during the reign of the 
First Raja, was continued by his successor. Early in 1868 Charles 
Brooke asked the Sultan of Brunei if he would cede the district of 
Baram in return for a suitable yearly payment; 612 by acquiring this 
area Brooke was planning to add another hundred miles to Sarawak's 
coastline. The Sultan refused to consider any such proposal, however, 
and appealed for support against the 'aggression' of Sarawak to 
Gavernor Pope-Hennessy of Labuan (who was also British Consul-
General for Borneo), claiming that Brunei had a right to British 
610 Singapore Chamber of Commerce to Lord RusselI, October 5th, 1860. (F.O. 
12/28). 
611 Spenser St. John to Lord RusselI, August 29th, 1861. (F.O. 12/29). 
UI This wa~ some months before Charles Brooke actually acceded to the Raj, 
but he was already administering the Government with full powers in bis 
unc1e's name. 
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protection under the Treaty of 1847.613 Pope-Hennessy announced that 
he would be willing to act as arbitrator in the matter, if both parties 
wished him to do so 614 - a suggestion which greatly irritated Brooke, 
who believed that sovereign powers like Sarawak and Brunei had no 
need of outside assistance in the management of their affairs. The 
Governor of Labuan, he complained to the British Foreign Office, 
had been listening to "false and cunning statements" from the Sultan 
of Brunei, upon whose word no credence could be placed. A simple 
matter like the ces sion of Baram could be settled by the Brunei and 
Sarawak Governments alone, and he was "ignorant why it should 
require interference from other parties".615 The Foreign Office, how-
ever, were not so easily to be persuaded to lay aside the responsibilities 
they believed Great Britain owed to Brunei. "You will . . . remind the 
Raja of Sarawak", they told Pope-Hennessy at the end of 1868, "of 
the provisions in our Treaty with Brunei against the ces sion of territory 
without the consent of the British Government, and, in so doing, you 
will state that H. M. Government have no desire to see any change in 
the present state of territorial possession in Borneo, nor are they dis-
posed to countenance any attempt to induce the Sultan to act in contra-
vention to that Treaty".616 
The British Government maintained their opposition to territoria! 
changes in Borneo for the next ten years. In 1874 Brooke suggested 
that Great Britain should declare a protectorate over the whole of 
Brunei or, alternatively, should allow the Government of Sarawak to 
do so. Neither proposal was acceptab!e to the Foreign Office. Her 
Majesty's Government, he was toId, had no thought of extending 
protection to Bruriei themselves, nor did they favour "any considerable 
extension" of his own "anomalous jurisdiction".617 Two years later he 
asked the Foreign Office to waive the stipulation in the 1847 Treaty 
which forbade the Sultan to alienate territory without British consent, 
and onee again his request was bluntly refused.618 
Brooke was understandably annoyed at not being allowed to enlarge 
his dominions at the expense of Brunei, which he regarded as "debased, 
613 Sultan of Brunei to Governor Pope-Hennessy, April 13th, 1868. (F.O. 12/34A). 
614 Governor Pope-Hennessy to Charles Brooke, April 23rd, 1868. (C.O.I44/28). 
6UI Charles Brooke to Lord Stanley, April 3Oth, 1868. (Ibid.) 
616 Foreign Office to Governor Pope-Hennessy, December 2nd, 1868. (F.O. lZJ34A). 
617 Earl of Derby to Charles Brooke, May IOth, 1875. (F.O. 12/42). 
618 Charles Brooke to the Foreign Office, March 2Oth, 1876. Foreign Office to 
Sir James Brooke (sic I), June 12th, 1876. (C.O. 144/47). 
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sordid, exacting, and unreliable". 619 The inhabitants of a district like 
Baram, he contended, would be much happier under his rule than under 
their rapacious Brunei overlords. He laid the blame for the British 
Government's restrictive policy on the Governors of Labuan, who, he 
believed, were unfairly prejudiced against Sarawak, and had been using 
their influence with the Foreign Office to sabotage his plans. 
Most Governors of Labuan between 1860 and 1880 were in fact 
jealous of Sarawak, and with good reason, for they saw in its expansion 
along the north-west coast a threat to the prosperity, if not the existence, 
of their own colony. The reports they sent home of the "restless aspira-
tions of the Sarawak Government for territorial aggrandizement" 620 
consequently tended to emphasize the less reputable incidents in the 
story of Sarawak-Brunei relations. When, for example, Governor Pope-
Hennessy advised the Foreign Office in April 1868 that Brooke was 
trying to obtain the district of Baram, he disc10sed that during the 
previous year the Sarawak Government had 'fined' the Sultan $ 4,000 
for "breach of dignity". Letters had arrived from Brunei with the seal 
fixed much higher up the paper than was customary, and the General 
Council at Kuching had decided that this was a calculated insult. Only 
one third of the annual tribute money owing to the Sultan had therefore 
been paid.621 In 1876 Brooke again held back a large sum ($ 3,805) 
from the tribute money, because some debts due to Sarawak traders 
from a Brunei nakodah were outstanding. "I learn", wrote Governor 
Ussher to Lord Derby, the British Foreign Secretary, "that Raja 
Brooke offered to forego his deduction of the debts and other matters, 
if the Sultan would cede him Baram. I fear this aspect considerably 
diminishes the integrity of the transaction" .1122 
These reports from Labuan were responsible for the British Govern-
ment's conviction that Brunei required protection from the encroach-
ments of Sarawak, and led to the Foreign Office ban on territorial 
changes in northern Borneo. It was obvious that Great Britain had the 
power to impose such a ban. That she had a moral duty to support a 
weak native ruler, with whom she was allied by treaty, against a power-
ful and ambitious neighbour was arguable. But whether she had any 
legal right to interfere in a dispute involving the transfer of territory 
from Brunei to Sarawak was extremely doubtful. 
619 Charles Brooke to Governor Pope-Hennessy, April 3Oth, 1868. (e.O. 144128). 
620 Governor Bulwer to Earl Granville, June 18th, 1872. (e.O. 144/37). 
621 Minutes of the Sarawak General Council, September 8th, 1867. Governor 
Pope-Hennessy to the Foreign Office, April 23rd, 1868. (C.O. 144/28). 
1122 Governor Ussher to Lord Derby, September 15th, 1876. (C.O. 144146). 
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By the Treaty of 1847 the Sultan of Brunei had promised not to 
cede "any part of his dominions to any other nation, or to the subjects 
or citizens thereof, without the consent of Her Britannic Majesty".6l18 
But there was nothing in this Treaty to prevent him from ceding terri-
tory to the subjects of Great Britain. Indeed, since 1847 he had twice 
made over large sections of his dominions to a British subject (Sir 
James Brooke) and on neither occasion had he secured Foreign Office 
approval beforehand. When these cessions had later been reported to 
the British Government, moreover, no objection to them had been 
raised. But now, when Sir James Brooke's successor, also a British 
subject, wished to negotiate a precisely similar cession, the Foreign 
Office assumed the right to check him. 
There was astrange inconsistency at this time in the attitude of the 
British Government towards Sarawak. From the beginning, as has been 
shown, the Foreign Office firmly refused to recognize the territory 
of the White Rajas as an independent state, yet the logical consequence 
of this refusal do not appear to have been understood. I f the Brookes 
were not independent sovereign princes, then they were obviously 
vassals of Brunei, and, in that case, the grants made by the Sultan to 
the First Raja were feudal in nature, and not to be regarded as absolute 
cessions of territory. From this it should have followed that further 
grants of the same kind would not be contrary to the Treaty of 1847, 
the purpose of which had been to prevent the Sultan of Brunei from 
alienating his country permanently to foreign nations, not from farming 
portions of it to British subjects in exchange for an annual tribute. 
In denying to Charles Brooke the right to acquire land in Brunei, the 
Foreign Office were recognizing the fact of Sarawak's independenee 
and, at the same time, refusing to admit that it was independent in 
theory. 
Such a policy, whether logical or not, was feasible only so long as 
no other powers besides Sarawak had territorial designs on the Sul-
tanate of Brunei. But during the 1860's and 1870's several foreign 
Governments, incIuding some who had never previously shown any 
interest in Borneo, began to realize that the northern part of the 
island possessed considerable commercial and strategie possibilities. The 
growth of foreign competition obliged the British Government to re-
examine their policy towards Sarawak, since if Brooke were not allowed 
&SI Treaty of May 27th, 1847, Artic1e X. (F.O. 93/16 (2). Maxwell and Gibson, 
op. cit., p. 146). 
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to absorb the Sultanate of Brunei there was a risk that it might before 
long be swallowed up by an alien power. 
Early in July 1865 Mr. Charles Lee Moses, who had recently been 
appointed United States Consul to Brunei, arrived at the Sultan's 
capital to take up his duties. These presumably consisted in giving 
advice to visiting American merchant ships, but Moses was not a man 
to neglect the opportunities for private gain to which his official position 
provided access. By emphasizing that he was an accredited represen-
tative of the Government of the United States, he succeeded in 
persuading the Sultan and Pengeran Temënggong of Brunei to grant 
him a personal ten-year lease of the greater part of northern Borneo, 
together with the islands of Banggi, Balabac, and Palawan, in exchange 
for an annual rental of $ 9,500.624 
Having negotiated this remarkable bargain, Moses departed for Hong 
Kong, where he transferred his rights to the 'American Trading Com-
pany of Borneo'. The president of this company was a certain Joseph 
Torrey, who travelled to Brunei the following November in order to 
be installed as 'Raja of Ambong and Marudu and Supreme Ruler of 
the whole of the northern portion of Borneo'.6215 Under Torrey's 
guidance a small plantation and trading settlement, staffed by 10 Ame-
ricans and 60 Chinese coolies, was established on the shores of Kimanis 
Bay. The enterprise was financed temporarily by loans from the 
Chinese merchant community at Labuan.626 
Torrey soon quarrelled with Moses, however, and went back to Hong 
Kong, hotly pursued by one of his Labuan creditors. The settlement 
at Kimanis languished, became bankrupt, and at the end of 1866 
finally died.627 From then on the American Company 628 confined itself 
to occasional trading ventures on the Borneo coast. Torrey and his 
associates still retained their title to most of northern Borneo, however, 
6"J4 Governor Callaghan to the Foreign Office, July 8th, 1865. (F.O. 12J32B). 
625 Proclamation by Joseph William Torrey, December 21st, 1865. (F.O. 12J33A). 
62'6 Governor Bulwer to Earl Granville, August 17th, 1872. (c.a. 144/37). 
627 Acting-Governor Low to Lord Stanley, December ht, 1866. (c.a. 144/25). 
628 In 1868 Torrey was in New York, trying to obtain new financial backing. 
A prospectus for a new 'American Trading Company of Borneo' published 
by him that year spoke of the country's "enormous wea\th, the salubrity of its 
climate, and the unsurpassed fertility of its soit." "The auriferous deposits", 
Torrey announced, were "only equalIed by the Australian and California 
mines." The latter was a large claim, since gold had not then been discovered 
in northern Borneo, at any rate by Europeans. (Americcm Trading Comjxmy 
of Borneo: orgcmized wnder speciol concesSÏDn from Ris Rtghness the Sultcm 
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though it remained to be seen whether they would be able to pro fit by it. 
The next 'interlopers' to appear on the north-west coast of Borneo 
were the Italians. In February 1870 Captain Racchia of the Royal 
Italian Navy brought his ship, the Principessa Clotilde, to anchor in 
Labuan harbour, and astonished the British authorities there by an-
nouncing that he had been instructed to look for a site in Borneo for 
a penal colony.629 For some time past the Government of Italy had 
been trying to create such a colony, but their attempts to do so in 
Abyssinia, Socotra, and the Nicobars had all been frustrated.630 Racchia 
examined the coast opposite Labuan, and decided to recommend Gaya 
Bay, gene rally recognized as the finest anchorage in north-western 
Borneo. The British at Labuan complained to the Colonial Office that 
an Italian penal colony would corrupt the people of Brunei,631 and a 
long correspondence ensued between London and Rome on the subject. 
In the end nothing came of the plan, since in 1873 the Italian Govern-
ment abandoned of their own accord all idea of transporting convicts 
overseas.832 
Meanwhile the Spanish Government of the Philippines had become 
involved in what proved to be the final phase in their seemingly endless 
contest with the Sultans of Sulu. Spain had first occupied Sulu in 
1638, but since then, despite frequent military expeditions and numerous 
treaties of friendship and mutual protection, its piratical and warlike 
inhabitants had never submitted to the Spanish yoke for more than a 
few years at a time.633 In 1851, for example, af ter his capital had been 
occupied by Spanish troops, the Sultan agreed to make a "solemn act 
of incorporation and adhesion to the sovereignty of Her Catholic 
Majesty", and promised to suppress piracy in his dominions, but four 
years later raiders from Sulu captured and burnt the greater part of 
Zamboanga.634 Spanish intentions with regard to this area we re of 
importance to the future of Borneo because the Sultans of Sulu pos-
sessed hereditary sovereign rights over the whole of the north-east coast 
of Borneo ... , New York, 1868). The business men of New York, however, 
were not to be persuaded to invest in wild-cat schemes of Torrey's devising, 
nor were the American Government ready to listen to his plea that the U.S. 
Navy needed a base on the is!and of Banggi. 
629 Governor Pope-Hennessy to Earl Granville, April llth, 1870. (e.O. 144131). 
63() Chevalier Cadorna (Italian Ambassador in London) to Earl Granville, January 
29th, 1872. (e.O. 144/39). 
631 Governor Bu!wer to Lord Kimberley, January 15th, 1873. (e.O. 14414{). 
632 e.O. 144140 and 41. 
633 Najeeb M. Sa!eeby, The History of Su/u, pp. 177-200. 
634 Ibid., pp. 209 and 214. 
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from Boeloengan to Marudu Bay and over the north-west coast as far 
south as Pandasan.635 
In 1873 the Government of the Philippines decided to subdue Sulu 
once and for all. This could best be done, they believed, by driving 
away all trading prahus and by blockading all pork "Every vessel 
coming from the Sulu Archipelago and manned by Moors [ie. Moros]", 
ordered the naval commander-in-chief at Manila, "shall be destroyed. 
and its crew and passengers destined to labour on pubEc works ... If 
the vessels ... be armed, they shall, as our laws direct, be held as pirates, 
and their crews be tried by court-martial ... Every vessel, although it 
may not be manned, belonging to the Moors of the Islands of Sulu 
and Tawi Tawi, shall he destroyed by the cruisers".636 In addition, 
foreign nations were peremptorily informed that no ships other than 
those sailing under Spanish colours would be permitted to trade directly 
with Sulu or with any of its dependencies.631 
Most of the overseas trade of Sulu was in the hands of British and 
German firms at Singapore, who became highly indignant when a 
Spanish blockade was declared. Prompted by Sir Harry Ord, Governor 
of the Straits Settlements, the British Government lodged a protest in 
Madrid against the restrictions, while the German Government, which 
had already sent a warship to Sulu to conduct an investigation on the 
spot, suggested that Germany and England, by joint action, should 
compel Spain to restore freedom of trade to the Archipelago. N either 
the British nor the German Government, it was pointed out, had ever 
admitted that Sulu formed part of the Spanish Philippines.638 
Bringing pressure to bear on Spain by the methods of diplomacy, 
however, was a tedious process, and while negotiations dragged on in 
Europe, several enterprising merchant skippers in the Far East 
started a brisk smuggling trade with the proscribed Sulu ports. The 
small Spanish naval forces based on the Philippines were able to inter-
cept only a small portion of this traffic, but they did succeed in cap-
turing a few blockade-runners, and Anglo-German protests became 
63& Sir Hugh Low, 'Selesilah .. .', JRASSB, June 1880, pp. 13-17. 
636 Orders issued by Rear-Admiral Don Juan Antequera y Bobadilla, August 
2nd, 1873. (P.P., 1882, LXXXI, p. 338). 
63'1' Notification by the Spanish Consul in Singapore, published in the Straits 
Settlements Government Gasette of November 7th, 1873. 
688 Governor Ord to Lord Kimberley, March 13th, 1873. Earl Granville to Mr. 
Layard (British Ambassador in Madrid), October 2Oth, 1873. Count Münster 
(German Ambassador in London) to Earl Granville, January 19th, 1874. 
Governor Bulwer to Earl Granville, March 22nd and April IOth, 1873. (e.O. 
144/40). 
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stronger than ever. At last, in November 1876, the Government of the 
Philippines agreed to open Jolo, the main port of Sulu, to the trade 
of aU nations, and the following year a protocol was signed in Madrid 
by England, Germany, and Spain, providing for "free access" and 
"free trade and navigation" throughout the whole Sulu Archipelago.639 
Although Spain was thus compelled to rescind her blockade policy, 
she had no intention of abandoning the struggle altogether. Indeed, she 
was now all the more determined to conquer Sulu. In 1876 Spanish 
troops had made a successful assault on J 010, and garrisons had been 
instaUed at strategie points in the Archipelago. Unrest continued during 
the following two years, but aU outbreaks we re harshly suppressed, and 
by the middle of 1878 the people of Sulu were ready to admit defeat. 
On July 20th of that year "artic1es of pacification and capitulation" 
were signed at the Sultan's capital, and Spanish sovereignty proc1aimed 
over all his dominions, inc1uding those on the mainland of Borneo.64o 
Already, however, events in that island had placed His Highness' 
mainland possessions beyond the Spanish sphere of influence for ever. 
One of the most successful of the merchant ship captains who ran 
the Sulu blockade during the 1870's was W. C. Cowie, a Scot employed 
by Carl Schomburgk and Company, of Singapore. Cowie received many 
favours from the Sultan of Sulu, inc1uding permission to erect a trans-
shipment depot for his merchandise at Sandakan, a fine natural har-
bour on the north-east cost of Borneo. He later entered into partnership 
with Schomburgk and with Captain Ross, another trader with wide 
experience of the Eastern Seas, and the three men formed the 'Labuan 
Trading Company', the sole purpose of which, despite its apparently 
innocent title, was to smuggle guns, ammunition, opium, tobacco, and 
other contraband into SUIU.641 
In order to dispose of the barter goods which he coUected in northern 
Borneo and the nearby islands, Cowie made a practice of paying 
occasional visits to Hong Kong. During one of these trips, while 
arranging for the sale of a cargo of pearls and rattans, he received an 
689 Decree of the Government of the Philippines of November 16th, 1876, and 
Protocol of March llth, 1877. (P.P., 1882, LXXXI, pp. 434 and 545-7). 
640 Saleeby, op. cit., pp. 222-3l. 
641 W. C. Cowie, 'North Borneo and how it became British', London and China 
Express, November 27th, 1908 (Supplement). 'Confidential report on the state 
of the Sulu Archipelago', by Commander Buckle, R.N., June 3rd, 1873. (e.O. 
144/45). See also F. W. Burbidge, The Gardens of the Sun, pp. 183-4. 
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unexpected demand for a ten per cent 'export duty' from Joseph 
Torrey, the only surviving member of the American Trading Company, 
and now the manager of a Hong Kong sugar refinery. Cowie had not 
previously been aware of the existence of Torrey's Bornean conces-
sions, but he immediately saw their value, and suggested to his two 
partners that they should join with him in buying the American out. 
Ross and Schomburgk, however, would not agree.6~ 
Although Cowie did not know it, the Bornean concessions had already 
attracted the attent ion of a resident of Hong Kong who was in a 
position to make better use of them than an impecunious Scottish gun-
runner.643 This was Baron von Overbeck, consul at Hong Kong of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, and at one time the local manager of the 
great China opium firm of Dent and Company. In 1874 Overbeck 
visited London, and submitted a scheme for acquiring Torrey's rights 
to the Austrian Ambassador, Count Montgelas, who, in turn, fired the 
enthusiasm of certain capitalists in Vienna. As aresuIt an Austrian 
warship was sent to Labuan in May 1875 to inquire into commercial 
prospects. Vet another European power had become involved in the 
fortunes of northern Borneo.644 
Returning from Europe to Hong Kong in January 1875, Overbeck 
purchased Torrey's rights in the American Trading Company,64S and 
the following June visited Brunei himself to make sure that the con-
cessions he had just bought were valid. (The leases acquired by Moses 
in 1865, it wiII be recalled, were to run for a period of ten years only). 
Having satisfied himself on this score, the Baron entered into partner-
ship with Alfred Dent, a son of his former employer, who undertook 
to supply most of the necessary financial backing. Two years later 
Overbeck made a second journey to Brunei in order to negotiate a 
permanent settlement with the Sultan.646 
~ Cowie, op. cito 
648 Cowie later became Managing Director and Chairman of the British North 
Borneo Company and spread abroad the story that he was that Company's 
real founder. The facts do not support him. (See K. G. Tregonning, 'The 
administration and development of North Borneo by the British North Borneo 
Company, 1881-1903', Unpublished Dissertation, University of Oxford, 1952, 
p. 21). 
au Acting-Governor Low to the Foreign Office, May 3Oth, 1875. (F.O. 12/41). 
Governor Treacher to Lord Derby, January 2nd, 1878. (C.O. 144150). 
846 Tregonning, op. cit., p. 20. 
t46 Acting-Governor Low to Lord Carnarvon, July 6th, 1875. (C.O. 144144). 
'Memorandum respecting the cessions to Messrs. Dent and Overbeck .• .' 
(Printed for the use of the Cabinet, October 6th, 1879: F.O. 12/54). 
The total capital of the North Borneo enterprise at this stage was i 10,000, 
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On December 29th, 1877, by means of four separate instruments, 
the Sultan and Pengeran Temenggong of Brunei ceded to Baron von 
Overbeck and Alfred Dent, Esq., all the territories, rivers, lands, and 
provinces lying in the area between Kimanis Bay on the north-west 
coast of Borneo and Seboekoe River on the east.647 Baron von Over-
beck was created 'Maharaja of Sabah and Raja of Gaya and Sanda-
kan',648 with powers of life and death over the native populations in 
the ceded areas, absolute ownership of all agricultural, animal, and 
mineral products of the country, the right to make laws, coin money, 
create an army and navy, and levy customs duties and taxes, with "all 
other powers and rights usually exercised by and belonging to sovereign 
rulers".649 In exchange the Sultan was to receive $ 12,000 annually, 
and the Temenggong $ 3,000. 
The Pengeran Temenggong was involved in these transactions 
because of the complicated system of land tenure then operating in 
Brunei. All revenues, whether from land or taxation, feIl into three 
categories: k'érajaan (lit. 'ruIe, empire'), implying, in this case, state 
revenues which were automatically inherited by a new Sultan from his 
predecessor; koripan, a name given to revenues allotted to a state official 
by virtue of his office; and tulin or p'ésaka (lit. 'heirloom') revenues 
bel on ging to anyone, whether Sultan, nobIe, headman, or commoner, 
in his private capacity. The Temenggong of Brunei possessed tulin 
rights over some of the districts bordering on Kimanis Bay, and was 
consequently able to participate in the tribute money offered by (or 
extracted from) Baron von Overbeck.650 
It will immediately be seen that the recipients of these grants acquired 
far wider powers than the Dutch had ever obtained from the princes 
in their part of Borneo. Under the Dutch system, as applied on the 
West and East Coasts, though not on the South, a sultan or raja who 
had ceded his territories to the Netherlands Government continued to 
administer them as a sovereign prince (by and with the advice of a 
of whieh Dent had eontributed I. 6,000. Torrey surrendered his rights to Over-
beek for 1.15.000, less the costs of the expedition of 1877-8. (Governor Treaeher 
to Lord Derby, January 2nd, 1878: c.O. 144/50). 
647 Maxwell and Gibson, op. cit., pp. 154-6. These ces si ons did not confer a title 
to the entire eoastline between the points named, but they were sufficiently 
comprehensive for Overbeek's purpose. 
648 'Sabah' was originally a native name for certain parts of the north-west coast, 
but later beeame applieable to the State of North Borneo as a whoie. 
649 Maxwell and Gibson, op. cit., p. 157. 
85() This paragraph is based on a memorandum written by Administrator Leys of 
Labuan, dated December 14th, 1885. (C.O, 144/59). 
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Dutch official), and his jurisdiction extended to all persons in his 
dominions except Europeans, Chinese and other 'foreign orientals', and 
those of his subjects who we re employed in Government establish-
ments. lISt The powers conferred on Overbeek, on the other hand, 
constituted an absolute transfer of sovereignty. He was given the right 
to set up an independent state, not within the Sultan of Brunei's 
dominions, but entirely separate from them. The grants were subject 
to one proviso only, namely, that if the tribute money were not paid 
for three consecutive years the leas es would lapse. But it cannot be 
supposed that the Sultan of Brunei, weak and impoverished as he was, 
would ever have been able to regain possession of his territories, once 
having surrendered them. 
Indeed, as Overbeek well knew, the Sultan of Brunei did not exer-
cise any effective rule in most of the territory he now so unreservedly 
gave away. The whole of the north-east coast was claimed by the 
Sultan of Sulu, and insofar as the local chiefs recognized any 
superior authority at all, they regarded him, and not the ruler of 
Brunei, as their overlord. The Baron therefore decided to visit Sulu 
in order to obtain a second cession, which would place the grants he 
had already received beyond doubt, and on January 22nd, 1878, the 
Sultan of Sulu transferred to him sovereignty over all the lands lying 
between the Seboekoe and Pandasan Rivers in return for an annual 
tribute of $ 5,000. In addition His Highness appointed Overbeek 
"supreme and independent" ruler of the ceded territories and "Datu 
Bëndahara and Raja of Sandakan", with powers as extensive as those 
already granted by the Sultan of Brunei.6112 
By virtue of these two cessions, Alfred Dent and his associates in 
London - Overbeek, failing to gain Austrian Government support, with-
drew from the North Borneo enterprise early in 1879 - became the 
owners of a territory with a total area of over 30,000 square miles and 
a coastline of 850 miles. Their neighbours were the Spanish Govern-
ment of the Philippines to the north-east, and the Netherlands Indian 
Government and Sarawak to the south. None of these powers was 
like1y to welcome an addition to the ranks of existing sovereign 
authorities in the Indian Archipelago. 
The first act of the new proprietors of northern Borneo was to set 
up administrative posts at various places around the coast. Initially. 
65l. Cf. E. de Waal, Onze Indische financiën, Deel viii, pp. 76-81. 
6115 Maxwell and Gibson, op. cit., pp. 158-60. 
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these establishments were on a very small scale.8S3 The staff provided 
for Resident W. B. Pryer of Sandakan, for example, who was theoreti-
cally responsible for the whole area from Marudu Bay to the Dutch 
border, consisted of ua West Indian black named Anderson, a half-cast 
Hindoo named Abdul, and a couple of China boys".654 Consequently, 
when on September 4th, 1878, a Spanish warship steamed into Sanda-
kan harbour to lay claim to north-eastern Borneo in accordance with 
the treaty concluded between the Philippines and Sulu the previous 
July, Pryer was not in astrong bargaining position. He refused to be 
cowed by me re superior force, however, and blandly rejected all his 
visitors' demands. Finding that argument was useless, the Spanish 
commander resorted to threats. Unless the Spanish flag was flying 
over Sandakan by twelve noon on the 6th, he announced, he would 
order his guns to open fire. Pryer remained unimpressed, and the 
Spaniards, not wishing to provoke an international incident, had no 
option but to sail ignominiously away.655 
The Philippine Government did not make any further attempt to 
assert their authority over north-eastern Borneo, although the British 
and Spanish home Governments carried on a fitful correspondence on 
the subject for some years. Eventually, by a protocol of March 7th, 
1885, Spain abandoned all her territorial claims in Borneo and, in 
return, the United Kingdom and Germany recognized her undisputed 
sovereignty over the Sulu Archipelago, including Cagayan Sulu and 
Balabac.656 The Philippine Government did not long enjoy this unchal-
lenged supremacy, however, for on August 20th, 1899, following the 
Spanish-American War, the Archipelago of Sulu became a possession 
of the United States. 
The first move by the Dutch Government against the new British 
enterprise was less warlike, but more effective. In September 1879 a 
landing party from a Dutch gunboat hoisted the N etherlands flag at 
Batu Tinagat, more than forty miles up the coast from the Seboekoe 
River, and therefore weil within the territory of North Borneo as 
defined in both the Brunei and Sulu cessions. With the limited resources 
available to him Pryer could do nothing to en force his Government's 
territorial claims. He did, however, make a formal protest later to a 
visiting Dutch naval commander.657 
6&3 North Borneo Herald mul Offictal Gazette, March 15t, 1883. 
654 Ada Pryer, A Decade m Borneo, p. 14. 
- Ibid., pp. 29-31. 
656 Saleeby, op. cit., pp. 371-3. Maxwell and Gib5on, op. cit., pp. 174-7. 
6ST W. B. pryer to H. O. Wickes (Comd. Z.M.S. Atjeh), July 4th, 1880. (F.O. 
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To determine precisely where the north-eastern boundary of Dutch 
Borneo lay in 1879 was by no means easy. The Besluit of February 
28th, 1846 (which instituted the short-lived 'Government of Borneo') 
fixed the frontier at 3° 20' North. In March 1850 it was raised by 
Kabinetsbeschikking to 4° 20', a parallel which intersects the coast weIl 
to the north of Batu Tinagat. But this decree was not made public, 
and Dutch maps and atlases produced between 1850 and 1879 continued 
to show various and conflicting boundaries. The 'Algemeene land- en 
zeekaart van de Nederlandsche overzeesche bezittingen', by J. W. Wal-
ter (1857), for example, retained the 1846 boundary of 3° 20' N. In 
J. Kuijper's map, 'Nederlandsch Oost-Indië' (1866), the boundary 
was marked to coincide with the Seboekoe River, while the 'Algemeene 
Atlas van Nederlandsch-Indië' (1870), by Baron Melvill van Carnbee 
and W. F. Versteeg, placed it north of Sebatik Island. There was 
general agreement that Dutch Borneo extended as far as the borders of 
the Sulu dependencies, but no one was sure just how far south these 
came. 
The truth was that the Dutch had given little thought to the problem 
of defining their frontiers in eastern Borneo before the negotiation 
of the Dent-Overbeck concessions made this a matter of urgency, and 
even then, apart from the one gesture of sending a gunboat to Batu 
Tinagat, they did not try to hinder the spread of British influence 
southwards. 
Inevitably, charges of apathy and negligence were levelled in the 
States-General at Baron van Goltstein, the Colonial Minister, but he 
was able to satisfy most of his critics by pointing out that, in the first 
place, the new undertaking was a private one, with no British Govern-
ment support behind it, and that, secondly, no infringement of Dutch 
sovereign rights was involved, since the Dent-Overbeck concessions 
had been obtained from native princes who were not, and never had 
been, in alliance with the Kingdom of the Netherlands.658 Appropriate 
steps, he added, we re being taken to ensure that Dutch boundaries in 
Borneo were adequately safeguarded. 
The Dutch feIt that there was no cause for alarm so long as N orth 
Borneo was being developed by a genuinely private concern, but they 
were anxious, nevertheless, to prevent Dent's undertaking from being 
12/86}. 'Koloniaal verslag van 1880', Staatscourant, BiJblad, 1880-1, Bijlage C, 
p. 16. Sir Rutherford Alcock to Earl Granvi1le, July lst, 1882. (F.O. 12/86). 
P. Adriani, HerinnerÎlJgen, p. 181. 
858 Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, October 2Oth, 1879. 
204 NINETEENTH-CENTURY BORNEO 
used as a cloak for British imperialism. In November 1879 the Dutch 
Ambassador in London, Count van Bylandt, told the British Foreign 
Office that his Government would be obliged to make "reservations" 
should the Borneo enterprise "acquire the character of an establishment 
under an English Protectorate". Such an establishment, said van 
Bylandt, would be "contrary to the spirit which prevailed at the drawing 
up of the Treaty of the 17th March 1824".659 
To this line of argument, hy now very familiar, the British Govern-
ment made their usual reply. Great Britain, van Bylandt was told, had 
never recognized that the Treaty of 1824 applied to Borneo. All the 
same, Her Majesty's Government had "no present intention" of ex-
tending protection to any part of that island, their object being "to 
promote the development of the resources of the country. .. not to 
set up any dominion or to enter upon controversy with respect to 
territorial claims".660 With this somewhat evasive statement of British 
policy the Dutch we re temporarily content. 
Meanwhile Alfred Dent and his colleagues in London had been 
working hard to secure official British recognition for their under-
taking. From the outset the North Borneo project received support 
from men of position and influence in the community, and Dent's 
standing with the Foreign Office was always high. In this respect he 
had agreat advantage over the Raja of Sarawak. Ris associates in-
cluded Mr. Richard Biddulph Martin, M.P., the eminent banker, 
Admiral Sir Henry Keppel, conqueror of the Borneo pirates, and Sir 
Rutherford Alcock, a retired diplomat with a long and distinguished 
career in the Far East. It was Alcock who succeeded in winning the 
co-operation of Sir Julian Pauncefote, the legal adviser and later the 
Permanent Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office, who became an 
untiring advocate and champion of the Dent enterprise and, holding 
the appointments he did, was weIl placed to see that his views were 
carried into execution. 
Largelyon Pauncefote's recommendation, the British Government 
indicated halfway through 1880 that they were prepared to confer a 
Royal Charter on Dent's undertaking. Advising Count van Bylandt of 
this decision, the Foreign Secretary, Earl Granville, gave an assurance 
that 'political considerations' were not involved, and that Great Britain 
859 Baron van Lynden van Sandenburg to Count van Bylandt, November llth, 
1879. (P.P., 1882, LXXXI. p. 72). 
860 Marquis of Salisbury to Mr. Stuart (reporting a conversation with Count 
van Bylandt), November 24th, 1879. (Ibid., p. 73). 
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had no thought of annexing northern Borneo or of obtaining a protec-
torate over it.661 To the Dutch, however, the granting of a Royal 
Charter implied a degree of official British support for the undertaking 
that involved very definite 'political considerations'. Such a document, 
they maintained, "would seem to create a tie between the Company 
receiving and the Government bestowing it".662 Moreover, the enter-
prise would certainly not retain its private character if, as was proposed, 
the British Government reserved the right to share in the selection of 
the Company's chief officials, to control its foreign policy, and to veto 
the transfer of its territories to third parties.663 But all that the Foreign 
Office would promise was that the Dutch would be allowed to see a 
copy of the Charter before it was promulgated.664 
Early the following year a 'British North Borneo Provisional Asso-
ciation, Limited' was formed for the purpose of acquiring Dent's 
interests. This association, the leading members of which were Dent 
himself, Akock, Martin, Rear-Admiral R. C. Mayne, and W. H. M. 
Read, petitioned the Crown for a Royal Charter, on the understanding 
that when this privilege had been conferred, the Association would 
wind itself up and transfer its assets to a new body, to be known as 
the 'British North Borneo Company'. For reasons which will be 
examined later, this request was granted with little delay, and the North 
Borneo Company received its Charter under the Great Seal on N ovem-
ber Ist, 1881.665 
True to their promise, the Foreign Office had sent a draft of the 
Charter to the N etherlands Government the previous J uly, inviting 
comments and suggestions.666 The Dutch immediately raised objections 
to several articles, claiming that ratification of the document as it stood 
would result in "profound disturbances in the present political relations 
in the north of the Island of Borneo".667 The British, however, refused 
to modify the text in any particular whatever. When the Charter was 
finally gazetted in November, the Dutch accepted the fait accompli, 
661 Earl Granvilte to Mr. Stuart, July 21st, 1880. (Ibid., p. 75). 
002 Baron van Lynden van Sandenburg to Count van Bylandt, August 2nd, 1880. 
(Ibid., p. 77). 
863 COUllt van Bylandt to Earl Granvilte, April 8th, 1881. (Ibid., pp. 87-8). 
664 Earl Granvilte to Mr. Stuart, May 27th, 1881. (Ibid., p. 88). 
665 The text may he found in Maxwell and Gibson, op. cit., pp. 160-71. 
666 Earl Granvilte to Count van Bylandt, July 29th and August 8th, 1881. (P.P., 
1882, LXXXI, pp. 88-9). 
06T Baron van Lynden van Sandenburg to Count van Bylandt, August Hth, 1881. 
(Ibid., p. 92). 
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but still maintained their original reservation, namely that the Treaty 
of 1824 prohibited "absolute British annexation" of the areas con-
cerned.668 
The problem now was to decide where the boundary-line between 
British and Dutch Borneo should be drawn. The Netherlands flag 
hoisted at Batu Tinagat in 1879 had been removed by the local inhabi-
tants, but early in 1883 a Dutch controleur was stationed at the nearby 
village of Tawau, and Dutch warships, based on Tarakan Island, were 
patrolling the north-east coaSt.669 In September 1883, W. H. Treacher, 
the first Governor of North Borneo, determined to assert his territorial 
rights. Proceeding to the disputed area in his official launch, he steamed 
at full speed past two Dutch gunboats at anchor off Tawau, and landed 
on the south bank of the Seboekoe River, where he hoisted the North 
Borneo flag. A jeu de joie was fired, the flag run down again, and 
the symbols - BNB 83 - carved on an adjacent mangrove tree. 
Returning to Tawau, Treacher exchanged vi sits with the gunboat cam-
manders, and entertained the controleur to dinner. No sooner had he 
left the coast, however, than the Dutch chopped down his boundary 
mark.670 
An incident of this kind might easily have caused serious friction, 
but in 1884 the British and Dutch Governments very sensibly agreed 
to set up a joint commission to look into the whole boundary question 
on the spot. This commission began its work in J uly 1889, and its 
recommendations provided the basis for an Anglo-Dutch frontier con-
vention signed in June 1891.671 As often happens in such cases, the 
boundary then laid down represented a compromise between the extreme 
claims of the two parties. At the time the geography of the interior of 
Borneo was not sufficiently weIl known for a boundary-line to be 
drawn in detail. The frontier which now divides the British colony 
of North Borneo from Indonesian Borneo was established by a joint 
Anglo-Dutch survey team in 1912.672 
668 Mr. Rochussen to Count van Bylandt, December 12th, 1881. (Ibid., p. 102). 
- 'Koloniaal verslag van 1883', Stootscourant, Bijblad, 1883-4, Bijlage C, p. 16. 
China Telegraph, February 22nd, 1883. Sir Rutherford Alcock to Earl Gran-
ville, July Ist, 1882. (F.O. 12/86). 
670 Governor Treacher to Sir Rutherford Aloock, September IOth, 1883. (F.O. 
12186). 
671 'Convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands defining boundaries 
in Borneo', June ZOth, 1891. (P.P., 1892, XCV, pp. 721-6. Maxwell and Gibson, 
op. cit., pp. 215-17). 
6'i2 See the Verslag der commissie tot uitzetting op het terrein van de lusscken 
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The Dutch had not acquiesced willingly in the foundation of the 
British North Borneo Company, yet it cannot be said that they fought 
a full-scale diplomatie battle against it. By comparison with Ambas-
sador Dedel's vigorous denunciations of the activities of James Brooke 
forty years bef are, the protests which Count van Bylandt was instructed 
to make were weak and hesitant. This was because most Dutch Liberals, 
whose party was in power at the time, openly admitted that the N ether-
lands had forfeited all right to oppose British expansion in northern 
Borneo by accepting the British treaty with Brunei of 1847.673 Van 
Bylandt's protests were probably intended more to pacify the Con-
servative party in the States-General than to impress the British Foreign 
Office. The Government of Sarawak, on the other hand, which had 
been trying for ten years to obtain from Brunei a much smaller cession 
of territory than the one negotiated by Baron van Overbeek, could 
not afford to take sa detached a view. 
From the beginning Raja Brooke was bitterly hostile to the N orth 
Borneo enterprise, and sought to defeat it by every means at his com-
mand. As soon as he learnt that the Dent-Overbeck concessions had 
been signed, he hurried to Brunei and harangued the Sultan and Court, 
pointing out that the negotiations had been completed without the 
approval, or even the cognizance, of the chiefs who ruled the ceded 
areas.674 Crossing the bay to Labuan, he told W. H. Treacher, then 
the Acting-Governor of the Colony, that the proposed company might 
easily be a total failure, that the Sultan, who was in his dotage, had no 
right to dispose of territory at all, and that he himself "intended to 
proceed up the coast and stir up the minds of the natives against the 
Baron".671i Finally, he wrote in protest to the Foreign Office against 
the "wholesale" character of the cessions, and cIaimed that, in any case, 
they were contrary to the Treaty of 1847.676 
In basing his case on this Treaty, which the Foreign Office had so 
aften used to block the expansion of his own country, Brooke appeared 
to have an unanswerable argument. Overbeck was, after all, an Austrian 
hel N ederkmdsche gebied en Britsch Noord-Borneo 'llastgestelde grens, 
Batavia, 1913. 
61'3 See the debates in the Tweede Kamer of December 2nd, 1879, and December 
Sth-6th, 1881. 
674 Brooke to Treacher, April 6th, 1878. Overbeck to Treacher, April 7th, 1878. 
(e.O. 144/50). 
6715 Acting-Governor Treacher to Lord Derby, April 17th, 1878. (Ibid.). 
676 Brooke to Lord Derby, April llth, 1878. (F.O. 12/53). 
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baron, and therefore belonged to that category of 'foreign subjects' 
whose interference in the affairs of Brunei the Treaty was expressly 
designed to prevent. The cessions had been signed, moreover, without 
the British Government's knowIedge, and this, too, was contrary to 
the Treaty.677 Yet, on receipt of Brooke's communication, Sir Julian 
Pauncefote commented sourly: "Raja Brooke is evidently incensed with 
jealousy of Raja Overbeck, but considering that his uncle annexed 
large portions of territory in defiance of the Treaty which he now dtes 
against the Dent-Overbeck concession, the objection comes with bad 
grace from him".678 It was cIear that, 50 far as Pauncefote was con-
cerned, the Foreign Office would give no support to Sarawak in its 
coming battle with the influential North Borneo Company. Her 
Majesty's Government, Brooke was told, "have no reason to apprehend 
any proceedings on the part of the Company likely to affect injuriously 
the rights and liberties of the native populations, and they would regret 
to learn that ... any action had been taken by any Foreign Government 
prejudicial to the private interests of the British capitalists con-
cerned".679 Here is further proof of the confusion of thought prevailing 
at this time concerning the status of Sarawak. When Brooke's plans 
to expand his own borders were being discussed, his country was 
refused recognition as an independent power. Now, he is apparently 
to be regarded as the head of a 'foreign government' I 
In J une 1878, sensing that Dent and Overbeck had more powerful 
backing than he had at first supposed, Brooke asked the Borneo Com-
pany, Limited, for a loan of i. 20,000. With this money he hoped to be 
able to bribe the Sultan of Brunei into granting him the entire north-
west coast as far as Marudu Bay - thereby getting Overbeck and 
Dent "out of the way", as he put it. The Borneo Company agreed to 
supply the necessary funds, but the plan was not carried through.680 
Brooke then dedded to approach the Sultan once more regarding the 
677 No stipulation was induded to this effect in the Brunei cessions, but, iIIogica1ly 
enough, British approval was made a pre-requisite of the cessions obtained 
from the Sultan of Sulu, with whom Great Britain had no treaty relations 
whatever. By the time he reached Sulu, Overbeck had become convinced that 
no enterprise in Borneo could survive without the goodwill of the British 
Government. \Vhen the second treaty was signed he therefore agreed to the 
insertion of a restrictive dause. (Tregonning, op. cit., p. 27). 
678 Minute by Sir Julian Pauncefote on Brooke's letter of April llth, 1878. 
(F.O. 12153). 
6"19 Marquis of Salisbury to Charles Brooke, June 3rd, 1878. (c.a. 144151). 
68Q Minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors of the Borneo Company, 
Ltd., June 16th, and August 14th, 1878. 
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cession of Baram, and in December Ris Highness agreed to hand over 
the entire Baram River basin in exchange for a tribute of $ 4,200 per 
annum. At once Brooke applied to the Foreign Office for permis sion 
to close the dea1.681 His request was referred to the Colonial Office 
who, for· their part, were inclined to support it. "Raja Brooke", 
remarked the Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, "would 
appear to have strong claims for consideration, as his government has 
now been firmly established for many years, and has been conducted 
with success".682 But the Foreign Office were still reluctant to give 
their consent,683 and decided to seek advice in the matter from Acting-
Governor Treacher of Labuan. 
From Brooke's point of view, any reference to the Government of 
Labuan was bound to be disastrous. Not only had Treacher inherited 
the prejudices of his predecessors against Sarawak, but he had by this 
time all but thrown in his lot with the North Borneo Company, then 
in process of formation, and was soon to become that Company's first 
Governor. In forwarding his advice to the Foreign Office, therefore, 
Treacher mustered every argument he could against the extension of 
the authority of Sarawak to Baram. The Chinese of Labuan, he told 
the Foreign Secretary, were unanimously opposed to the ces sion. 
Labuan, they had said, was like a crab with its claws on the trading 
rivers of the opposite coast. Cut those claws away and the crab would 
die. The Brunei traders were equally hostile to the proposed transfer. 
If Baram passed to Sarawak, its trade would be diverted from Brunei 
to Kuching. Even the Sultan had no real desire to part with additional 
territory to Raja Brooke. He had agreed only because he was af raid 
that a refusal might lead once again to the withholding of the annual 
Sarawak tribute money.684 
Most of these arguments contained little substance, for the trade of 
Baram was quite insignificant, but Treacher correctly described the 
attitude of the Sultan, who, throughout the whole of this period, was 
playing a double game. At one moment he would agree to cede Baram 
and at the next refuse his consent, at the same time appealing to the 
British Government for protection against Raja Brooke's aggressive-
ness.685 In all probability he was hoping that these tactics would enable 
681 Charles Brooke to the Foreign Office, December IOth, 1878. (F.O. 12/52). 
682 Colonial Office to the Foreign Office, February 9th, 1878. (Ibid.). 
683 Foreign Office Minute of February 15th, 1879. (F.O. 12/52). 
684 Treacher to Salisbury, May 3rd, 1879. (C.O. 144/52). 
685 Sultan of Brunei to Treacher, May 18th, 1879. (Ibid.). 
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him to extract from Brooke a particularly high price for the cession. 
Brooke soon realized this and in August 1879, when he received a note 
advising him that Her Majesty's Government were "not prepared to 
take any steps to induce the Sultan to act contrary to his feelings in 
the matter", gave orders for all negotiations in connection with Baram 
to cease.686 
Meanwhile Alcock, Keppel, and others had been urging the Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Salisbury, to approve the granting of a Royal Charter 
to the proposed North Borneo Company. Salisbury was an early convert 
to this plan. Keppel persuaded him that northern Borneo would be 
useful to Great Britain as a naval base, and he was impressed by a 
warning from Alcock that unless some form of official British recog-
nition were given to the Dent enterprise another European power 
might step in and occupy its territory.687 A delay was caused, however, 
while the protests of Spain and the Netherlands were being considered, 
and early in 1880, before any decision had been reached, the Conser-
vative administration to which Salisbury belonged was replaced by a 
Liberal Government under Mr. Gladstone. 
Support for schemes involving an increase in Britain's imperial 
responsibilities was, of course, entirely against the Liberal tradition. 
In spite of this, the new Foreign Secretary, Earl Granville, the new 
Colonial Secretary, the Earl of Kimberley, and Gladstone himself 
all gave their blessing to the plan to confer a Charter on the North 
Borneo Company. The circumstances were held to be exceptional for 
two main reasons.688 In the first place, as Kimberley pointed out, the 
powers most likely to annex northern Borneo, if Britain took no action, 
were Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands. Of these, both Germany 
and Spain were 'protectionist'. If the country fell into the hands of 
either, British trade must inevitably suffer. As for the Netherlands, 
he personally would be "sorry to see an extension of their power".689 
Secondly, as Gladstone and Lord Granville later explained in the 
Commons and Lords respectively, the cessions had already taken place, 
and a company to exploit them would certainly he formed whether a 
Royal Charter were conferred on it or not. Only by granting such a 
Charter could the Government make sure of being able to exercise 
686 Marquis of Salishury to Brooke, August 25th, 1879. Brooke to Salisbury, 
August 29th, 1879. (Ibid.). 
687 Minute by the Marquis of Salisbury, October Hth, 1879. (F.O. 12/54). Cf. 
Tregonning, op. cit., pp. 44-5. 
688 Cf. Sir Charles Dilke, Problems of Greater Brita4n, Vol. ii, pp. 165-6. 
689 Minute by the Earl of Kimberley, July 15th, 1880. (C.O. 144/54). 
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arestraining influence on the company's activities. "The Charter", said 
Granville, "confers no powers beyond those which Mr. Dent and his 
partners might have procured under the Companies Act", but, by 
conferring one, the Government had acquired a "negative control" 
over the domestic as weU as the foreign policy of the new State of 
N orth Borneo.690 
When the text of the Charter was made public in November 1881, 
therefore, it was found to consist almost entirely of restrictions on the 
Company's future policy and behaviour. Some of its articles bore wit-
ness to the workings of the Liberal conscience. Others revealed the 
Government's anxiety about the possibility of foreign intervention. 
The Company was always to remain "British in character and domicile" 
(Art. 3). It was forbidden to alienate its territories or possessions 
without the British Government's consent, and its re1ations with other 
nations were to be subject to the British Government's control (Arts. 
4--6). It must take all practical steps to abolish slavery in its dominions, 
preserve native religion and customs, and administer justice with due 
regard to native law (Arts. 8-10). It must grant free facilities in its 
ports to ships of the Royal Navy (Art. 12), and the appointment of its 
principal representative in Borneo must receive the British Govern-
ment's prior sanction (Art. 13). In return, the Company was apparently 
to receive nothing at all. The Charter made no reference to the provision 
of British military aid in time of war, or even to British moral support. 
Yet Dent and his friends were weil satisfied. The dignity of a Royal 
Charter not only enhanced the prestige of their undertaking in the eyes 
of the inhabitants of Borneo, but improved its standing and, it may be 
added, the value of its shares, in the city of London.691 
It is not always realized that the North Borneo Company was the first 
of the great chartered companies which figured so prominently in the 
story of British colonial expansion during the latter part of the nine-
teenth century. The Royal Niger Company was not chartered until 
1886, the Imperial British East Africa Company until 1888, nor the 
British South Africa Company until 1889. To find a precedent for the 
British Government's action in issuing to the North Borneo Company 
a Royal Charter conferring exclusive sovereign rights over foreign 
800 Speech by Earl Granville, March 13th, 1882. (Hansard, Vol. 267, Cols. 713-18). 
Speech by W. E. Gladstone, March 17th, 1882. (Ibid., Cols. 1188-96). Cf. Paul 
Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy, pp. 146-7. 
691 Cf. Owen Rutter, British North Borneo, p. 128. 
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territory, it is necessary to go back to the seventeenth century.692 The 
East India Company, moreover, the greatest of all chartered companies 
of earlier days, had ceased to exercise governmental functions only 
a short time before (Act for the Better Government of India, August 
1858), while the Hudson's Bay Company had similarly made over its 
remaining sovereign powers to the Crown in 1869 (Deed of Surrender, 
November 1869). The chartering of 'the North Borneo' was a reversal 
of the trend of history and marked the start of a new era in European 
commercial imperalism. 
An immediate result of the granting of the N orth Borneo Charter 
was the removal of the British Government's ban on the acquisition 
of new territory by the Government of Sarawak. The Foreign Office 
realized that they could not continue to refuse Brooke permission to 
extend his frontiers, and at the same time approve the concessions which 
had been obtained by the North Borneo Company. In January 1882, 
therefore, the Government of Brunei was advised that Great Britain 
had now withdrawn her earlier objections to the transfer of the district 
of Baram,693 and five months later, much against his will, the Sultan 
ceded this long-disputed area to Raja Brooke.694 
The successful negotiation of the Baram cession initiated a period of 
intense competition between Sarawak and N orth Borneo for control of 
the few Brunei territories now remaining. Agents dispatched to the 
Sultan's capital by Brooke and by Governor Treacher obtained nume-
rous grants and concessions - some from the Sultan himself, some 
from the pêngerans of the Court - and many of these, when compared 
later, we re found to be conflicting. Brooke and Treacher promptly 
accused each other of 'piracy' and 'extortion', and angrily appealed 
to the British Government for redress. 
The situation became even more confused when in August 1884 an 
armed revolt took place in the district of Limbang. By now the Brunei 
Government had become so weak and inefficient that it was forced 
to borrow twenty-four ri fles from Labuan in order to defend the 
Sultan's palace, and peace was restored only through the intervention 
of a British gunboat. In May of the next year, following the death 
of Sultan Abdul Mumin of Brunei, another crisis occurred. The 
Pengeran Temenggong, Hassim, was raised to the throne, but several 
692 Cf. Pierre Bonassieux, Les grandes compagnies de commerce, pp. 517-27. 
693 Administrator Leys to the Foreign Offic~, January 18th, 1882. (c.a. 144(56). 
694 Charles Brooke to Administrator Leys, June 13th, 1882. (Ibid.). 
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influential members of the Court and many provincial headmen refused 
to accept him as their lawful ruler.695 
While chaos reigned in Brunei, the Foreign and Colonial Offices we re 
doing their best to unravel the tang!e of claims and counter-claims with 
which Brooke and Treacher had presented them. They found their 
efforts were greatly hindered, however, by the inaccuracy of the maps 
supplied by the two contestants.696 A certain amount of delay was there-
fore inevitable before an equitable solution to the problem could be 
worked out, and meanwhile tempers in Borneo had reached boiling-
point. "If something is not done soon", remarked a member of the 
Colonial Office in May 1885, "to cool the exasperation of Messrs. 
Brooke and Treacher, there will not be a pengeran left in Brunei".697 
The 'scrambie for Brunei' coincided with a sudden quickening of the 
tempo of European colonial expansion in other parts of the Far East. 
It was during the years from 1883 to 1885 that the French, under the 
energetic leadership of Jules Ferry, made good their hold on Annam 
and annexed Tongking. The Germans were equally active; in addition 
to claiming huge areas in Africa, they hoisted the Imperia! flag in the 
Caroline Islands and declared a Protectorate over north-eastern N ew 
Guinea. Either or both of these powers, the British realized, might soon 
be fishing in the troubled waters of northern Borneo. Of the two, 
Germany was considered the more dangerous. "Remember the new 
principles Bismarck has introduced into colonial polities", warned Lord 
Salisbury in October 1885. "He might as likely as not seize the balance 
[of Brunei] whi!e we are waiting to see it reach the proper stage of 
decay".698 If the Germans were to obtain a foothold in Brunei, the 
strategie consequences would be serious, since from there they could 
threaten British trade with China.699 
By 1886 it was clear that unless preventive action were taken soon, 
northern Borneo might pass into the German, or possibly the French, 
sphere of influence. From the British point of view, therefore, the 
two essentials were, first, to forestall any attempt by a foreign power 
to meddle with the area and, secondly, to bring to an end the prevailing 
anarchy in Brunei. In October of that year a joint Foreign and Co!onial 
Office conference was called in London to consider how this twofold 
696 c.a. 144158-9. Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, op. cit., pp. 343-6. 
669 Minute by Sir J ulian Pauncefote, October 15th, 1885. (F.O. 12/68). 
697 Colonial Office to the Foreign Office, May 22nd, 1885, Private. (c.a. 144/60). 
698 Minute by the Marquis of Salisbury, October 24th, 1885. (F.O. 12/68). 
699 Cf. Dilke, op. cit., Vol. ii, pp. 188-9. 
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object might best be achieved. The Foreign Office had already put 
forward a suggestion that Brunei should become a British Protectorate, 
and it was now decided that a simpIer and more effective course would 
be to extend formal British protection to North Borneo and Sarawak 
as weIl. By these means other nations would be given warning that they 
must not interfere, and relations between Brunei and its more powerful 
neighbours would be brought under c10ser British supervision."oo 
Early in 1887 Sir Frederick WeId, Governor of the Straits Settle-
ments, was sent to Brunei to secure the Sultan's consent to this plan. 
His Highness gladly accepted British protection, but refused to comply 
with an additional suggestion from WeId that a Resident should be 
provided to advise on matters of domestic policy.TOI No British Resident 
was appointed to Brunei until 1906. Sarawak and North Borneo also 
accepted the British offer, and by September 1888 Protectorate agree-
ments had been negotiated between Her Majesty's Government and 
all th ree powers.702 
The Sultan of Brunei welcomed a British Protectorate primarily 
because, without it, he had small chance of retaining his throne. Tt gave 
him, moreover, a far more effective guarantee than he had had before 
that Great Britain would come to his assistance if exorbitant demands 
for territorial concessions were made upon him. To the North Borneo 
Company, the chief advantage of a Protectorate was that it ensured 
full British support in time of war, while still leaving the management 
of all internal afTairs in the hands of the officials of the Company. 
Similar benefits of greater stability and security were conferred on 
Sarawak, but to Raja Brooke a British Protectorate meant something 
more: it marked the successful conclusion of a battle which had been 
begun forty years before by the First White Raja. The British Govern-
ment had now finally admitted that Sarawak was independent from the 
Sultanate of Brunei, and a sovereign state in its own right. 
700 Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, October 29th, 1886. (F.O. 12173). 
Colonial Office Minute of the same date. (c.a. 144/62). 
rol Sir Frederick WeId to Sir Julian Pauncefote, June 2lst, 1887, Private. (F.O. 
12/77). 
702 P.P., 1888, LXXIII, pp. 181-5. 
CONCLUSION 
Early in the nineteenth century, when the Dutch resumed possession 
of the South and West Coasts of Borneo, nothing appeared likely to 
hinder the eventual extension of their rule over the whole island. 
Nearly all the local princes were willing to accept them as protectors, 
and the British, their chief potential rivals among foreign colonial 
powers east of the Straits of Malacca, were still thinking in terms of 
'trade, not territory'. Yet, as the century wore on, the Dutch seemed 
to be neglecting their opportunities. It was not until af ter the foundation 
of Sarawak by James Brooke in 1841 that they exerted their supremacy 
in the west and south, and not until af ter the negotiation of another 
large private concession by Dent and Overbeck in 1877 that they made 
a belated attempt to advance their frontier towards the far north-east. 
To some extent this apparent slowness and hesitation on the part of 
the Dutch was the result of timidity and lack of vision at home. As in 
contemporary England, the belief that colonies were a source of weak-
ness rather than strength had gained wide currency in Holland. Never-
the1ess, as the speeches and writings of many Dutch statesmen of the 
day c1early show, imperialism was by no means a forsaken cause either 
in The Hague or in Batavia, where, in some circ1es at least, the spirit of 
Jan Pieterszoon Coen was still very much alive. That the Dutch did 
not succeed in occupying the whole of Borneo while they had the chance 
was due not so much to lack of interest or enterprise as to the fact 
that at no time did they command the resources in men and materials 
needed to carry out so formidable a task. 
Af ter the restoration of the colonies one of the most serious problems 
confronting the Government of the Netherlands lndies was a shortage 
of trained colonial servants. Officials with experience under the East 
India Company had nearly all been dispersed during the disorganization 
of the Napoleonic period and facilities for training new ones were not 
immediately available. The position improved considerably af ter the 
establishment of the 'Koninklijke Academie' at Delft in 1842 although, 
even then, the chief beneficiary under the new system was Java. In 
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the Outer Islands the shortage of competent officials, particularly of 
linguists, persisted until the end of the century. 
Similar manpower difficulties bes et the Dutch colonial army. Because 
the constitution of the Netherlands prohibited the sending of conscripts 
overseas, military detachments for the Indies had to be recruited by 
voluntary enlistment, and the better type of Dutchman did not of ten 
apply for the colonial service, not at any rate for service in the ranks. 
Unemployed and unemployables from half the countries of Europe, 
German and Swiss mercenaries, deserters from the armies of many 
different nations - these were the raw material of the Dutch colonial 
forces. When sent to the Indies, they proved to be "excellents en 
expédition, mais détestables en garnison" 103 and did not make a 
favourable impression on the native populations among whom their 
duties lay. The countIess riots and disturbances which figure so pro-
minently in the history of the Chinese districts of western Borneo and 
which for so long hindered the spread of Dutch rule in that area were 
by no means all due to the 'persistent recalcitrance' of the local inhabi-
tants. Much of the trouble was caused by the uncouth and provocative 
behaviour of the Dutch military garrisons. 
Finally, the chronic political instability of nineteenth-century Borneo 
prevented overseas capital from being attracted to it in any appreciable 
quantity. The re sult was that the burden of economic development fell 
on the Government of the Netherlands Indies, which proved both un-
willing and unable to accept the role of large-scale entrepreneur. During 
the period of the batig-saldo politiek, when the authorities in Batavia 
had to send substantial remittances home to the motherland every year, 
they could not afford to spend money freely in areas like western and 
southern Borneo, where no quick returns on investment could be 
guaranteed. Moreover, due partly to high production costs and partIy 
to the general infertility of the soil, none of the attempts made by the 
Dutch Government to promote mining or agriculture in Borneo met 
with any considerable degree of success. The comparative prosperity 
which porti ons of the island enjoy today rests not on coal or gold. 
pepper, sago, or jungle products - the staple exports of the nineteenth 
century - but on petroleum and rubber, two commodities for which 
until fifty years ago the world had found very little use. 
The failure of the Dutch to expand their rule to the north-west and 
north-east coasts Ie ft the way clear for exploitation by private indivi-
703 eh. et R. Pety de Thozée, Théories de la coloniration au XIX· siècle .. , p. 162. 
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duals. Of these the most successful were Raja Brooke of Sarawak and 
that trio of adventurers - an American speculator, an Austrian baron, 
and a London business-man - who se united efforts led to the foun-
dation of the North Borneo Company. Like Dutch Borneo, however, 
the northern part of the is land conferred small economie benefits on 
its possessors until af ter the development of the petroleum, rubber, 
timber, tobacco, and copra industries in more recent times. 
In these circumstances it was not surprising that the British Govern-
ment shared the hesitation of the Dutch about acquiring extensive 
territorial responsibilities in Borneo. So long as British merchants we re 
assured of free access to the island's trade, neither the Foreign Office 
nor the Colonial Office could see any point in competing for possession 
of the island itself. Great Britain could not be persuaded to exert her 
supremacy along the northern coasts of Borneo until the attacks of the 
local Malay and Dyak pirates provoked more than usually forceful 
protests from commercial inter ests in England and in Singapore, and 
until, in the 1880's, the threat of interference by Spain, Germany, and 
France seemed likely to endanger her vital trade routes to China. 
Throughout the nineteenth century strategie considerations were of 
paramount importance in determining the course of British policy in 
Borneo. They prevented the East India Company from acquiescing in 
exc1usive Dutch sovereignty over the island between 1818 and 1824, 
provided J ames Brooke and Henry Wise with their strongest arguments 
for the creation of a British naval base and harbour of refuge at 
Labuan in 1846, induced Her Majesty's Government to grant a Royal 
Charter to the North Borneo Company in 1881 and led, finally, to the 
declaration of British Protectorates over N orth Borneo, Brunei, and 
Sarawak in 1888. During the present century the direct strategie signi-
ficanee of the island has dec1ined, although its value to Great Britain 
as a souree of 'strategie' commodities like oil and rubber is immense. 
But if, as at the moment seems Iikely, the frontier between the free 
and Communist worlds moves southwards from Indochina, northern 
Borneo may well take on a new importance as an outpost of the West 
in the Eastern Seas. 
APPENDIX 'A' 
A NOTE ON TUE COLONIAL MSS PRESERVED AT 
THE ALGEMEEN RIJKSARCIDEF 
The archives of the former Ministerie van Koloniën for the period 
1813-1875 fall into two main sections: 
(a) The records of the Ministry itself, and 
(b) A series of volumes containing duplicates of the decrees 
(besluiten) of the Netherlands Indian Government at 
Batavia. 
A. THE RECORDS OF THE MINISTRY lTSELF 
(i) The 'General Archives' (Gewoon archief) 
This series comprises the day to day incoming and outgoing corres-
pondence of the Ministry on all matters not regarded at the time as 
confidential or secret. The 1,906 bun dIes which refer to the years 
1814-49 are located at the main repository at Bleijenburg 7, The 
Hague. Those referring to 1850---1900 (5,250 bundies) are housed in 
an auxiliary repository at Schaarsbergen, near Arnhem, but may be 
consulted in The Hague by arrangement. 
(ii) The 'Secret Archives' (Geheim archief) 
During the nineteenth century many topics were classified as secret 
which, given similar circumstances, would probably not be placed in 
such a category today. As a result, all documents dealing with future 
plans (even when these were concerned with comparatively unimportant 
matters), all memoranda and reports containing expressions of opinion 
on past Government policies or actions, and all dispatches connected, 
however remotely, with the activities of foreign nations or individuals, 
seem to have found their way into the Geheim, rather than into the 
Gewoon, Archief. For the study of Dutch colonial policy the former 
is therefore by far the more valuable source. 
The MSS which make up the Geheim Archief (1813-75) are 
arranged in approximately 195 bundIes, known collectively as the 
'Koloniën, Geheim, Resolutiën'. One of these bundies may contain any 
number from four or five to a hundred or more files, or 'dossiers', and 
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the files themselves vary in size from one page to several scores of 
documents. Each file is identified by a date and a reference number. 
The date is normally that upon which the topic with which the file 
deals was closed by a decision or recommendation of the Minister of 
the Colonies. For example, the file marked '22 Januarij 1853, No. 4ljE, 
\,eheim' contains a series of reports from the Resident of Pontianak 
to the Governor-General on the Chinese problem in western Borneo, 
the minutes of the deliberations of the Raad van Indië on the matter, 
decrees issued by the Governor-General and dispatches from him to the 
Minister of the Colonies on the same subject and, finally, under date 
January 22nd, 1853, a letter from the Minister to the Governor-General 
approving past actions and suggesting a course for the future. The 
reference number allotted to this letter, which corresponds to the num-
ber of the file, indicates that it was the 41st secret letter originated by 
the Minister of the Colonies since the beginning of 1853. 
At various times throughout the nineteenth century the clerical staff 
of the Ministry entered the secret decisions, transactions, and corres-
pondence of their department in annual 'agendas' and 'indexes' . The 
'agendas' record the 'acts' of the Minister in chronological order by 
years. The indexes list the same acts, but under subject-headings, such 
as, 'Borneo, Civil Administration, Outer Possessions', etc. In some 
years 'klappers' were also drawn up. These are alphabetical lists of 
proper names, titles, catch-words, etc., mentioned in the indexes, and 
provide a ready reference by page numbers to the index headings under 
which such names, tides or catch-words occur. 
The comprehensiveness, and therefore the value for purposes of 
historical research, of these agendas, indexes, and klappers varies 
greatly, as the following table shows: 
1814-29: Chronological lists provided for the years 1814-17 and 
1824--29 only (though for the intervening years, 
1818-23, the Gewoon Archief contains agendas which 
re late to 'secret' as weIl as 'ordinary' matters); indexes 
for the years 1826--29 only. 
1830-49: Agendas, indexes, and klappers for the whole period. 
185~57: Agendas only. 
1858----69: Indexes are combined with those of the Kabinetsarchief 
(see below). Separate agendas. 
187~75: Both agendas and indexes are combined with those of the 
Kabinetsarchief . 
Where indexes are lacking it is possible to work out the dates and 
numbers of the files which relate to a particular topic by going through 
the appropriate agendas. 
In perhaps ten per cent of cases files identified by reference to the 
indexes and/or agendas turn out to be missing from the bundIes. 
Whether they have been transferred to another series, borrowed, or 
simply lost is a matter for conjecture. 
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(iii) Other archives 
In addition to the 'Ordinary' and 'Secret' Archives, the records of 
the Colonial Ministry for 1815-75 inc1ude the following files and 
registers: 
The Kabinetsarchief (1834-75), which contains the personal tran-
sactions and decrees of the Minister of the Colonies. 
A series of registers giving details of the careers of colonial officials. 
A nominal roU of aU officers and other ranks who served in the East 
Indies during the course of the nineteenth century. 
A list of all male Europeans in Java, compiled in the early 1820's. 
30 private collections of documents, deposited with the Rijksarchief by 
officials who served in the East or by their descendants. 
B. COPIES OF EAST INDIAN DECREES 
Until1836 the decrees (besluiten) of the Government of the Nether-
lands Indies were promulgated either by the Governor-General in 
Council (in Rade) or by the Governor-General alone (buiten Rade). By 
the Regeeringsreglement of that year, however, the Council of the 
Indies (Raad van Indië) was deprived of its executive function and 
became a purely advisory body. 
Under the general title, 'East lndian Decrees', the following collec-
tions of documents are inc1uded: 
(i) At the Rijksarchief 
'Letters from Commissioners-General of the Netherlands lndies', 
1816--28; 'Transactions and Decrees of Commissioners-General of 
the Netherlands Indies', 1816--17 and 1820--28; 'Secret Decrees 
of the Commissioners-General', 1816--19. 
'Decrees of the Governor-General of the N etherlands Indies' (acting 
alone), 1814-49. 
'Secret Decrees of the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies' 
(acting alone). 
'Decrees of the Governor-General of the N etherlands Indies in Council', 
1819-36. 
'Secret Decrees of the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies in 
Council', 1819-34. 
'Decrees of the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies' or 'East 
Indian Decrees', 1830-49. 
(ii) At the Schaarsbergen Repository 
'Decrees of the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies' or 'East 
Indian Decrees', 1850-1932. 
The records of the Ministry of the Colonies af ter 1900 are not 
open to public inspection. 
APPENDIX 'B' 
LIST OF SOUBCES 
PRIMARY 
A. MANUSCRIPT 
(1) India Office Library 
(a) East India Company Records 
(i) Factory Records 
Borneo 
Vol. i : Miscellaneous Documents, 1648-1814. 
Java 
No. 40: 









Java Separate Dependencies Consultations, 29 Jan to 
1 Jun 1814. 
Do, 27 Jul to 28 Dec 1814. 
Java Separate and Political Consultations, 6 Jan to 
21 Jun 1815. 
Letters from Java, 24 Oct 1812 to 21 Sep 1813. 
Do, 11 Feb 1814 to 13 Dec 1816. 
Do, 20 Feb and 23 Feb 1817. 
Mise. Memoranda on Java and the Eastern Islands, 
1813-20. 
Miscellaneous Documents. 
Original Letters from Java, 19 Mar 1812 to 20 Jul 
1817. 
Original Enclosures to ditto, 1812-13. 
Straits Settiements 
No. 182: Letters received from Prince of Wales Island, 6 May 
1818 to 6 Dec 1820. 
No. 185: Abstracts of ditto, 12 Nov 1805 to 30 Jun 1830. 
(ii) Dutch Records 'A' 











Do, Vol. vii, 1816-17. 
Do, Vol. viii, 1818-24. 
Mission to Achin, 1818-19. 
Dutch Factories in India. Singapore. 1818-19. 
Trade in the Eastern Archipelago, 1818-20. 
Treaty with the Netherlands, 1823-4, Vol. i. 
Do, Vol. ii. 
(iii) Home M iscellaneous Series 
Vols. 542 and 673. 
(b) RaffIes Collection 
II: MSS Eur. E. 104. 
XI: MSS Eur. E. 109. 
XIV: MSS Eur. e. 36. 
(2) Pub I i c Ree 0 r dOf f i c e 
(a) Colonial Office Records 
(i) Labuan: Original C orrcspondence 
c.a. 144/1-74 
Letters and dispatches from and to the Government of Labuan, 
domestic correspondence with other Government Departments, minutes 
and memoranda by Secretaries and Under-Secretaries of State and by 
Colonial Office officials, miscellaneous correspondence and documents. 
1844-1900. 
e.O. 352/1-5 
Registers of Correspondence, 1849-1885. 
(ii) Government of Labuan: Official Documents 
e.O. 145/1-3 
Acts of the Legislative Council, 1849-1906. 
e.O. 146 
Blue Books, 1850---1906. 
e.O. 404/1-5 
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C.O.434/1 
Minutes of the Legislative Council, 1849-89. 
(b) Foreisn Office Records 
F.O.12 
Vois. 1-18, 22-31, 32A and B, 33A and B, 34A and B, 36-41, 
43-47, 50-1, 57, 59, 61-6, 69-70, 74-5, 78, 80. 
Letters and dispatches, diplomatie and consular, from and to thc 
British Consuls-General to the native states of Borneo, and at Sarawak 
and Brunei; domestic correspondence with other Government Depart-
ments ; Foreign Office minutes and memoranda; correspondence with 
foreign governments, 1842--88. 
Vols.19-21: 'Commission of Inquiry, Sir J. Brooke', 1853-4. 





Brooke's proposals respecting Sarawak', 1852-69. 
'Proposals for Establishment of a British Protec-
torate in Brunei, etc.', 1870--5. 
'Claims of the Sultan of Brunei against the Oriental 
Coal Company', 1873-9. 
'Case of the "Tony" Steam Launch', 1877-9. 
'Cession of Territory (Baram) by the Sultan of 
Brunei to the Rajah of Sarawak', 1878---81. 
V 015. 53-6 : 'Dent and Overbeek Concession' , 1877-8. 









'British North Borneo Company. Papers, Maps, 
etc., used in connection with the question of the 
Boundary of the Netherlands Possessions'. 
'Proceedings of the British and Dutch Authorities 
in the Eastern Seas', Vol. ii, 1862-64. 
Ditto, Vol. iii, 1865-7. 
Ditto, Vol. iv, 1868. 
Ditto, Vol. v, 1869-70. 
Part 16, N 0.1 : Cession of Labuan, 1846. 
No.2: Treaty with Brunei, May 1847. 
No.3 : Agreement with Brunei, November 1856. 
F.O.97 
Vol. 249: 'Proceedings of the British and Dutch Authorities 






'Treaties between the N etherland Indian Govern-
ment and Native Powers', Vol. i, 1843-61. 
Ditto, Vol. ii, 1841~5. 
Ditto, Vol. iii, 1863-5. 
N ote : In footnote references I have sometimes given a volume 
in the e.O. 144 series as my authority for a letter to the British Foreign 
Office. The explanation is as follows: 
Af ter 1861, when the posts of Governor of Labuan and Consul-
General for Borneo were amalgamated, it became standard practice for 
the Governors of Labuan to send to the Colonial Secretary copies of 
all correspondence addressed by them in their consular capacity to the 
Foreign Office. Such copies, whatever the nature of their subject mat-
ter, were automatically filed by the Colonial Office staff in the Labuan 
series (e.O. 144). Many of the original letters, however, particularly 
those dealing with relations with foreign countries, are missing from 
F.O. 12; some may have been lost, but most were probably filed at the 
time in other F.O. series. 
(3) Alg e mee n R ij ksa r c hief 
(a) Records of the Ministry ol Foreign Aflairs 
'Buitenlandsche Zaken, Nos. 3133-4 (Retroacta A, No. 60, be-
trekkelijk Borneo)'. 
Two large bundies of documents which comprise the records of 
the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in regard to Borneo from 
1838-47 (Bundle 3133) and from 1847-70 (Bundle 3134). The 
documents have been extracted at an unspecified date from the Minis-
try's running files. They give a valuable picture of the Dutch Govern-
ment's reaction to the arrival in Borneo and subsequent activities of 
Sir James Brooke, and may be regarded as the Dutch counterpart of 
the Series F.O. 12 in the British Public Record Office. 
(b) Records of the Ministry ol Colonies 
(i) 'Register der Handelingen en Besluiten van Commissarissen 
Generaal over Nederlandsch Indien', 1816. 
(ii) 'Afschriften en Besluiten: Commissarissen Generaal over Neder-
landsch Indie', 1817. 
(iii) 'Geheim verbaal', 1816-17. 
(iv) 'Instructiën', 1816-17. (Kol. 813.) 
(v) 'Koloniën, Geheim, Resolutiën', 1841-75. 
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The above is a list of the basic Dutch MS material used during 
the writing of the present study. In addition a number of documents 
were found for me in other collections by the staffs of the Rijksarchief 
and the Ministerie voor Uniezaken en Overzeesche Rijksdelen. These 
are as follows: 
(i) 'Overzicht van de maatregelen in het verleden op Borneo genomen 
ten opzichte van de inboorlingen en Chinezen'. (Kol., Oct 14th, 
1844, No. 25.) 
(ii) Dispatch from the Dutch Ambassador in Washington on' American 
re1ations with Brunei, dated Oct 27th, 1845. (Kol., Dec 3rd, 
1845, L" A, No. 2.) 
(iii) 'Brow: 1844'. (A report by J. van Capellen, dated Mar 31st, 1846, 
on the East Coast district of Berouw.) 
(iv) Various reports on Borneo. (Kol., May 1Ith, 1846, No. 13.) 
(v) Letter from Governor Weddik to the Governor-General, Sep 27th, 
1846. (Kol., 730"/15.) 
(vi) Correspondence regarding English plans in Borneo. (Kol., May 
24th, 1848, No. 9.) 
(vii) 'Briefwisseling over de reorganisatie van het bestuur van Borneo'. 
(Kol., May llth, 1849, La A, No. 1.) 
(viii) 'Memories van overgave' (reports compiled by outgoing Residents 
of Dutch Borneo, South and Eastern Division, for the benefit 
of their successors) dated: Apr 3Oth, 1877; Mar 2nd, 1880 
(Mailrapport 232); May 19th, 1891 (Mailrapport 692); Apr 
23rd, 1894 (Mailrapport 542). 
(4) Miscellaneous 
(i) The Aberdeen Papers 
(British Museum, Add. MSS 43188 and 43200). 
These volumes contain a number of letters which passed between 
the Earls of Aberdeen and Clarendon in connection with the Commis-
sion of Inquiry into the position of Sir J ames Brooke, held at Singapore 
in 1854. 
(ii) Borneo Company Minutes 
(Vois. i-viii: June 9th, 1856, to Sept 28th, 1899). 
The minutes of the regular meetings of the directors of the 
Borneo Company, Limited, preserved at the Head Office of the Com-
pany, Sackville House, 153-9, Fenchurch Street, London, E.e. 3. 
15 
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B. PUBLISHED SOURCES 
(1) Official Publications 
(a) British Parliamentary Debates 
Ser. iii 
Vol. 97, Cols. 699-700 : 
Vol. 101, Cols. 311-14 
Vol. 108, Cols, 661-6 
Vol. 109, Cols. 1219-21 
Vol. 111, Cols. 294-311: 
Vol. 112, Cols. 1300-26 : 
Vol. 113, Cols. 106-22 : 
Vol. 117, Cols. 3-6 
Vol. 118, Cols. 436-504: 
Cols. 679-80 
Vol. 119, Cols. 1257-61 
Vol. 120, Cols. 43-5 
Vol. 122, Cols. 604-11 
Vol. 125, Cols. 723-6 
Vol. 126, Cols. 909-10 
Vol. 267, Cols. 708-24 
Cols. 1148-1230: 
Ser. iv 
'Settlements in Labuan and Borneo'. 
'Supply - Labuan'. 
'Pirates (Head Money) Repeal Bill'. 
'Borneo - Pirates', and 'Pirates 
(Head Money) Repeal Bill'. 
'N avy Estimates - Miscellaneous 
Series'. 
'Alleged Piracy of! Borneo'. 
'Supply - Labuan'. 
'Sir James Brooke - Borneo'. 
'Borneo - Sir James Brooke'; 
'Supply - Labuan'. 
'Borneo - Sir James Brooke'. 
'Borneo'. 
'Supply - Labuan' 
'Sir James Brooke - Piracy in 
Borneo'. 
'The Borneo Pirates'. 
'British North Borneo Company 
(Charter). - Observations'. 
'British North Borneo Company 
(Charter). - Resolution'. 
Vol. 5, Cols.1808-19: 'British North Borneo Company'. 
(b) British Parliamentary Papers 
(Command Papers in square brackets; Sessional Papers in paren-
theses.) 
'Estimate of the Amount of Aid required to defray the Charge 
of Labuan', 1847-54, 1857-69. 
'Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls on the Trade and Commerce 
of Brunei', 1858-88. (Irregular.) 
'Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls on the Trade and Commerce 
of Sarawak', 1863-72. (Irregular.) 
'Reports exhibiting the Past and Present State of Her Majesty's 
Colonial Possessions' - Labuan, 1849-90. 
'Statistical Tables re1ating to the Colonial and Other Possessions 


















Vol. V (363) p. 1. 
Vol. XXX [352} p. 123. 
Vol. XLII (460) p. 251. 
Vol. XXII [1082] p.1. 
Vol. LVI [1014] p.5. 
Vol. X (662) p. 1. 
Vol. XXIII [1204] p. 55. 
Vol. XXXIII (434) p.259. 
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Vol. LV (114) p. 49, (122) p. 9, (238) p. 3, (456) p. 1, 
[1197] p. 27, [1265] p. 45. 
Vol. XXXIII (428) p. 309. 
Vol. XXXVI (682) p. 29, [1374] p. 1, [1375] p. 9, 
[1378] p. 19. 
Vol. LVI, Pt. i (53) p. 145, (222) p. 153, (378) p. 149, 
[1351] p. 123, [1390] p. 1. 
Vol. XXXI (72) p. 673, (357) p. 679, (419) p. 417, 
(468) p. 425, (517) p. 567, (572) p. 439, [1441] 
p. 623, [1462] p. 445, [1536] p. 543, [1537] 
p. 429, [1538] p. 473. 
Vol. LXI (4) p. 281, (55) p. 235, (81) p. 253, (157) 
p. 335, (249) p. 247, (266) p. 299, (281) p. 333, 
(317) p. 331, (717) p. 321, (770) p. 317, (967) 
p. 277, [1599] p. 343. 
Vol. XLII (12) p.433, (298) p.497. 
Vol. XXIX [1976] p.1. 
Vol. XLIII (90) p. 567. 
Vol. LXXVII [co 2181] p.17l. 
Vol. LXXXI [co 3108] p. 315, [co 3109] p.59. 
Vol. LIl (131) p. 645. 
Vol. LXXIII [c. 5617] p. 179. 
Vol. XCV [co 6553] p.721. 
(c) Dutch Parliamentary Papers 
'Koloniale Verslagen', 1849-90. 
(Published in the Staatscourant, Bijblad, 1851/2 to 1890/1.) 
(d) Periodicals and Gazettes 
Almanak van N ederlandsch-l ndië. 
Bataviasche Koloniale Courant. 
Java Government Gazette. 
North Borneo Heraid and Official Gazette. 
Sarawak Gazette. 
Staatsblad van N ederlandsch-l ndië. 
(e) M isceI1aneous 
Brunei: 1950 
North Borneo: 1950 
Sarawak : 1950 
Colonial Reports. 
London, H.M.S.O .. 1951. 
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Dutch Borneo. (Foreign Office Handbook No. 84.) London, 
H.M.S.O., 1920. 
H andbook of British N orth Borneo. (Compiled for the Colonial 
and lndian Exhibition of 1886.) London, Clowes, 1886. 
Handbook of the State of North Borneo. London, British North 
Borneo (Chartered) Company, 1929. 
Overeenkomsten met de zeifbesturen in de Residentie Wester-
afdeeiing van Borneo. 1856-1900. 
Overeenkomsten met de zeifbesturen in de Residentie Zuid- en 
Oosterafdeeiing van Borneo. 1862-1900. 
Verslag der commissie tot uitzetting van de tusschen het N eder-
landsch gebied en Britsch Noord-Borneo vastgestelde grens. 
Batavia, Landsdrukkerij, 1913. 
(2) C 0 II e c t ion sof D 0 cum ent s 
BAKER, A. C. 'Some account of Anglo-Dutch relations in the East 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century', JRASSB, 1913, 
pp. 1-168. 
CHIIS, J. A. VAN DER. Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek, 1602-1811. 
Batavia, Landsdrukkerij, 1885-1900. 17 din. 
COLENBRANDER, H. T. Gedenkstukken der algemeene geschiedenis van 
Nederland van 1795 tot 1840. 8" Deel, Ie stuk. 's-Gravenhage, 
Nijhoff, 1915. 
COWAN, C. D. 'Early Penang and the ri se of Singapore, 1805-32', 
JRASMB, March 1950. 
DEVENTER, M. L. VAN. Het Nederlandsch gezag over Java en onder-
hoorigheden sedert 1811: eerste deel - 1811-20. 's-Gravenhage, 
Nijhoff, 1891. 
ELOuT VAN SOETERWOUDE, P. J. Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis der onder-
handelingen met Engeland betreffende de overzeesche bezittingen, 
1820-1824. (Getrokken uit de nagelaten papieren van wijlen den 
Minister van Staat Elout.) 's-Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1865. 
MAXWELL, Sir WILLIAM G. and GIBSON, W. S. Treaties and Engage-
ments affecting the Maiay States and Borneo. London, Comd., 
1924. 
RUTTER, E. OWEN (ED.). Rajah Brooke & Baroness Burdett Coutts. 
(Consisting of the Letters from Sir J ames Brooke, first White 
Rajah of Sarawak to Miss Angela (afterwards Baroness) Burdett 
Coutts.) London, Hutchinson, 1935. 
Selection from Papers re lating to Borneo and Proceedings at Sarawak 
of James Brooke, Esq., now Agent for the British Government 
in Borneo, A. London, Robson, Levy & Franklyn, 1844--6. 
(Compiled by Henry Wise.) 
TEMPLER, JOHN C. (ED.). The Private Letters of Sir James Brookc, 
K.C.B., Rajah of Sarawak ... London, Bentley, 1853. 3 vols. 
WEBSTER, Sir CHARLES K. (ED.). British Diplomacy, 1813-1815. 
London, BeU, 1921. 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY BORNEO 229 
(3) Rep 0 r t s a n dNa r rat i v e s b y Par tic i pan t sin 
Events 
BELCHER, Captain Sir EDWARD. Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. 
Samarang, During the Years 1843-46,' Employed Surveying the 
Islands of the Eastern Archipelago ... London, Reeve, 1851. 
2 vols. 
BRooKE, Sir ]AMES. 'Expedition to Borneo', Journ. Roy. Geog. Soc., 
1838, pp. 443-8. 
-- A Letter from Borneo, with Notices of the Country and its 
Inhabitants. London, Seeley, 1842. 
-- Statement relative to Sarawak. Privately printed, 1863. 
-- A Vindication of his Character and Proceedings.... London, 
Ridgway, 1853. 
[For Sir ]ames Brooke's private journaIs, see Keppel, Captain 
the Hon. Henry, and Mundy, Captain Rodney; for his private 
correspondence, see Rutter, E. Owen, and TempIer, ]ohn C.] 
COWIE, W. C. 'North Borneo and how it became British', London and 
China Express, November 27th, 1908. (Supplement.) 
DALTON, ]OHN. 'Papers on Borneo', Moor's Natices, pp. 15-78. 
DEWALL, H. VON. 'Aanteekeningen omtrent de Noord-oostkust van 
Borneo', TTLV, Deel iv (1855), pp. 423-58. 
-- 'Matan, Simpang, Soekadana, de Karimata-eilanden en Koeboe', 
TTLV, 1862, pp. 1-146. 
DUNGEN GRONOVIUS, D. ]. VAN DEN. 'Over de goudgraverijen in de af-
deeling Sambas', TvNI, 1847, ii, pp. 385-98. 
._- 'Verslag over de Residentie Borneo's Westkust, 1827-1829', 
TvNI, 1871, i, pp. 10-40. 
FORBES, Lieutenant F. E. Five Years in China,' from 1842 ta 1847. 
With an account of the Occupatian of the Islands of Labuan and 
Borneo by Her Majesty's Farces. London, Bentley, 1848. 
FRANCIS,E.A. 'Westkust van Borneo in 1832', TvNI, 1842, ii, pp.I-34. 
GAFFRON, HEINRICH VON. 'Beschrijving van het westelijke gedeelte van 
de Zuid- en Oosterafdeeling van Borneo (de afdeeling Sampit en 
de Zuidkust)', BTLV, 1860, pp. 243-346. 
-- 'Verslag over de goudmijnen in het westelijke gedeelte van Tanah 
Lawut (eiland Borneo)', NTvNI, 1851, pp. 30-40. 
GALLOIS, ]. G. A. 'Korte aantekeningen, gehouden gedurende eene reis 
langs de Oostkust van Borneo, verrigt op last van het Neder-
landsch Indisch Gouvernement', BTLV, 1855, pp. 221-63. 
GRAAF, G. M. VAN DE. 'Verslag eener reis naar Montrado gedaan in het 
jaar 1844', nJNI, 1847, iii, pp. 63-75. 
KEPPEL, Captain the Hon. (later Admiral of the Fleet Sir) HENRY. The 
Expeditian to Borneo of H.M.S. Dido for the Suppression of 
Piracy: with Extracts from the Journalof James Brooke, Esq., 
of Sarawak (now Agent for the British Government in Borneo). 
London, Chapman & Hall, 1846 (2nd. Ed.). 2 vals. 
-- Idem. (A proof copy of the first (ie. suppressed) printing, preser-
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ved in the British Museum; autographed by Henry Wise: "Memo. 
Suppressed IOth Sept. 1845".) 
-- A Sailor's Life under Four Sovereigns. London, Macmillan, 1899. 
3 vols. 
-- A Visit to the Indian Archipelago in H.M. Ship Maeander with 
Portions of the Private Journalof Sir James Brooke, K.C.B. 
London, Bentley, 1853. 2 vols. 
KERVEL, T. A. C. VAN. 'De hervorming van den maatschappelijken 
toestand ter Westkust van Borneo', (Report of August 25th, 
1848), TvNI, 1853, i, pp. 186-98. 
LIJNDEN, D. W. C. baron VAN. 'De verhouding in welke het Gouverne-
ment staat tot de Chinezen en Dajaks op de Westkust van Borneo 
en voornamelijk op Sambas', TvNI, 1853, i, pp. 171--86. 
MUNDY, Captain RODNEY. Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes 
down to the Occupation of Labuan. London, Murray, 1848. 2 vols. 
'Rapport der speciale kommissie benoemd bij koninklijk besluit van 
25 Februarij, no. 26, aan den minister van Koloniën', 24 Julij 
1850, NTvNI, 1851, pp. 80--107. 
ROCHUSSEN, J. J. Toelichting en verdediging van eenige daden van mijn 
bestuur in Indië. " 's-Gravenhage, van Cleef, 1853. 
TOBIAS, J. H. 'Beschrijving van Banjer Massing', De Nederlandsche 
Hermes, IIIe Jaarg., No. 13, pp. 1-38. 
-- 'De Westkust van Borneo', De Nederlandsche Hermes, IIIeJaarg., 
No. 12, pp. 1-99. 
WEDDIK, A. L. 'Beknopt overzigt van het rijk van Koetei op Borneo', 
Indisch Archief, 1849, i, pp. 78-105, 123-70. 
ZWAGER, J. 'Het rijk van Koetei op de Oostkust van Borneo in het 
jaar 1853', TvNI, 1866, ii, pp. 231-66. 
( 4 ) Con tem por a r y P a m p h let s, Art i c les 
and Books 
ADDERLEY, C. B. (Baron NORTON). Review of 'The Colonial Policy of 
Lord J. Russell' s Administration', by Earl Grey, 1853," and of 
Subsequent Colonial History. London, Stanford, 1869. 
American Trading Company of Borneo: Organized under special con-
cession from His Highness the Sultan of Borneo and the general 
laws of the State of New York. Nèw York, Bryant, 1868. 
ANDERSON, JOHN. Acheen and the Ports on the North and East Coasts 
of Sumatra," with I ncidental Notias of the Trade in the Eastern 
Seas, and the Aggressions of the Dutch. London, Allen, 1840. 
Appel de la Hollande à la justice et à la raison de la Grande-Bretagne. 
La Haye, van Hoogstraten, 1836. 
ASSEY, CHARLES. On the Trade to China and the Indian Archipelago: 
with Observations on the Insecurity of the British Interests in 
that Quarter. London, Rodwell & Martin, 1819. 
AUDIGANNE, A. 'Politique coloniale de I' Angleterre: expédition de 
Bornéo', Revue des Deux Mondes, Avril-Juin 1846, pp. 645-70. 
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'Berichten omtrent den zeeroof in den Indischen Archipel', TTLV. 
(Recurrent article.) 
'Bijdrage tot de kennis der binnenlandsche rijken van het westelijke 
gedeelte van Borneo', TvNI, 1849, i, pp. 338-56. 
'Borneo', in Bijdragen tot de kennis der Nederlandsche en vreemde 
koloniën bijzonder betrekkelijk de vrijlating der slaven, 1845. 
Deel ii. Utrecht, van der Post, 1846. 
'Borneo en de heer Rochussen', TvNI, 1854, i, pp. 26-34. 
Borneo Question, The. Compiled from the Singapore Free Press, and 
other sources. Singapore, 1854. 
BRooKE, Captain J. BROOKE. A statement regarding Sarawak. Privately 
printed, 1863. 
CHAMEROVZOW, LOUIS A. Borneo Facts versus Borneo Fallacies. London, 
Gilpin, 1851. 
CRAWFURD, JOHN. 'Memorandum on the proposed British settlement on 
the north-west coast of Borneo', in Keppel, Dido, ii, pp. 212-26. 
DALRYMPLE, ALEXANDER. A Full and Clear Proof that the Spaniards 
can have na Claim to Balambangan. London, printed for the 
author, 1774. 
-- General Collection of Nautical Publications. London, Bigg, 1783. 
-- Oriental Repertory. London, printed for the author, 1793 and 
1808. 2 vols. 
-- A Plan for Extending the Commerce of This Kingdom, and of 
the East India Company. London, printed for the author, 1769. 
DAVIDSON, G. F. Trade and Travel in the Far East. London, Madden 
& Malcolm, 1846. 
DOREN, J. B. J. VAN. Bij wien ligt de schuld van de gruwelijke gebeur-
tenissen te Bandjermasin ... ? Amsterdam, Sybrandi, 1861. 
FOGGO, GEORGE. Adventures of Sir James Brooke, K.C.B., Rajah of 
Sarawak, "Sovereign de facto of Borneo Proper", late Gavernor 
of Labuan. London, Wilson, 1853. 
GLADSTONE, W. E. 'Piracy in Borneo and the operations of July 1849', 
The Contemporary Review, 1877, pp. 181-98. 
GREY, Earl. The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration. 
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